Editing Burden of proof (law) (section)

== Standards of proof in the United Kingdom <span class="anchor" id="Standard of proof in the United Kingdom"></span> ==
In the three jurisdictions of the UK (Northern Ireland; [[England and Wales]]; and Scotland) there are only two standards of proof in trials. There are others which are defined in statutes, such as those relating to police powers.

The criminal standard was formerly described as "beyond reasonable doubt". That standard remains,{{Citation needed|date=August 2024}} and the words commonly used,{{Citation needed|date=August 2024}} though the Judicial Studies Board guidance is that juries might be assisted by being told that to convict they must be persuaded "so that you are sure".

The civil standard is 'the balance of probabilities', often referred to in judgments as "more likely than not". [[Tom Denning, Baron Denning|Lord Denning]], in ''Miller v. Minister of Pensions'', worded the standard as "more probable than not".<ref>''Miller v. Minister of Pensions'' [1947] 2 All ER 372</ref>

The civil standard is also used in criminal trials in relation to those defences which must be proven by the defendant (for example, the statutory defence to [[Drunk driving law by country#United Kingdom|drunk in charge]] that there was no likelihood of the accused driving while still over the alcohol limit<ref>[http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/52/section/5 s.5 Road Traffic Act 1988] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303043404/http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/52/section/5 |date=2016-03-03 }}; see [https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldjudgmt/jd041014/gen4-1.htm R. vs Sheldrake] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170224160129/https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldjudgmt/jd041014/gen4-1.htm |date=2017-02-24 }})</ref>). However, where the law does not stipulate a reverse burden of proof, the defendant need only raise the issue and it is then for the prosecution to negate the defence to the criminal standard in the usual way (for example, that of self-defence<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/self_defence/#Burden_of_Proof|title=Self-Defence and the Prevention of Crime - The Crown Prosecution Service|website=www.cps.gov.uk|access-date=2016-03-05|archive-date=2016-03-05|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160305005658/http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/self_defence/#Burden_of_Proof|url-status=live}}</ref>).

Prior to the decision of the House of Lords in ''Re B (A Child)'' [2008] UKHL 35<ref name=":0">{{cite web |title=House of Lords - In Re B (Children) (Fc) Appellate Committee Lord Hoffmann Lord Scott of Foscote Lord R |url=https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd080611/child-1.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170922165838/https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd080611/child-1.htm |archive-date=2017-09-22 |access-date=2017-08-30 |work=parliament.uk |quote=(paragraph 15): I wish to lay some stress upon the words I have italicised. Lord Nicholls was not laying down any rule of law. There is only one rule of law, namely that the occurrence of the fact in issue must be proved to have been more probable than not. Common sense, not law, requires that in deciding this question, regard should be had, to whatever extent appropriate, to inherent probabilities.}}</ref> there had been some confusion – even at the Court of Appeal – as to whether there was some intermediate standard, described as the 'heightened standard'. The House of Lords found that there was not. As the above description of the American system shows, anxiety by judges about making decisions on very serious matters on the basis of the balance of probabilities had led to a departure from the common law principles of just two standards. [[Baroness Hale]] said:

{{blockquote|
70. ... Neither the seriousness of the allegation nor the seriousness of the consequences should make any difference to the standard of proof to be applied in determining the facts. The inherent probabilities are simply something to be taken into account, where relevant, in deciding where the truth lies.

72. ... there is no logical or necessary connection between seriousness and probability. Some seriously harmful behaviour, such as murder, is sufficiently rare to be inherently improbable in most circumstances. Even then there are circumstances, such as a body with its throat cut and no weapon to hand, where it is not at all improbable. Other seriously harmful behaviour, such as alcohol or drug abuse, is regrettably all too common and not at all improbable. Nor are serious allegations made in a vacuum. Consider the famous example of the animal seen in Regent's Park. If it is seen outside the zoo on a stretch of greensward regularly used for walking dogs, then of course it is more likely to be a dog than a lion. If it is seen in the zoo next to the lions' enclosure when the door is open, then it may well be more likely to be a lion than a dog.}}

The task for the tribunal then when faced with serious allegations is to recognize that their seriousness generally means they are inherently unlikely, such that to be satisfied that a fact is more likely than not the evidence must be of a good quality. But the standard of proof remains 'the balance of probabilities'.