Editing Nguyễn Khánh (section)

===Falling out with the Americans===
The infighting exasperated [[Maxwell Taylor]], the US ambassador to South Vietnam and former Chairman of the [[US Joint Chiefs of Staff]],<ref name=l/> who felt that the disputes between the junta's senior officers were derailing the war effort.<ref name=k399/><ref name=lr/> Only a few days later Westmoreland had invited him and the generals to a dinner and asked for an end to the changes in leadership, which Khánh and his men assured would be the case.<ref name=m344/> Westmoreland warned them that persistent instability would turn American political and public opinion against Saigon, fearing it would be useless to support such a regime.<ref name=k398>Karnow, p. 398.</ref> Initially Taylor issued a thinly disguised threat to cut aid, releasing a public statement saying that Washington might reconsider its military aid if "the fabric of legal government" was not reinstated.<ref name=s295/>

Taylor summoned the generals to his office, and Khánh sent Thi, Kỳ, Thiệu and Vice Admiral [[Chung Tan Cang|Cang]], the commander of the navy.<ref name=versus/> He asked the four to sit down and then asked "Do all of you understand English?".<ref name=k398/> The ambassador then angrily denounced the generals. According to [[Stanley Karnow]], Taylor "launched into a tirade, scolding them as if he were still superintendent of [[West Point]] and they a group of cadets caught cheating".<ref name=k398/> He said "I told you all clearly at General Westmoreland's dinner we Americans were tired of coups. Apparently I wasted my words."<ref name=m344/> He decried the removal of the HNC as "totally illegal" and said that "... you have made a real mess. We cannot carry you forever if you do things like this." Taylor believed that the HNC was an essential part of the governance of the country, because as an American, he believed that civilian legitimacy was necessary.<ref name=m344/> He declared that if the military did not transfer some powers or advisory capacity to the HNC or another civilian institution, then aid would be withheld, and some planned military operations against the [[Ho Chi Minh trail|Hồ Chí Minh trail]] that was being used to infiltrate communists into the south would be suspended.<ref name=versus/>

The four officers were taken aback by Taylor's searing words and felt that they had been humiliated. A decade after the incident, Kỳ wrote that Taylor was "the sort of man who addressed people rather than talked to them", referencing the confrontation.<ref name=k399/> Karnow said that "For the sake of their own pride, they [the officers] resented being treated in ways that reminded them of their almost total dependence on an alien power. How could they preserve a sense of sovereignty when Taylor, striving to push them into 'getting things done', behaved like a viceroy?"<ref name=k399/> Thi was seen by a CIA officer soon after, grinning. When asked why he was happy, Thi said "Because this is one of the happiest days of my life ... Today I told the American ambassador that he could not dictate to us."<ref name=post>{{cite news|title=South Vietnamese Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi|newspaper=[[Washington Post]]|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/26/AR2007062602195.html|author=Sullivan, Patricia|date=26 June 2007|access-date=11 October 2009}}</ref>

Khánh's quartet of delegates responded to Taylor by responding in a circumlocutory way. They remained calm and did not resort to direct confrontation. Kỳ said the change was necessary, as "the political situation is worse than it ever was under Diệm".<ref name=mo770>Moyar (2004), p. 770.</ref> Kỳ explained that the situation mandated the dissolution of the council, saying "We know you want stability, but you cannot have stability until you have unity".<ref name=mo770/> He claimed that some HNC members were disseminating coup rumors and creating doubt among the population and that "both military and civilian leaders regard the presence of these people in the High National Council as divisive of the Armed Forces due to their influence".<ref name=mo770/> Kỳ then promised that he would explain the decision at a media conference and that he and his colleagues would return to their military roles in the near future.<ref name=m345>Moyar (2006), p. 345.</ref> Thiệu said "I do not see how our action has hurt the Hương government ... Hương now has the full support of the Army and has no worries from the High National Council, which we have eliminated". When Taylor said that the moves detracted from Hương and Sửu's powers, the generals disagreed, and said that they supported the pair in full and that Hương had approved of the deposal of the HNC. Taylor was unimpressed by the reassurances, saying at the meeting's end, "I don't know whether we will continue to support you after this ... [Y]ou people have broken a lot of dishes and now we have to see how we can straighten out this mess".<ref name=m345/>

