Editing Battle of the Little Bighorn (section)

==Battle==

===Reno's attack===
[[File:Custer.gif|thumb|Movements of the 7th Cavalry<br />A: Custer B: Reno C: Benteen D: Yates E: Weir]]
[[File:Www-cgsc.army.mil MAP20 Renos Attack.GIF|thumb|Movement of Major Reno's three companies]]

The first group to attack was Major Reno's second detachment (Companies A, G, and M) after receiving orders from Custer written out by Lt. [[William W. Cooke]], as Custer's Crow scouts reported Sioux tribe members were alerting the village. Ordered to charge, Reno began that phase of the battle. The orders, made without accurate knowledge of the village's size, location, or the warriors' propensity to stand and fight, had been to pursue the Native Americans and "bring them to battle." Reno's force crossed the Little Bighorn at the mouth of what is today Reno Creek around 3:00 pm on June 25. They immediately realized that the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne were present "in force and not running away."

Reno advanced rapidly across the open field towards the northwest, his movements masked by the thick belt of trees that ran along the southern banks of the Little Bighorn River. The same trees on his front right shielded his movements across the wide field over which his men rapidly rode, first with two approximately forty-man companies abreast and eventually with all three charging abreast. The trees also obscured Reno's view of the Native American village until his force had passed that bend on his right front and was suddenly within arrow-shot of the village. The tepees in that area were occupied by the Hunkpapa Sioux. Neither Custer nor Reno had much idea of the length, depth and size of the encampment they were attacking, as the village was hidden by the trees.{{citation needed |date=January 2013}} When Reno came into the open in front of the south end of the village, he sent his Arikara/Ree and Crow Indian scouts forward on his exposed left flank.<ref>{{cite web |author=Running Dog |url= http://www.astonisher.com/archives/museum/little_sioux_big_horn.html |title=Confirmed by one of his surviving Arikara scouts, Little Sioux |publisher=Astonisher.com |access-date= 2012-03-15 |url-status = live|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20120118221826/http://www.astonisher.com/archives/museum/little_sioux_big_horn.html |archive-date= January 18, 2012 |df=mdy-all }}</ref> Realizing the full extent of the village's width, Reno quickly suspected what he would later call "a trap" and stopped a few hundred yards short of the encampment.

He ordered his troopers to dismount and deploy in a [[skirmish line]], according to standard army doctrine. In this formation, every fourth trooper held the horses for the troopers in firing position, with {{convert|5|to|10|yard|m|0}} separating each trooper, officers to their rear and troopers with horses behind the officers. This formation reduced Reno's firepower by 25 percent. As Reno's men fired into the village and by some accounts killed several wives and children of the Sioux chief Gall (in Lakota, ''Phizí''), the mounted warriors began streaming out to meet the attack. With Reno's men anchored on their right by the protection of the tree line and bend in the river, the Indians rode against the center and exposed left end of Reno's line. After about 20 minutes of long-distance firing, Reno had taken only one casualty, but the odds against him had risen (Reno estimated five to one), and Custer had not reinforced him. Trooper Billy Jackson reported that by then, the Indians had begun massing in the open area shielded by a small hill to the left of Reno's line and to the right of the Indian village.<ref>{{cite web |author= Running Dog |url= http://www.astonisher.com/archives/museum/little_sioux_big_horn.html |title=Little Sioux's Story of the Battle of the Little Bighorn |publisher= Astonisher.com |access-date= 2012-03-15 |url-status = live|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20120118221826/http://www.astonisher.com/archives/museum/little_sioux_big_horn.html |archive-date=January 18, 2012 |df=mdy-all }}</ref> From this position the Indians mounted an attack of more than 500 warriors against the left and rear of Reno's line,<ref>Goodrich, Thomas. ''Scalp Dance: Indian Warfare on the High Plains, 1865–1879''. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1997. p. 242.</ref> turning Reno's exposed left flank. This forced a hasty withdrawal into the timber along the bend in the river.<ref>Perrett, Bryan. ''Last Stand: Famous Battles Against the Odds''. London: Arms & Armour, 1993; p. 8.</ref> Here the Native Americans pinned Reno and his men down and tried to set fire to the brush to try to drive the soldiers out of their position.

