Editing Hirohito (section)

==== Preparations ====
In July 1939, Hirohito quarrelled with his brother, [[Yasuhito, Prince Chichibu|Prince Chichibu]], over whether to support the [[Anti-Comintern Pact]], and reprimanded the army minister, [[Seishirō Itagaki]].{{sfnm|Hidenari|1991|1pp=106–108|Wetzler|1998|2pp=25, 231}} But after the success of the [[Wehrmacht]] in Europe, Hirohito consented to the alliance. On 27 September 1940, ostensibly under Hirohito's leadership, Japan became a contracting partner of the [[Tripartite Pact]] with [[Nazi Germany|Germany]] and [[Kingdom of Italy|Italy]] forming the [[Axis powers]].

The objectives to be obtained were clearly defined: a free hand to continue with the conquest of China and Southeast Asia, no increase in U.S. or British military forces in the region, and cooperation by the West "in the acquisition of goods needed by our Empire."<ref>{{Cite book |title=Japan's decision for war : records of the 1941 policy conferences |year=1967 |publisher=Stanford University Press |others=Nobutaka Ike |isbn=0-8047-0305-1}}</ref>

On 5 September, Prime Minister Konoe informally submitted a draft of the decision to Hirohito, just one day in advance of the Imperial Conference at which it would be formally implemented. On this evening, Hirohito had a meeting with the chief of staff of the army, Sugiyama, chief of staff of the navy, [[Osami Nagano]], and Prime Minister Konoe. Hirohito questioned Sugiyama about the chances of success of an open war with [[Western world|the Occident]]. As Sugiyama answered positively, Hirohito scolded him:

{{blockquote
|—At the time of the [[Second Sino-Japanese War|China Incident]], the army told me that we could achieve peace immediately after dealing them one blow with three divisions ... but you can't still beat Chiang Kai-shek even today! Sugiyama, you were army minister at that time.<br />—China is a vast area with many ways in and ways out, and we met unexpectedly big difficulties ...<br />—You say the interior of China is huge; isn't the Pacific Ocean even bigger than China? ... Didn't I caution you each time about those matters? Sugiyama, are you lying to me?{{sfn|Bix|2001|pp=411, 745}}}}

Chief of Naval General Staff Admiral Nagano, a former Navy Minister and vastly experienced, later told a trusted colleague, "I have never seen the Emperor reprimand us in such a manner, his face turning red and raising his voice."<ref>Prange, G. W., Dillon, K. V., Goldstein, D. M. (1991). At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor; Revised Edition. United Kingdom: Penguin Publishing Group.</ref><ref>Pike, F. (2016). Hirohito's War: The Pacific War, 1941–1945. United Kingdom: Bloomsbury Publishing.</ref>

[[File:Emperor Shōwa Army 1938-1-8.jpg|thumb|Emperor Hirohito riding Shirayuki during an Army inspection on 8 January 1938]]

Nevertheless, all speakers at the Imperial Conference were united in favor of war rather than diplomacy.<ref>{{cite web |title=Chapter III: Politico-Military Evolution Toward War |url=https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V2%20P1/ch3.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071226081745/http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V2%20P1/ch3.htm |url-status=dead |archive-date=26 December 2007 |access-date=25 November 2022 |website=history.army.mil}}</ref> Baron [[Yoshimichi Hara]], President of the Imperial Council and Hirohito's representative, then questioned them closely, producing replies to the effect that war would be considered only as a last resort from some, and silence from others.

