Editing Nikita Khrushchev (section)

==Leader of the Soviet Union (1955–1964)==
=== Domestic policies ===
{{main|Khrushchev Thaw}}

==== Consolidation of power and "Secret Speech" ====
{{main|On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences}}
After the demotion of Malenkov, Khrushchev and Molotov initially worked together well. Molotov even proposed that Khrushchev, not Bulganin, replace Malenkov as premier. However, Khrushchev and Molotov increasingly differed on policy. Molotov opposed the Virgin Lands policy, instead proposing heavy investment to increase yields in developed agricultural areas, which Khrushchev felt was not feasible due to a lack of resources and a lack of a sophisticated farm labor force. The two differed on foreign policy as well; soon after Khrushchev took power, he sought a peace treaty with [[Austria]], which would allow Soviet troops then occupying part of the country to leave. Molotov was resistant, but Khrushchev arranged for an Austrian delegation to come to Moscow and negotiate the treaty.{{sfn|Fursenko|2006|p=27}} Although Khrushchev and other Presidium members attacked Molotov at a Central Committee meeting in mid-1955, accusing him of conducting a foreign policy which turned the world against the USSR, Molotov remained in his position.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=266–269}}

By the end of 1955, thousands of political prisoners had returned home and told their experiences of the [[Gulag]] labor camps.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=275}} Continuing investigation into the abuses brought home the full breadth of Stalin's crimes to his successors. Working together with his close ally Anastas Mikoyan, Khrushchev believed that once the stain of Stalinism was removed, the Party would inspire loyalty among the people.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=276}} Beginning in October 1955, Khrushchev fought to tell the delegates to the upcoming [[20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|20th Party Congress]] about Stalin's crimes. Some of his colleagues, including Molotov and Malenkov, opposed the disclosure and persuaded him to make his remarks in a closed session.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=279–280}}

The 20th Party Congress opened on 14 February 1956. In his opening words in his initial address, Khrushchev denigrated Stalin by asking delegates to rise in honour of the Communist leaders who had died since the last congress, whom he named, equating Stalin with [[Klement Gottwald]] and the little-known [[Kyuichi Tokuda]].{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=153}} In the early morning of 25 February, Khrushchev delivered what became known as the "[[On the Personality Cult and its Consequences|Secret Speech]]" to a closed session of the Congress limited to Soviet delegates. In four hours, he demolished Stalin's reputation. Khrushchev noted in his memoirs that the "congress listened to me in silence. As the saying goes, you could have heard a pin drop. It was all so sudden and unexpected."{{sfn|Khrushchev|2006|p=212}} Khrushchev told the delegates:
{{blockquote|It is here that Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality, and his abuse of power&nbsp;... he often chose the path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the party or the Soviet Government.{{sfn|''The New York Times'', 1956-05-06}}}}

The Secret Speech did not fundamentally change Soviet society but had wide-ranging effects. The speech was a factor in [[Poznań 1956 protests|unrest in Poland]] and [[Hungarian Revolution of 1956|revolution in Hungary]] later in 1956, and Stalin defenders led [[1956 Georgian demonstrations|four days of rioting]] in his native Georgia in June, calling for Khrushchev to resign and Molotov to take over.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=286–291}} In meetings where the Secret Speech was read, communists would make even more severe condemnations of Stalin (and of Khrushchev), and even call for multi-party elections. However, Stalin was not publicly denounced, and his portrait remained widespread through the USSR, from airports to Khrushchev's Kremlin office. [[Mikhail Gorbachev]], then a [[Komsomol]] official, recalled that though young and well-educated Soviets in his district were excited by the speech, many others decried it, either defending Stalin or seeing little point in digging up the past.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=286–291}} Forty years later, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev applauded Khrushchev for his courage in taking a huge political risk and showing himself to be "a moral man after all".{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=282}}

The term "Secret Speech" proved to be an utter misnomer. While the attendees at the Speech were all Soviet, Eastern European delegates were allowed to hear it the following night, read slowly to allow them to take notes. By 5 March, copies were being mailed throughout the Soviet Union, marked "not for the press" rather than "top secret". An official translation appeared within a month in [[Poland]]; the Poles printed 12,000 extra copies, one of which soon reached the West.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=279–280}} Khrushchev's son, [[Sergei Khrushchev|Sergei]], later wrote: <blockquote>clearly, Father tried to ensure it would reach as many ears as possible. It was soon read at Komsomol meetings; that meant another eighteen million listeners. If you include their relatives, friends, and acquaintances, you could say that the entire country became familiar with the speech&nbsp;... Spring had barely begun when the speech began circulating around the world.{{sfn|Khrushchev|2000|p=200}}</blockquote>

The anti-Khrushchev minority in the Presidium was augmented by those opposed to Khrushchev's proposals to decentralize authority over industry, which struck at the heart of Malenkov's power base. During the first half of 1957, Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich worked to quietly build support to dismiss Khrushchev. At an 18 June Presidium meeting at which two Khrushchev supporters were absent, the plotters moved that Bulganin, who had joined the scheme, take the chair, and proposed other moves which would effectively demote Khrushchev and put themselves in control. Khrushchev objected on the grounds that not all Presidium members had been notified, an objection which would have been quickly dismissed had Khrushchev not held firm control over the military, through [[List of Ministers of Defense of the Soviet Union|Minister of Defense]] Marshal Zhukov, and the security departments. Lengthy Presidium meetings took place, continuing over several days. As word leaked of the power struggle, members of the Central Committee, which Khrushchev controlled, streamed to Moscow, many flown there aboard military planes, and demanded to be admitted to the meeting. While they were not admitted, there were soon enough Central Committee members in Moscow to call an emergency Party Congress, which effectively forced the leadership to allow a session of the Central Committee. At that meeting, the three main conspirators were dubbed the [[Anti-Party Group]], and denounced with accusations of factionalism and complicity in Stalin's crimes. The three were expelled from the Central Committee and Presidium, as was former Foreign Minister and Khrushchev client [[Dmitri Shepilov]] who joined them in the plot. Molotov was sent as Ambassador to [[Mongolia]]; the others were sent to head industrial facilities and institutes far from Moscow.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=176–183}}

Marshal Zhukov was rewarded for his support with full membership in the Presidium, but Khrushchev feared his popularity and power. In October 1957, the defense minister was sent on a tour of the Balkans, as Khrushchev arranged a Presidium meeting to dismiss him. Zhukov learned what was happening, and hurried back to Moscow, only to be formally notified of his dismissal. At a Central Committee meeting several weeks later, not a word was said in Zhukov's defense.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=361–364}} Khrushchev completed the consolidation of power in March 1958, arranging for Bulganin's dismissal as premier in favor of himself (Bulganin was appointed to head the ''[[Gosbank]]'') and by establishing a USSR Defense Council, led by himself, effectively making him commander in chief.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=189}} Though Khrushchev was now preeminent, he did not enjoy Stalin's absolute power.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=189}}

