Editing Khmer Rouge (section)

=== Path to power and reign ===
==== KPRP Second Congress ====
After returning to Cambodia in 1953, Pol Pot threw himself into party work. At first, he went to join with forces allied to the Viet Minh operating in the rural areas of [[Kampong Cham Province]]. After the end of the war, he moved to Phnom Penh under Tou Samouth's "urban committee", where he became an important point of contact between above-ground parties of the left and the underground secret communist movement.<ref name="Short">{{cite book|title=Pol Pot: Anatomy of a Nightmare|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XW24koscGMkC&q=pol+pot+viet+minh&pg=PR11|first=Philip|last=Short|publisher=Macmillan|year=2007|chapter=Initiation to the Maquis|page=95|isbn=9781429900935|access-date=18 October 2020|archive-date=13 October 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231013183141/https://books.google.com/books?id=XW24koscGMkC&q=pol+pot+viet+minh&pg=PR11#v=snippet&q=pol%20pot%20viet%20minh&f=false|url-status=live}}</ref>

His comrades Ieng Sary and Hou Yuon became teachers at a new private high school, the Lycée Kambuboth, which Hou Yuon helped to establish. Khieu Samphan returned from Paris in 1959, taught as a member of the law faculty of the University of Phnom Penh, and started a left-wing French-language publication, ''L'Observateur''. The paper soon acquired a reputation in Phnom Penh's small academic circle. The following year, the government closed the paper, and Sihanouk's police publicly humiliated Samphan by beating, undressing and photographing him in public; as Shawcross notes, "not the sort of humiliation that men forgive or forget".<ref name="Shawcross 1979">{{cite book|last=Shawcross|first=William|title=Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and The Destruction of Cambodia|publisher=Cooper Square Press|year=1979|isbn=978-0815412243}}</ref>{{rp|92–100, 106–112}} Yet the experience did not prevent Samphan from advocating cooperation with Sihanouk in order to promote a united front against United States activities in South Vietnam. Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon and Hu Nim were forced to "work through the system" by joining the Sangkum and by accepting posts in the prince's government.<ref name="Tyner" />

In late September 1960, twenty-one leaders of the KPRP held a secret congress in a vacant room of the Phnom Penh railroad station. This pivotal event remains shrouded in mystery because its outcome has become an object of contention and considerable historical rewriting between pro-Vietnamese and anti-Vietnamese Khmer communist factions.<ref name="Tyner" /> The question of cooperation with, or resistance to, Sihanouk was thoroughly discussed. Tou Samouth, who advocated a policy of cooperation, was elected general secretary of the KPRP that was renamed the Workers' Party of Kampuchea (WPK). His ally [[Nuon Chea]], also known as Long Reth, became deputy general secretary, but Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were named to the Political Bureau to occupy the third and the fifth highest positions in the renamed party's hierarchy. The name change is significant. By calling itself a workers' party, the Cambodian movement claimed equal status with the Vietnam Workers' Party. The pro-Vietnamese regime of the People's Republic of Kampuchea implied in the 1980s that the September 1960 meeting was nothing more than the second congress of the KPRP.<ref name="Tyner" />

On 20 July 1962, Tou Samouth was murdered by the Cambodian government. At the WPK's second congress in February 1963, Pol Pot was chosen to succeed Tou Samouth as the party's general secretary. Samouth's allies Nuon Chea and [[Keo Meas]] were removed from the Central Committee and replaced by [[Son Sen]] and [[Vorn Vet]]. From then on, Pol Pot and loyal comrades from his Paris student days controlled the party centre, edging out older veterans whom they considered excessively pro-Vietnamese.<ref name="Kiernan 2004" />{{rp|241}} In July 1963, Pol Pot and most of the central committee left Phnom Penh to establish an insurgent base in [[Ratanakiri Province]] in the northeast. Pol Pot had shortly before been put on a list of 34 leftists who were summoned by Sihanouk to join the government and sign statements saying Sihanouk was the only possible leader for the country. Pol Pot and Chou Chet were the only people on the list who escaped. All the others agreed to cooperate with the government and were afterward under 24-hour watch by the police.<ref name="Frey" />

==== Sihanouk and the GRUNK ====
{{see also|Cambodian Civil War}}
The region where Pol Pot and the others moved to was inhabited by tribal minorities, the [[Khmer Loeu]], whose rough treatment (including resettlement and [[forced assimilation]]) at the hands of the central government made them willing recruits for a guerrilla struggle. In 1965, Pol Pot made a visit of several months to North Vietnam and China.<ref name="Frey" /> From the 1950s on, Pol Pot had made frequent visits to the People's Republic of China, receiving political and military training—especially on the theory of [[dictatorship of the proletariat]]—from the personnel of the CCP.<ref name="Chandler 2018" /><ref name="Wilson Center 2018" /><ref name="ifeng shidian">{{Cite web|url=http://news.ifeng.com/history/2/shidian/200804/0410_2666_485387.shtml|script-title=zh:西哈努克、波尔布特与中国|website=ifeng.com|language=zh|access-date=26 November 2019|archive-date=30 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201030081609/http://news.ifeng.com/history/2/shidian/200804/0410_2666_485387.shtml|url-status=live}}</ref> From November 1965 to February 1966, Pol Pot received training from high-ranking CCP officials such as [[Chen Boda]] and [[Zhang Chunqiao]], on topics such as the [[Chinese Communist Revolution|communist revolution in China]], [[class conflict]]s, and [[Communist International]].<ref name="yhcqw">{{cite web|url=http://www.yhcqw.com/13/2114.html|script-title=zh:波尔布特：并不遥远的教训|publisher=炎黄春秋|language=zh|access-date=23 November 2019|archive-date=27 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200627212910/http://www.yhcqw.com/13/2114.html|url-status=dead}}</ref> Pol Pot was particularly impressed by the lecture on political purge by [[Kang Sheng]].<ref name="Chandler 2018" /><ref name="yhcqw" /> This experience had enhanced his prestige when he returned to the WPK's "liberated areas". Despite friendly relations between Sihanouk and the Chinese, the latter kept Pol Pot's visit a secret from Sihanouk.{{citation needed|date=August 2021}}

