Editing Disinformation (section)

== Research ==
{{Main|Disinformation research}}
[[File:Disinformation and echo chambers.jpg|thumb|A framework for how disinformation spreads in social media<ref name="DiazRuizNilsson2022" />]]
Research related to disinformation studies is increasing as an applied area of inquiry.<ref>{{Cite journal|url=https://mediawell.ssrc.org/literature-reviews/defining-disinformation/versions/1-0/|title=Defining "Disinformation", V1.0|last=Spies|first=Samuel|date=2019-08-14|website=MediaWell, Social Science Research Council|language=en|access-date=2019-11-09|archive-date=30 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201030094140/https://mediawell.ssrc.org/literature-reviews/defining-disinformation/versions/1-0/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Tandoc|first=Edson C.|date=2019|title=The facts of fake news: A research review|journal=Sociology Compass|language=en|volume=13|issue=9|pages=e12724|doi=10.1111/soc4.12724|s2cid=201392983|issn=1751-9020}}</ref> The call to formally classify disinformation as a cybersecurity [[Threat (computer)|threat]] is made by advocates due to its increase in social networking sites.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Caramancion|first=Kevin Matthe|title=2020 3rd International Conference on Information and Computer Technologies (ICICT) |chapter=An Exploration of Disinformation as a Cybersecurity Threat |date=2020|pages=440–444|doi=10.1109/ICICT50521.2020.00076|isbn=978-1-7281-7283-5|s2cid=218651389}}</ref> Despite the proliferation of social media websites, Facebook and Twitter showed the most activity in terms of active disinformation campaigns. Techniques reported on included the use of bots to amplify hate speech, the illegal harvesting of data, and paid trolls to harass and threaten journalists.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/09/CyberTroop-Report19.pdf|title=Samantha Bradshaw & Philip N. Howard. (2019) The Global Disinformation Disorder: 2019 Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation. Working Paper 2019.2. Oxford, UK: Project on Computational Propaganda|website=comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk|accessdate=17 November 2022|archive-date=25 May 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220525105011/https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/09/CyberTroop-Report19.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>

Whereas disinformation research focuses primarily on how actors orchestrate deceptions on social media, primarily via [[fake news]], new research investigates how people take what started as deceptions and circulate them as their personal views.<ref name="DiazRuizNilsson2022">{{Cite journal |last1=Diaz Ruiz |first1=Carlos |last2=Nilsson |first2=Tomas |date=16 May 2022 |title=Disinformation and Echo Chambers: How Disinformation Circulates in Social Media Through Identity-Driven Controversies |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/07439156221103852 |journal=Journal of Public Policy & Marketing |volume=42 |pages=18–35 |doi=10.1177/07439156221103852 |s2cid=248934562 |access-date=20 June 2022 |archive-date=20 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220620070343/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/07439156221103852 |url-status=live }}</ref> As a result, research shows that disinformation can be conceptualized as a program that encourages engagement in oppositional fantasies (i.e., [[culture war]]s), through which disinformation circulates as rhetorical ammunition for never-ending arguments.<ref name="DiazRuizNilsson2022" /> As disinformation entangles with [[culture war]]s, identity-driven controversies constitute a vehicle through which disinformation disseminates on [[social media]]. This means that disinformation thrives, not despite raucous grudges but because of them. The reason is that controversies provide fertile ground for never-ending debates that solidify points of view.<ref name="DiazRuizNilsson2022" />

