Editing Bernard Montgomery (section)

====Montgomery's early command====
{{See also|North African campaign|Western Desert campaign|Tunisia campaign|Italian campaign (World War II)}}
[[File:Bernard Law Montgomery 1942.jpg|thumb|Montgomery in a [[M3 Lee|Grant]] tank in North Africa, November 1942]]

In 1942, a new field commander was required in the Middle East, where Auchinleck was fulfilling both the role of C-in-C of [[Middle East Command]] and commander [[Eighth Army (United Kingdom)|Eighth Army]]. He had stabilised the Allied position at the [[First Battle of El Alamein]], but after a visit in August 1942, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, replaced him as C-in-C with General [[Harold Alexander, 1st Earl Alexander of Tunis|Sir Harold Alexander]] and [[William Gott]] as commander of the Eighth Army in the [[Western Desert Campaign|Western Desert]]. However, after Gott was killed flying back to [[Cairo]], Churchill was persuaded by Brooke, who by this time was [[Chief of the General Staff (United Kingdom)|Chief of the Imperial General Staff]] (CIGS), to appoint Montgomery, who had only just been nominated to replace Alexander, as commander of the [[First Army (United Kingdom)|British First Army]] for [[Operation Torch]], the invasion of [[French North Africa]].<ref>{{harvnb|Playfair|Flynn|Molony|Gleave|2004c|pp=367–369}}</ref>

A story, probably apocryphal but popular at the time, is that the appointment caused Montgomery to remark that "After having an easy war, things have now got much more difficult." A colleague is supposed to have told him to cheer up—at which point Montgomery said "I'm not talking about me, I'm talking about [[Erwin Rommel|Rommel]]!"<ref>Churchill, p. 420. According to J. Toland, ''Battle: The Story of the Bulge'', 1959, p. 157, this conversation was with Churchill's chief military assistant, General [[Hastings Ismay, 1st Baron Ismay|Ismay]], beginning with Montgomery saying to Ismay, "It's a sad thing that a professional soldier can reach the peak of generalship and then suffer a reverse which ruins his career."</ref>

Montgomery's assumption of command transformed the fighting spirit and abilities of the Eighth Army.<ref name="Playfair370">{{harvnb|Playfair|Flynn|Molony|Gleave|2004c|p=370}}</ref> Taking command on 13 August 1942, he immediately became a whirlwind of activity. He ordered the creation of the [[X Corps (United Kingdom)|X Corps]], which contained all armoured divisions, to fight alongside his [[XXX Corps (United Kingdom)|XXX Corps]], which was all infantry divisions. This arrangement differed from the German Panzer Corps: one of Rommel's Panzer Corps combined infantry, armour and artillery units under one corps commander. The only common commander for Montgomery's all-infantry and all-armour corps was the Eighth Army Commander himself. Writing post-war the English historian [[Correlli Barnett]] commented that Montgomery's solution "was in every way opposite to Auchinleck's and in every way wrong, for it carried the existing dangerous separatism still further."<ref>{{harvnb|Barnett|1983|p=281}}</ref> Montgomery reinforced the {{convert|30|mi|km}} long front line at El Alamein, something that would take two months to accomplish. He asked Alexander to send him two new British divisions ([[51st (Highland) Division|51st Highland]] and [[44th (Home Counties) Division|44th Home Counties]]) that were then arriving in Egypt and were scheduled to be deployed in defence of the Nile Delta. He moved his field HQ to Burg al Arab, close to the Air Force command post in order to better coordinate combined operations.<ref name="Playfair370"/>

Montgomery was determined that the army, navy and air forces should fight their battles in a unified, focused manner according to a detailed plan. He ordered immediate reinforcement of the vital heights of Alam Halfa, just behind his own lines, expecting the German commander, Erwin Rommel, to attack with the heights as his objective, something that Rommel soon did. Montgomery ordered all contingency plans for retreat to be destroyed. "I have cancelled the plan for withdrawal. If we are attacked, then there will be no retreat. If we cannot stay here alive, then we will stay here dead",<ref name="Moorehead118-127">{{harvnb|Moorehead|1973|pp=118–127}}</ref> he told his officers at the first meeting he held with them in the desert, though, in fact, Auchinleck had no plans to withdraw from the strong defensive position he had chosen and established at El Alamein.{{sfn|Caddick-Adams|2012|p=461}}

[[File:The British Army in North Africa 1942 E15787.jpg|thumb|left|Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery, the new commander of the British Eighth Army, and Lieutenant-General [[Brian Horrocks]], the new GOC XIII Corps, discussing troop dispositions at 22nd Armoured Brigade HQ, 20 August 1942. The brigade commander, Brigadier [[George Philip Bradley Roberts|George Roberts]] is on the right (in beret).]]

Montgomery made a great effort to appear before troops as often as possible, frequently visiting various units and making himself known to the men, often arranging for cigarettes to be distributed. Although he still wore a standard British officer's cap on arrival in the desert, he briefly wore an Australian [[slouch hat|broad-brimmed hat]] before switching to wearing the black beret (with the badge of the [[Royal Tank Regiment]] and the British General Officer's [[cap badge]]) for which he became notable. The black beret was offered to him by Jim Fraser while the latter was driving him on an inspection tour.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/27/jim-fraser-obituary|title=Jim Fraser obituary|newspaper=The Guardian|date=27 May 2013|access-date=28 May 2013}}</ref> Both Brooke and Alexander were astonished by the transformation in atmosphere when they visited on 19 August, less than a week after Montgomery had taken command.<ref name="Moorehead118-127"/>

Alan Brooke said that Churchill was always impatient for his generals to attack at once, and he wrote that Montgomery was always "my Monty" when Montgomery was out of favour with Churchill. [[Anthony Eden|Eden]] had some late night drinks with Churchill, and Eden said at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff the next day (29 October 1942) that the Middle East offensive was "petering out". Alanbrooke had told Churchill "fairly plainly" what he thought of Eden's ability to judge the tactical situation from a distance, and was supported at the Chiefs of Staff meeting by [[Jan Smuts|Smuts]].{{sfn|Alanbrooke|2001|pp=}}