Editing Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (section)

=== ''The Philosophy of Spirit'' ===
[[File:John Collier - Priestess of Delphi.jpg|thumb|upright|''Priestess of Delphi'' (1891) by [[John Collier (Pre-Raphaelite painter)|John Collier]]. The Delphic imperative to "know thyself" governs Hegel's entire philosophy of spirit.]]

The German ''Geist'' has a wide range of meanings.<ref>See {{harvnb|Inwood|1992|loc="Spirit"|pp=274–77}} for an elaboration.</ref> In its most general Hegelian sense, however, "''Geist'' denotes the human mind and its products, in contrast to nature and also the logical idea."{{sfn|Inwood|1992|p=275}} (Some older translations render it as "mind," rather than "spirit."{{efn|Inwood further elaborates the justification for preferring "spirit" as the translation: "''Geist'' is the usual German word for the intellectual aspect of an individual, the mind, but in the ''Phenomenology'' it more commonly refers to the collective mind or 'spirit' shared by a group of people. It is, as Hegel memorably puts it, 'I that is We, and We that is I' (PS ¶177). It can also refer to the third person of the Trinity, the holy spirit, and this religious connotation is never far from Hegel's mind when he uses the word ''Geist''."{{sfn|Inwood|2018|p=vii}}}})

As is especially evident in the Anthropology, Hegel's concept of spirit is an appropriation and transformation of the self-referential Aristotelian concept of ''[[energeia]]''.{{sfn|Ferrarin|2007|pp=7–8}} Spirit is not something above or otherwise external to nature. It is "the highest organization and development" of nature's powers.{{sfn|Beiser|2005|p=112}}

According to Hegel, "the ''essence'' of spirit is ''freedom''."{{sfn|Hegel|1991b|loc=§382}} The ''Encyclopedia'' Philosophy of Spirit charts the progressively determinate stages of this freedom until spirit fulfills the [[Pythia|Delphic]] imperative with which Hegel begins: "''Know thyself''."{{sfn|Hegel|2010b|loc=§377}}

As becomes clear, Hegel's concept of freedom is not (or not merely) the capacity for arbitrary choice, but has as its "core notion" that "something, especially a person, is free if and only if, it is independent and self-determining, not determined by or dependent upon something other than itself."{{sfn|Inwood|1992|p=110}} It is, in other words, (at least predominantly, dialectically) an account of what [[Isaiah Berlin]] would later term [[positive liberty]].{{sfn|Carter|2022}}

==== Subjective spirit ====
Standing at the transition from nature to spirit, the role of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit is to analyze "the elements necessary for or presupposed by such relations [of objective spirit], namely, the structures characteristic of and necessary to the individual rational agent." It does this by elaborating "the fundamental nature of the biological/spiritual human individual along with the cognitive and the practical prerequisites of human social interaction."{{sfn|deVries|2013|p=133}}

This section, particularly its first part, contains various comments that were commonplace in Hegel's day and can now be recognized as openly racist, such as unfounded claims about the "naturally" lower intellectual and emotional development of Black people. In his perspective, these racial differences are related to ''climate'': according to Hegel, it is not racial characteristics, but the climactic conditions in which a people lives that variously limit or enable its capacity for free self-determination. He believes that race is not destiny: any group could, in principle, improve and transform its condition by migrating to friendlier climes.{{sfn|Fritzman|2014|pp=103–04}}{{efn|For a discussion of Hegel's racial comments in the Anthropology, informed by the 19th-century literature available to Hegel, see {{harvnb|de Laurentiis|2021|loc=ch. 4}}.}}

Hegel divides his philosophy of the subjective spirit into three parts: anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology. Anthropology "deals with 'soul', which is spirit still mired in nature: all that within us which precedes our self-conscious mind or intellect." In the section "Phenomenology", Hegel examines the relation between consciousness and its object and the emergence of intersubjective rationality. Psychology "deals with a great deal that would be categorized as epistemology (or 'theory of knowledge') today. Hegel discusses, among other things, the nature of attention, memory, imagination and judgement."{{sfn|Magee|2011|loc=p. 235, caps modified}}