In September 1966, the WPK changed its name to the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK).{{citation needed|date=February 2023}} The change in the name of the party was a closely guarded secret. Lower ranking members of the party and even the Vietnamese were not told of it and neither was the membership until many years later. The party leadership endorsed armed struggle against the government, then led by Sihanouk. In 1968, the Khmer Rouge was officially formed, and its forces launched a national insurgency across Cambodia. Though North Vietnam had not been informed of the decision, its forces provided shelter and weapons to the Khmer Rouge after the insurgency started. Vietnamese support for the insurgency made it impossible for the Cambodian military to effectively counter it. For the next two years, the insurgency grew as Sihanouk did very little to stop it. As the insurgency grew stronger, the party finally openly declared itself to be the Communist Party of Kampuchea.<ref name="Frey" />

The political appeal of the Khmer Rouge was increased as a result of the situation created by the [[1970 Cambodian coup d'état|removal of Sihanouk as head of state in 1970]]. Premier Lon Nol deposed Sihanouk with the support of the [[National Assembly of Cambodia|National Assembly]]. Sihanouk, who was in exile in Beijing, made an alliance with the Khmer Rouge on the advice of CCP, and became the nominal head of a Khmer Rouge–dominated government-in-exile (known by its French acronym [[GRUNK]]) backed by China. In 1970 alone, the Chinese reportedly gave 400 tons of military aid to the United Front.<ref name="Xiamen Forum 2013">{{Cite journal|author=宋梁禾|year=2013|others=吴仪君|script-title=zh:中国对柬埔寨的援助：评价及建议|url=https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/41448796.pdf|url-status=live|journal=Xiamen University Forum on International Development|language=zh|issue=6|pages=54–58|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190414161319/https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/41448796.pdf|archive-date=14 April 2019|access-date=25 November 2019}}</ref> Although thoroughly aware of the weakness of Lon Nol's forces and loath to commit American military force to the new conflict in any form other than air power, the [[Presidency of Richard Nixon|Nixon administration]] supported the newly proclaimed Khmer Republic.<ref name="Shawcross 1979" />{{rp|181–2, 194}}<ref>{{cite book|last1=Isaacs|first1=Arnold|last2=Hardy|first2=Gordon|last3=Brown|first3=MacAlister|title=The Vietnam Experience: Pawns of War: Cambodia and Laos|publisher=Boston Publishing Company|year=1987|isbn=978-0-939526246|page=[https://archive.org/details/pawnsofwarcambod00isaa/page/98 98]|url=https://archive.org/details/pawnsofwarcambod00isaa/page/98}}</ref>

On 29 March 1970, the North Vietnamese launched an offensive against the Cambodian army. Documents uncovered from the Soviet Union archives revealed that the invasion was launched at the explicit request of the Khmer Rouge following negotiations with Nuon Chea.<ref name="Mosyakov">Mosyakov, Dmitry. "The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists: A History of Their Relations as Told in the Soviet Archives". In Cook, Susan E., ed. (2004). "Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda". ''Yale Genocide Studies Program Monograph Series''. '''1''': 54. "In April–May 1970, many North Vietnamese forces entered Cambodia in response to the call for help addressed to Vietnam not by Pol Pot, but by his deputy Nuon Chea. Nguyen Co Thach recalls: "Nuon Chea has asked for help and we have "liberated" five provinces of Cambodia in ten days."</ref> A force of North Vietnamese quickly overran large parts of eastern Cambodia reaching to within {{convert|15|mi|km}} of Phnom Penh before being pushed back. By June, three months after the removal of Sihanouk, they had swept government forces from the entire northeastern third of the country. After defeating those forces, the North Vietnamese turned the newly won territories over to the local insurgents. The Khmer Rouge also established "liberated" areas in the south and the southwestern parts of the country, where they operated independently of the North Vietnamese.<ref>Sutsakhan, Lt. Gen. Sak, The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 1987. p. 32.</ref>

After Sihanouk showed his support for the Khmer Rouge by visiting them in the field, their ranks swelled from 6,000 to 50,000 fighters. Many of the new recruits for the Khmer Rouge were apolitical peasants who fought in support of the king, not for communism, of which they had little understanding.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IC15Ae01.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070328161501/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IC15Ae01.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=2007-03-28|title=Dining with the Dear Leader|work=Asia Time}}</ref> Sihanouk's popular support in rural Cambodia allowed the Khmer Rouge to extend its power and influence to the point that by 1973 it exercised ''de facto'' control over the majority of Cambodian territory, although only a minority of its population.{{citation needed|date=August 2021}} By 1975, with the Lon Nol government running out of ammunition, it was clear that it was only a matter of time before the government would collapse. On 17 April 1975, there was the [[Fall of Phnom Penh]], as the Khmer Rouge captured the capital.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2018-08-21 |title=Khmer Rouge |url=https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/the-khmer-rouge |access-date=2023-09-29 |website=HISTORY |language=en |archive-date=17 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221117085947/https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/the-khmer-rouge |url-status=live }}</ref>

