Editing Ethics (section)

=== Basic concepts ===
[[File:Deontic square.svg|thumb|upright=1.2|alt=Diagram of the deontic square|The deontic square visualizes the relations between possible moral statuses of an act.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McNamara|Van De Putte|2022|loc=Lead section, § 1.2 The Traditional Scheme and the Modal Analogies}} | {{harvnb|Ribino|Lodato|2019|p=3}} }}</ref>]]

Metaethics examines basic ethical concepts and their relations. Ethics is primarily concerned with [[normative statement]]s about what [[Is–ought problem|ought]] to be the case, in contrast to [[Positive statement|descriptive statements]], which are about what is the case.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Miller|2023|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|Lloyd|Hansen|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=agwMiPq5R1QC&pg=PA21 21]}} }}</ref>{{efn|This contrast is closely related to the [[is–ought problem]] problem, first articulated by [[David Hume]], which states that one cannot deduce a normative statement from a descriptive statement.<ref>{{harvnb|Fieser|2000|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9Jl2x7G1G90C&pg=PA159 159]}}</ref> The exact relation between these types of statements is disputed.<ref>{{harvnb|Hudson|1969|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=m_-vCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 11–13]}}</ref>}} [[Duty|Duties]] and [[obligation]]s express requirements of what people ought to do.<ref>{{harvnb|O'Neill|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KfeOAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA423 423–424 ]}}</ref> Duties are sometimes defined as counterparts of the [[rights]] that always accompany them. According to this view, someone has a duty to benefit another person if this other person has the right to receive that benefit.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stoljar|1984|pp=36–37}} | {{harvnb|Feibleman|2012|pp=121–122}} | {{harvnb|Corbin|1924|pp=501–502}} }}</ref>

''Obligation'' and ''[[Permission (philosophy)|permission]]'' are contrasting terms that can be defined through each other: to be obligated to do something means that one is not permitted not to do it and to be permitted to do something means that one is not obligated not to do it.<ref name="auto">{{multiref | {{harvnb|McNamara|Van De Putte|2022|loc=§ 1.2 The Traditional Scheme and the Modal Analogies}} | {{harvnb|Belzer|loc=§ 1. Standard Deontic Logic (SDL)}} }}</ref>{{efn|[[Deontic logic]] provides a [[formal system]] describing the logical relations between these and similar concepts.<ref name="auto"/>}} Some theorists define obligations in terms of [[Value (ethics)|values]] or what is [[good]]. When used in a general sense, ''good'' contrasts with ''bad''. When describing people and their intentions, the term ''[[evil]]'' rather than ''bad'' is often employed.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Haiming|2021|pp=75–76}} | {{harvnb|Miller|2023|pp=4–5}} | {{harvnb|Calder|2022|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>

Obligations are used to assess the moral status of actions, [[Motivation|motives]], and [[character trait]]s.<ref>{{harvnb|Miller|2023|pp=4–5}}</ref> An action is morally right if it is in tune with a person's obligations and morally wrong if it violates them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pick|2004|pp=159–160}} | {{harvnb|Haiming|2021|pp=88–89}} | {{harvnb|Miller|2023|pp=5–6}} }}</ref> [[Supererogation]] is a special moral status that applies to cases in which the agent does more than is morally required of them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Heyd|2019|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Miller|2023|pp=5–6}} }}</ref> To be [[Moral responsibility|morally responsible]] for an action usually means that the person possesses and exercises certain capacities or some form of [[Control (psychology)|control]].{{efn|Some philosophers suggest that there is [[moral luck]], which occurs when factors outside a person's control influence the moral status of that person.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Latus|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Nelkin|2023|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>}} If a person is morally responsible then it is appropriate to respond to them in certain ways, for example, by [[praise|praising]] or [[blame|blaming]] them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Talbert|2019|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Williams|loc=Lead section, § 1. Introduction}} }}</ref>