Editing Camp David Accords (section)

==Consequences==
[[File:Anti Kamp-David agreement demonstration in Damascus, Syria.jpg|thumb|248x248px|Anti Camp-David accords demonstration in [[Damascus]], [[Syria]], 1978.]]
The Camp David accords changed Middle Eastern politics. Notably, the perception of Egypt within the Arab world changed. With the most powerful of the Arab militaries and a history of leadership in the Arab world under [[Gamal Abdel Nasser|Nasser]], Egypt had more leverage than any of the other Arab states to advance Arab interests. Egypt was subsequently suspended from the [[Arab League]] from 1979 until 1989.

Jordan's King Hussein saw it as a slap to the face when Sadat volunteered Jordan's participation in deciding how functional autonomy for the Palestinians would work. Specifically, Sadat effectively said that Jordan would have a role in how the West Bank would be administered. Like the Rabat Summit Resolution, the Camp David Accords circumscribed Jordan's objective to reassert its control over the West Bank. Focusing as it did on Egypt, the Carter administration accepted Sadat's claim that he could deliver Hussein. However, with Arab world opposition building against Sadat, Jordan could not risk accepting the Accords without the support of powerful Arab neighbours, like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.<ref name="Stein, Kenneth 1999, p.254"/> Hussein consequently felt diplomatically snubbed. One of Carter's regrets was allowing Sadat to claim that he could speak for Hussein if Jordan refused to join the talks, but by then the damage was done to the Jordanians.<ref name="Stein, Kenneth 1999, p.254"/>
[[File:Carter and Sadat White House2.jpg|right|thumb|United States President [[Jimmy Carter]] greeting Egyptian president [[Anwar Sadat]] at the [[White House]] shortly after the Camp David Accords went into effect, 8 April 1980.]]
The Camp David Accords also prompted the disintegration of a united Arab front in opposition to Israel. Egypt's realignment created a power vacuum that [[Saddam Hussein]] of [[Iraq]], at one time only a secondary power, hoped to fill. Because of the vague language concerning the implementation of [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 242|Resolution 242]], the [[Palestinian people|Palestinian]] problem became the primary issue in the [[Arab–Israeli conflict]]. Many of the Arab nations blamed Egypt for not putting enough pressure on Israel to deal with the Palestinian problem in a way that would be satisfactory to them. Syria also informed Egypt that it would not reconcile with the nation unless it abandoned the peace agreement with Israel.<ref name=ldmm />

According to ''The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East'':

<blockquote>The normalization of relations [between Israel and Egypt] went into effect in January 1980. Ambassadors were exchanged in February. The boycott laws were repealed by Egypt's National Assembly the same month, and some trade began to develop, albeit less than Israel had hoped for. In March 1980 regular airline flights were inaugurated. Egypt also began supplying Israel with crude oil".<ref>Sela, "Arab–Israel Conflict", 100{{Full citation needed|date=February 2018}}</ref></blockquote>

According to Kenneth Stein in ''Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab–Israeli Peace'':

<blockquote>The Accords were another interim agreement or step, but negotiations that flowed from the Accords slowed for several reasons. These included an inability to bring the Jordanians into the discussions; the controversy over settlements; the inconclusive nature of the subsequent autonomy talks; domestic opposition sustained by both Begin and Sadat and, in Sadat's case, ostracism and anger from the Arab world; the emergence of a what became a [[cold peace]] between Egypt and Israel; and changes in foreign policy priorities including discontinuity in personnel committed to sustaining the negotiating process[.]<ref name="Stein, Kenneth 1999, p.254"/></blockquote>

Historian Jørgen Jensehaugen argues<ref>Jørgen Jensehaugen. ''Arab–Israeli Diplomacy under Carter:  The US, Israel and the Palestinians'' (2018) p. 178, quoted [https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/4083976/h-diplo-roundtable-xx-36-j%C3%B8rgen-jensehaugen-arab-israeli on H-DIPLO])</ref> that by the time Carter left office in January 1981, he:
{{Blockquote|text=was in an odd position—he had attempted to break with traditional US policy but ended up fulfilling the goals of that tradition, which had been to break up the Arab alliance, side-line the Palestinians, build an alliance with Egypt, weaken the Soviet Union and secure Israel.}}