During the civil war, unparalleled atrocities were executed on both sides.<ref name="Karllson & Schoenhals 2008" />{{rp|90}} While the civil war was brutal, its estimated death toll has been revised downwards over time.<ref>Heuveline, Patrick (2001). "The Demographic Analysis of Mortality Crises: The Case of Cambodia, 1970–1979". Forced Migration and Mortality. National Academies Press. pp. 103–104. {{ISBN|9780309073349}}.</ref>

==== Foreign involvement ====
===== Before 1975 =====
{{further|Allegations of United States support for the Khmer Rouge|Operation Menu|Operation Freedom Deal}}
[[File:Bomb craters in Cambodia.jpg|thumb|An aerial view of bomb craters in Cambodia]]
The relationship between the massive [[carpet bombing]] of Cambodia by the United States and the growth of the Khmer Rouge, in terms of recruitment and popular support, has been a matter of interest to historians. Some scholars, including [[Michael Ignatieff]], [[Adam Jones (Canadian scholar)|Adam Jones]]<ref>{{cite book|url=https://www.mcvts.net/cms/lib07/NJ01911694/Centricity/Domain/155/Textbook.pdf|title=Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction|last=Jones|first=Adam|publisher=Routledge|year=2006|pages=189–90|access-date=25 January 2019|archive-date=5 August 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190805203324/https://www.mcvts.net/cms/lib07/NJ01911694/Centricity/Domain/155/Textbook.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> and [[Greg Grandin]],<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QGGzBgAAQBAJ&q=%22grandin,%22+khmer+rouge|title=Kissinger's Shadow: The Long Reach of America's Most Controversial Statesman|last=Grandin|first=Greg|date=2015|publisher=Henry Holt and Company|isbn=978-1627794503|pages=179–80}}</ref> have cited the United States intervention and bombing campaign (spanning 1965–1973) as a significant factor which led to increased support for the Khmer Rouge among the Cambodian peasantry.<ref>Kiernan, Ben (Winter 1989). "The American Bombardment of Kampuchea 1969–1973". ''Vietnam Generation''. '''1''' (1): 4–41.</ref>

According to Ben Kiernan, the Khmer Rouge "would not have won power without U.S. economic and military destabilization of Cambodia. ... It used the bombing's devastation and massacre of civilians as recruitment [[propaganda]] and as an excuse for its brutal, radical policies and its purge of moderate communists and Sihanoukists."<ref name="Kiernan 2008" />{{rp|16–19}} Pol Pot biographer David P. Chandler writes that the bombing "had the effect the Americans wanted – it broke the Communist encirclement of Phnom Penh", but it also accelerated the collapse of rural society and increased social polarization.<ref name="Chandler 2018" />{{rp|96–8}}<ref>Chandler, David (2005). ''Cambodia 1884–1975'', in The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia, edited by Norman Owen. University of Hawaii Press, p. 369.</ref> [[Peter Rodman]] and [[Michael Lind]] claim that the United States intervention saved the Lon Nol regime from collapse in 1970 and 1973.<ref>Rodman, Peter (23 August 2007). [http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0823iraq_rodman.aspx "Returning to Cambodia"]. Brookings Institution. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111110165813/http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0823iraq_rodman.aspx|date=10 November 2011}}</ref><ref>Lind, Michael, ''Vietnam: The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict'', Free Press, 1999.</ref> Craig Etcheson acknowledged that U.S. intervention increased recruitment for the Khmer Rouge but disputed that it was a primary cause of the Khmer Rouge victory.<ref>Etcheson, Craig, ''The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea'', Westview Press, 1984, p. 97.</ref> [[William Shawcross]] writes that the United States bombing and ground incursion plunged Cambodia into the chaos that Sihanouk had worked for years to avoid.<ref name="Shawcross 1979" />{{rp|92–100, 106–112}}

By 1973, Vietnamese support of the Khmer Rouge had largely disappeared.<ref name="Cook 2017" /> On the other hand, the CCP largely "armed and trained" the Khmer Rouge, including Pol Pot, both during the Cambodian Civil War and the years afterward.<ref>Bezlova, Antoaneta (21 February 2009). [https://web.archive.org/web/20090223174332/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KB21Ad01.html "China haunted by Khmer Rouge links"]. ''Asia Times''. Retrieved 21 February 2009.</ref> In 1970 alone, the Chinese reportedly gave 400 tons of military aid to the [[National United Front of Kampuchea]] formed by Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge.<ref name="Xiamen Forum 2013" />