====Liberalization and the arts====
After assuming power, Khrushchev allowed a modest amount of freedom in the arts. [[Vladimir Dudintsev]]'s novel ''[[Not by Bread Alone]]'',{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=307}} about an idealistic engineer opposed by rigid bureaucrats, was allowed to be published in 1956, though Khrushchev called the novel "false at its base".{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=308}} In 1958, however, Khrushchev ordered a fierce attack on [[Boris Pasternak]] after his novel ''[[Doctor Zhivago (novel)|Doctor Zhivago]]'' was published abroad (he was denied permission to publish it in the Soviet Union). ''Pravda'' described the novel as "low-grade reactionary hackwork", and the author was expelled from the Writer's Union.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=385}} Pasternak was awarded the [[Nobel Prize for Literature]], but under heavy pressure he declined it. Once he did so, Khrushchev ordered a halt to the attacks on Pasternak. In his memoirs, Khrushchev stated that he agonized over the novel, very nearly allowed it to be published, and later regretted not doing so.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=385}} After his fall from power, Khrushchev read the novel (he had earlier read only excerpts) and stated, "We shouldn't have banned it. I should have read it myself. There's nothing anti-Soviet in it."{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=628}}

Khrushchev believed that the USSR could match the West's living standards,<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6DkdGcjM7tQ Khrushchev speech, Los Angeles, 19 September 1959]. Youtube</ref> and was not afraid to allow Soviet citizens to see Western achievements.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=175}} Stalin had permitted few tourists to the Soviet Union, and had allowed few Soviets to travel. Khrushchev let Soviets travel (over two million Soviet citizens travelled abroad between 1957 and 1961, 700,000 of whom visited the West) and allowed foreigners to visit the Soviet Union, where tourists became subjects of immense curiosity.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=172}} In 1957, Khrushchev authorized the [[6th World Festival of Youth and Students]] to be held in Moscow that summer. He instructed [[Komsomol]] officials to "smother foreign guests in our embrace".{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=174}} The resulting "socialist carnival" involved over three million Moscovites, who joined with 30,000 young foreign visitors in events that ranged from discussion groups throughout the city to events at the Kremlin itself.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|pp=174–175}} According to historian [[Vladislav Zubok]], the festival "shattered propagandist clichés" about Westerners by allowing Moscovites to see them for themselves.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=175}}
[[File:Khrushchev family at the Waldorf-Astoria 1959.jpg|thumb|right|Khrushchev, his wife, his son [[Sergei Khrushchev|Sergei]] (far right) and his daughter [[:ru:Аджубей, Рада Никитична|Rada]] during their trip to the US in 1959]]
In 1962, Khrushchev, impressed by [[Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn]]'s ''[[One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich]]'', persuaded the Presidium to allow publication.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=525–528}} That renewed thaw ended on 1 December 1962, when Khrushchev was taken to the [[Manezh Gallery]] to view an exhibit which included a number of [[avant-garde]] works. On seeing them, Khrushchev exploded with anger, an episode known as the [[Manege Affair]], describing the artwork as "dog shit",{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=257–260}} and proclaiming that "a donkey could smear better art with its tail".{{sfn|Neizvestny|1979}} A week later, ''Pravda'' issued a call for artistic purity. When writers and filmmakers defended the painters, Khrushchev extended his anger to them. However, despite the premier's rage, none of the artists were arrested or exiled. The Manezh Gallery exhibit remained open and experienced a considerable rise in attendance after the article in ''Pravda''.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=257–260}}

==== Political reform ====
Under Khrushchev, the special tribunals operated by security agencies were abolished. These tribunals, known as ''[[NKVD troika|troikas]]'', had often ignored laws and procedures. Under the reforms, no prosecution for a political crime could be brought even in the regular courts unless approved by the local Party committee. This rarely happened; there were no major political trials under Khrushchev, and at most several hundred political prosecutions overall. Instead, other sanctions were imposed on [[Soviet dissidents]], including loss of job or university position, or expulsion from the Party. During Khrushchev's rule, [[Political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union|forced hospitalization]] for the "socially dangerous" was introduced.{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|pp=41–42}} According to author Roy Medvedev, who wrote an early analysis of Khrushchev's years in power, "political terror as an everyday method of government was replaced under Khrushchev by administrative means of repression".{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|pp=41–42}}

In 1958, Khrushchev opened a Central Committee meeting to hundreds of Soviet officials; some were even allowed to address the meeting. For the first time, the proceedings of the committee were made public in book form, a practice which was continued at subsequent meetings. This openness, however, actually allowed Khrushchev greater control over the committee, since dissenters would have to make their case in front of a large, disapproving crowd.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=198–199}}

In 1962, Khrushchev divided ''[[oblast]]'' level Party committees (''[[obkom]]s'') into two parallel structures, one for industry and one for agriculture. This was unpopular among Party ''[[apparatchik]]s'', and led to confusions in the chain of command, as neither committee secretary had precedence over the other. As there were limited numbers of Central Committee seats from each ''oblast'', the division set up the possibility of rivalry for office between factions, and, according to Medvedev, had the potential for beginning a two-party system.{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|pp=154–157}} Khrushchev also ordered that one-third of the membership of each committee, from low-level councils to the Central Committee itself, be replaced at each election. This decree created tension between Khrushchev and the Central Committee,{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|p=153}} and upset the party leaders upon whose support Khrushchev had risen to power.{{sfn|Whitman|1971}}

==== Agricultural policy ====
{{Further|Agriculture in the Soviet Union}}
Khrushchev was an expert on agricultural policies and sensed an urgent need to reform the backward, inefficient system with ideas that worked in the US. He looked especially at collectivism, state farms, liquidation of machine-tractor stations, planning decentralization, economic incentives, increased labor and capital investment, new crops, and new production programs. [[Henry Ford]] had been at the center of American technology transfer to the Soviet Union in the 1930s; he sent over factory designs, engineers, and skilled craftsmen, as well as tens of thousands of Ford tractors. By the 1940s Khrushchev was keenly interested in American agricultural innovations, especially on large-scale family-operated farms in the Midwest. In the 1950s he sent several delegations to visit farms and land grant colleges, looking at successful farms that utilized high-yielding seed varieties, very large and powerful tractors and other machines, all guided by modern management techniques.<ref>Aaron Hale-Dorrell, "The Soviet Union, the United States, and Industrial Agriculture" ''Journal of World History'' (2015) 26#2 pp. 295–324.</ref> Especially after his visit to the US in 1959, he was keenly aware of the need to emulate and even match American superiority and agricultural technology.<ref>Lazar Volin, "Soviet agriculture under Khrushchev." ''American Economic Review'' 49.2 (1959): 15–32 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1816099 online].</ref><ref>Lazar Volin,  ''Khrushchev and the Soviet agricultural scene'' (U of California Press, 2020).</ref>