Reno's Arikara scout [[Bloody Knife]] was shot in the head, splattering brains and blood onto Reno's face.{{sfn|Nevin|1973|p=214}} The shaken Reno ordered his men to dismount and mount again.{{sfn|Nevin|1973|p=214}} He then said, "All those who wish to make their escape follow me."{{Citation needed|date=June 2021}} Abandoning the wounded, he led a disorderly rout for a mile next to the river.{{sfn|Nevin|1973|p=214}} He made no attempt to engage the Indians to prevent them from picking off men in the rear.{{sfn|Nevin|1973|p=214}} The retreat was immediately disrupted by Cheyenne attacks at close quarters. A steep bank some {{convert|8|ft|m}} high awaited the mounted men as they crossed the river; some horses fell back onto others below them.{{sfn|Nevin|1973|p=214}} Indians fired on the soldiers from a distance, and within close quarters pulled them off their horses and clubbed their heads.{{sfn|Nevin|1973|p=214}} Later, Reno reported that three officers and 29 troopers had been killed during the retreat and subsequent fording of the river. Another officer and 13–18 men were missing. Most of these missing men were left behind in the timber, although many eventually rejoined the detachment.

====Reno and Benteen on Reno Hill====
[[File:Bloody Knife, Custer's scout, on Yellowstone Expedition, 1873 - NARA - 524373.jpg|thumb|[[Bloody Knife]], a scout in the American army.]]

Atop the bluffs near what is known today as Reno Hill, Reno's depleted and shaken troops were joined by Captain Benteen's column while Reno’s men were still retreating up from the valley.{{sfn|Nevin|1973|p=216}} (Companies D, H and K), arriving from the south. This force had been returning from a lateral scouting mission when it had been summoned by Custer's messenger, Italian immigrant bugler John Martin (Giovanni Martino) with the handwritten message: "Benteen. Come on, Big Village, Be quick, Bring packs. P.S. Bring Packs."<ref name="court of inquiry" /> This message made no sense to Benteen, as his men would be needed more in a fight than the packs carried by herd animals.{{sfn|Nevin|1973|p=216}} Though both men inferred that Custer was engaged in battle, Reno refused to move until the packs arrived so his men could resupply.{{sfn|Nevin|1973|p=216}} The detachments were later reinforced by McDougall's Company B and the pack train. The 14 officers and 340 troopers on the bluffs organized an all-around defense and dug rifle pits using whatever implements they had among them, including knives. This practice had become standard during the last year of the [[American Civil War]], as Union and Confederate troops used knives, eating utensils, mess plates and pans to dig effective battlefield fortifications.<ref>John Keegan, The American Civil War.</ref>

[[File:Www-cgsc.army.mil MAP21 Defense of Reno-Benteen Hill.GIF|thumb|left|Reno–Benteen defensive position]]

