Editing Gerd von Rundstedt (section)

===Defeat in Normandy===
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-718-0149-18A, Paris, Gerd v. Rundstedt, Erwin Rommel.jpg|thumb|With [[Erwin Rommel]], December 1943]]

The [[Allied invasion of Italy]] in September 1943 removed Rundstedt's fears that France would be invaded that summer, but he could not have doubted that the [[Operation Bolero|massive build-up]] of American troops in Britain meant that a cross-channel invasion would come in 1944.<ref>{{harvnb|Messenger|2011|loc=ch. 9, 10}}; {{harvnb|Wilmot|1952|loc=ch. 10}}; {{harvnb|Ambrose|1994|loc=ch. 3}}.</ref> In October Rundstedt sent Hitler a memorandum on the defensive preparations. He placed no faith in the Atlantic Wall, seeing it merely as useful propaganda. He said: "We Germans, do not indulge in the tired [[Maginot Line|Maginot]] spirit."<ref>{{harvnb|Wilmot|1952|p=186}}</ref> He argued that an invasion could only be defeated by a defence in depth, with armoured reserves positioned well inland so that they could be deployed to wherever the invasion came, and launch counter-offensives to drive the invaders back. There were several problems with this, particularly the lack of fuel for rapid movements of armour, the Allied air superiority which enabled them to disrupt the transport system, and the increasingly effective sabotage efforts of the French resistance. Hitler was not persuaded: his view was that the invasion must be defeated on the beaches. Characteristically, however, he told Rundstedt he agreed with him, then sent Field Marshal [[Erwin Rommel]] to France with orders to hasten the completion of the Atlantic Wall; while Rundstedt remained the commander in France, Rommel became the official commander of Army Group B. Rundstedt was extremely angered by this decision; although he admired Rommel's tactical skill, he knew from his colleagues that Rommel was notoriously difficult to work with and would mostly be able to ignore Rundstedt's authority thanks to his patronage by Hitler and [[Joseph Goebbels|Goebbels]]. Rommel in fact agreed with Rundstedt that the Atlantic Wall was a "gigantic bluff", but he also believed that Allied air power made Rundstedt's proposed defense plan impossible; like Hitler, he believed the invasion could only be stopped on the beach itself.<ref>{{harvnb|Ambrose|1994|p=63}}</ref>

By the spring of 1944 Rommel had turned the mostly nonexistent 'Wall' into a formidable defensive line, but since he believed the invasion would come somewhere between [[Dunkirk]] and the mouth of the [[River Somme|Somme]], much of his work was directed at strengthening the wrong area, although in late 1943 he had focused on Normandy. As fears of an imminent invasion mounted, conflict broke out among the commanders. Rommel wanted the armoured divisions positioned close to the coast, mostly in the area he considered at highest risk. The commander of armoured forces in France, General [[Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg|Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg]], backed by Rundstedt, strongly disagreed, wanting his forces to be positioned inland to preserve their manoeuvrability. Eventually Hitler intervened, imposing a compromise: half the armour would be allocated to the Army Groups defending the beaches, and half would be kept in reserve under Geyr von Schweppenburg; the latter, however, were not to be deployed without Hitler's direct order. Hitler made matters worse by appointing Rommel commander of Army Group B, covering all of northern France. This unworkable command structure was to have dire consequences when the invasion came.<ref>{{harvnb|Messenger|2011|pp=178–80}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Ambrose|1994|p=64}}</ref>

The [[Operation Overlord|invasion]] duly came before dawn on 6 June 1944, in [[Normandy]], far to the west of the sector where Rundstedt and Rommel had expected it. Rommel was on leave in Germany, many of the local commanders in Normandy were at a conference in [[Rennes]], and Hitler was asleep at Berchtesgaden. But Rundstedt, now 68, was up before 03:00,<ref>{{harvnb|Hargreaves|2008|p=42}}</ref> trying to take charge of a confusing situation. He immediately saw that the reported Allied airborne landings in Normandy presaged a seaborne invasion. He contacted OKW and demanded that he be given authority to deploy the armoured reserves, but OKW could not agree to this without Hitler's approval. Hitler's refusal came through at 10:00, followed by his change of mind at 14:30, by which time the Allies were well ashore and the cloud cover had lifted, preventing the armour from moving until dusk. In mid-afternoon Rundstedt ordered that "the Allies [be] wiped out before the day's end, otherwise the enemy would reinforce and the chance would be lost",<ref>{{harvnb|Hargreaves|2008|p=58}}</ref> but it was too late. Rundstedt's biographer concludes: "If Hitler had released the Panzer reserves as soon as Rundstedt had asked for them, the Allies would have experienced a much harder day on 6 June than they did."<ref>{{harvnb|Messenger|2011|p=188}}</ref> The historian [[Stephen E. Ambrose]] wrote: "The only high-command officer who responded correctly to the crisis at hand was Field Marshal Rundstedt, the old man who was there for window-dressing and who was so scorned by Hitler and OKW&nbsp;... Rundstedt's reasoning was sound, his actions decisive, his orders clear."<ref>{{harvnb|Ambrose|1994|p=481}}</ref>