[[File:25th_anniversary of conquering virgin land. USSR block. 1979.jpg|500px|thumbnail|A postage stamp from 1979 commemorating the 25th anniversary of the [[Virgin Lands campaign]]]]

Khrushchev became a hyper-enthusiastic crusader to grow corn ([[maize]]).<ref>Aaron Hale-Dorrell, ''Corn Crusade: Khrushchev's Farming Revolution in the Post-Stalin Soviet Union'' (2019) [https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/downloads/hd76s0171 PhD dissertation version].</ref> He established a corn institute in Ukraine and ordered thousands of hectares to be planted in the [[Virgin Lands Campaign|Virgin Lands]].{{sfn|Carlson|2009|p=205}} In 1955, Khrushchev advocated an Iowa-style corn belt in the Soviet Union, and a Soviet delegation visited the U.S. state that summer. The delegation chief was approached by farmer and corn seed salesman [[Roswell Garst]], who persuaded him to visit [[Roswell and Elizabeth Garst Farmstead Historic District|Garst's large farm]].<ref>Stephen J. Frese, "Comrade Khrushchev and Farmer Garst: East-West Encounters Foster Agricultural Exchange." ''The History Teacher'' 38#1 (2004), pp. 37–65. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1555626 online].</ref> The Iowan visited the Soviet Union, where he became friends with Khrushchev, and Garst sold the USSR {{convert|5000|ST|MT|disp=flip}} of seed corn.{{sfn|Carlson|2009|pp=205–206}} Garst warned the Soviets to grow the corn in the southern part of the country and to ensure there were sufficient stocks of fertilizer, [[insecticide]]s, and [[herbicide]]s.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=373}} This, however, was not done, as Khrushchev sought to plant corn even in [[Siberia]], and without the necessary chemicals. The corn experiment was not a great success, and he later complained that overenthusiastic officials had overplanted without laying the proper groundwork, and "as a result corn was discredited as a [[silage]] crop—and so was I".{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=373}}

Khrushchev sought to abolish the Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS) which not only owned most large agricultural machines but also provided services such as plowing, and transfer their equipment and functions to the ''kolkhozes'' and ''sovkhozes'' (state farms).{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|p=85}} After a successful test involving MTS which served one large ''kolkhoz'' each, Khrushchev ordered a gradual transition—but then ordered that the change take place with great speed.{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|pp=86–87}} Within three months, over half of the MTS facilities had been closed, and ''kolkhozes'' were being required to buy the equipment, with no discount given for older or dilapidated machines.{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|pp=87–89}} MTS employees, unwilling to bind themselves to ''kolkhozes'' and lose their state employee benefits and the right to change their jobs, fled to the cities, creating a shortage of skilled operators.{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|pp=89–91}} The costs of the machinery, plus the costs of building storage sheds and fuel tanks for the equipment, impoverished many ''kolkhozes''. Inadequate provisions were made for repair stations.{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|pp=92–93}} Without the MTS, the market for Soviet agricultural equipment fell apart, as the ''kolkhozes'' now had neither the money nor skilled buyers to purchase new equipment.{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|pp=91–92}}

In the 1940s Stalin put [[Trofim Lysenko]] in charge of agricultural research, with his ideas that flouted modern genetics science. Lysenko maintained his influence under Khrushchev, and helped block the adoption of American techniques.<ref>[[David Joravsky]], ''The Lysenko Affair'' (1970) pp. 172–80.</ref> In 1959, Khrushchev announced a goal of overtaking the US in the production of milk, meat, and butter. Local officials kept Khrushchev happy with unrealistic pledges of production. These goals were met by farmers who slaughtered their breeding herds and by purchasing meat at state stores, then reselling it back to the government, artificially increasing recorded production.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=214–216}}

In June 1962, food prices were raised, particularly on meat and butter, by 25–30%. This caused public discontent. In the southern Russian city of [[Novocherkassk]], this discontent escalated to a strike and a revolt against the authorities. The revolt was put down by the military, resulting in [[Novocherkassk massacre|a massacre]] that killed 22 people and wounded 87 according to Soviet official accounts. In addition, 116 demonstrators were convicted of involvement and seven were executed. Information about the revolt was completely suppressed in the USSR, but spread through [[Samizdat]] and damaged Khrushchev's reputation in the West.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=519–523}}

Drought struck the Soviet Union in 1963; the harvest of {{cvt|107500000|ST|MT|disp=flip}} of grain was down from a peak of {{cvt|134700000|ST|MT|disp=flip}} in 1958. The shortages resulted in bread lines, a fact at first kept from Khrushchev. Reluctant to purchase food in the West,{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=607}} but faced with the alternative of widespread hunger, Khrushchev exhausted the nation's hard currency reserves and expended part of its gold stockpile in the purchase of grain and other foodstuffs.{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|pp=160–161}}<ref>Il'ia E.  Zelenin, "N. S. Khrushchev's Agrarian Policy and Agriculture in the USSR." ''Russian Studies in History'' 50.3 (2011): 44–70.</ref>

====Education====
[[File:RIAN archive 159271 Nikita Khrushchev, Valentina Tereshkova, Pavel Popovich and Yury Gagarin at Lenin Mausoleum.jpg|thumb|Khrushchev (right) with cosmonauts [[Yuri Gagarin]], [[Pavel Popovich]] and [[Valentina Tereshkova]], 1963]]
While visiting the United States in 1959, Khrushchev was impressed by the agricultural education program at [[Iowa State University]], and sought to imitate it in the Soviet Union. At the time, the main agricultural college in the USSR was in Moscow, and students did not do the manual labor of farming. Khrushchev proposed moving the programs to rural areas. He was unsuccessful, due to resistance from professors and students, who never actually disagreed with the premier, but who did not carry out his proposals.{{sfn|Carlson|2009|p=221}} Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs: <blockquote>It's nice to live in Moscow and work at the [[Russian State Agricultural University|Timiryazev Agricultural Academy]]. It's a venerable old institution, a large economic unit, with skilled instructors, but it's in the city! Its students aren't yearning to work on the collective farms because to do that they'd have to go out in the provinces and live in the sticks.{{sfn|Khrushchev|2007|p=154}}</blockquote>

