Editing Ford Pinto (section)

=== NHTSA investigation ===
In April 1974, the [[Center for Auto Safety]] petitioned the [[National Highway Traffic Safety Administration]] (NHTSA) to recall Ford Pintos to address fuel system design defects after reports from attorneys of three deaths and four serious injuries in rear-end collisions at moderate speeds.<ref name=Graham>{{cite journal|last1=Graham|first1=John D.|editor1-last=Huber|editor1-first=Peter W.|editor2-last=Litan|editor2-first=Robert E.|title=Does liability promote the safety of motor vehicles?|journal=The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Rules on Innovation and Safety |date=1991 |page=132 |publisher=Brookings Institution |location=Washington DC}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Business Ethics: A Stakeholder and Issues Management Approach |first=Joseph W. |last=Weiss |publisher=Berrett-Koehler Publishers |year=2014 |isbn=978-1-62656-141-0}}</ref> The NHTSA found there was not enough evidence to warrant a defect investigation.<ref name=Graham/><ref>{{harvnb|Lee|Ermann|1999}}:pg 41</ref> In August 1977, Dowie's "Pinto Madness" article was published, leveling a series of accusations against Ford, the Pinto and the NHTSA. These included that Ford knew the Pinto was a "firetrap" and said that Ford did not implement design changes because the company's cost-benefit analysis document showed that paying out millions in damages in lawsuits was less expensive than the design changes.<ref>{{harvnb|Dowie|1977}}: Ford knows the Pinto is a firetrap, yet it has paid out millions to settle damage suits out of court, and it is prepared to spend millions more lobbying against safety standards&nbsp;... Ford waited eight years because its internal "cost-benefit analysis," which places a dollar value on human life, said it wasn't profitable to make the changes sooner.</ref> The day after the article's release consumer advocate [[Ralph Nader]] and the author of the ''Mother Jones'' article held a news conference in Washington DC on the alleged dangers of the Pinto's design.<ref>{{harvnb|Dardis|Zent|1982}}: On August 10, 1977, Ralph Nader and Mark Dowie held a press conference to notify the public that unnecessary deaths and injuries were being suffered as a result of the faulty design of the pre-1977 model year Pinto.</ref> On the same day, Nader and the Center for Auto Safety re-submitted their petition to the NHTSA.<ref>{{harvnb|Center for Auto Safety|2009}}</ref>

Former UCLA law professor Gary T. Schwartz in a ''[[Rutgers Law Review]]'' article said the NHTSA investigation of the Pinto was in response to consumer complaints and noted the ''Mother Jones'' article included a clip out "coupon" that readers could mail to the NHTSA.<ref>{{harvnb|Schwartz|1991}}: Pg 1019, Schwartz noted, "The Mother Jones article had encouraged consumers to write to NHTSA and demand a recall of earlier Pintos. Responding to the wave of consumer complaints it received, NHTSA began a recall proceeding relating to 1971–1976 Pintos." Also see footnote 15.</ref> Lee and Ermann note that the ''Mother Jones'' labeling of the Pinto as a "firetrap" and accusations that the NHTSA was buckling to industry pressure as well as the public interest created by sensationalized news stories "forced a second Pinto investigation and guaranteed that the NHTSA would be under the microscope for its duration."<ref>{{harvnb|Lee|Ermann|1999}}: By 1977, the social context had changed. Dowie's (1977:18) article had labeled the Pinto a "firetrap" and accused the agency of buckling to auto-industry pressure. Public interest generated by the article forced a second Pinto investigation and guaranteed that NHTSA would be under a microscope for its duration.</ref>

On August 11, 1977, the day after the Nader and ''Mother Jones'' press conference, the NHTSA initiated an investigation.<ref>{{harvnb|Dardis|Zent|1982}}: On August 11, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) began an investigation of the claims.</ref> On May 8, 1978, the NHTSA informed Ford of their determination that the Pinto fuel system was defective.<ref>{{harvnb|Jones|1978}}: But NHTSA, a Department of Transportation agency, informed Ford on May 8 about the results of the new investigation, which concluded that Pintos had a safety defect.</ref> The NHTSA concluded:

<blockquote>1971–1976 Ford Pintos have experienced moderate speed, rear-end collisions that have resulted in fuel tank damage, fuel leakage, and fire occurrences that have resulted in fatalities and non-fatal burn injuries&nbsp;... The fuel tank design and structural characteristics of the 1975–1976 Mercury Bobcat which render it identical to contemporary Pinto vehicles, also render it subject to like consequences in rear-impact collisions.<ref>{{harvnb|Dardis|Zent|1982}}: In May 1978, NHTSA determined that pre-1977 model year Ford Pintos were subject to "fuel tank damage, Fuel leakage and fire occurrences which had resulted in fatalities and non-fatal burn injuries" when impacted at "moderate speeds," and that the "fire threshold" in those vehicles was reached at closing speeds of 30–35 MPH.</ref><ref>{{cite report |title=Investigative Report: Alleged Fuel Tank and Filler Neck Damage in Rear-end Collisions of Subcompact Cars Passenger Cars, 1971–1976 Ford Pinto, 1975–1976 Mercury Bobcat |publisher=Office of Defects Investigation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration |date=May 1978 |url= http://www.autosafety.org/wp-content/uploads/import/ODIPinto.pdf |access-date=March 5, 2016 |quote=Based upon the information either developed or acquired during this investigation, the following conlcusions have been reached: 1971–1976 Ford Pintos have experienced moderate speed, rear-end collisions that have resulted in fuel tank damage, fuel leakage, and fire occurrences that have resulted in fatalities and non-fatal burn injuries. |archive-date=February 2, 2017 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20170202161424/http://www.autosafety.org/wp-content/uploads/import/ODIPinto.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref></blockquote>

NHTSA scheduled a public hearing for June 1978, and NHTSA negotiated with Ford on the recall.<ref>{{harvnb|Jones|1978}}: A spokesman for NHTSA said that his agency and Ford began a "process of negotiation" after May 8 that led to Ford's announcement in Detroit yesterday.</ref> 
 
Lee and Ermann noted that NHTSA used a worst-case test to justify the recall of the Pinto, rather than the regular 1977 rear-impact crash test. A large and heavy car was used instead of a standard moving barrier. Weights were placed in the nose of the car to help it slide under the Pinto and maximize gas tank contact. The vehicle headlights were turned on to provide a possible ignition source. The fuel tank was completely filled with gasoline rather than partially filled with non-flammable [[Stoddard solvent|Stoddard fluid]] as was the normal test procedure. In a later interview, the NHTSA engineer was asked why the NHTSA forced a Pinto recall for failing a 35&nbsp;mph test given that most small cars of the time would not have passed. "Just because your friends get away with shoplifting, doesn't mean you should get away with it too."<ref>{{harvnb|Lee|Ermann|1999}}: NHTSA engineer Lee Strickland was assigned to determine if Pinto (and Chevrolet Vega) tank problems warranted a mandatory recall. Strickland's workgroup held the Pinto and Vega to a higher standard than other cars (Strickland 1996). It dispensed with the usual moving barrier. Instead, it intentionally selected a large and particularly rigid "bullet car" to hit the Pinto's rear end. It weighed down the bullet car's nose to slide under the Pinto and maximize gas tank contact. It also turned on the bullet car's headlights to provide a ready source of ignition. It completely filled the gas tanks in both cars with gasoline rather than the non-flammable Stoddard fluid normally used. Strickland justified these actions as approximating real-world worst-case circumstances (Davidson 1983; NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). For NHTSA, the tests seemed an unqualified success: two 1972 Pintos burst into flame upon impact. In the summer of 1978, NHTSA announced that the Pinto gas tank represented a safety defect, leading to the largest recall campaign in automobile history at that time (NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). Ford agreed to "voluntarily" recall 1971–1976 Pintos. Other small cars sold during the 1970s were not recalled, even though most were comparable, or in the case of the AMC Gremlin probably less safe (Schwartz 1991; NHTSA C7-38; Swigert and Farrell 198081:180). Their manufacturers successfully defended them as acceptable risks (see Wallace 1978). When we asked why NHTSA forced a Pinto recall for failing the 35 mile-per-hour test, although most small cars could not withstand such a test, Strickland ( 1996) analogized that, "Just because your friends get away with shoplifting, doesn't mean you should get away with it too."</ref><ref name="Lee1998">{{cite journal|last1=Lee |first1=Matthew T. |title=The Ford Pinto Case and the Development of Auto Safety Regulations, 1893—1978 |journal=Business and Economic History |date=1998 |volume=27 |issue=2 |pages=390–401}}</ref>