===== 1975–1992 =====
In April 1975, the Khmer Rouge seized power in Cambodia, and in January 1976, Democratic Kampuchea was established. During the [[Cambodian genocide]], the CCP was the main international patron of the Khmer Rouge, supplying "more than 15,000 military advisers" and most of its external aid.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Roett|first1=Riordan|last2=Ruz|first2=Guadalupe|title=China's Expansion into the Western Hemisphere: Implications for Latin America and the United States|publisher=Brookings Institution Press|year=2008|isbn=9780815775546|page=193}}</ref> It is estimated that at least 90% of the foreign aid to Khmer Rouge came from China, with 1975 alone seeing [[US$]]1 billion in interest-free economic and military aid and US$20&nbsp;million gift, which was "the biggest aid ever given to any one country by China".<ref name="NYT 2015-03-30" /><ref name="Kiernan 2008" /><ref name="Southgate 2019" /> In June 1975, Pol Pot and other officials of Khmer Rouge met with Mao Zedong in [[Beijing]], receiving Mao's approval and advice; in addition, Mao also taught Pot his "Theory of Continuing Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" ({{lang|zh|无产阶级专政下继续革命理论}}).<ref name="Chandler 2018" /><ref name="RFA 2019-11-26" /><ref name="ifeng shidian" /><ref name="yhcqw" /> High-ranking CCP officials such as Zhang Chunqiao later visited Cambodia to offer help.<ref name="Chandler 2018" /><ref name="Wilson Center 2018" /><ref name="RFA 2019-11-26" /><ref>{{cite web|url=http://ywang.uchicago.edu/history/docs/2016_12_30.pdf|script-title=zh:2016:张春桥幽灵|last=Wang|first=Youqin|publisher=The University of Chicago|language=zh|access-date=27 November 2019|archive-date=25 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200625142035/http://ywang.uchicago.edu/history/docs/2016_12_30.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>

Democratic Kampuchea was overthrown by the [[People's Army of Vietnam|Vietnamese army]] in January 1979, and the Khmer Rouge fled to [[Thailand]]. However, to counter the power of the Soviet Union and Vietnam, a group of countries including China, the United States, Thailand as well as some Western countries supported the Khmer Rouge-dominated [[Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea]] to continue holding Cambodia's seat in the United Nations, which was held until 1993, after the [[Cold War]] had ended.<ref name="Tufts.edu" /> In 2009, China defended its past ties with previous Cambodian governments, including that of Democratic Kampuchea or Khmer Rouge, which at the time had a legal seat at the United Nations and foreign relations with more than 70 countries.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE51G33W20090217|publisher=Reuters|first=Ben|last=Blanchard|title=China defends its Khmer Rouge ties as trial opens|date=17 February 2009|access-date=30 July 2019|archive-date=7 April 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230407222155/https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE51G33W20090217|url-status=live}}</ref>

==== Regime ====
{{main|Democratic Kampuchea}}

===== Leadership =====
The governing structure of Democratic Kampuchea was split between the state presidium headed by Khieu Samphan, the cabinet headed by Pol Pot (who was also Democratic Kampuchea's prime minister) and the party's own Politburo and Central Committee. All were complicated by a number of political factions which existed in 1975. The leadership of the Party Centre, the faction which was headed by Pol Pot, remained largely unchanged from the early 1960s to the mid-1990s. Its leaders were mostly from middle-class families and had been educated at French universities.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/Khmer-Rouge|title=Khmer Rouge — Facts, Leadership, & Death Toll|encyclopedia=Encyclopedia Britannica|access-date=5 November 2017|archive-date=7 November 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171107033002/https://www.britannica.com/topic/Khmer-Rouge|url-status=live}}</ref> The second significant faction was made up of men who had been active in the pre-1960 party and had stronger links to Vietnam as a result; government documents show that there were several major shifts in power between factions during the period in which the regime was in control.{{citation needed|date=August 2021}}

In 1975–1976, there were several powerful regional Khmer Rouge leaders who maintained their own armies and had different party backgrounds than the members of the Pol Pot clique, particularly [[So Phim]] and Nhim Ros, both of whom were vice presidents of the state [[presidium]] and members of the Politburo and Central Committee respectively.<ref name="Vickery 1999" />{{rp|158}} A possible military coup attempt was made in May 1976, and its leader was a senior Eastern Zone cadre named Chan Chakrey, who had been appointed deputy secretary of the army's General Staff.{{citation needed|date=January 2020}} A reorganisation that occurred in September 1976, during which Pol Pot was demoted in the state presidium, was later presented as an attempted pro-Vietnamese coup by the Party Center.<ref name="Vickery 1999" />{{rp|158}} Over the next two years, So Phim, Nhim Ros, Vorn Vet and many other figures who had been associated with the pre-1960 party were arrested and executed.<ref name="Vickery 1999" />{{rp|158}} Phim's execution was followed by that of the majority of the cadres and much of the population of the Eastern Zone that he had controlled.<ref name="Vickery 1999" />{{rp|159}} The Party Centre, lacking much in the way of their own military resources, accomplished their seizure of power by forming an alliance with Southwestern Zone leader Ta Mok and Pok, head of the North Zone's troops. Both men were of a purely peasant background and were therefore natural allies of the strongly peasant ideology of the Pol Pot faction.<ref name="Vickery 1999" />{{rp|159}}