Scholars have pointed out that disinformation is not only a foreign threat as domestic purveyors of disinformation are also leveraging traditional media outlets such as newspapers, radio stations, and television news media to disseminate false information.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Miller |first1=Michael L. |last2=Vaccari |first2=Cristian |date=July 2020 |title=Digital Threats to Democracy: Comparative Lessons and Possible Remedies |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1940161220922323 |journal=The International Journal of Press/Politics |language=en |volume=25 |issue=3 |pages=333–356 |doi=10.1177/1940161220922323 |s2cid=218962159 |issn=1940-1612 |access-date=14 December 2022 |archive-date=14 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221214125205/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1940161220922323 |url-status=live }}</ref> Current research suggests right-wing online political [[Activism|activists]] in the United States may be more likely to use disinformation as a strategy and tactic.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Freelon|first1=Deen|last2=Marwick|first2=Alice|last3=Kreiss|first3=Daniel|date=2020-09-04|title=False equivalencies: Online activism from left to right|url=https://www.science.org/doi/abs/10.1126/science.abb2428|journal=Science|volume=369|issue=6508|pages=1197–1201|language=EN|doi=10.1126/science.abb2428|pmid=32883863|bibcode=2020Sci...369.1197F|s2cid=221471947|access-date=2 February 2022|archive-date=21 October 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211021142705/https://www.science.org/doi/abs/10.1126/science.abb2428|url-status=live}}</ref> Governments have responded with a wide range of policies to address concerns about the potential threats that disinformation poses to democracy, however, there is little agreement in elite policy discourse or academic literature as to what it means for disinformation to threaten democracy, and how different policies might help to counter its negative implications.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Tenove |first=Chris |date=July 2020 |title=Protecting Democracy from Disinformation: Normative Threats and Policy Responses |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1940161220918740 |journal=The International Journal of Press/Politics |language=en |volume=25 |issue=3 |pages=517–537 |doi=10.1177/1940161220918740 |s2cid=219437151 |issn=1940-1612 |access-date=14 December 2022 |archive-date=14 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221214125205/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1940161220918740 |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Consequences of exposure to disinformation online ===
There is a broad consensus amongst scholars that there is a high degree of disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda online; however, it is unclear to what extent such disinformation has on political attitudes in the public and, therefore, political outcomes.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last1=Tucker|first1=Joshua|last2=Guess|first2=Andrew|last3=Barbera|first3=Pablo|last4=Vaccari|first4=Cristian|last5=Siegel|first5=Alexandra|last6=Sanovich|first6=Sergey|last7=Stukal|first7=Denis|last8=Nyhan|first8=Brendan|date=2018|title=Social Media, Political Polarization, and Political Disinformation: A Review of the Scientific Literature|journal=SSRN Working Paper Series|url=https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3144139|doi=10.2139/ssrn.3144139|issn=1556-5068|access-date=29 October 2019|archive-date=21 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210221202942/https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3144139|url-status=live}}</ref> This [[conventional wisdom]] has come mostly from investigative journalists, with a particular rise during the 2016 U.S. election: some of the earliest work came from Craig Silverman at Buzzfeed News.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook|title=This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories Outperformed Real News On Facebook|website=BuzzFeed News|date=16 November 2016|access-date=2019-10-29|archive-date=17 July 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180717155014/https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook|url-status=live}}</ref> Cass Sunstein supported this in ''#Republic,'' arguing that the internet would become rife with [[echo chamber (media)|echo chambers]] and informational cascades of misinformation leading to a highly polarized and ill-informed society.<ref>{{Cite book|title=#Republic : divided democracy in the age of social media|last=Sunstein, Cass R.|isbn=978-0691175515|location=Princeton|oclc=958799819|date=14 March 2017|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/republi_sun_2017_00_0042}}</ref>

Research after the 2016 election found:  (1) for 14 percent of Americans social media was their "most important" source of election news; 2) known false news stories "favoring Trump were shared a total of 30 million times on Facebook, while those favoring Clinton were shared 8 million times"; 3) the average American adult saw fake news stories, "with just over half of those who recalled seeing them believing them"; and 4) people are more likely to "believe stories that favor their preferred candidate, especially if they have ideologically segregated social media networks."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Allcott|first1=Hunt|last2=Gentzkow|first2=Matthew|date=May 2017|title=Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election|journal=Journal of Economic Perspectives|language=en|volume=31|issue=2|pages=211–236|doi=10.1257/jep.31.2.211|s2cid=32730475|issn=0895-3309|doi-access=free}}</ref> Correspondingly, whilst there is wide agreement that the digital spread and uptake of disinformation during the 2016 election was massive and very likely facilitated by foreign agents, there is an ongoing debate on whether all this had any actual effect on the election. For example, a double blind randomized-control experiment by researchers from the London School of Economics (LSE), found that exposure to online fake news about either Trump or Clinton had no significant effect on intentions to vote for those candidates. Researchers who examined the influence of Russian disinformation on Twitter during the 2016 US presidential campaign found that exposure to disinformation was (1) concentrated among a tiny group of users, (2) primarily among Republicans, and (3) eclipsed by exposure to legitimate political news media and politicians. Finally, they find "no evidence of a meaningful relationship between exposure to the Russian foreign influence campaign and changes in attitudes, polarization, or voting behavior."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Eady|first1=Gregory|last2=Paskhalis|first2=Tom|last3=Zilinsky|first3=Jan|last4=Bonneau|first4=Richard|last5=Nagler|first5=Jonathan|last6=Tucker|first6=Joshua A.|date=2023-01-09|title=Exposure to the Russian Internet Research Agency Foreign Influence Campaign on Twitter in the 2016 US Election and its Relationship to Attitudes and Voting Behavior|journal=Nature Communications|volume=14|issue=62|page=62 |doi=10.1038/s41467-022-35576-9|pmid=36624094 |pmc=9829855 |bibcode=2023NatCo..14...62E |doi-access=free}}</ref> As such, despite its mass dissemination during the 2016 Presidential Elections, online fake news or disinformation probably did not cost Hillary Clinton the votes needed to secure the presidency.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Leyva |first1=Rodolfo |title=Testing and unpacking the effects of digital fake news: on presidential candidate evaluations and voter support |journal=AI & Society |date=2020 |volume=35 |issue=4 |page=970 |doi=10.1007/s00146-020-00980-6 |s2cid=218592685 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

