Editing Consequentialism (section)

=== Actualism and possibilism ===
{{About|actualism and possibilism in ethics|actualism and possibilism in metaphysics|Actualism|section=yes}}
The normative status of an action depends on its consequences according to consequentialism. The consequences of the actions of an agent may include other actions by this agent. '''Actualism and possibilism''' disagree on how later possible actions impact the normative status of the current action by the same agent. Actualists assert that it is only relevant what the agent ''would'' actually do later for assessing the value of an alternative. Possibilists, on the other hand, hold that we should also take into account what the agent ''could'' do, even if she would not do it.<ref name="Timmerman">{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Timmerman |first1=Travis |last2=Cohen |first2=Yishai |title=Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/actualism-possibilism-ethics/ |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Cohen |first1=Yishai |last2=Timmerman |first2=Travis |title=Actualism Has Control Issues |journal=Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy |date=2016 |volume=10 |issue=3 |pages=1–18 |doi=10.26556/jesp.v10i3.104 |url=http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c6af/de0d7ba1047b9aa487be99b7eab2eba994d3.pdf|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Jackson">{{cite journal |last1=Timmerman |first1=Travis |last2=Swenson |first2=Philip |title=How to Be an Actualist and Blame People |journal=Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility |date=2019 |volume=6 |pages=216–240 |doi=10.1093/oso/9780198845539.003.0009 |isbn=9780198845539 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMHTB}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jackson |first1=Frank |last2=Pargetter |first2=Robert |title=Oughts, Options, and Actualism |journal=Philosophical Review |date=1986 |volume=95 |issue=2 |pages=233–255 |doi=10.2307/2185591 |jstor=2185591 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/JACOOA|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

For example, assume that Gifre has the choice between two alternatives, eating a cookie or not eating anything. Having eaten the first cookie, Gifre could stop eating cookies, which is the best alternative. But after having tasted one cookie, Gifre would freely decide to continue eating cookies until the whole bag is finished, which would result in a terrible stomach ache and would be the worst alternative. Not eating any cookies at all, on the other hand, would be the second-best alternative. Now the question is: should Gifre eat the first cookie or not? Actualists are only concerned with the actual consequences. According to them, Gifre should not eat any cookies at all since it is better than the alternative leading to a stomach ache. Possibilists, however, contend that the best possible course of action involves eating the first cookie and this is therefore what Gifre should do.<ref name="Portmore5">{{cite book |last1=Portmore |first1=Douglas W. |title=Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options |date=2019 |publisher=New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/POROFT |chapter=5. Rationalist Maximalism}}</ref>

One counterintuitive consequence of actualism is that agents can avoid moral obligations simply by having an imperfect [[moral character]].<ref name="Timmerman"/><ref name="Jackson"/> For example, a lazy person might justify rejecting a request to help a friend by arguing that, due to her lazy character, she would not have done the work anyway, even if she had accepted the request. By rejecting the offer right away, she managed at least not to waste anyone's time. Actualists might even consider her behavior praiseworthy since she did what, according to actualism, she ought to have done. This seems to be a very easy way to "get off the hook" that is avoided by possibilism. But possibilism has to face the objection that in some cases it sanctions and even recommends what actually leads to the worst outcome.<ref name="Timmerman"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Goldman |first1=Holly S. |title=Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection |journal=Philosophical Review |date=1976 |volume=85 |issue=4 |pages=449–487 |doi=10.2307/2184275 |jstor=2184275 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GOLDRA|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Douglas W. Portmore has suggested that these and other problems of actualism and possibilism can be avoided by constraining what counts as a genuine alternative for the agent.<ref name="Portmore3">{{cite book |last1=Portmore |first1=Douglas W. |title=Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options |date=2019 |publisher=New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/POROFT |chapter=3. What's the Relevant Sort of Control?}}</ref> On his view, it is a requirement that the agent has rational control over the event in question. For example, eating only one cookie and stopping afterward only is an option for Gifre if she has the rational capacity to repress her temptation to continue eating. If the temptation is irrepressible then this course of action is not considered to be an option and is therefore not relevant when assessing what the best alternative is. Portmore suggests that, given this adjustment, we should prefer a view very closely associated with ''possibilism'' called ''maximalism''.<ref name="Portmore5"/>