Editing Mind (section)

== Non-human ==
=== Animal ===
It is commonly acknowledged today that animals have some form of mind, but it is controversial to which animals this applies and how their mind differs from the human mind.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carruthers|2019|pp=ix, 29–30}} | {{harvnb|Griffin|1998|pp=53–55}} }}</ref> Different conceptions of the mind lead to different responses to this problem. When understood in a very wide sense as the capacity to process information, the mind is present in all forms of life, including insects, plants, and individual cells.<ref>{{harvnb|Spradlin|Porterfield|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aynUBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA17 17–18]}}</ref> On the other side of the spectrum are views that deny the existence of mentality in most or all non-human animals based on the idea that they lack key mental capacities, like abstract [[rationality]] and symbolic language.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carruthers|2019|pp=29–30}} | {{harvnb|Steiner|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=nHBEBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA93 93]}} | {{harvnb|Thomas|2020|pp=999–1000}} }}</ref> The status of [[Animal cognition|animal minds]] is highly relevant to the field of [[ethics]] since it affects the treatment of animals, including the topic of [[animal rights]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Griffin|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K2uXAwAAQBAJ&pg=PR9 ix]}} | {{harvnb|Carruthers|2019|p=ix}} | {{harvnb|Fischer|2021|pp=28–29}} }}</ref>

Discontinuity views state that the minds of non-human animals are fundamentally different from human minds and often point to higher mental faculties, like thinking, reasoning, and deliberate decision-making.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fischer|2021|pp=30–32}} | {{harvnb|Lurz|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Carruthers|2019|pp=ix, 29–30}} | {{harvnb|Penn|Holyoak|Povinelli|2008|pp=109–110}} }}</ref> This outlook is reflected in the traditionally influential position of defining humans as "[[rational animal]]s" as opposed to all other animals.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Melis|Monsó|2023|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Rysiew|2012}} }}</ref> Continuity views, by contrast, emphasize similarities and see cognitive differences in degree rather than kind. Central considerations for this position are the shared evolutionary origin and organic similarities on the level of the brain and nervous system. Observable behavior is another key factor, such as problem-solving skills, [[animal communication]], and reactions to and expressions of pain and pleasure. Of particular importance are the questions of consciousness and [[sentience]], that is, to what extent non-human animals have a subjective experience of the world and are capable of suffering and feeling joy.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fischer|2021|pp=32–35}} | {{harvnb|Lurz|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Griffin|1998|pp=53–55}} | {{harvnb|Carruthers|2019|pp=ix–x}} | {{harvnb|Penn|Holyoak|Povinelli|2008|pp=109–110}} }}</ref>

=== Artificial ===
{{main|Philosophy of artificial intelligence}}

Some of the difficulties of assessing animal minds are also reflected in the topic of artificial minds. It includes the question of whether computer systems implementing [[artificial intelligence]] should be considered a form of mind.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McClelland|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=viQqEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT81 81]}} | {{harvnb|Franklin|1995|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Anderson|Piccinini|2024|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=o68FEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA232 232–233]}} | {{harvnb|Carruthers|2004|pp=267–268}} }}</ref> This idea is consistent with some theories of the nature of mind, such as functionalism and its claim that mental concepts describe functional roles. It asserts that the functions implemented by biological brains could in principle also be implemented by artificial devices.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carruthers|2004|pp=267–268}} | {{harvnb|Levin|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 1. What Is Functionalism?}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|p=62}} | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=136–137}} }}</ref>

[[File:Turing test diagram.png|thumb|alt=Diagram of a person receiving two written pages, one from a computer and one from a human|The [[Turing test]] aims to determine whether a computer can imitate human linguistic behavior to the degree that it is not possible to tell the difference between human and computer.<ref name="auto2">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Biever|2023|pp=686–689}} | {{harvnb|Carruthers|2004|pp=248–249, 269–270}} | {{harvnb|Bansal|2022|loc=§ 6. The Plastic Mind}} | {{harvnb|Hodges|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cgqrCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 3, 6]}} }}</ref>]]

The [[Turing test]], proposed by [[Alan Turing]] (1912–1954), is a traditionally influential procedure to test artificial intelligence: a person exchanges messages with two parties, one of them a human and the other a computer. The computer passes the test if it is not possible to reliably tell which party is the human and which one the computer. While there are computer programs today that may pass the Turing test, this alone is usually not accepted as conclusive proof of mindedness.<ref name="auto2"/> For some aspects of mind, it is controversial whether computers can, in principle, implement them, such as desires, feelings, consciousness, and free will.<ref>{{harvnb|Carruthers|2004|pp=270–273}}</ref>

This problem is often discussed through the contrast between [[Weak artificial intelligence|weak]] and strong artificial intelligence. Weak or narrow artificial intelligence is limited to specific mental capacities or functions. It focuses on a particular task or a narrow set of tasks, like [[Vehicular automation|autonomous driving]], [[speech recognition]], or [[Automated theorem proving|theorem proving]]. The goal of strong AI, also termed ''[[artificial general intelligence]]'', is to create a complete artificial person that has all the mental capacities of humans, including consciousness, emotion, and reason.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chen|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=C8vAEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1141 1141]}} | {{harvnb|Bringsjord|Govindarajulu|2024|loc=§ 8. Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence}} | {{harvnb|Butz|2021|pp=91–92}} }}</ref> It is controversial whether strong AI is possible; influential arguments against it include [[John Searle]]'s [[Chinese Room Argument]] and [[Hubert Dreyfus]]'s critique based on [[Martin Heidegger|Heideggerian]] philosophy.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bringsjord|Govindarajulu|2024|loc=§ 8. Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence}} | {{harvnb|Fjelland|2020|pp=1–2}} }}</ref>