Despite hearing heavy gunfire from the north, including distinct volleys at 4:20 pm, Benteen concentrated on reinforcing Reno's badly wounded and hard-pressed detachment rather than continuing on toward Custer's position. Benteen's apparent reluctance to reach Custer prompted later criticism that he had failed to follow orders. Around 5:00 pm, Capt. [[Thomas Weir (American soldier)|Thomas Weir]] and Company D moved out to contact Custer.<ref name="court of inquiry" /> Capt. Weir remained on the bluffs, while D moved to the right down Cedar Coulee (RCOI figure 8), but they soon looped back around to the bluffs. Lt Luther Rector Hare, sent by Reno to Weir, and troops M, K and H also had moved north from the Reno retreat area. D, M and K advanced a mile to what is today Weir Peaks or Weir Point, and dismounted. From his vantage point on the bluffs, Weir could see that the Indian camps comprised some 1,800 [[Lodging|lodge]]s.{{sfn|Nevin|1973|p=216}} Behind them he saw through the dust and smoke hills that were oddly red in color; he later learned that this was a massive assemblage of Indian ponies.{{sfn|Nevin|1973|p=216}} By this time, roughly 5:25 pm,{{Citation needed|date=June 2021}} Custer's battle may have concluded. From high ground at Weir Peaks, looking though his [[Refracting telescope|spyglass]], Weir witnessed many Indians on horseback and on foot shooting at items on the ground, perhaps killing wounded soldiers and firing at dead bodies on the "Last Stand Hill" at the northern end of the Custer battlefield. Realizing these were Indians, the 3 troops remained on the peaks and the hill to the east. Some historians have suggested that what Weir witnessed was a fight on what is now called Calhoun Hill some minutes earlier.{{Citation needed|date=June 2021}} The destruction of Keogh's battalion may have begun with the collapse of L, I and C Company (half of it) following the combined assaults led by [[Crazy Horse]], [[White Bull (Native American)|White Bull]], Hump, [[Gall (Native American leader)|Gall]], and others.<ref name="michno1997">Michno, Gregory F., ''Lakota Noon, the Indian narrative of Custer's defeat'', Mountain Press, 1997, pp. 284–285. {{ISBN|0-87842-349-4}}.</ref>{{rp|240}} Other native accounts contradict this understanding, however, and the time element remains a subject of debate. The other companies had eventually left the area near Reno Hill and followed Weir by assigned battalions—first Benteen, M troop, Reno’s command, & the pack train and wounded. Strung along the bluffs behind D/M/K, Benteen and H soon returned to meet Reno’s command at the high point called Capt. Weir’s Hill (RCOI figure 7) and deployed along the ridge/bluffs there. Benteen informed Reno of their bad position. Weir also returned from the Peaks to the command at that location. The 3 troops (D, M, K) which had dismounted and remained at Weir Peaks (RCOI figure 9) were soon attacked by natives,{{sfn|Nevin|1973|p=216}} increasingly coming from the concluded Custer engagement. Following Benteen’s advice, Reno via Hare ordered the withdrawal of the 3 advance troops, and all seven companies eventually fell back to Reno Hill before the pack train had moved even a quarter mile ({{convert|1/4|mi|m|disp=out}}). Lt. Edward Settle Godfrey, Lt. Hare and troop K set up a skirmish line where Reno had retreated up from the valley, south of Weir’s Hill, to halt the pursuing Indians, who took the surrounding high ground and hills. The companies remained pinned down on the bluff, fending off the Indians for three hours until night fell.{{sfn|Nevin|1973|p=216}} The soldiers dug crude trenches as the Indians performed their war dance.{{sfn|Nevin|1973|p=216}}

Benteen was hit in the heel of his boot by an Indian bullet. At one point, he led a counterattack to push back Indians who had continued to crawl through the grass closer to the soldiers' positions.{{citation needed|date=November 2020}}

===Custer's fight===
{{external media|float=right|headerimage=[[File:Chief Gall ca1880s.jpg|210px]] [[Gall (Native American leader)|Gall]]|video1=[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q2UzKRUgzJ0 C-SPAN Cities Tour – Billings: Battle of the Little Bighorn], 38:44, [[C-SPAN]]<ref name="cspan">{{cite web|title=Battle of Little Bighorn|publisher=[[C-SPAN]]|date=September 12, 2013|url=https://www.c-span.org/video/?315349-1/battle-little-bighorn|access-date=May 24, 2017|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170612134900/https://www.c-span.org/video/?315349-1%2Fbattle-little-bighorn|archive-date=June 12, 2017|df=mdy-all}}</ref> Park Ranger Steve Adelson describes the battle on-site}}

The precise details of Custer's fight and his movements before and during the battle are largely conjectural since none of the men who went forward with Custer's battalion (the five companies under his immediate command) survived the battle. Later accounts from surviving Indians are useful but are sometimes conflicting and unclear.

While the gunfire heard on the bluffs by Reno and Benteen's men during the afternoon of June 25 was probably from Custer's fight, the soldiers on Reno Hill were unaware of what had happened to Custer until General Terry's arrival two days later on June 27. They were reportedly stunned by the news. When the army examined the Custer battle site, soldiers could not determine fully what had transpired. Custer's force of roughly 210 men had been engaged by the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne about {{convert|3.5|mi|km}} to the north of Reno and Benteen's defensive position. Evidence of organized resistance included an apparent skirmish line on Calhoun Hill and apparent [[breastworks]] made of dead horses on Custer Hill.<ref name="michno1997" /> By the time troops came to recover the bodies, the Lakota and Cheyenne had already removed most of their own dead from the field. The troops found most of Custer's dead men stripped of their clothing, ritually mutilated, and in a state of decomposition, making identification of many impossible.<ref name="Brininstool, 60–62">Brininstool, 60–62.</ref> The soldiers identified the 7th Cavalry's dead as well as they could and hastily buried them where they had fallen.