Taylor met Hương and urged the prime minister to reject the dissolution of the HNC. Hương said that he and Suu had not been notified of the moves, but agreed to step in to take over the work of the body. Taylor asked Hương to publicly condemn the deposal of the HNC and to call on the army to release those arrested in the coup.<ref name=m345/> Hương said he would be willing to reorganize his administration to the wishes of the military.<ref name=s295/> Taylor warned that the US did not agree with military rule as a principle, and might reduce aid, but Hương was unmoved and said that the Vietnamese people "take a more sentimental than legalistic approach" and that the existence of civilian procedure and the HNC was much less pressing than the "moral prestige of the leaders".<ref name=m345/> American military advisers and intelligence officers who liaised with senior junta members found out that they were unconcerned with any possible legal ramifications of their actions.<ref name=mo770/>

Later, the quartet called a media conference, where they maintained that the HNC had been dissolved in the nation's interest and vowed to stand firm and not renege on their decision, although they proclaimed their ongoing confidence for Sửu and Hương.<ref name=versus/> Two days later, went public in support of the coup against the HNC, condemning the advisory body and asserting the army's right to step into government matters if "disputes and differences create a situation favorable to the common enemies: Communism and colonialism."<ref name=versus/> They announced that they had formed a new body called the Armed Forces Council.<ref name=s295>Shaplen, p. 295.</ref>

The day after the press conference, Taylor met Khánh in a private meeting at the latter's office. He complained about the dissolution of the HNC and said that it did not accord with the values of the alliance and the loyalty that Washington expected of [[Saigon]]. Khánh replied that Vietnam was not a satellite of Washington and compared the situation to the US support of a coup against Diệm, saying that loyalty was meant to be reciprocated. Taylor then bemoaned Khánh, saying he had lost confidence in him.<ref name=k399/><ref name=lr>Langguth, pp. 322–25.</ref><ref>Moyar (2006), pp. 344–45.</ref> Taylor added that military supplies being shipped to Vietnam would be withheld after arriving at Saigon and that American help in planning and advising military operations would be suspended.<ref name=s297>Shaplen, p. 297.</ref>

Khánh bristled and said that "You should keep to your place as Ambassador ... as Ambassador, it is really not appropriate for you to be dealing in this way with the commander-in-chief of the armed forces on a political matter, nor was it appropriate for you to have summoned some of my generals to the Embassy yesterday."<ref name=m346/> He threatened to expel Taylor, who said that his forced departure would mean the end of US support for South Vietnam.<ref name=k399>Karnow, p. 399.</ref> However, Khánh later said he was open to the possibility of going abroad and asked Taylor if he thought this would be good for the country, to which the ambassador replied in the affirmative.<ref name=m346>Moyar (2006), p. 346.</ref> Khánh ended the meeting, saying that he would think about his future.<ref name=m346/>

Later, Khánh phoned Taylor from his office and expressed his desire to resign and go abroad along with several other generals, asking for the Americans to fund the costs of travel. He then Taylor the list of generals for whom arrangements needed to be made, and then asked the ambassador to repeat the names for confirmation. Taylor did so, unaware that Khánh was taping the dialogue.<ref name=m346/> Afterwards, Khánh played back the tape out of context to his colleagues, giving them the impression that Taylor was calling for them to be expelled.<ref name=m346/> Khánh asked his colleagues to participate in a campaign of fomenting anti-American street protests and to give the impression that the country did not need aid from Washington.<ref name=s296/>

On 22 December, Khánh went back on his promise to leave the country and announced on Radio Vietnam that "We make sacrifices for the country's independence and the Vietnamese people's liberty, but not to carry out the policy of any foreign country".<ref name=lr/><ref name=m346/> He said it was "better to live poor but proud as free citizens of an independent country rather than in ease and shame as slaves of the foreigners and Communists".<ref name=mo771>Moyar (2004), p. 771.</ref> Khánh explicitly denounced Taylor in an interview published in the ''[[New York Herald Tribune]]'' on 23 December<ref name=k399/><ref name=m346/> saying "if Taylor did not act more intelligently, Southeast Asia would be lost", and that the US could not expect to succeed by modelling South Vietnam on American norms.<ref name=mo771/> He added that Taylor's "attitude during the last 48 hours-as far as my small head is concerned—has been beyond imagination".<ref name=versus/> Justifying the removal of the HNC, Khánh said they were "exploited by counter-revolutionary elements who placed partisan considerations above the homeland's sacred interest".<ref name=s296>Shaplen, p. 296.</ref> Taylor responded by stating that generals had participated in "improper interference" into the purview of civilian government, while embassy staff said that their head had done nothing improper, as did the State Department, effectively again threatening to cut aid.<ref name=s296/>

On 24 December, he issued a declaration of independence from "foreign manipulation",<ref name=lr/> and condemned "colonialism".<ref name=k399/> At the time, Khánh was also secretly negotiating with the communists, hoping to put together a peace deal so he could expel the Americans from Vietnam, although this did not lead anywhere in the two months before Khánh was eventually forced from power.<ref>Kahin. pp. 294–99.</ref>

