Editing Neville Chamberlain (section)

=== Relations with Ireland ===
Relations between the United Kingdom and the [[Irish Free State]] had been strained since the 1932 appointment of [[Éamon de Valera]] as [[President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State|President of the Executive Council]]. The [[Anglo-Irish Trade War]], sparked by the withholding of money that Ireland had agreed to pay the United Kingdom, had caused economic losses on both sides, and the two nations were anxious for a settlement. The de Valera government also sought to sever the remaining ties between Ireland and the UK, such as ending the King's status as Irish Head of State. As chancellor, Chamberlain had taken a hard-line stance against concessions to the Irish, but as premier sought a settlement with Ireland, being persuaded that the strained ties were affecting relations with other Dominions.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=298–99}}

Talks had been suspended under Baldwin in 1936 but resumed in November 1937. De Valera sought not only to alter the constitutional status of Ireland, but to overturn other aspects of the [[Anglo-Irish Treaty]], most notably the issue of [[Partition of Ireland|partition]], as well as obtaining full control of the three [[Treaty Ports (Ireland)|Treaty Ports]] which had remained in British control. Britain, on the other hand, wished to retain the Treaty Ports, at least in time of war, and to obtain the money that Ireland had agreed to pay.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=298–99}}

The Irish proved very tough negotiators, so much so that Chamberlain complained that one of de Valera's offers had "presented United Kingdom ministers with a three-leafed shamrock, none of the leaves of which had any advantages for the UK."{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=298–99}} With the talks facing deadlock, Chamberlain made the Irish a final offer in March 1938 which acceded to many Irish positions, though he was confident that he had "only given up the small things", and the agreements were signed on 25 April 1938.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=298–99}} The issue of partition was not resolved, but the Irish agreed to pay £10&nbsp;million to the British. There was no provision in the treaties for British access to the Treaty Ports in time of war, but Chamberlain accepted de Valera's oral assurance that in the event of war the British would have access.{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=298–99}} Conservative backbencher [[Winston Churchill]] attacked the agreements in Parliament for surrendering the Treaty Ports, which he described as the "sentinel towers of the [[Western Approaches]]".{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=298–99}} When war came, de Valera denied Britain access to the Treaty Ports under [[Irish neutrality]].{{sfn|Self|2006|pp=298–99}} Churchill railed against these treaties in ''[[The Second World War (book series)|The Gathering Storm]]'', stating that he "never saw the House of Commons more completely misled" and that "members were made to feel very differently about it when our existence hung in the balance during the [[Battle of the Atlantic]]."{{sfn|Macklin|2006|p=64}} Chamberlain believed that the Treaty Ports were unusable if Ireland was hostile, and deemed their loss worthwhile to assure friendly relations with Dublin.{{sfn|Taylor|1965|p=406}}