Khrushchev founded several academic towns, such as [[Akademgorodok]]. The premier believed that Western science flourished because many scientists lived in university towns such as [[Oxford]], isolated from big-city distractions, and had pleasant living conditions and good pay. He sought to duplicate those conditions. Khrushchev's attempt was generally successful, though his new towns and scientific centres tended to attract younger scientists, with older ones unwilling to leave Moscow or Leningrad.{{sfn|Medvedev|Medvedev|1978|p=108}}

Khrushchev also proposed to restructure Soviet high schools. While the high schools provided a college preparatory curriculum, few Soviet youths went on to university. Khrushchev wanted to shift the focus of secondary schools to vocational training.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=192–193}} In practice, schools developed links with nearby enterprises and students went to work for only one or two days a week; the organizations disliked having to teach, while students and their families complained that they had little choice in what trade to learn.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=193}}

While the vocational proposal would not survive Khrushchev's downfall, a longer-lasting change was a related establishment of specialized high schools.{{sfn|Kelly|2007|p=147}} These schools were modeled after the foreign-language schools that had been established in Moscow and Leningrad beginning in 1949.{{sfn|Laurent|2009}} In 1962, a special summer school was established in [[Novosibirsk]] to prepare students for the Siberian math and science Olympiad. The following year, the Novosibirsk Maths and Science Boarding-School became the first permanent residential school specializing in math and science. Other such schools were soon established in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. By the early 1970s, over 100 specialized schools had been established, in mathematics, the sciences, art, music, and sport.{{sfn|Kelly|2007|p=147}} Preschool education was increased as part of Khrushchev's reforms, and by the time he left office, about 22% of Soviet children attended preschool—about half of urban children, but only about 12% of rural children.{{sfn|Perrie|2006|p=488}}

====Anti-religious campaign====
The anti-religious campaign of the Khrushchev era began in 1959, coinciding with the [[21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|21st Party Congress]]. It was carried out by mass closures of churches<ref name="demokratizatsiya1">{{cite journal|doi=10.3200/DEMO.17.1.73-92|author=Daniel, Wallace L. |date=2009|title=Father Aleksandr men and the struggle to recover Russia's heritage|journal= Demokratizatsiya|volume= 17|issue=1|pages=73–92| issn=1074-6846}}</ref><ref name="regels1">Letters from Moscow, Gleb Yakunin and Lev Regelson, {{cite web |author=Yakunin, Gleb |author2=Regelson, Lev |url=http://www.regels.org/humanright.htm |title=Religion and Human Rights in Russia |access-date=18 June 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090816211643/http://www.regels.org/humanright.htm |archive-date=16 August 2009}}</ref> (reducing the number from 22,000 in 1959{{sfn|Pospielovsky|1987|p=83}} to 13,008 in 1960 and to 7,873 by 1965<ref>Chumachenko, Tatiana A. in ''Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev years''. Edward E. Roslof (ed.). (ME Sharpe, 2002) p. 187. {{ISBN|9780765607492}}</ref>), monasteries, convents, and seminaries. The campaign also included a restriction on parental rights to teach religion to their children; a ban on the presence of children at church services; and a ban on the administration of the [[Eucharist]] to children over the age of four. Khrushchev additionally banned all services held outside of churches' walls, renewed enforcement of 1929 legislation banning pilgrimages, and recorded the personal identities of all adults requesting church baptisms, weddings, or funerals.<ref name="autogenerated377">{{cite journal|jstor=3712491|author=Tchepournaya, Olga |title= The hidden sphere of religious searches in the Soviet Union: independent religious communities in Leningrad from the 1960s to the 1970s|journal= Sociology of Religion|volume= 64|issue=3 |pages=377–88 |date=2003|doi=10.2307/3712491}}</ref> He disallowed the ringing of church bells and services in daytime in some rural settings from May to the end of October under the pretext of fieldwork requirements. Non-fulfillment of these regulations by clergy would lead to disallowance of state registration (meaning clergy could no longer do any pastoral or liturgical work without special state permission). According to [[Dimitry Pospielovsky]], the state carried out forced retirement, arrests, and prison sentences for clergymen on "trumped-up charges," but in reality, he writes, said state actions were taken against clergy who resisted the closure of churches; delivered sermons attacking the USSR's [[state atheism]] and anti-religious campaign; conducted Christian charity; or made religion popular by personal example.{{sfn|Pospielovsky|1987|p=84}}

=== Foreign and defense policies ===
{{Multiple image
| direction         = horizontal
| image1            = Nasser and Khrushchev, 1964.jpg
| footer            = Khrushchev and Egyptian President [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] aboard a train returning to Cairo from Alexandria, during a visit by Khrushchev to Egypt, 1964. And Ethiopian Emperor [[Haile Selassie I]] during his state visit to Moscow, 1959
| image2            = Soviet Union Ethiopia.png
| total_width       = 325
}}
From 1950 to 1953 Khrushchev was well-placed to closely observe and evaluate Stalin's foreign policy. Khrushchev considered the entire Cold War to be a serious mistake on Stalin's part. In the long term, it created an unnecessary and expensive militarized struggle with NATO. It diverted attention away from the neutral developing world, where progress could be made, and it weakened Moscow's relationship with its East European satellites. Basically Khrushchev was much more optimistic about the future than Stalin or Molotov, and was more of an internationalist. He believed the working classes and the common peoples of the world would eventually find their way towards socialism and even communism, and that conflicts like the Cold War diverted their attention from this eventual goal. Peaceful coexistence of the sort that [[Vladimir Lenin|Lenin]] himself had practiced at first would allow the Soviet Union and its satellite states to build up their economies and their standard of living. Khrushchev decided that Stalin had made a series of mistakes, such as heavy-handed pressure in [[Turkey]] and [[Iran]] in 1945 and 1946, and especially heavy pressure on Berlin that led to the failed Berlin blockade in 1948. Germany was a major issue for Khrushchev, not because he feared a NATO invasion eastward, but because it weakened the East German regime, which economically paled in comparison to the economic progress of West Germany. Khrushchev blamed Molotov for being unable to resolve the conflict with [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia|Yugoslavia]], and largely ignoring the needs of the East European communist satellites.

