Editing Miranda v. Arizona (section)

===Legal developments===
The federal [[Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968]] purported to overrule ''Miranda'' for federal criminal cases and restore the "totality of the circumstances" test that had prevailed previous to ''Miranda''.<ref name="saras">{{cite news|url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=mDIjAAAAIBAJ&pg=4156%2C4467268|work=Sarasota Journal|title=Cite Miranda And Go Free|date=31 May 1968|page=7}}</ref> The validity of this provision of the law, which is still codified at [https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3501- 18 U.S.C. §&nbsp;3501], was not ruled on for another 30 years because the Justice Department never attempted to rely on it to support the introduction of a confession into evidence at any criminal trial.{{citation needed|date=February 2017}}

''Miranda'' was undermined by several subsequent decisions that seemed to grant exceptions to the Miranda warnings, challenging the ruling's claim to be a necessary corollary of the Fifth Amendment. The exceptions and developments that occurred over the years included:

* The Court held in ''Harris v. New York'', {{ussc|401|222|1971}}, that a confession obtained in violation of the ''Miranda'' standards may nonetheless be used for purposes of impeaching the defendant's testimony; that is, if the defendant takes the stand at trial and the prosecution wishes to introduce the defendant's confession as a prior inconsistent statement to attack the defendant's credibility, the ''Miranda'' holding will not prohibit this.
* The Court held in ''[[Rhode Island v. Innis]]'', {{ussc|446|291|1980}}, that a "spontaneous" statement made by a defendant while in custody, even though the defendant has not been given the Miranda warnings or has invoked the right to counsel and a lawyer is not yet present, is admissible in evidence, as long as the statement was not given in response to police questioning or other conduct by the police likely to produce an incriminating response.
* The Court held in ''[[Berkemer v. McCarty]]'', {{ussc|468|420|1984}}, that a person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit of the procedural safeguards enunciated in ''Miranda'', regardless of the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected or for which he was arrested.
* The Court held in ''[[New York v. Quarles]]'', {{ussc|467|649|1984}}, that there is also a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before questioning; for example, if the defendant is in possession of information regarding the location of an unattended gun or there are other similar exigent circumstances that require protection of the public, the defendant may be questioned without warning and his responses, though incriminating, will be admissible in evidence. In 2009, the [[Supreme Court of California|California Supreme Court]] upheld the conviction of [[Richard Allen Davis]], finding that the public-safety exception applied despite the fact that 64 days had passed from the disappearance of the girl later found to be murdered.<ref>''People vs. Davis'', S056425.</ref>
* The Court held in ''[[Colorado v. Connelly]]'', {{ussc|479|157|1986}}, that the words "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" mean only that suspects reasonably appear to understand what they are doing and are not being coerced into signing the waiver; the Court ruled that it is irrelevant whether the suspect may actually have been cognitively or mentally impaired at the time.

''United States v. Garibay'' (1998) clarified an important matter regarding the scope of ''Miranda''. Defendant Jose Garibay barely spoke English and clearly showed a lack of understanding; indeed, "the agent admitted that he had to rephrase questions when the defendant appeared confused."<ref>{{cite journal |last=Einesman |first=Floralynn |title=Confessions and Culture: The Interaction of ''Miranda'' and Diversity |journal=[[Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology]] |year=1999 |volume=90 |issue=1 |pages=1–48 [p. 41] |jstor=1144162 |id={{NCJ|182327}} |doi=10.2307/1144162 |url=https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol90/iss1/1 }}</ref> Because of the defendant's low [[Intelligence quotient|I.Q.]] and poor English-language skills, the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that it was a "clear error" when the district court found that Garibay had "knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights." The court investigated his waiver and discovered that it was missing all items for which they were looking: he never signed a waiver, he only received his warnings verbally and in English, and no interpreter was provided although they were available. With an opinion that stressed "the requirement that a defendant 'knowingly and intelligently' waive his Miranda rights," the Court reversed Garibay's conviction and [[Remand (court procedure)|remanded]] his case.<ref name=Findlaw>{{citation | url = https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1396556.html | title = UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Rosario GARIBAY, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. No. 96-50606. | author = United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit | date = May 5, 1998 | access-date = February 15, 2017}}</ref>