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) ultimately directed Ford to recall the Pinto. Initially, the NHTSA did not feel there was sufficient evidence to demand a recall due to incidents of fire. The NHTSA investigation found that 27 deaths were found to have occurred between 1970 and mid-1977 in rear-impact crashes that resulted in a fire. The NHTSA did not indicate if these impacts would have been survivable absent fire or if the impacts were more severe than even a state-of-the-art (for 1977) fuel system could have withstood.<ref>{{harvnb|Schwartz|1991}}: Relying on a variety of external sources (including Ford), NHTSA indicated that it was aware of thirty-eight instances in which rear-end impact on Pintos had resulted in fuel-tank leakage or fire; these instances, in turn, resulted in twenty-seven deaths and twenty-four nonfatal burn injuries.66 The NHTSA report also incorporated the data internally provided by NHTSA's own Fatal Accident Reporting System ("FARS"), which had begun operation in 1975. FARS data showed that from January 1975 through the middle of 1977, seventeen people had died in accidents in which Pinto rear-end collisions resulted in fires. 67 In comparing NHTSA's figure of twenty-seven deaths for 1971–77 with the FARS figure of seventeen for 1975–77, 68 one should keep in mind that the number of Pintos on the road was cumulatively increasing every year. The NHTSA figure of twenty-seven fatalities hence seems roughly in the ballpark by way of suggesting the number of people who had died in Pinto rear-end fires. In setting forth this number, however, NHTSA made no effort to estimate how many of these deaths were caused by the Pinto's specific design features. Many fire deaths undeniably result from high-speed collisions that would induce leakage even in state-of-the-art fuel systems;69 Moreover, cars in the subcompact class generally entail a relatively high fatality risk.70 Yet the NHTSA report did not compare the performance results of the Pinto to the results of other cars then on the road, including other subcompacts.</ref> In their analysis of the social factors affecting the NHTSA's actions, Lee and Ermann note that 27 is the same number of deaths attributed to a Pinto transmission problem which contributed to collisions after the affected cars stalled.<ref>{{harvnb|Lee|Ermann|1999}}: Beginning in the late 1970s, claims consistent with "Pinto Madness" readily gained public acceptance, but credible contradictory claims did not (e.g., Davidson 1983; Epstein 1980). For instance, Dowie's "conservative" estimate of 500 deaths (1977:18) was accepted, while NHTSA's report that it could document only 27 Pinto fire-related deaths (NHTSA C7-38; Frank 1985) was ignored. A transmission problem that also caused 27 Pinto deaths (and 180 on other Ford products [Clarke 1988]) never became a social problem. Similarly, the public accepted claims of safety errors leveled by Harley Copp, a Ford engineer who was apparently overseas when early crucial decisions were made (Camps 1997; Strobel 1980) but ignored other safety-conscious Pinto engineers who believed windshield retention was a more important safety problem (Camps 1997), and lack of safety glass caused more deaths (Feaheny 1997).</ref> They also note that the NHTSA had two primary incentives in proving a defect existed in the Pinto's fuel system design. The administration was pressured by safety advocates (Center for Auto Safety) as well as the public response. It was also being forced into action due to how both the courts and executive branch were limiting the ability of the NHTSA to address systematic auto safety issues.<ref>{{harvnb|Lee|Ermann|1999}}: By the time of its Pinto investigation, NHTSA had essentially abandoned its original mission of forcing industry-wide safety improvements, in favor of investigating and recalling specific cars (Mashaw and Harfst 1990). NHTSA had two primary incentives in reinforcing the extant Nfocal organization" imagery of the Pinto narrative. First, NHTSA was pressured by specific organizations in its network (e.g., the Center for Auto Safety) and members of the public (see NHTSA C7-38) to take action concerning the Pinto's gas tank. Second, other network actors (e.g., courts, the Nixon administration, and the auto industry) had increasingly limited NHTSA's ability to address systemic auto safety issues.</ref>