The Standing Committee of the Khmer Rouge's Central Committee during its period of power consisted of the following:
* Pol Pot (Saloth Sar), "Brother number&nbsp;1", General Secretary from 1963 until his death in 1998 and effectively the leader of the movement.
* Nuon Chea (Long Bunruot), "Brother number&nbsp;2", Prime Minister. High status made him Pol Pot's "right hand man".
* Ieng Sary (Pol Pot's brother-in-law), "Brother number 3", Deputy Prime Minister.
* [[Khieu Samphan]], "Brother number&nbsp;4", President of Democratic Kampuchea.
* Ta Mok (Chhit Chhoeun), "Brother number&nbsp;5", Southwest Regional Secretary.
* [[Son Sen]], "Brother number&nbsp;89", Defence Minister, superior of [[Kang Kek Iew]] and executed on Pol Pot's orders for treason.
* [[Yun Yat]], wife of Son Sen, former Information Minister, executed with Son Sen.
* [[Ke Pauk]], "Brother number&nbsp;13", former secretary of the Northern zone.
* [[Ieng Thirith]], sister-in-law of Pol Pot and wife of Ieng Sary, former Social Affairs Minister.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/IHRLC/Leaders_of_the_Khmer_Rouge.pdf|title=Leaders of the Khmer Rouge|access-date=30 July 2019|archive-date=5 August 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190805203332/https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/IHRLC/Leaders_of_the_Khmer_Rouge.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>

==== Life under the Khmer Rouge ====
The Khmer Rouge carried out a radical program that included isolating the country from all foreign influences, closing schools, hospitals and some factories, abolishing banking, finance and currency, and collectivising agriculture. Khmer Rouge theorists, who developed the ideas of Hou Yuon and Khieu Samphan, believed that an initial period of self-imposed economic isolation and national self-sufficiency would stimulate the rebirth of the crafts as well as the rebirth of the country's latent industrial capability.<ref name="Jackson 1992" />{{rp|47}}

==== Evacuation of the cities ====
In Phnom Penh and other cities, the Khmer Rouge told residents that they would be moved only about "two or three kilometers" away from the city and would return in "two or three days". Some witnesses said they were told that the evacuation was because of the "threat of American bombing" and they were also told that they did not have to lock their houses since the Khmer Rouge would "take care of everything" until they returned. If people refused to evacuate, they would immediately be killed and their homes would be burned to the ground. The evacuees were sent on long marches to the countryside, which killed thousands of children, elderly people and sick people.<ref name="Kiernan 2004" />{{rp|251–310}} These were not the first evacuations of civilian populations by the Khmer Rouge; similar evacuations of populations without possessions had been occurring on a smaller scale since the early 1970s.<ref name="Kiernan 2004" />{{rp|251–310}}

On arrival at the villages to which they had been assigned, evacuees were required to write brief autobiographical essays. The essay's content, particularly with regard to the subject's activity during the Khmer Republic regime, was used to determine their fate.<ref name="Bergin p31">Bergin, S. ''The Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian Genocide'', Rosen, p. 31.</ref> Military officers and those occupying elite professional roles were usually sent for reeducation, which in practice meant immediate execution or confinement in a labour camp.<ref name="Bergin p31" /> Those with specialist technical skills often found themselves sent back to cities to restart production in factories which had been interrupted by the takeover.<ref name="Bergin p31" /> The remaining displaced urban population ("[[New People (Cambodia)|new people]]"), as part of the regime's drive to increase food production, were placed into [[agricultural commune]]s alongside the peasant "base people" or "old people". The latter's holdings were collectivised. Cambodians were expected to produce three tons of rice per hectare, whereas before the Khmer Rouge era the average was one ton per hectare.

The lack of agricultural knowledge on the part of the former city dwellers made [[famine]] inevitable. The rural peasantry were often unsympathetic, or they were too frightened to assist them. Such acts as picking wild fruit or berries were seen as "private enterprise" and punished with death. Labourers were forced to work long shifts without adequate rest or food, resulting in many deaths through exhaustion, illness and starvation. Workers were executed for attempting to escape from the communes, for breaching minor rules, or after being denounced by colleagues. If caught, offenders were taken off to a distant forest or field after sunset and killed.<ref>Seng Kok Ung, I survived the killing fields, pp. 22–26</ref> Unwilling to import Western medicines, the regime turned to traditional medicine instead and placed medical care in the hands of cadres who were only given rudimentary training. The famine, forced labour and lack of access to appropriate services led to a high number of deaths.<ref name="Kiernan 2004" />{{rp|251–310}}

===== Economic policies =====
Khmer Rouge economic policies took a similarly extreme course. Officially, trade was restricted to bartering between communes, a policy which the regime developed in order to enforce self-reliance.<ref name="Jackson 1992" />{{rp|62}} Banks were raided, and all currency and records were destroyed by fire, thus eliminating any claim to funds.<ref>Cambodia Tribunal, "Life in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge Regime".</ref> After 1976, the regime reinstated discussion of export in the period after the disastrous effects of its planning began to become apparent.<ref name="Jackson 1992" />{{rp|58}} [[Commercial fishing]] was banned in 1976.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/12/let-fish-dammed/|title=Dam the Fish|last=Tolson|first=Michelle|publisher=Inter Press Service|date=17 December 2013|access-date=30 July 2019|archive-date=1 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190301235803/http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/12/let-fish-dammed/|url-status=live}}</ref>