Khrushchev chose Austria as a way to quickly come to agreement with NATO. It became a small neutralized nation economically tied to the West but diplomatically neutral and no threat.<ref>Aleksandr Fursenko, and Timothy Naftali, ''Khrushchev's cold war: the inside story of an American adversary'' (2006) pp. 23–28.</ref>

When Khrushchev took control, the outside world still knew little of him, and initially was not impressed by him. Short, heavyset, and wearing ill-fitting suits, he "radiated energy but not intellect", and was dismissed by many as a buffoon who would not last long.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=146}} British Foreign Secretary [[Harold Macmillan]] wondered, "How can this fat, vulgar man with his pig eyes and ceaseless flow of talk be the head—the aspirant Tsar for all those millions of people?"{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=149}}

Khrushchev biographer Tompson stated:
<blockquote>
He could be charming or vulgar, ebullient or sullen, he was given to public displays of rage (often contrived) and to soaring hyperbole in his rhetoric. But whatever he was, however, he came across, he was more human than his predecessor or even than most of his foreign counterparts, and for much of the world that was enough to make the USSR seem less mysterious or menacing.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=150}}
</blockquote>

====United States and NATO====
=====Early relations and U.S. visit (1957–1960)=====
{{Further|Berlin Crisis of 1958–1959}}
[[File:Nixon and khrushchev.jpg|thumb|left|alt=A middle-aged man and an older one confer with each other.|Khrushchev with Vice President [[Richard Nixon]], 1959]]

Khrushchev sought to find a lasting solution to the problem of a divided Germany and of the enclave of [[West Berlin]]. In November 1958, calling West Berlin a "malignant tumor", he gave the United States, United Kingdom and [[France]] six months to conclude a peace treaty with both German states and the Soviet Union. If one was not signed, Khrushchev stated, the Soviet Union would conclude a peace treaty with East Germany. This would leave East Germany, which was not a party to treaties giving the Western Powers access to Berlin, in control of the routes to the city. They proposed making Berlin a free city, which meant no outside military forces would be stationed there. West Germany, United States and France strongly opposed the ultimatum, but Britain wanted to consider it as a starting point for negotiations. No one wanted to risk war over the issue. At Britain's request, Khrushchev extended and ultimately dropped the ultimatum, as the Berlin issue became part of the complex agenda of high-level summit meetings.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=195–196}}

Khrushchev sought to sharply reduce levels of conventional weapons and to defend the Soviet Union with missiles. He believed that without this transition, the huge Soviet military would continue to eat up resources, making Khrushchev's goals of improving Soviet life difficult to achieve.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=187, 217}} He abandoned Stalin's plans for a large navy in 1955, believing that the new ships would be too vulnerable to either a conventional or nuclear attack.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=127}} In January 1960, he took advantage of improved relations with the U.S. to order a reduction of one-third in the size of Soviet armed forces, alleging that advanced weapons would make up for the lost troops.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=216–217}} While conscription of Soviet youth remained in force, exemptions from military service became more and more common, especially for students.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|pp=183–184}}

[[File:Nikita-Khrushchev-TIME-1958.jpg|thumb|upright=0.85|Khrushchev featured as ''Time'' Magazine's [[Time Person of the Year|Man of the Year]] for 1957 after the launch of Sputnik]]
Historians Campbell Craig and [[Sergey Radchenko]] later argued that Khrushchev thought that policies like [[Mutual assured destruction|Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)]] were too dangerous for the Soviet Union. His approach did not greatly change his foreign policy or military doctrine but is apparent in his determination to choose options that minimized the risk of war.<ref>Campbell Craig and [[Sergey Radchenko]], "MAD, not Marx: Khrushchev and the nuclear revolution". ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' (2018) 41#1/2:208–33.</ref> The Soviets had few operable [[ICBM|intercontinental ballistic missiles]] (ICBM), but Khrushchev publicly boasted of the Soviets' missile programs, stating that Soviet weapons were varied and numerous. The First Secretary hoped that public perception that the Soviets were ahead would put psychological pressure on the West resulting in political concessions.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=188}} The Soviet space program, which Khrushchev firmly supported, appeared to confirm his claims when the Soviets launched [[Sputnik 1]] into orbit, a feat that astonished the world. Western governments concluded that the Soviet ICBM program was further along than it actually was.<ref>Walter A. McDougall, "The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite". ''Reviews in American History'' 21.4 (1993): 698–703.</ref> Khrushchev added to this misapprehension by stating in an October 1957 interview that the USSR had all the rockets, of whatever capacity, that it needed.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=187}}
For years, Khrushchev would make a point of preceding a major foreign trip with a rocket launch, to the discomfiture of his hosts.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=187}} In January 1960 Khrushchev told the Presidium that Soviet ICBMs made an agreement with the U.S. possible because "main-street Americans have begun to shake from fear for the first times in their lives".{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=131}} The United States had learned of the underdeveloped state of the Soviet missile program from overflights in the late 1950s, but only high U.S. officials knew of the deception. The perception of a "[[missile gap]]" led to a considerable defense buildup on the part of the United States.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=188}}

During Vice President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union in 1959 he and Khrushchev took part in what later became known as the [[Kitchen Debate]]. Nixon and Khrushchev had an impassioned argument in a model kitchen at the [[American National Exhibition]] in Moscow, with each defending the economic system of his country.{{sfn|Whitman|1971}}{{Sfn|UPI 1959 Year in Review}}
[[File:20111110-OC-AMW-0013 - Flickr - USDAgov.jpg|thumb|left|alt=A group of middle-aged men at a farm. A man in a white suit in the centre is caressing a cow.|Khrushchev with Agriculture Secretary [[Ezra Taft Benson]] (left of Khrushchev) and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations [[Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.|Henry Cabot Lodge]] (far left) during his visit on 16 September 1959 to the [[Agricultural Research Service]] Center]]
Nixon invited Khrushchev to visit the United States, and he agreed. He [[1959 Khrushchev visit to the United States|made his first visit to the United States]], arriving in Washington, on 15 September 1959, spending thirteen days in the country. This first visit by a Soviet premier resulted in an extended media circus.{{sfn|Carlson|2009|p=247}} Khrushchev brought his wife and adult children with him, though it was not usual for Soviet officials to travel with their families.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=421–422}} He visited [[New York City]], [[Los Angeles]], [[San Francisco]] (visiting a supermarket), [[Coon Rapids, Iowa]] (visiting [[Roswell and Elizabeth Garst Farmstead Historic District|Roswell Garst's farm]]), [[Pittsburgh]], and [[Washington, DC|Washington]],{{sfn|Carlson|2009|p=63}} concluding with a meeting with President Eisenhower at [[Camp David]].{{sfn|Carlson|2009|pp=226–227}} During luncheon at the [[Twentieth Century-Fox]] Studio in Los Angeles Khrushchev engaged in an improvised yet jovial debate with his host [[Spyros Skouras]] over the merits of capitalism and communism.<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUQ88MsGVT2GWoHtL3GbYhHnLOe22MPRc Khrushchev speech, 19 September 1959]. Youtube</ref> Khrushchev was also to visit [[Disneyland]], but the visit was canceled for security reasons, much to his disgruntlement.{{sfn|Carlson|2009|pp=155–159}}<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5pRaYsbFpKY Khrushchev speech, Los Angeles, 19 September 1959]. Youtube</ref> He did, however, visit [[Eleanor Roosevelt]] at her home.{{sfn|Carlson|2009|p=133}} While visiting [[IBM]]'s new research campus in [[San Jose, California]], Khrushchev expressed little interest in computer technology, but he greatly admired the self-service cafeteria, and, on his return, introduced self-service in the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Khrushchev|2000|p=334}}