Custer's body was found with two gunshot wounds, one to his left chest and the other to his left temple. Either wound would have been fatal, though he appeared to have bled from only the chest wound; some scholars believe his head wound may have been delivered postmortem. Some Lakota oral histories assert that Custer, having sustained a wound, committed suicide to avoid capture and subsequent torture. This would be inconsistent with his known right-handedness, but that does not rule out assisted suicide (other native accounts note several soldiers committing suicide near the end of the battle).<ref>{{multiref|Wooden Leg, [[Thomas B. Marquis]] (interpreter), ''A Warrior Who Fought Custer'', p. 246|Sun Bear, "A Cheyenne Old Man", in Marquis, ''The Cheyennes of Montana'', p. 86|Kate Big Head, [[Thomas B. Marquis]] (interpreter), ''She Watched Custer's Last Battle''}}</ref> Custer's body was found near the top of Custer Hill, which also came to be known as "Last Stand Hill". There the United States erected a tall memorial obelisk inscribed with the names of the 7th Cavalry's casualties.<ref name="Brininstool, 60–62" />

Several days after the battle, [[Curly (scout)|Curley]], Custer's Crow scout who had left Custer near Medicine Tail Coulee (a drainage which led to the river), recounted the battle, reporting that Custer had attacked the village after attempting to cross the river. He was driven back, retreating toward the hill where his body was found.<ref>Fox, pp. 10–13.</ref> As the scenario seemed compatible with Custer's aggressive style of warfare and with evidence found on the ground, it became the basis of many popular accounts of the battle.

According to [[Pretty Shield]], the wife of Goes-Ahead (another Crow scout for the 7th Cavalry), Custer was killed while crossing the river: "...{{nbsp}}and he died there, died in the water of the Little Bighorn, with Two-bodies, and the blue soldier carrying his flag".<ref name="linderman">Linderman, F. (1932) ''Pretty-shield: Medicine Woman of the Crows''. University of Nebraska Press. {{ISBN|0803280254}}. (Preface © 2003 by Alma Snell and Becky Matthews).</ref>{{rp|136}} In this account, Custer was allegedly killed by a Lakota called Big-nose.<ref name="linderman" />{{rp|141}} However, in Chief Gall's version of events, as recounted to Lt. [[Edward Settle Godfrey]], Custer did not attempt to ford the river and the nearest that he came to the river or village was his final position on the ridge.<ref name="godfrey">Godfrey, E. S. (1892) [http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c/cent/cent.1892.html ''Custer's Last Battle''] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110811113204/http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c/cent/cent.1892.html |date=August 11, 2011 }}. The Century Magazine, Vol. XLIII, No. 3, January. New York: The Century Company.</ref>{{rp|380}} Chief Gall's statements were corroborated by other Indians, notably the wife of Spotted Horn Bull.<ref name="godfrey" />{{rp|379}} Given that no bodies of men or horses were found anywhere near the ford, Godfrey himself concluded "that Custer did not go to the ford with any body of men".<ref name="godfrey" />{{rp|380}}

Cheyenne oral tradition credits [[Buffalo Calf Road Woman]] with striking the blow that knocked Custer off his horse before he died.<ref name="helenair.com">[http://www.helenair.com/news/state-and-regional/article_fcf44c96-cfb6-56f4-9c57-062e944350ce.html Martin J. Kidston, "Northern Cheyenne break vow of silence"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100628050508/http://helenair.com/news/state-and-regional/article_fcf44c96-cfb6-56f4-9c57-062e944350ce.html |date=June 28, 2010 }}, ''Helena Independent Record'', June 28, 2005. RetrievedOctober 23, 2009.</ref>

====Custer at Minneconjou Ford====
[[File:William W. Cooke's "Come quick" message to Frederick Benteen, Battle of the Little Bighorn, June 25, 1876.jpg|thumb|left|Lt. Adjutant William W. Cooke's message conveying Custer's orders to Frederick Benteen, June 25, 1876. Benteen's transcription is at upper right.]]
{{quote box|width=23em|''Hurrah boys, we've got them! We'll finish them up and then go home to our station''.|— Reported words of Lieutenant Colonel Custer at the battle's outset.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=E6t3ODKOQkkC&q=custer+%22We've+got+them.+We'll+finish+them+up+and+then+go+home+to+our+station%22&pg=PA86|title=I fought with Custer by Charles Windolph, Frazier Hunt, Robert Hunt|year=1987|access-date=2012-03-15|isbn= 978-0-8032-9720-3|last1=Windolph|first1=Charles|publisher=U of Nebraska Press}}</ref>}}