Being right was little consolation to Rundstedt. By 11 June it was evident that the Allies could not be dislodged from their beach-head in Normandy. Their total command of the air and the sabotage of roads and bridges by the Resistance made bringing armoured reinforcements to Normandy slow and difficult, but without them there was no hope of an effective counter-offensive. Supported by Rommel, he tried to persuade Keitel at OKW that the only escape was to withdraw from Normandy to a prepared defensive line on the [[Seine]], but Hitler forbade any withdrawal. On 17 June Hitler flew to France and met Rundstedt and Rommel at his [[Wolfsschlucht II|command bunker]] near [[Soissons]]. Both Field Marshals argued that the situation in Normandy required either massive reinforcements (which were not available) or a rapid withdrawal. Remarkably, they both also urged that Hitler find a political solution to end the war, which Rommel told him bluntly was unwinnable.{{Sfn|Wilmot|1952|p=333}}{{efn|Wilmot's account is based on conversations with Blumentritt and General [[Hans Speidel]], who were both present.}} Hitler ignored all their demands, requiring "fanatical" defence and a counter-attack with whatever was available. Rommel warned Hitler about the inevitable collapse in the German defences, but was rebuffed and told to focus on military operations.{{Sfn|Lieb|2014|p=125}}

It was during the desperate German attempts to bring reserve units to the front that men of the {{lang|de|[[2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich|Das Reich]]}} SS Panzer Division destroyed the village of [[Oradour-sur-Glane]] in central France, in retaliation for partisan attacks in the area.{{Sfn|Hastings|1983}}{{Page needed|date=October 2012}} Rundstedt was German commander-in-chief in France, had ordered {{lang|de|Das Reich}} to head north to Normandy, and had previously condoned tough action against partisans who had killed or tortured German officers or personnel, including the shooting of hostages. He also authorised the use of terror against civilians. This was enough for the French government to demand after the war that he stand trial for the massacre at Oradour.<ref>{{harvnb|Messenger|2011|pp=237–38}}</ref>

On 29 June Rundstedt and Rommel were summoned to Berchtesgaden for a further meeting with Hitler, at which they repeated their demands, and were again rebuffed. On his return to Saint-Germain, on 30 June, Rundstedt found an urgent plea from Schweppenburg, who was commanding the armoured force at [[Battle for Caen|Caen]], to be allowed to withdraw his units out of range of Allied naval gunfire, which was decimating his forces. Rundstedt at once agreed, and notified OKW of this decision. On 1 July he received a message from OKW countermanding his orders. In a fury, he phoned Keitel, urging him to go to Hitler and get the decision reversed. Keitel pleaded that this was impossible. "What shall we do?" he asked. Rundstedt is said to have replied "{{lang|de|Macht Schluss mit dem Krieg, ihr Idioten!}}" (one version of the story as told by Blumentritt did not include the "{{lang|de|ihr Idioten}}"). This literally means "End the war, you idiots!", but has commonly been reported in English-language accounts as "Make peace, you idiots!" There has been some doubt raised as to whether Rundstedt actually said this, but [[Chester Wilmot|Wilmot]] says the incident was recounted to him and [[B. H. Liddell Hart|Liddell Hart]] by Blumentritt, who was present.<ref>{{harvnb|Wilmot|1952|p=347}}; {{harvnb|Messenger|2011|p=197}}.</ref>{{efn|Blumentritt seems to have given several versions of the story to postwar questioners.}}

Keitel conveyed to Hitler that Rundstedt felt unable to cope with the increased demands, and Hitler relieved him of his command, replacing him with Kluge. It is likely that Hitler had already decided that Rundstedt should be replaced after the meetings of 17 and 29 June. It was officially given out that Rundstedt was retiring on the grounds of age and ill-health. Hitler wrote him a "very cordial" letter, and awarded him the Oak Leaves to his [[Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross|Knight's Cross]], one of the highest of the new decorations created in 1940. Rundstedt departed Saint-Germain for the last time on 4 July, accompanied by his son, and was driven back to the sanatorium at Bad Tölz, to be reunited with his wife. He told Rommel on departing that he would never hold another military command.<ref>{{harvnb|Messenger|2011|p=199}}</ref>