Editing Bell's theorem (section)

=== The Copenhagen interpretation ===
[[Copenhagen interpretation|Copenhagen-type interpretations]] generally take the violation of Bell inequalities as grounds to reject the assumption often called [[counterfactual definiteness]] or "realism", which is not necessarily the same as abandoning realism in a broader philosophical sense.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Werner|first=Reinhard F. |author-link=Reinhard F. Werner |date=2014-10-24|title=Comment on 'What Bell did'|journal=[[Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical]]|volume=47|issue=42|pages=424011|doi=10.1088/1751-8113/47/42/424011|issn=1751-8113 |bibcode=2014JPhA...47P4011W|s2cid=122180759 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Żukowski|first=Marek|title=Quantum &#91;Un&#93;Speakables II |chapter=Bell's Theorem Tells Us Not What Quantum Mechanics is, but What Quantum Mechanics is Not |date=2017|series=The Frontiers Collection|pages=175–185|editor-last=Bertlmann|editor-first=Reinhold|place=Cham|publisher=Springer International Publishing|doi=10.1007/978-3-319-38987-5_10|isbn=978-3-319-38985-1|editor2-last=Zeilinger|editor2-first=Anton |editor-link2=Anton Zeilinger |arxiv=1501.05640|s2cid=119214547}}</ref> For example, [[Roland Omnès]] argues for the rejection of hidden variables and concludes that "quantum mechanics is probably as realistic as any theory of its scope and maturity ever will be".<ref name="omnes">{{cite book|first=R. |last=Omnès |author-link=Roland Omnès |title=The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics |publisher=Princeton University Press |year=1994 |isbn=978-0-691-03669-4 |oclc=439453957 }}</ref>{{Rp|531}} Likewise, [[Rudolf Peierls]] took the message of Bell's theorem to be that, because the premise of locality is physically reasonable, "hidden variables cannot be introduced without abandoning some of the results of quantum mechanics".<ref>{{cite book|last=Peierls |first=Rudolf |author-link=Rudolf Peierls |title=Surprises in Theoretical Physics |pages=26–29 |publisher=Princeton University Press |year=1979 |isbn=0-691-08241-3}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Mermin |first=N. D. |author-link=N. David Mermin |title=What Do These Correlations Know About Reality? Nonlocality and the Absurd |journal=[[Foundations of Physics]] |volume=29 |year=1999 |issue=4 |pages=571–587 |arxiv=quant-ph/9807055 |bibcode=1998quant.ph..7055M |doi=10.1023/A:1018864225930}}</ref>

This is also the route taken by interpretations that descend from the Copenhagen tradition, such as [[consistent histories]] (often advertised as "Copenhagen done right"),<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hohenberg|first=P. C.|author-link=Pierre Hohenberg|date=2010-10-05|title=Colloquium : An introduction to consistent quantum theory|journal=[[Reviews of Modern Physics]] |language=en |volume=82 |issue=4 |pages=2835–2844 |arxiv=0909.2359 |doi=10.1103/RevModPhys.82.2835 |issn=0034-6861 |bibcode=2010RvMP...82.2835H|s2cid=20551033}}</ref>{{rp|2839|q=CQT most definitely opts for retaining locality (EPR2) and rejecting classical realism (EPR1)}} as well as [[QBism]].<ref>{{Cite book|chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quantum-bayesian/|title=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |last=Healey|first=Richard|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|year=2016|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|chapter=Quantum-Bayesian and Pragmatist Views of Quantum Theory|access-date=2021-09-16|archive-date=2021-08-17|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210817204745/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quantum-bayesian/|url-status=live}}</ref>