This visit resulted in an informal agreement that there would be no firm deadline over Berlin, but that there would be a four-power summit to try to resolve the issue. The Russian's goal was to present warmth, charm and peacefulness, using candid interviews to convince Americans of his humanity and good will. He performed well and Theodore Windt calls it "the zenith of his career."<ref>Theodore Otto Windt Jr., "The Rhetoric of Peaceful Coexistence: Khrushchev in America, 1959" ''Quarterly Journal of Speech'' (1971) 57#1 pp. 11–22.</ref> The friendly American audiences convinced Khrushchev that he had achieved a strong personal relationship with Eisenhower and that he could achieve [[détente]] with the Americans. Eisenhower was actually unimpressed by the Soviet leader.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=211}} He pushed for an immediate summit but was frustrated by French President [[Charles de Gaulle]], who postponed it until 1960, a year in which Eisenhower was scheduled to pay a return visit to the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=218}}

=====U-2 and Berlin crisis (1960–1961)=====
[[File:Nikita Khrushchev 1960.jpg|thumb|alt=An older man sits among United Nations delegation tables, looking at the camera.|Khrushchev and head of USSR delegation [[:ru:Миронова, Зоя Васильевна|Zoya Mironova]] at the United Nations, September 1960]]

A constant irritant in Soviet–U.S. relations was the overflight of the Soviet Union by American [[Lockheed U-2|U-2 spy aircraft]]. On 9 April 1960, the U.S. resumed such flights after a lengthy break. The Soviets had protested the flights in the past but had been ignored by Washington. Content in what he thought was a strong personal relationship with Eisenhower, Khrushchev was confused and angered by the flights' resumption, and concluded that they had been ordered by [[CIA]] Director [[Allen Dulles]] without Eisenhower's knowledge. Khrushchev planned to visit the U.S. to meet Eisenhower, but the visit was canceled when [[Soviet Air Defence Forces]] brought down the U.S. U-2.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2000/11/10/gem-of-a-jeweler-faces-a-final-cut/d2394c5f-de3a-4db3-8792-3c1ddeba959c/|url-access=limited|title=Gem of a Jeweler Faces a Final Cut|last=Hamilton|first=Martha|date=10 November 2000|newspaper=The Washington Post|access-date=6 April 2019}}</ref> On 1 May, a U-2 [[U-2 crisis of 1960|was shot down]], its pilot, [[Francis Gary Powers]], captured alive.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=219–220}} Believing Powers to have been killed, the U.S. announced that a weather plane had been lost near the Turkish-Soviet border. Khrushchev risked destroying the summit, due to start on 16 May in Paris, if he announced the shootdown, but would look weak in the eyes of his military and security forces if he did nothing.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=219–220}} On 5 May, Khrushchev announced the shootdown and Powers' capture, blaming the overflight on "imperialist circles and militarists, whose stronghold is the Pentagon", and suggesting the plane had been sent without Eisenhower's knowledge.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=223}} Eisenhower could not have it thought that there were rogue elements in the Pentagon operating without his knowledge, and admitted that he had ordered the flights, calling them "a distasteful necessity".{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=224}} The admission stunned Khrushchev and turned the U-2 affair from a possible triumph to a disaster for him, and he even appealed to U.S. Ambassador [[Llewellyn Thompson]] for help.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=225}}

Khrushchev was undecided what to do at the summit even as he boarded his flight. He finally decided, in consultation with his advisers on the plane and Presidium members in Moscow, to demand an apology from Eisenhower and a promise that there would be no further U-2 flights in Soviet airspace.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=225}} Neither Eisenhower nor Khrushchev communicated with the other in the days before the summit, and at the summit, Khrushchev made his demands and stated that there was no purpose in the summit, which should be postponed for six to eight months, until after the [[1960 United States presidential election]]. The U.S. president offered no apology but stated that the flights had been suspended and would not resume and renewed his [[Treaty on Open Skies|Open Skies]] proposal for mutual overflight rights. This was not enough for Khrushchev, who left the summit.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=219–220}} Eisenhower accused Khrushchev "of sabotaging this meeting, on which so much of the hopes of the world have rested".{{sfn|UPI 1960 Year in Review}} Eisenhower's visit to the Soviet Union, for which the premier had even built a golf course so the U.S. president could enjoy his favorite sport,{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=441}} was cancelled by Khrushchev.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=469}}

Khrushchev made his second and final visit to the US in September 1960. He had no invitation but had appointed himself as head of the USSR's UN delegation.{{sfn|Carlson|2009|pp=265–266}} He spent much of his time wooing the new [[Third World]] states which had recently become independent.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=230}} The U.S. restricted him to the island of [[Manhattan]], with visits to an estate owned by the USSR on [[Long Island]]. The notorious [[shoe-banging incident]] occurred during a debate on 12 October over a Soviet resolution decrying colonialism. Khrushchev was infuriated by a statement of the [[Philippines|Filipino]] delegate [[Lorenzo Sumulong]] charging the Soviets with employing a double standard by decrying colonialism while dominating Eastern Europe. Khrushchev demanded the right to reply immediately and accused Sumulong of being "a fawning lackey of the American imperialists". Sumulong accused the Soviets of hypocrisy. Khrushchev yanked off his shoe and began banging it on his desk.{{sfn|Carlson|2009|pp=284–286}} This behavior by Khrushchev scandalized his delegation.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=139}}

[[File:John Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev 1961.jpg|thumb|left|alt=A younger man and an older one confer together.|Khrushchev and [[John F. Kennedy]], Vienna, June 1961]]