Throughout this section, but especially in the Anthropology, Hegel appropriates and develops [[Aristotle]]'s [[hylomorphic]] approach to what is today theorized as the [[mind–body problem]]: "The solution to the mind–body problem [according to this theory] hinges upon recognizing that mind does not act upon the body as cause of effects but rather acts upon itself as an embodied living subjectivity. As such, mind develops itself, progressively attaining more and more of a self-determined character."{{sfn|Dien Winfield|2011|p=236}}{{sfn|de Laurentiis|2021}}

Its final section, Free Spirit, develops the concept of "free will," which is foundational for Hegel's philosophy of right.{{sfn|Peperzak|2001|p=174}}{{sfn|Hegel|1991a|loc=§4}}

==== Objective spirit ====
[[File:King Frederick William III of Prussia.jpg|thumb|upright=0.8|left|[[King Frederick William III of Prussia]] (1797–1840) stifled the political reforms for which Hegel had hoped and advocated.{{sfn|Wood|1991|p=ix–x}}]]

In the broadest terms, Hegel's philosophy of objective spirit "is his social philosophy, his philosophy of how the human spirit objectifies itself in its social and historical activities and productions."{{sfn|Westphal|2013|p=157}} Or, put differently, it is an account of the institutionalization of freedom.{{sfn|Pippin|2008b}} Besier declares this a rare instance of unanimity in Hegel scholarship: "all scholars agree there is no more important concept in Hegel's political theory than freedom." This is because it is the foundation of right, the essence of spirit, and the ''telos'' of history.{{sfn|Beiser|2005|p=197}}

This part of Hegel's philosophy is presented first in his 1817 ''[[Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences|Encyclopedia]]'' (revised 1827 and 1830) and then at greater length in the 1821 ''[[Elements of the Philosophy of Right|Elements of the Philosophy of Right, or Natural Law and Political Science in Outline]]'' (like the ''Encyclopedia'', intended as a textbook), upon which he also frequently lectured. Its final part, the philosophy of world history, was additionally elaborated in [[Lectures on the Philosophy of History|Hegel's lectures on the subject]].{{sfn|Pinkard|2000|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=GHWJQhWRNy0C&pg=PA375&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false 375]}}{{sfn|Magee|2011|p=186}}

Hegel's ''Elements of the Philosophy of Right'' has been controversial from the date of its original publication.{{sfn|Wood|1991|pp=viii–x}}{{sfn|Pinkard|2000|pp=457–61}} It is not, however, a straightforward defense of the autocratic Prussian state, as some have alleged, but is rather a defense of "Prussia as it was to have become under [proposed] reform administrations."{{sfn|Wood|1991|p=x}}

The German [[Translating "law" to other European languages|''Recht'']] in Hegel's title does not have a direct English equivalent (though it does correspond to the Latin ''ius'' and the French ''droit''). As a first approximation, Michael Inwood distinguishes three senses:

*a right, claim or title
*justice (as in, e.g., 'to administer justice'...but not justice as a virtue...)
*'the law' as a principle, or 'the laws' collectively.{{sfn|Inwood|1992|p=259}}

Beiser observes that Hegel's theory is "his attempt to rehabilitate the [[natural law]] tradition while taking into account the criticisms of the historical school." He adds that "without a sound interpretation of Hegel's theory of natural law, we have very little understanding of the very foundation of his social and political thought."{{sfn|Beiser|2008|pp=13–14}}{{efn|Hegel himself acknowledges an ambiguity in the term "natural right" [''Naturrecht''] between meaning "a right that is present in an ''immediately natural way''" and a right that is "determined by the nature of the thing [''Sache''], i.e., by the ''concept''." His is the latter: "In fact right and all of its determinations are based on ''free personhood'' alone, a ''self-determination'', which is the very contrary of ''determination by nature''.{{sfn|Hegel|2010b|loc= §502R}}<p>

