Editing Guadalcanal campaign (section)

===Tokyo Express===
{{Main|Tokyo Express}}
[[File:Guadalcanal Japanese reinforcements.jpg|thumb|Japanese reinforcements arriving on Guadalcanal, circa early September 1942; note Savo Island in background]]

By 23 August, Kawaguchi's 35th Infantry Brigade reached Truk and was loaded onto slow transport ships for the rest of the trip to Guadalcanal. The damage done to Tanaka's convoy during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons caused the Japanese to reconsider trying to deliver more troops to Guadalcanal via slow transport. Instead, the ships carrying Kawaguchi's soldiers were rerouted to Rabaul. From there, the Japanese planned to deliver Kawaguchi's unit to Guadalcanal using fast destroyers at night, staging through a Japanese naval base in the Shortland Islands. The Japanese destroyers were usually able to make round trips down "The Slot" ([[New Georgia Sound]]) to Guadalcanal and back in a single night throughout the campaign, which minimized their exposure to daytime Allied air attack. These runs became known as the "Tokyo Express" to Allied forces, and were labeled "rat transportation" by the Japanese.<ref>Griffith, p. 113; Frank, pp. 198–199, 205, 266. The term "rat transportation" was used because, like a rat, the Japanese ships were active only at night. The 35th Infantry Brigade, from the [[18th Division (Imperial Japanese Army)|18th Division]], contained 3,880 troops and was centered on the 124th Infantry Regiment with various attached supporting units (Alexander, p. 139).</ref> While troops could be transported in this manner, most of the heavy equipment such as heavy artillery and vehicles, and supplies such as food and ammunition, could not. In addition, this activity tied up destroyers that the IJN desperately needed to escort [[convoy]]s elsewhere in the Pacific. The Byzantine nature of the Japanese navy's command setup in the region exacerbated these logistical problems; Tanaka was receiving contradictory orders from the Combined Fleet headquarters and two rival subordinate naval commands at Rabaul, the Eleventh Air Fleet and the Eighth Fleet.<ref name=":0" /> Regardless, Tanaka's persistent destroyer operations gradually increased the strength of the forces available to Kawaguchi on the island. A combination of inability and unwillingness prevented Allied naval commanders from frequently challenging Japanese naval forces at night, so the Japanese effectively controlled the seas around the Solomon Islands after sunset. Conversely, the growing Allied airpower at Henderson Field (which was further reinforced on September 11–12 by 24 Wildcats that had been made homeless by the torpedoing of the carrier ''Saratoga'' in early September by IJN submarine ''I-26'') meant that any Japanese vessel within range ({{convert|200|mi|km|disp=or}}) of Guadalcanal in daylight was at great risk from air attack. This tactical situation, wherein Japanese naval forces operated freely at night and Allied aircraft enjoyed local air superiority during the day, persisted for the next several months of the campaign.<ref>Morison ''The Struggle for Guadalcanal'' pp. 113–114</ref>

Between 29 August and 4 September, Japanese light cruisers, destroyers, and [[patrol boat]]s were able to land almost 5,000 troops at Taivu Point, including most of the 35th Infantry Brigade, much of the Aoba (4th) Regiment, and the rest of Ichiki's regiment. General Kawaguchi, who landed at Taivu Point on 31 August, was placed in command of all Japanese forces on Guadalcanal.<ref>Frank, pp. 201–203; Griffith, pp. 116–124; and Smith, pp. 87–112.</ref> A barge convoy took another 1,000 soldiers of Kawaguchi's brigade, under the command of Colonel [[Akinosuke Oka]], to Kamimbo, west of the Lunga perimeter.<ref>Frank pp. 218–219</ref>