===== Family relations =====
[[File:Photos of victims in Tuol Sleng prison.JPG|thumb|Rooms of the [[Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum]] contain thousands of photos taken by the Khmer Rouge of their victims.]]
The regulations made by the Angkar (អង្គការ, The Organisation, which was the ruling body) also had effects on the traditional Cambodian family unit. The regime was primarily interested in increasing the young population and one of the strictest regulations prohibited [[Extramarital sex|sex outside marriage]] which was punishable by execution.<ref name="Vickery 1999" />{{rp|186–7}} The Khmer Rouge followed a morality based on an idealised conception of the attitudes of prewar rural Cambodia.<ref name="Vickery 1999" />{{rp|186}} Marriage required permission from the authorities, and the Khmer Rouge were strict, giving permission to marry only to people of the same class and level of education. Such rules were applied even more strictly to party cadres.<ref name="Vickery 1999" />{{rp|186}} While some refugees spoke of families being deliberately broken up, this appears to have referred mainly to the traditional Cambodian extended family unit, which the regime actively sought to destroy in favour of small [[nuclear family|nuclear]] units of parents and children.<ref name="Vickery 1999" />{{rp|188}}

The regime promoted [[Arranged marriage|arranged marriages]], particularly between party cadres. While some academics such as Michael Vickery have noted that arranged marriages were also a feature of rural Cambodia prior to 1975, those conducted by the Khmer Rouge regime often involved people unfamiliar to each other.<ref name="Mam 1998 p18">Mam, K. (1998) ''An Oral History of Family Life Under the Khmer Rouge'', Yale, p. 18.</ref> As well as reflecting the Khmer Rouge obsession with production and reproduction, such marriages were designed to increase people's dependency on the regime by undermining existing family and other loyalties.<ref name="Mam 1998 p18" />

===== Education =====
{{further|Anti-intellectualism#Democratic Kampuchea}}
It is often concluded that the Khmer Rouge regime promoted [[functional illiteracy]]. This statement is not completely incorrect, but it is quite inaccurate. The Khmer Rouge wanted to "eliminate all traces of Cambodia's imperialist past", and its previous culture was one of them. The Khmer Rouge did not want the Cambodian people to be completely ignorant, and [[primary education]] was provided to them. Nevertheless, the Khmer Rouge's policies dramatically reduced the Cambodian population's cultural inflow as well as its knowledge and creativity. The Khmer Rouge's goal was to gain full control of all of the information that the Cambodian people received and spread revolutionary culture among the masses.<ref>[https://gsp.yale.edu/literacy-and-education-under-khmer-rouge "Literacy and Education under the Khmer Rouge"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190217012047/https://gsp.yale.edu/literacy-and-education-under-khmer-rouge |date=17 February 2019 }}.</ref>

Education came to a "virtual standstill" in Democratic Kampuchea.<ref name="Vickery 1999" />{{rp|185}} Irrespective of central policies, most local cadres considered higher education useless and as a result, they were suspicious of those who had received it.<ref name="Vickery 1999" />{{rp|185}} The regime abolished all literary schooling above primary grades, ostensibly focusing on basic literacy instead.<ref name="Vickery 1999" />{{rp|183}} In practice, primary schools were not set up in many areas because of the extreme disruptions which had been caused by the regime's takeover, and most ordinary people, especially "new people", felt that their children were taught nothing worthwhile in those schools which still existed. The exception was the Eastern Zone, which until 1976 was run by cadres who were closely connected with Vietnam rather than the Party Centre, where a more organised system seems to have existed under which children were given extra rations, taught by teachers who were drawn from the "base people" and given a limited number of official textbooks.<ref name="Vickery 1999" />{{rp|184}}

Beyond primary education, technical courses were taught in factories to students who were drawn from the favoured "base people".<ref name="Vickery 1999" />{{rp|184}} There was a general reluctance to increase people's education in Democratic Kampuchea, and in some districts, cadres were known to kill people who boasted about their educational accomplishments, and it was considered bad form for people to allude to any special technical training.<ref name="Vickery 1999" />{{rp|185}} Based on a speech which Pol Pot made in 1978, it appears that he may have ultimately envisaged that illiterate students with approved poor peasant backgrounds could become trained engineers within ten years by doing a lot of targeted studying along with a lot of practical work.<ref name="Vickery 1999" />{{rp|185}}

==== Language reforms ====
The [[Khmer language]] has a complex system of usages to define speakers' rank and social status. During the rule of the Khmer Rouge, these usages were abolished. People were encouraged to call each other "friend" (មិត្ត; ''mitt'') and to avoid traditional signs of deference such as bowing or folding the hands in salutation, known as [[sampeah]]. Language was also transformed in other ways. The Khmer Rouge invented new terms. In keeping with the regime's theories on Khmer identity, the majority of new words were coined with reference to [[Pali]] or [[Sanskrit]] terms,<ref name="smyth">Judith; Smyth David A., ed. (2013). [https://books.google.com/books?id=ZTv_AQAAQBAJ ''Cambodian Linguistics, Literature and History: Collected Articles'']. Routledge. p. 164.</ref> while Chinese and Vietnamese-language borrowings were discouraged. People were told to "forge" (លត់ដំ; ''lot dam'') a new revolutionary character, that they were the "instruments" (ឧបករណ៍; ''opokar'') of the ruling body known as Angkar (អង្គការ, The Organisation) and that nostalgia for pre-revolutionary times (ឈឺសតិអារម្មណ៍; ''chheu satek arom'', or "memory sickness") could result in execution.{{citation needed|date=August 2021}}