Having isolated Reno's force and driven them away from their encampment, the bulk of the native warriors were free to pursue Custer. The route taken by Custer to his "Last Stand" remains a subject of some debate. One possibility is that after ordering Reno to charge, Custer continued down Reno Creek to within about a half-mile (800 m) of the Little Bighorn, but then turned north and followed a ridge towards the bluffs, reaching them near the same spot to which Reno would soon retreat. A half mile farther, he reached the high ground and ridge, near the high point called Weir’s Hill (2500’ above Weir Peaks). From this high pinnacle where the bluff was tight to the river, he could see part of the big village in the valley on the other side. After passing over the high ridge (which connected Weir’s Hill to Sharpshooter’s Hill, sometimes referred to as “Martin’s Ridge”), Custer and his troops descended Cedar Coulee (RCOI figure 8) and into Medicine Tail Coulee. Some historians believe that part of Custer's force descended the coulee, going west to the river and attempting unsuccessfully to cross into the village. According to some accounts, a small contingent of Indian sharpshooters effectively opposed this crossing.

White Cow Bull claimed to have shot a leader wearing a buckskin jacket off his horse in the river. While no other Indian account supports this claim, if White Bull did shoot a buckskin-clad leader off his horse, some historians have argued that Custer may have been seriously wounded by him. Some Indian accounts claim that besides wounding one of the leaders of this advance, a soldier carrying a company [[Guidon (United States)|guidon]] was also hit.<ref>[http://www.astonisher.com/archives/museum/white_cow_bull_little_big_horn.html "White Cow Bull's Story of the Battle of the Little Bighorn #1"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080511210009/http://www.astonisher.com/archives/museum/white_cow_bull_little_big_horn.html|date=May 11, 2008}}.</ref> Troopers had to dismount to help the wounded men back onto their horses.<ref name="michno1997" />{{rp|117–19}} The fact that either of the non-mutilation wounds to Custer's body (a bullet wound below the heart and a shot to the left temple) would have been instantly fatal casts doubt on his being wounded and remounted.<ref>Wert, 1996, p. 355.</ref>

Reports of an attempted fording of the river at Medicine Tail Coulee might explain Custer's purpose for Reno's attack, that is, a coordinated "hammer-and-anvil" maneuver, with Reno's holding the Indians at bay at the southern end of the camp, while Custer drove them against Reno's line from the north. Other historians have noted that if Custer did attempt to cross the river near Medicine Tail Coulee, he may have believed it was the north end of the Indian camp, only to discover that it was the middle. Some Indian accounts, however, place the Northern Cheyenne encampment and the north end of the overall village to the left (and south) of the opposite side of the crossing.<ref name="michno1997" />{{rp|10–20}} The precise location of the north end of the village remains in dispute, however.

[[File:Custer's route over Little Bighorn battlefield.jpg|thumb|upright=1.3|Custer's route over battlefield, as theorized by [[Edward S. Curtis|Curtis]]. (Credit: [[Northwestern University Library]] [http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/curtis/ ''Edward S. Curtis's The North American Indian,'' 2003]). ]]
[[File:Custer Battlefield 1908 (bottom).jpg|thumb|upright=1.3|1:5260 of Custer battlefield – surveyed 1891, detailing U.S. soldiers' body locations]]