Khánh's defiance of Taylor saw his approval rise among the fellow generals, as the ambassador's actions were seen as being an insult to the nation.<ref name=m346/> On the night of 23 December, Khánh convinced his colleagues to join him in lobbying Hương to declare Taylor ''[[persona non grata]]'' and expel him from South Vietnam. They were confident that Hương could not reject them and side with a foreign power at the expense of the military that installed him, and made preparations to meet him the next day. However, someone in the junta was a CIA informant and reported the incident, allowing representatives of Washington to individually lobby the officers to change their stance.<ref name=m346/> The next day, the generals changed their mind and when they called on Huong at his office, only called on him to formally denounce Taylor's behaviour in his meeting with Khánh and his quartet and to "take appropriate measures to preserve the honor of all the Vietnamese armed forces and to keep national prestige intact".<ref name=m347>Moyar (2006), p. 347.</ref> On the same day, the [[1964 Brinks Hotel bombing|Việt Cộng bombed the Brinks Hotel]], where United States officers were billeted. As a result, there was a suspicion among a minority that Khánh's junta had been behind the attack,<ref name=l/> even though the Viet Cong had claimed responsibility through a radio broadcast. When the Americans started making plans to retaliate against North Vietnam, they did not tell Khánh and his junta.<ref name=m348>Moyar (2006), p. 348.</ref>

As a result of these tensions, a standoff started between the Americans and the Vietnamese generals. The US had hoped the generals would relent because they could not survive without aid from Washington, and that they would not be able to repel the communists or rival officers without bending to receive support. On the other hand, Khánh hoped the Americans would become more worried about the communists first and acquiesce to their ''fait accompli'' against the HNC.<ref name=versus/>

The South Vietnamese eventually had their way. Seeing that the generals and Hương were not willing to reinstate the HNC Taylor sent General [[John L. Throckmorton|John Throckmorton]] to meet the generals to mend fences. Throckmorton told the Vietnamese generals that they had read too much into Taylor's comments and that the US had no intention of pressuring them out of power. Khánh appeared reassured by this and made a public statement on 30 December, saying he was not as hostile to the Americans as reported, and he wanted Thiệu and Cang to meet the Americans to relieve any tension that remained.<ref name=m347/> The generals eventually won out, as the Americans did not move against them in any way for their refusal to reinstate the HNC.<ref name=versus/>

The only concession the AFC made was on 6 January, when they made the ostensible move of officially renouncing all their power to Hương, who was asked to organize elections.<ref name=m350>Moyar (2006), p. 350.</ref> They also agreed that a new appointed civilian body would be created in the meantime and that those arrested in December would be released.<ref name=s297/> This resulted in an official announcement by Hương and Khánh three days later, in which the military again reiterated their commitment to civilian rule through an elected legislature and a new constitution, and that "all genuine patriots" would be "earnestly assembled" to collaborate in making a plan to defeat the communists.<ref name=s297/> The Americans were unimpressed with the statement, which was shown to Taylor before it was made public; the State Department dourly announced that "it appears to represent some improvement to the situation".<ref name=s298>Shaplen, p. 298.</ref>

The South Vietnamese won in large part because the Americans had spent so much on the country, and could not afford to abandon it and lose to the communists over the matter of military rule, as it would be a big public relations coup for the Soviet bloc. According to Karnow, for Khánh and his officers, "their weakness was their strength".<ref name=k399/> An anonymous South Vietnamese government official said "Our big advantage over the Americans is that they want to win the war more than we do."<ref name=k399/>

In late January 1965, Buddhist protests against Prime Minister Hương broke out across South Vietnam, and were at their largest in central Vietnam in I Corps. In Huế, matters degenerated into a riot as 5,000 demonstrators attacked the US Information Service Library and burned 8,000 books. Khánh and Thi turned a blind eye to the rioting and destruction of property. It was believed that they did so to allow the disorder to ruin the Hương government and allow them to inherit power.<ref name="Moyar 2004, pp. 774–775">Moyar (2004), pp. 774–75.</ref>

Khánh decided to have the armed forces take over the government, and remove Hương. On the morning of 27 January, Khánh staged a bloodless putsch with the support of Thi and Kỳ. He promised to leave politics once the situation was stabilized and hand over power to a civilian body. It was believed some of the officers supported Khánh's return to power so that it would give him an opportunity to fail and be removed permanently.<ref name=mo775>Moyar (2004), p. 775.</ref> Khánh persisted with the facade of civilian government by retaining Sửu and replacing Huong with the economist [[Nguyễn Xuân Oanh]].<ref name=k400>Karnow, p. 400.</ref>