Editing Metaphysics (section)

== Methodology ==
Metaphysicians employ a variety of [[Philosophical methodology|methods]] to develop metaphysical theories and formulate arguments for and against them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=xi, 2}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=2–3}} }}</ref> Traditionally, ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' methods have been the dominant approach. They rely on rational [[intuition]] and abstract reasoning from general principles rather than sensory [[experience]]. ''A posteriori'' approaches, by contrast, ground metaphysical theories in [[empirical observation]]s and scientific theories.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=2–3}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 10. What Is Metaphysics?}} | {{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=151–152}} | {{harvnb|Jaksland|2023|pp=198–199}} }}</ref> Some metaphysicians incorporate perspectives from fields such as [[physics]], [[psychology]], [[linguistics]], and [[history]] into their inquiry.<ref>{{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=2–3}}</ref> The two approaches are not mutually exclusive: it is possible to combine elements from both.<ref>{{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=151–152, 172–173}}</ref> The method a metaphysician chooses often depends on their understanding of the nature of metaphysics, for example, whether they see it as an inquiry into the mind-independent structure of reality, as [[Metaphysical realism|metaphysical realists]] claim, or the principles underlying thought and experience, as some [[Metaphysical anti-realism|metaphysical anti-realists]] contend.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 10. What Is Metaphysics?}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=2–3}} | {{harvnb|Effingham|Beebee|Goff|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=BBKsAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA123 123]}} | {{harvnb|Khlentzos|2021|loc=Lead Section, § 3. The Anti-Realist Challenges to Metaphysical Realism}} }}</ref>

''A priori'' approaches often rely on intuitions{{em dash}}non-inferential impressions about the correctness of specific claims or general principles.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Daly|2015|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137344557_1 11–12]|loc=Introduction and Historical Overview}} | {{harvnb|Duignan|2009}} | {{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=177–180}}}}</ref>{{efn|The term ''intuition'' has a variety of other meanings in philosophy. It can refer to a simple opinion, a disposition to belief, what seems to be the case, or a relation between the mind and abstract objects.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pust|2019|loc=§ 1. The Nature of Intuitions}} | {{harvnb|Lacey|2005|p=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-1255 442]}} }}</ref> The concept plays a central role in the philosophy of [[Immanuel Kant]], who understands intuitions as conscious, objective representations closely associated with the sense of space and time.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Janiak|2022|loc=§ 2.2 Kant's Understanding of Representation}} | {{harvnb|Lacey|2005|p=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-1255 442]}} }}</ref>}} For example, arguments for the [[A-theory of time]], which states that time flows from the past through the present and into the future, often rely on pre-theoretical intuitions associated with the sense of the passage of time.<ref>{{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=188–190}}</ref> Some approaches use intuitions to establish a small set of [[self-evident]] fundamental principles, known as [[axiom]]s, and employ [[deductive reasoning]] to build complex metaphysical systems by drawing conclusions from these axioms.<ref>{{harvnb|Goldenbaum|loc=Lead Section, § 1. The Geometrical Method}}</ref> Intuition-based approaches can be combined with [[thought experiments]], which help evoke and clarify intuitions by linking them to imagined situations. They use [[counterfactual thinking]] to assess the possible consequences of these situations.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=177–178}} | {{harvnb|Brown|Fehige|2019|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Goffi|Roux|2011|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/GOFOTV 165, 168–169]}} | {{harvnb|Eder|Lawler|Van Riel|2020|pp=915–916}} }}</ref> For example, to explore the relation between matter and consciousness, some theorists compare humans to [[philosophical zombies]]{{em dash}}hypothetical creatures identical to humans but without [[Consciousness|conscious experience]].<ref>{{harvnb|Kirk|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 2. Zombies and Physicalism}}</ref> A related method relies on commonly accepted beliefs instead of intuitions to formulate arguments and theories. The [[Common sense|common-sense]] approach is often used to criticize metaphysical theories that deviate significantly from how the average person thinks about an issue. For example, common-sense philosophers have argued that [[mereological nihilism]] is false since it implies that commonly accepted things, like tables, do not exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lawson|2020|pp=185–186}} | {{harvnb|Jaksland|2023|pp=198–199}} }}</ref>

[[Conceptual analysis]], a method particularly prominent in [[analytic philosophy]], aims to decompose metaphysical concepts into component parts to clarify their meaning and identify essential relations.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jackson|1998|pp=28–30}} | {{harvnb|Eder|Lawler|Van Riel|2020|p=915}} | {{harvnb|Shaffer|2015|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/26602327 555–556]}} | {{harvnb|Audi|2006|loc=[https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy/philosophy-terms-and-concepts/philosophy § Philosophical Methods]}} }}</ref> In [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenology]], the method of [[eidetic variation]] is used to investigate essential structures underlying [[Phenomenon|phenomena]]. This method involves imagining an object and varying its features to determine which ones are essential and cannot be changed.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Drummond|2022|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=VQ9hEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 75]}} | {{harvnb|Lohmar|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rsqdCfBCL1MC&pg=PA83 83]}} }}</ref> The [[Transcendental arguments|transcendental]] method is a further approach and examines the metaphysical structure of reality by observing what entities there are and studying the [[Condition of possibility|conditions of possibility]] without which these entities could not exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pihlström|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=srGLpb7pWdkC&pg=PA60 60–61]}} | {{harvnb|Stern|Cheng|2023|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref>

Some approaches give less importance to ''a priori'' reasoning and view metaphysics as a practice continuous with the empirical sciences that generalizes their insights while making their underlying assumptions explicit. This approach is known as ''naturalized metaphysics'' and is closely associated with the work of [[Willard Van Orman Quine]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=30–31}} | {{harvnb|Van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 4. The Methodology of Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Jaksland|2023|pp=198–199}} }}</ref> He relies on the idea that true sentences from the sciences and other fields have [[ontological commitments]], that is, they imply that certain entities exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=37–38, 40}} | {{harvnb|Van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 4. The Methodology of Metaphysics}} }}</ref> For example, if the sentence "some electrons are bonded to protons" is true then it can be used to justify that electrons and protons exist.<ref>{{harvnb|Ney|2014|p=41}}</ref> Quine used this insight to argue that one can learn about metaphysics by closely analyzing{{efn|Quine's method of analysis relies on [[logic translation]] to [[first-order logic]] in order to express claims as precisely as possible while relying [[existential quantifier]]s to identify their ontological commitments.<ref>{{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=40–41}}</ref>}} scientific claims to understand what kind of metaphysical picture of the world they presuppose.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=40–43}} | {{harvnb|Van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 4. The Methodology of Metaphysics}} }}</ref>

In addition to methods of conducting metaphysical inquiry, there are various methodological principles used to decide between competing theories by comparing their theoretical virtues. [[Ockham's Razor]] is a well-known principle that gives preference to simple theories, in particular, those that assume that few entities exist. Other principles consider [[explanatory power]], theoretical usefulness, and proximity to established beliefs.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McDaniel|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3tDaDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA217 217–221]}} | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=48–49}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 10. What Is Metaphysics?}} | {{harvnb|Van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 4. The Methodology of Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=2–3}} }}</ref>