On 8 October, Sugiyama signed a 47-page report to the Emperor (sōjōan) outlining in minute detail plans for the advance into Southeast Asia. During the third week of October, Sugiyama gave Hirohito a 51-page document, "Materials in Reply to the Throne," about the operational outlook for the war.{{sfn|Wetzler|1998|pp=52–54}}

As war preparations continued, Prime Minister [[Fumimaro Konoe]] found himself increasingly isolated, and he resigned on 16 October. He justified himself to his chief cabinet secretary, Kenji Tomita, by stating:

{{blockquote|Of course His Majesty is a pacifist, and there is no doubt he wished to avoid war. When I told him that to initiate war was a mistake, he agreed. But the next day, he would tell me: "You were worried about it yesterday, but you do not have to worry so much." Thus, gradually, he began to lean toward war. And the next time I met him, he leaned even more toward. In short, I felt the Emperor was telling me: my prime minister does not understand military matters, I know much more. In short, the Emperor had absorbed the view of the army and navy high commands.<ref>Fujiwara, ''Shōwa tennō no jūgo-nen sensō'', 1991, p. 126, citing Kenji Tomita's diary.</ref>}}

The army and the navy recommended the appointment of [[Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni]], one of Hirohito's uncles, as prime minister. According to the Shōwa "Monologue", written after the war, Hirohito then said that if the war were to begin while a member of the imperial house was prime minister, the imperial house would have to carry the responsibility and he was opposed to this.{{sfn|Hidenari|1991|p=118}} Instead, Hirohito chose the hard-line General [[Hideki Tojo|Hideki Tōjō]], who was known for his devotion to the imperial institution, and asked him to make a policy review of what had been sanctioned by the Imperial Conferences.

[[File:Imperial general headquaters meeting.jpg|thumb|The Emperor as head of the [[Imperial General Headquarters]] on 29 April 1943.]]
On 2 November Tōjō, Sugiyama, and Nagano reported to Hirohito that the review of eleven points had been in vain. Emperor Hirohito gave his consent to the war and then asked: "Are you going to provide justification for the war?"{{sfn|Bix|2016|p=421}}{{sfn|Wetzler|1998|pp=47–50}} The decision for war against the United States was presented for approval to Hirohito by General Tōjō, Naval Minister Admiral [[Shigetarō Shimada]], and Japanese Foreign Minister [[Shigenori Tōgō]].<ref>''Day of Deceit'', Robert B. Stinnett, New York, 2000, p. 143.</ref>

On 3 November, Nagano explained in detail the plan of the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]] to Hirohito.{{sfn|Wetzler|1998|pp=29, 35}} On 5 November Emperor Hirohito approved in imperial conference the operations plan for a war against the [[Western world]] and had many meetings with the military and Tōjō until the end of the month.{{sfn|Bix|2016|pp=424, 430-31}} He initially showed hesitance towards engaging in war, but eventually approved the decision to strike Pearl Harbor despite opposition from certain advisors.<ref name="nuclearmuseum_emperor-hirohito">{{cite web |url=https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/profile/emperor-hirohito/#:~:text=The%20emperor%27s%20office%20signed%20off,his%20ability%20to%20do%20so |title=Emperor Hirohito - Nuclear Museum}}</ref> In the period leading up to Pearl Harbor, he expanded his control over military matters and participated in the Conference of Military Councillors, which was considered unusual of him. Additionally, he sought additional information regarding the attack plans.<ref name="nuclearmuseum_emperor-hirohito"/> An aide reported that he openly showed joy upon learning of the success of the surprise attacks.<ref name="nuclearmuseum_emperor-hirohito"/>

On 25 November [[Henry L. Stimson]], United States Secretary of War, noted in his diary that he had discussed with U.S. President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] the severe likelihood that Japan was about to launch a surprise attack and that the question had been "how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves."

On the following day, 26 November 1941, [[U.S. Secretary of State]] [[Cordell Hull]] presented the Japanese ambassador with the [[Hull note]], which as one of its conditions demanded the complete withdrawal of all Japanese troops from [[French Indochina]] and China. Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tojo said to his cabinet, "This is an ultimatum." On 1 December an Imperial Conference sanctioned the "War against the United States, United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Netherlands."<ref>{{cite book |title=December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor |year=2003 |first=William H. |last=Bartsch}} p. 187.</ref>