==== Crimes against humanity ====
[[File:Choeungek2.JPG|thumb|Skulls of Khmer Rouge victims]]
[[File:Khmer Rouge Victims.JPG|thumb|Remains of victims of the Khmer Rouge in the Kampong Trach Cave, Kiry Seila Hills, Rung Tik (Water Cave), or Rung Khmao (Dead Cave)]]
Acting through the [[Santebal]], the Khmer Rouge arrested, tortured and eventually executed anyone who was suspected of belonging to several categories of supposed enemies:<ref name="Frey" />
* People with connections to former Cambodian governments, either those of the [[Khmer Republic]] or the [[Sangkum]], to the Khmer Republic military, or to foreign governments.
* Professionals and intellectuals, including almost everyone with an education and people who understood a foreign language. Many artists, including musicians, writers, and filmmakers were executed including [[Ros Serey Sothea]], [[Pen Ran|Pan Ron]] and [[Sinn Sisamouth]].
* [[Vietnamese people|Ethnic Vietnamese]], ethnic Chinese, ethnic Thai and other minorities in the Eastern Highlands, Cambodian Christians (most of whom were Catholic), [[Chams|Muslims]] and senior Buddhist monks. The Roman Catholic [[Roman Catholic Cathedral of Phnom Penh|cathedral of Phnom Penh]] was razed. The Khmer Rouge forced Muslims to eat pork, which they regard as forbidden ([[ḥarām]]). Many of those who refused were killed. Christian clergy and Muslim imams were executed.
* "Economic saboteurs" as many former urban dwellers were deemed guilty of sabotage because of their lack of agricultural ability.
* Party cadres who had fallen under political suspicion: the regime tortured and executed thousands of party members during its purges.<ref name="Jackson 1992" />{{rp|3}}

The Santebal established over 150 prisons for political opponents; [[Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum|Tuol Sleng]] is a former high school that was turned into the Santebal headquarters and interrogation center for the highest value [[political prisoner]]s. Tuol Sleng was operated by the Santebal commander [[Kang Kek Iew|Khang Khek Ieu]], more commonly known as Comrade Duch, together with his subordinates [[Mam Nai]] and Tang Sin Hean.<ref name="Jackson 1992" />{{rp|3}}<ref>{{cite journal|last=Locard|first=Henri|url=http://www.paulbogdanor.com/left/cambodia/locard.pdf|title=State Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979) and Retribution (1979–2004)|journal=European Review of History|volume=12|issue=1|date=March 2005|doi=10.1080/13507480500047811|page=134|s2cid=144712717|access-date=30 January 2013|archive-date=30 October 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131030013853/http://www.paulbogdanor.com/left/cambodia/locard.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> According to Ben Kiernan, "all but seven of the twenty thousand Tuol Sleng prisoners" were executed.<ref name="Kiernan 2008" />{{rp|464}} The buildings of Tuol Sleng have been preserved as they were left when the Khmer Rouge were driven out in 1979. Several of the rooms are now lined with thousands of black-and-white photographs of prisoners that were taken by the Khmer Rouge.<ref name="DDCam History">{{cite book|title=A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979)|year=2007|publisher=Documentation Center of Cambodia|isbn=978-99950-60-04-6}}</ref>{{rp|74}}

On 7 August 2014, when sentencing two former Khmer Rouge leaders to life imprisonment, Cambodian judge Nil Nonn said there was evidence of "a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population of Cambodia". He said the leaders, Nuon Chea, the regime's chief ideologue and former deputy to late leader Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan, the former head of state, together in a "[[joint criminal enterprise]]" were involved in murder, extermination, political persecution and other inhumane acts related to the mass eviction of city-dwellers, and executions of enemy soldiers.<ref name="CheaAppeal">{{cite news|title=Cambodian court sentences two former Khmer Rouge leaders to life term|url=http://www.thecambodianews.net/index.php/sid/224538879|access-date=8 August 2014|publisher=The Cambodia News|archive-date=22 August 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160822164336/http://www.thecambodianews.net/index.php/sid/224538879|url-status=live}}</ref> In November 2018, the trial convicted Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan of crimes against humanity and genocide against the Vietnamese, while Nuon Chea was also found guilty of genocide relating to the Chams.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/1298|title=Case 002/02 &#124; Drupal|publisher=Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia|accessdate=29 August 2021|archive-date=15 September 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210915141035/https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/1298|url-status=live}}</ref>

===== Number of deaths =====
According to a 2001 academic source, the most widely accepted estimates of excess deaths under the Khmer Rouge range from 1.5&nbsp;million to 2&nbsp;million, although figures as low as 1&nbsp;million and as high as 3&nbsp;million have been cited; conventionally accepted estimates of executions range from 500,000 to 1&nbsp;million, "a third to one half of excess mortality during the period".<ref name="Heuveline 2001">{{cite book|last=Heuveline|first=Patrick|title=Forced Migration and Mortality|chapter=The Demographic Analysis of Mortality Crises: The Case of Cambodia, 1970–1979|publisher=[[National Academies Press]]|year=2001|isbn=9780309073349}}</ref>{{rp|105}} A 2013 academic source (citing research from 2009) indicates that execution may have accounted for as much as 60% of the total, with 23,745 mass graves containing approximately 1.3&nbsp;million suspected victims of execution.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Seybolt|first1=Taylor B.|last2=Aronson|first2=Jay D.|last3=Fischoff|first3=Baruch|title=Counting Civilian Casualties: An Introduction to Recording and Estimating Nonmilitary Deaths in Conflict|publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]|year=2013|isbn=9780199977314|page=238}}</ref>