Khrushchev considered U.S. Vice President Nixon a hardliner and was delighted by his defeat in the 1960 presidential election. He considered the victor, [[John F. Kennedy]], as a far more likely partner for détente, but was taken aback by the newly inaugurated U.S. President's tough talk and actions in the early days of his administration.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=232}} Khrushchev achieved a propaganda victory in April 1961 with [[Vostok 1|the first human spaceflight]], while Kennedy suffered a defeat with the failure of the [[Bay of Pigs invasion]]. While Khrushchev had threatened to defend Cuba with Soviet missiles, the premier contented himself with after-the-fact aggressive remarks. The failure in Cuba led to Kennedy's determination to make no concessions at the [[Vienna summit]] scheduled for 3 June 1961. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev took a hard line, with Khrushchev demanding a treaty that would recognize the two German states and refusing to yield on the remaining issues obstructing a test-ban treaty. Kennedy, in contrast, had been led to believe that the test-ban treaty could be concluded at the summit, and felt that a deal on Berlin had to await easing of east–west tensions.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=233–235}}

[[File:Soviet empire 1960.png|thumb|The maximum territorial extent of countries in the world under Soviet [[Sphere of influence|influence]], after the [[Cuban Revolution]] of 1959 and before the official [[Sino-Soviet split]] of 1961]]

An indefinite postponement of action over Berlin was unacceptable to Khrushchev if for no other reason than that East Germany was suffering a continuous [[brain drain]] as highly educated East Germans fled west through Berlin. While the [[Inner German Border|boundary between the two German states]] had elsewhere been fortified, Berlin, administered by the four Allied powers, remained open. Emboldened by statements from former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow [[Charles E. Bohlen]] and [[United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]] Chairman [[J. William Fulbright]] that East Germany had every right to close its borders, Khrushchev authorized East German leader [[Walter Ulbricht]] to begin construction of what became known as the [[Berlin Wall]]. Construction preparations were made in great secrecy, and the border was sealed off in the early hours of Sunday, 13 August 1961, when most East German workers who earned hard currency by working in West Berlin would be at their homes. The wall was a propaganda disaster and marked the end of Khrushchev's attempts to conclude a peace treaty among the Four Powers and the two German states.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=235–236}} [[Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany|That treaty]] would not be signed until September 1990, as an immediate prelude to [[German reunification]].

====Cuban Missile Crisis and the test ban treaty (1962–1964)====
Superpower tensions culminated in the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] (in the USSR, the "Caribbean crisis") of October 1962, as the Soviet Union sought to install medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, about {{convert|90|mi}} from the U.S. coast.{{sfn|Whitman|1971}} Cuban Prime Minister [[Fidel Castro]] was reluctant to accept the missiles, and, once he was persuaded, warned Khrushchev against transporting the missiles in secret. Castro stated, thirty years later, "We had a sovereign right to accept the missiles. We were not violating international law. Why do it secretly—as if we had no right to do it? I warned Nikita that secrecy would give the imperialists the advantage."{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=248}}

On 16 October, Kennedy was informed that U-2 flights over Cuba had discovered what were most likely medium-range missile sites, and though he and his advisors considered approaching Khrushchev through diplomatic channels, they could come up with no way of doing this that would not appear weak.{{sfn|Fursenko|2006|pp=465–466}} On 22 October, Kennedy addressed his nation by television, revealing the missiles' presence and announcing a blockade of Cuba. Informed in advance of the speech but not (until one hour before) the content, Khrushchev and his advisors feared an invasion of Cuba. Even before Kennedy's speech, they ordered Soviet commanders in Cuba that they could use all weapons against an attack—except atomic weapons.{{sfn|Fursenko|2006|pp=469–472}}

As the crisis unfolded, tensions were high in the U.S.; less so in the Soviet Union, where Khrushchev made several public appearances and went to the [[Bolshoi Theatre]] to hear American opera singer [[Jerome Hines]].{{sfn|Whitman|1971}}{{sfn|''Life'', 1962-11-09}} By 25 October, with the Soviets unclear about Kennedy's full intentions, Khrushchev decided that the missiles would have to be withdrawn from Cuba.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=145}} Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles in exchange for a U.S. promise not to invade Cuba and a secret promise that the U.S. would withdraw missiles from Turkey.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=575}} As the last term was not publicly announced at the request of the U.S., and was not known until just before Khrushchev's death in 1971,{{sfn|Whitman|1971}} the resolution was seen as a great defeat for the Soviets and contributed to Khrushchev's fall less than two years later.{{sfn|Whitman|1971}} Castro had urged Khrushchev to launch a preemptive nuclear attack on the U.S. in the event of an invasion of Cuba,{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=148}} and was angered by the outcome, referring to Khrushchev in profane terms.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=579}}

After the crisis, superpower relations improved, as Kennedy gave [[American University speech|a conciliatory speech]] on 10 June 1963, recognizing the Soviet people's suffering during World War II, and paying tribute to their achievements.{{sfn|Kennedy|1963}} Khrushchev called the speech the best by a U.S. president since [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], and, in July, negotiated a [[Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty|test ban treaty]] with U.S. negotiator [[Averell Harriman]] and [[Quintin Hogg, Baron Hailsham of St Marylebone|Lord Hailsham]] of the United Kingdom.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=602}} Plans for a second Khrushchev-Kennedy summit were dashed by [[Assassination of John F. Kennedy|Kennedy's assassination]] in November 1963. The new U.S. president, [[Lyndon Johnson]], hoped for continued improved relations but was distracted by other issues and had little opportunity to develop a relationship with Khrushchev before the premier was ousted.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=604–605}}

====Eastern Europe====
[[File:Gheorghiu-Dej & Khrushchev at Bucharest's Baneasa Airport (June 1960).jpg|thumb|left|Khrushchev and [[Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej]] at Bucharest's [[Băneasa Airport]] in June 1960. [[Nicolae Ceaușescu]] can be seen at Gheorghiu-Dej's right-hand side.]]

The Secret Speech, combined with the death of the Polish communist leader [[Bolesław Bierut]], who suffered a heart attack while reading the Speech, sparked considerable liberalization in [[Polish People's Republic|Poland]] and [[Hungarian People's Republic|Hungary]]. In Poland, a worker's strike in [[Poznań]] [[Poznań 1956 protests|developed into disturbances]] that left more than 50 dead in June 1956.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=166–168}} When Moscow blamed the disturbances on Western agitators, Polish leaders ignored the claim and made concessions to the workers. With anti-Soviet displays becoming more common in Poland, and crucial Polish leadership elections upcoming, Khrushchev and other Presidium members flew to Warsaw on 19 October to meet with the Polish Presidium. The Soviets agreed to allow the new Polish leadership to take office, on the assurance there would be no change to the Soviet-Polish relationship.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=166–168}}<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://dziennikpolski24.pl/trzy-dni-pazdziernika/ar/2447598|title=Trzy dni października|date=19 October 2001|website=Dziennik Polski}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://histar.pl/2019/06/07/1956-sowieci-ida-na-warszawe/|title=1956: Sowieci idą na Warszawę!|first=Bartłomiej|last=Michalczyk|date=7 June 2019}}</ref> A period of at least partial liberalization, known as the [[Polish October]], followed.