Research on this topic remains inconclusive, for example, misinformation appears not to significantly change political knowledge of those exposed to it.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Allcott|first1=Hunt|last2=Gentzkow|first2=Matthew|date=May 2017|title=Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election|journal=Journal of Economic Perspectives|volume=31|issue=2|pages=211–236|doi=10.1257/jep.31.2.211|issn=0895-3309|doi-access=free}}</ref> There seems to be a higher level of diversity of news sources that users are exposed to on Facebook and Twitter than conventional wisdom would dictate, as well as a higher frequency of cross-spectrum discussion.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Bakshy|first1=E.|last2=Messing|first2=S.|last3=Adamic|first3=L. A.|date=2015-06-05|title=Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook|journal=Science|volume=348|issue=6239|pages=1130–1132|doi=10.1126/science.aaa1160|pmid=25953820|issn=0036-8075|bibcode=2015Sci...348.1130B|s2cid=206632821|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Wojcieszak|first1=Magdalena E.|last2=Mutz|first2=Diana C.|date=2009-03-01|title=Online Groups and Political Discourse: Do Online Discussion Spaces Facilitate Exposure to Political Disagreement?|journal=Journal of Communication|volume=59|issue=1|pages=40–56|doi=10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.01403.x|s2cid=18865773 |issn=0021-9916}}</ref> Other evidence has found that disinformation campaigns rarely succeed in altering the foreign policies of the targeted states.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Lanoszka|first=Alexander|date=2019|title=Disinformation in international politics|journal=European Journal of International Security|volume=4|issue=2|pages=227–248|doi=10.1017/eis.2019.6|s2cid=211312944|issn=2057-5637}}</ref>

Research is also challenging because disinformation is meant to be difficult to detect and some social media companies have discouraged outside research efforts.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|last1=Shu|first1=Kai|last2=Sliva|first2=Amy|last3=Wang|first3=Suhang|last4=Tang|first4=Jiliang|last5=Liu|first5=Huan|date=2017-09-01|title=Fake News Detection on Social Media: A Data Mining Perspective|url=https://doi.org/10.1145/3137597.3137600|journal=ACM SIGKDD Explorations Newsletter|volume=19|issue=1|pages=22–36|doi=10.1145/3137597.3137600|arxiv=1708.01967|s2cid=207718082|issn=1931-0145|access-date=1 February 2022|archive-date=5 February 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220205204457/https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3137597.3137600|url-status=live}}</ref>  For example, researchers found disinformation made "existing detection algorithms from traditional news media ineffective or not applicable...[because disinformation] is intentionally written to mislead readers...[and] users' social engagements with fake news produce data that is big, incomplete, unstructured, and noisy."<ref name=":2" />  Facebook, the largest social media company, has been criticized by [[Analytic journalism|analytical journalists]] and scholars for preventing outside research of disinformation.<ref>{{Cite web|last1=Edelson|first1=Laura|last2=McCoy|first2=Damon|title=How Facebook Hinders Misinformation Research|url=https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-facebook-hinders-misinformation-research/|access-date=2022-02-01|website=Scientific American|language=en|archive-date=2 February 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220202025821/https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-facebook-hinders-misinformation-research/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last1=Edelson|first1=Laura|last2=McCoy|first2=Damon|date=2021-08-14|title=Facebook shut down our research into its role in spreading disinformation|url=http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/aug/14/facebook-research-disinformation-politics|access-date=2022-02-01|website=The Guardian|language=en|archive-date=24 March 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220324171518/https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/aug/14/facebook-research-disinformation-politics|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Krishnan|first1=Nandita|last2=Gu|first2=Jiayan|last3=Tromble|first3=Rebekah|last4=Abroms|first4=Lorien C.|date=2021-12-15|title=Research note: Examining how various social media platforms have responded to COVID-19 misinformation|url=https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/research-note-examining-how-various-social-media-platforms-have-responded-to-covid-19-misinformation/|journal=Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review|language=en-US|doi=10.37016/mr-2020-85|s2cid=245256590|doi-access=free|access-date=1 February 2022|archive-date=3 February 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220203040557/https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/research-note-examining-how-various-social-media-platforms-have-responded-to-covid-19-misinformation/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|title=Only Facebook knows the extent of its misinformation problem. And it's not sharing, even with the White House.|language=en-US|newspaper=Washington Post|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/08/19/facebook-data-sharing-struggle/|access-date=2022-02-01|issn=0190-8286|archive-date=5 February 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220205042625/https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/08/19/facebook-data-sharing-struggle/|url-status=live}}</ref>