Probably his most direct discussion of the vocabulary of natural right is to be found in the Introduction to Hegel's 1817–1818 Heidelberg lectures; after this, he almost always speaks of right ''simplicitur'' or right as modified by his own distinct philosophical terms.{{sfn|Pöggeler|2012|loc= §II}}{{sfn|Hegel|2010c|loc=§§1–10}}}} Consistent with Beiser's position, scholar [[Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak|Adriaan T. Peperzak]] documents Hegel's arguments against [[social contract theory]] and stresses the metaphysical foundations of Hegel's philosophy of right.{{sfn|Peperzak|2001}}{{efn|Some commentators do not accept Hegel's own metaphysical self-understanding of his project. Allen W. Wood, for instance, declares, "Speculative thought is dead; but Hegel's thought is not": "The fact is rather that Hegel's great positive achievements as a philosopher do not lie where he thought they did." According to Wood, to read Hegel primarily as a social theorist is "admittedly, to read him in some measure against his own self-understanding; it is nevertheless the only way in which most of us, if we are honest with ourselves, can read him seriously at all."{{sfn|Wood|1991|pp=4–8}} Whether or not one accepts Wood's verdict on Hegel's overarching project, one must agree that to read Hegel as Wood proposes is to engage in a project of interpretive appropriation, not strictly textual or historical exegesis.}}

Observing that "analyzing the structure of Hegel's argument in the ''Philosophy of Right'' shows that achieving political autonomy is fundamental to Hegel's analysis of the state and government," philosopher Kenneth R. Westphal provides this brief outline:

*{{"'}}Abstract Right,' treats principles governing property, its transfer, and wrongs against property."
*{{"'}}Morality,' treats the rights of moral subjects, responsibility for one's actions, and [[a priori]] theories of right."
*{{"'}}[[Sittlichkeit|Ethical Life' (''Sittlichkeit'')]], analyzes the principles and institutions governing central aspects of rational social life, including the family, [[civil society]], and the [[nation state|state]] as a whole, including the government."{{sfn|Westphal|1993|p=246}}

Hegel describes the state of his time, a [[constitutional monarchy]], as rationally embodying three cooperative and mutually inclusive elements. These elements are "democracy (rule of the many, who are involved in legislation), [[aristocracy]] (rule of the few, who apply, concretize, and execute the laws), and monarchy (rule of the one, who heads and encompasses all power)."{{sfn|Peperzak|2001|p=523}}{{sfn|Hegel|1991a|loc=§286R}} It is what Aristotle called a "mixed" form of government, which is designed to include what is best of each of the three classical forms.{{sfn|Beiser|2005|p=252}} The division of powers "prevents an single power from dominating others."{{sfn|Beiser|2005|p=253}} Hegel is particularly concerned to bind the monarch to the constitution, limiting his authority so that he can do little more than to declare of what his ministers have already decided that it is to be so.{{sfn|Beiser|2005|pp=254–55}}

The relation of Hegel's philosophy of right to modern liberalism is complex. He sees liberalism as a valuable and characteristic expression of the modern world. However, it carries the danger within itself to undermine its own values. This self-destructive tendency may be avoided by measuring "the subjective goals of individuals by a larger objective and collective good." Moral values, then, have only a "limited place in the total scheme of things."{{sfn|Wood|1991|p=xi}} Yet, although it is not without reason that Hegel is widely regarded as a major proponent of what [[Isaiah Berlin]] would later term [[positive liberty]], he was just as "unwavering and unequivocal" in his defense of [[negative liberty]].{{sfn|Beiser|2005|pp=202–05}}