The Polish settlement emboldened the Hungarians.{{sfn|Fursenko|2006|p=122}} A mass demonstration in Budapest on 23 October turned into [[Hungarian Revolution of 1956|a popular uprising]]. In response, Hungarian Party leaders installed reformist [[Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Hungary|Premier]] [[Imre Nagy]].{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=168–170}} Soviet forces in the city clashed with Hungarians and fired on demonstrators, with hundreds of both Hungarians and Soviets killed. Nagy called for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of Soviet troops, which a Khrushchev-led majority in the Presidium decided to obey, choosing to give the new Hungarian government a chance.{{sfn|Fursenko|2006|pp=123–124}} Khrushchev assumed that if Moscow announced liberalization in how it dealt with its allies, Nagy would adhere to the alliance with the Soviet Union.

On 30 October Nagy announced multiparty elections, and the next morning that Hungary would leave the Warsaw Pact.{{sfn|Fursenko|2006|p=125}} On 3 November, two members of the Nagy government appeared in Ukraine as the self-proclaimed heads of a provisional government and demanded Soviet intervention, which was forthcoming. The next day, Soviet troops crushed the Hungarian uprising, with a death toll of 4,000 Hungarians and several hundred Soviet troops. Nagy was arrested and later executed. Despite the international outrage over the intervention, Khrushchev defended his actions for the rest of his life. Damage to Soviet foreign relations was severe and would have been greater were it not for the timing of the [[Suez crisis]], which distracted world attention.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=168–170}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-B0116-0010-043, Berlin, VI. SED-Parteitag, 2.Tag.jpg|thumb|alt=Two smiling men raise bouquets of flowers over their heads.|Khrushchev (left) and East German leader [[Walter Ulbricht]], 1963]]
In the aftermath of these crises, Khrushchev made the statement for which he became well-remembered, "[[We will bury you]]". While many in the West took this statement as a threat, Khrushchev made the statement in a speech on peaceful coexistence with the West.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=427–428}} When questioned about the statement during his 1959 U.S. visit, Khrushchev stated that he was not referring to a literal burial, but that, through inexorable historical development, communism would replace capitalism.{{sfn|Carlson|2009|p=96}}

Khrushchev greatly improved relations with [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia|Yugoslavia]], which had been entirely sundered in 1948 when Stalin realized he could not control Yugoslav leader [[Josip Tito]]. Khrushchev led a Soviet delegation to Belgrade in 1955. Though a hostile Tito did everything he could to make the Soviets look foolish, Khrushchev was successful in warming relations, ending the [[Informbiro]] period.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=145–147}} During the Hungarian crisis, Tito initially supported Nagy, but Khrushchev persuaded him of the need for intervention.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=169}} Still, the intervention in Hungary damaged Moscow's relationship with Belgrade, which Khrushchev spent several years trying to repair. He was hampered by the fact that China disapproved of Yugoslavia's [[Reformism#Socialism|reformist socialism]] and attempts to conciliate Belgrade resulted in an angry Beijing.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=189}}

====China====
[[File:Mao Tsé-toung, portrait en buste, assis, faisant face à Nikita Khrouchtchev, pendant la visite du chef russe 1958 à Pékin.jpg|thumb|alt=A balding man and a younger Chinese man sit and smile, the balding man holding a fan|Khrushchev with [[Mao Zedong]], 1958]]
After completing his takeover of mainland China in 1949, [[Mao Zedong]] sought material assistance from the USSR, and also called for the return to China of territories taken from it under the Tsars.{{sfn|Whitman|1971}} Khrushchev increased aid to China, even sending a small corps of experts to help develop the new communist country.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=336}} This assistance was described by historian [[William C. Kirby]] as "the greatest transfer of technology in world history".{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=337}} The Soviet Union spent 7% of its national income between 1954 and 1959 on aid to China.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=111}} On his 1954 visit to China, Khrushchev agreed to return [[Lüshunkou District|Port Arthur]] and [[Dalian]] to China, though Khrushchev was annoyed by Mao's insistence that the Soviets leave their artillery.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=336–337}}

Mao bitterly opposed Khrushchev's attempts to reach a ''rapprochement'' with more liberal Eastern European states such as Yugoslavia. Khrushchev's government was reluctant to endorse Mao's desires for an assertive worldwide revolutionary movement, preferring to conquer capitalism through raising the standard of living in communist-bloc countries.{{sfn|Whitman|1971}}

Relations between the two nations began to cool in 1956, with Mao angered both by the Secret Speech and by the fact that the Chinese had not been consulted in advance about it.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=338}} Mao believed that de-Stalinization was a mistake and a possible threat to his own authority.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=136}} When Khrushchev visited Beijing in 1958, Mao refused proposals for military cooperation.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=391}} Hoping to torpedo Khrushchev's efforts at détente with the U.S., Mao soon thereafter provoked the [[Second Taiwan Strait Crisis]], describing the Taiwanese islands as "batons that keep Eisenhower and Khrushchev dancing, scurrying this way and that."{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=392}}

The Soviets had planned to provide China with an atomic bomb and full documentation, but in 1959, amid cooler relations, the Soviets destroyed the device and papers instead.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|p=137}} When Khrushchev visited China in September, shortly after his successful U.S. visit, he met a chilly reception, and left the country on the third day of a planned seven-day visit.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=394}} Relations continued to deteriorate in 1960, as both the USSR and China used a Romanian Communist Party congress as an opportunity to attack the other. Khrushchev responded by pulling Soviet experts out of China.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=470–471}}

====West Africa====
Under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union provided considerable aid to the newly independent [[Ghana]] and [[Guinea]]. These were seen as ideal places to test the "socialist model of development" because of their critical dependence on economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, in contrast to larger Third World nations like Egypt and Indonesia. This project proved to be a resounding failure, although the lessons learned would have an important influence on Soviet foreign policy towards Africa in the following decades. The Soviet Union's display of ineptitude during the [[Congo Crisis]], where it failed to prevent both the newly independent [[Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville)|Republic of the Congo]] from descending into chaos and the substantial military intervention by Western powers, led to a further cooling of relations between the Soviet Union and its Ghanaian and Guinean partners.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Iandolo |first1=Alessandro |date=14 May 2012 |title=The rise and fall of the 'Soviet Model of Development' in West Africa, 1957–64 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14682745.2011.649255 |journal=[[Cold War History (journal)|Cold War History]] |volume=12 |issue=4 |pages=683–704 |doi=10.1080/14682745.2011.649255 |s2cid=154159207 |access-date=19 March 2023}}</ref>