=== Alternative perspectives and critiques ===
Researchers have criticized the framing of disinformation as being limited to technology platforms, removed from its wider political context and inaccurately implying that the media landscape was otherwise well-functioning.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Kuo |first1=Rachel |last2=Marwick |first2=Alice |date=2021-08-12 |title=Critical disinformation studies: History, power, and politics |url=https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/critical-disinformation-studies-history-power-and-politics/ |journal=Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review |language=en-US |doi=10.37016/mr-2020-76 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231015223538/https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/critical-disinformation-studies-history-power-and-politics/ |archive-date=2023-10-15 |doi-access=free}}</ref> "The field possesses a simplistic understanding of the effects of media technologies; overemphasizes platforms and underemphasizes politics; focuses too much on the United States and Anglocentric analysis; has a shallow understanding of political culture and culture in general; lacks analysis of race, class, gender, and sexuality as well as status, inequality, social structure, and power; has a thin understanding of journalistic processes; and, has progressed more through the exigencies of grant funding than the development of theory and empirical findings."<ref>{{Cite web |title=What Comes After Disinformation Studies? |url=https://citap.unc.edu/events/ica-preconference-2022/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230203095200/https://citap.unc.edu/ica-preconference-2022/ |archive-date=2023-02-03 |access-date=2024-01-16 |website=Center for Information, Technology, & Public Life (CITAP), University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill |language=en}}</ref>

Alternative perspectives have been proposed:

# Moving beyond ''[[fact-checking]] and [[media literacy]]'' to study a pervasive phenomenon as something that involves more than news consumption.
# Moving beyond ''technical solutions'' including AI-enhanced [[fact checking]] to understand the systemic basis of disinformation.
# Develop a theory that goes beyond ''[[Americentrism]]'' to develop a global perspective, understand cultural imperialism and Third World dependency on Western news'',<ref>{{Cite web |last=Tworek |first=Heidi |date=2022-08-02 |title=Can We Move Beyond Disinformation Studies? |url=https://www.cigionline.org/articles/can-we-move-beyond-disinformation-studies/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230601164258/https://www.cigionline.org/articles/can-we-move-beyond-disinformation-studies/ |archive-date=2023-06-01 |access-date=2024-01-16 |website=[[Centre for International Governance Innovation]]}}</ref>'' and understand disinformation in the Global South.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781119714491 |title=Disinformation in the Global South |date=2022-04-12 |publisher=Wiley |isbn=978-1-119-71444-6 |editor-last=Wasserman |editor-first=Herman |edition=1 |language=en |doi=10.1002/9781119714491 |editor-last2=Madrid-Morales |editor-first2=Dani |access-date=4 March 2024 |archive-date=4 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240304064723/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781119714491 |url-status=live }}</ref>
# Develop ''market-oriented disinformation research'' that examines the financial incentives and [[business model]]s that nudge content creators and [[Digital platform (infrastructure)|digital platforms]] to circulate disinformation online.<ref name=":5" /><ref name=":7" />
# ''Include a multidisciplinary approach'', involving [[history]], [[political economy]], [[ethnic studies]], [[feminist studies]], and [[science and technology studies]].
# Develop understandings of ''Gendered-based disinformation (GBD)'' defined as "the dissemination of false or misleading information attacking women (especially political leaders, journalists and public figures), basing the attack on their identity as women."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Sessa |first=Maria Giovanna |date=2020-12-04 |title=Misogyny and Misinformation: An analysis of gendered disinformation tactics during the COVID-19 pandemic |url=https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/misogyny-and-misinformation:-an-analysis-of-gendered-disinformation-tactics-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230919005420/https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/misogyny-and-misinformation:-an-analysis-of-gendered-disinformation-tactics-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/ |archive-date=2023-09-19 |access-date=2024-01-16 |website=EU DisinfoLab |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Sessa |first=Maria Giovanna |date=2022-01-26 |title=What is Gendered Disinformation? |url=https://il.boell.org/en/2022/01/26/what-gendered-disinformation |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220721155302/https://il.boell.org/en/2022/01/26/what-gendered-disinformation |archive-date=2022-07-21 |access-date=2024-01-16 |website=[[Heinrich Böll Foundation]] |language=en}}</ref>