Historian Ben Kiernan estimates that 1.671&nbsp;million to 1.871&nbsp;million Cambodians died as a result of Khmer Rouge policy, or between 21% and 24% of Cambodia's 1975 population.<ref>{{cite journal|author-link=Ben Kiernan|last=Kiernan|first=Ben|s2cid=143971159|title=The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The Death Tolls in Cambodia, 1975–79, and East Timor, 1975–80|journal=Critical Asian Studies|volume=35|issue=4|pages=585–597|year=2003|doi=10.1080/1467271032000147041}}</ref> A study by Polish demographer Marek Sliwinski calculated nearly 2&nbsp;million unnatural deaths under the Khmer Rouge out of a 1975 Cambodian population of 7.8&nbsp;million; 33.5% of Cambodian men died under the Khmer Rouge compared to 15.7% of Cambodian women.<ref name="Locard">{{cite journal|last=Locard|first=Henri|title=State Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979) and Retribution (1979–2004)|journal=[[European Review of History]]|volume=12|issue=1|pages=121–143|date=March 2005|doi=10.1080/13507480500047811|s2cid=144712717}}</ref> Researcher Craig Etcheson of the [[Documentation Center of Cambodia]] (DC-Cam) suggests that the death toll was between 2&nbsp;million and 2.5&nbsp;million, with a "most likely" figure of 2.2&nbsp;million. After five years of researching mass grave sites, he estimated that they contained 1.38&nbsp;million suspected victims of execution.<ref name="Mekong.net_deaths">{{cite web|last=Sharp|first=Bruce|title=Counting Hell: The Death Toll of the Khmer Rouge Regime in Cambodia|url=http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/deaths.htm|access-date=7 August 2019|archive-date=15 November 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131115041409/http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/deaths.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> Although considerably higher than earlier and more widely accepted estimates of Khmer Rouge executions, Etcheson argues that these numbers are plausible, given the nature of the mass grave and DC-Cam's methods, which are more likely to produce an under-count of bodies rather than an over-estimate.<ref name="Tufts.edu" /> Demographer Patrick Heuveline estimated that between 1.17&nbsp;million and 3.42&nbsp;million Cambodians died unnatural deaths between 1970 and 1979, with between 150,000 and 300,000 of those deaths occurring during the civil war. Heuveline's central estimate is 2.52&nbsp;million excess deaths, of which 1.4&nbsp;million were the direct result of violence.<ref name="Tufts.edu">{{cite web|url=https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/cambodia-u-s-bombing-civil-war-khmer-rouge/|title=Cambodia: U.S. bombing, civil war, & Khmer Rouge|publisher=[[World Peace Foundation]]|date=7 August 2015|access-date=5 August 2019|quote=Demographer Patrick Heuveline has produced evidence suggesting a range of 150,000 to 300,000 violent deaths from 1970 to 1975.&nbsp;... One of the more thorough demographic studies, conducted by Patrick Heuveline, also attempts to separate out violent civilian deaths from a general increase in mortality caused by famine, disease, working conditions, or other indirect causes. He does so by grouping deaths within different age and sex brackets and analyzing treatment of these age and sex groups by the Khmer Rouge and violent regimes in general. His conclusion is that an average of 2.52 million people (range of 1.17–3.42 million) died as a result of regime actions between 1970 and 1979, with an average estimate of 1.4 million (range of 1.09–2.16 million) directly violent deaths.|archive-date=14 July 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190714181839/https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/cambodia-u-s-bombing-civil-war-khmer-rouge/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Heuveline 2001" />{{rp|102–4}}

Despite being based on a house-to-house survey of Cambodians, the estimate of 3.3&nbsp;million deaths promulgated by the Khmer Rouge's successor regime, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), is generally considered to be an exaggeration; among other methodological errors, the PRK authorities added the estimated number of victims that had been found in the partially-exhumed mass graves to the raw survey results, meaning that some victims would have been double-counted.<ref name="Tufts.edu" /> An additional 300,000 Cambodians starved to death between 1979 and 1980, largely as a result of the after-effects of Khmer Rouge policy.<ref name="Heuveline 2001" />{{rp|124}}

===== Genocide =====
While the period from 1975 to 1979 is commonly associated with the phrase "the Cambodian genocide", scholars debate whether the legal definition of the crime can be applied generally.<ref name="Chandler 2007" />{{rp|260}} While two former leaders were convicted of genocide, this was for treatment of ethnic and religious minorities, the Vietnamese and Cham. The death toll of these two groups, approximately 100,000 people, is roughly 5% of the generally accepted total of two million. The treatment of these groups can be seen to fall under the legal definition of genocide, as they were targeted on the basis of their religion or ethnicity. The vast majority of deaths were of the Khmer ethnic group, which was not a target of the Khmer Rouge. The deaths occurring as a result of targeting these Khmer, whether it was the "new people" or enemies of the regime, was based on political distinctions rather than ethnic or religious. In an interview conducted in 2018, historian David P. Chandler states that crimes against humanity was the term that best fit the atrocities of the regime and that some attempts to characterise the majority of the killings as genocide was flawed and at times politicised.<ref>In the Shadows of Utopia Podcast, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xCNbBIiPTc4 "A History of Democratic Kampuchea with Historian David Chandler"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200304135820/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xCNbBIiPTc4&gl=US&hl=en |date=4 March 2020 }}.</ref>