If Hegel's ideal sovereign is much weaker than was typical in monarchies his time, so too is his democratic element much weaker than is typical in democracies of modern times. Although he insists upon the importance of public participation, Hegel severely limits suffrage and follows the English [[Bicameralism|bicameral]] model, in which only members of the lower house, that of commoners and [[bourgeoisie]], are elected officials. Nobles in the upper house, like the monarch, inherit their positions.{{sfn|Beiser|2005|pp=254–58}}

The final part of the Philosophy of Objective Spirit is entitled "World History." In this section, Hegel argues that "this immanent principle [the [[Stoicism|Stoic]] ''[[logos]]''] produces with logical inevitability an expansion of the species' capacities for self determination ('freedom') and a deepening of its self understanding ('self-knowing')."{{sfn|de Laurentiis|2010|p=207}} In Hegel's own words: "World history is progress in the consciousness of freedom – a progress that we must comprehend conceptually."{{sfn|de Laurentiis|2010|loc=207 (quoting Hegel, her translation)}}

==== Absolute spirit ====
[[File:Friedrich Hegel mit Studenten Lithographie F Kugler.jpg|thumb|right|Hegel with his Berlin students<br>(1828 sketch by [[Franz Theodor Kugler|F. T. Kugler]])]]
Hegel's use of the term "absolute" is easily misunderstood. Inwood, however, clarifies: derived from the Latin ''absolutus'', it means "not dependent on, conditional on, relative to or restricted by anything else; self-contained, perfect, complete."{{sfn|Inwood|1992|p=27}} For Hegel, this means that absolute knowing can only denote "an 'absolute relation' in which the ground of experience and the experiencing agent are one and the same: the object known is explicitly the subject who knows."{{sfn|de Laurentiis|2009|p=249}} That is, the only "thing" (which is really an activity) that is truly absolute is that which is entirely self-conditioned, and, according to Hegel, this only occurs when spirit takes itself up as its own object. The final section of his Philosophy of Spirit presents the three modes of such absolute knowing: art, religion, and philosophy.{{efn|
As [[Walter Jaeschke]], German scholar and editor of the critical ''Gesammelte Werke'' edition of Hegel's works puts it, "It is only in this sphere that spirit brings forth a shape – an image of itself, as it were – and relates itself to this shape in the forms of intuition [art], representation [religion], and comprehending thinking [philosophy/logic]. It is here that spirit relates itself to itself and is absolute precisely in its self-relation. It cognizes itself as what it is and it is with itself (''bei sich'') and free in this cognition. Only with this cognition is the concept of spirit – as the concept of a thinking relation to self – complete."{{sfn|Jaeschke|2013|p=179}}}}

It is with reference to different modalities of consciousness – [[Anschauung|intuition]], representation, and comprehending thinking – that Hegel distinguishes the three modes of absolute knowing.{{efn|His best discussion, per {{harvnb|Beiser|2005|p=288}}, is (oddly) to be found in ''The Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion'' v.1, pp. 234ff.}} [[Frederick C. Beiser|Frederick Beiser]] summarizes: "art, religion and philosophy all have the same object, the absolute or truth itself; but they consist in different forms of knowledge of it. Art presents the absolute in the form of immediate intuition (''Anschauung''); religion presents it in the form of representation (''Vorstellung''); and philosophy presents it in the form of concepts (''Begriffe'')."{{sfn|Beiser|2005|p=288}}

The German philosopher [[Rüdiger Bubner]] additionally clarifies that the increase in conceptual transparency according to which these spheres are systematically ordered is not hierarchical in any evaluative sense.{{sfn|Bubner|2007|p=296}}

Although Hegel's discussion of absolute spirit in the ''Encyclopedia'' is quite brief, he develops his account at length in [[Lectures on Aesthetics|lectures on the philosophy of fine art]], [[Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion|the philosophy of religion]], and [[Lectures on the History of Philosophy|the history of philosophy]].{{sfn|Magee|2011|p=186}}