''Miranda'' survived a strong challenge in ''[[Dickerson v. United States]]'', {{ussc|530|428|2000}}, when the validity of Congress's overruling of ''Miranda'' through §&nbsp;3501 was tested. At issue was whether the Miranda warnings were actually compelled by the Constitution, or were rather merely measures enacted as a matter of judicial policy.{{citation needed|date=June 2014}} In ''Dickerson'', the Court, speaking through [[William H. Rehnquist|Chief Justice Rehnquist]], upheld ''Miranda'' 7–2 and stated that "the warnings have become part of our national culture". In dissent, [[Antonin Scalia|Justice Scalia]] argued that ''Miranda'' warnings were not constitutionally required. He cited several cases demonstrating a majority of the then-current court, counting himself, and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas, as well as Rehnquist (who had just delivered a contrary opinion), "[were] on record as believing that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution."{{citation needed|date=June 2014}}

Over time, interrogators began to devise techniques to honor the "letter" but not the "spirit" of Miranda.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Pearl |first=Tracy Hresko |date=2017–2018 |title=Fifty Years Later: Miranda & the Police |url=https://texastechlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/50-Book-1_Pearl.PUBLISHED.pdf |journal=Texas Tech Law Review |volume=50 |pages=63}}</ref> In the case of ''[[Missouri v. Seibert]]'', {{ussc|542|600|2004}}, the Supreme Court halted one of the more controversial practices. Missouri police had been deliberately withholding Miranda warnings and questioning suspects until they obtained confessions, then providing the warnings, getting waivers, and eliciting confessions again. Justice Souter wrote for the plurality: "Strategists dedicated to draining the substance out of ''Miranda'' cannot accomplish by training instructions what ''Dickerson'' held Congress could not do by statute."<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/supremecourtonline/editedcases/misvsei.html |title=''Missouri v. Seibert'', section VI |access-date=2010-05-07 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090525183921/http://www.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/supremecourtonline/editedcases/misvsei.html |archive-date=May 25, 2009 }} Hosted by [[Duke University School of Law]].</ref>

''[[Berghuis v. Thompkins]]'' (2010) was a ruling in which the Supreme Court held that a suspect's "ambiguous or equivocal" statement, or lack of statements, does not mean that police must end an interrogation.<ref>''[[Berghuis v. Thompkins]]'', {{ussc|560|370|2010}}.</ref> At least one scholar has argued that ''Thompkins'' effectively gutted ''Miranda''. In ''The Right to Remain Silent'', Charles Weisselberg wrote that "the majority in ''Thompkins'' rejected the fundamental underpinnings of ''Miranda v. Arizona'''s prophylactic rule and established a new one that fails to protect the rights of suspects" and that 
{{blockquote|But in ''Thompkins'', neither Michigan nor the Solicitor General were able to cite any decision in which a court found that a suspect had given an implied waiver after lengthy questioning. Thompkins persevered for almost three hours before succumbing to his interrogators. In finding a waiver on these facts, ''Thompkins'' gives us an implied waiver doctrine on steroids.<ref name="Weisselberg">Charles Weisselberg and Stephanos Bibas, ''The Right to Remain Silent'', 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 69 (2010), Available at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=penn_law_review_online (Retrieved 25 June 2022)</ref>}}

In ''[[Vega v. Tekoh]]'' (2022), the Supreme Court ruled 6–3 that police officers could not be sued under a [[42 U.S. Code § 1983|particular statutory cause of action]] for failing to administer the Miranda warning, ruling that not every ''Miranda'' violation is a deprivation of a constitutional right.<ref name="NYTimes2">{{Cite news |last=Liptak |first=Adam |date=2022-06-23 |title=Police Officers Can't Be Sued for Miranda Violations, Supreme Court Rules |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/23/us/politics/supreme-court-miranda-lawsuits.html |access-date=2022-06-25 |issn=0362-4331|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220624034741/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/23/us/politics/supreme-court-miranda-lawsuits.html|archive-date=June 24, 2022}}</ref> In dissent, three justices held that the court had "repeatedly and emphatically" determined that the ''Miranda'' decision established a constitutional right, and would have allowed such lawsuits.<ref name="NYTimes2" /> According to pundits, the ruling ''[[Vega v. Tekoh]]'' "makes it easier for police to obtain coerced confessions – by continuing to ask questions even if someone doesn't want to speak" and "guts a major pathway for incentivizing police to provide a Miranda warning and ensuring their accountability."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Abdollah |first=Tami |title='You have to say the magic words.' What the Supreme Court ruling on Miranda rights means for you |url=https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2022/06/24/supreme-court-ruling-miranda-weakens-civil-rights-activists-say/7716824001/ |access-date=2022-06-25 |website=USA TODAY |language=en-US|archive-url=https://archive.today/20220625212924/https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2022/06/24/supreme-court-ruling-miranda-weakens-civil-rights-activists-say/7716824001/|archive-date=June 25, 2022}}</ref>