In 1908, [[Edward S. Curtis|Edward Curtis]], the famed ethnologist and photographer of the Native American Indians, made a detailed personal study of the battle, interviewing many of those who had fought or taken part in it. First, he went over the ground covered by the troops with the three Crow scouts [[White Man Runs Him]], [[Goes Ahead]], and [[Hairy Moccasin]], and then again with [[Two Moons]] and a party of Cheyenne warriors. He also visited the Lakota country and interviewed Red Hawk, "whose recollection of the fight seemed to be particularly clear".<ref name="curtis" />{{rp|44}} Then, he went over the battlefield once more with the three Crow scouts, but also accompanied by General [[Charles Woodruff (general)|Charles Woodruff]] "as I particularly desired that the testimony of these men might be considered by an experienced army officer". Finally, Curtis visited the country of the [[Arikara people|Arikara]] and interviewed the scouts of that tribe who had been with Custer's command.<ref name="curtis" />{{rp|44}} Based on all the information he gathered, Curtis concluded that Custer had indeed ridden down the Medicine Tail Coulee and then towards the river where he probably planned to ford it. However, "the Indians had now discovered him and were gathered closely on the opposite side".<ref name="curtis" />{{rp|48}} They were soon joined by a large force of Sioux who (no longer engaging Reno) rushed down the valley. This was the beginning of their attack on Custer who was forced to turn and head for the hill where he would make his famous "last stand". Thus, wrote Curtis, "Custer made no attack, the whole movement being a retreat".<ref name="curtis" />{{rp|49}}

====Other views of Custer's actions at Minneconjou Ford====
{{More citations needed section|date=December 2013}}

Other historians claim, from testimony of Lt. Edward Settle Godfrey, that Custer never approached the river, but rather continued north across the coulee and up the other side, where he gradually came under attack. According to this theory, by the time Custer realized he was badly outnumbered, it was too late to retreat to the south where Reno and Benteen could have provided assistance. Two men from the 7th Cavalry, the young Crow scout ''Ashishishe'' (known in English as Curley) and the trooper [[Peter Thompson (soldier)|Peter Thompson]], claimed to have seen Custer engage the Indians. The accuracy of their recollections remains controversial; accounts by battle participants and assessments by historians almost universally discredit Thompson's claim.

Archaeological evidence and reassessment of Indian testimony have led to a new interpretation of the battle. In the 1920s, battlefield investigators discovered hundreds of [[.45-70]] shell cases along the ridge line known today as Nye-Cartwright Ridge, between South Medicine Tail Coulee and the next drainage at North Medicine Tail (also known as Deep Coulee). Some historians believe Custer divided his detachment into two (and possibly three) battalions, retaining personal command of one while presumably delegating Captain George W. Yates to command the second.

Evidence from the 1920s supports the theory that at least one of the companies made a feint attack southwest from Nye-Cartwright Ridge straight down the center of the "V" formed by the intersection at the crossing of Medicine Tail Coulee on the right and Calhoun Coulee on the left. The intent may have been to relieve pressure on Reno's detachment (according to the Crow scout Curley, possibly viewed by both Mitch Bouyer and Custer) by withdrawing the skirmish line into the timber near the Little Bighorn River. Had the U.S. troops come straight down Medicine Tail Coulee, their approach to the Minneconjou Crossing and the northern area of the village would have been masked by the high ridges running on the northwest side of the Little Bighorn River.

That they might have come southwest, from the center of Nye-Cartwright Ridge, seems to be supported by Northern Cheyenne accounts of seeing the approach of the distinctly white-colored horses of Company E, known as the Grey Horse Company. Its approach was seen by Indians at that end of the village. Behind them, a second company, further up on the heights, would have provided long-range cover fire. Warriors could have been drawn to the feint attack, forcing the battalion back towards the heights, up the north fork drainage, away from the troops providing cover fire above. The covering company would have moved towards a reunion, delivering heavy [[volley fire]] and leaving the trail of expended cartridges discovered 50 years later.

===Last stand===
In the end, the hilltop to which Custer had moved was probably too small to accommodate all of the survivors and wounded. Fire from the southeast made it impossible for Custer's men to secure a defensive position all around Last Stand Hill where the soldiers put up their most dogged defense. According to Lakota accounts, far more of their casualties occurred in the attack on Last Stand Hill than anywhere else. The extent of the soldiers' resistance indicated they had few doubts about their prospects for survival. According to Cheyenne and Sioux testimony, the command structure rapidly broke down, although smaller "last stands" were apparently made by several groups. Custer's remaining companies (E, F, and half of C) were soon killed.

By almost all accounts, the Lakota annihilated Custer's force within an hour of engagement.<ref>Miller, David Humphreys, ''Custer's Fall'', Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1985, p. 158</ref><ref>Graham, Benteen letter to Capt. R. E. Thompson, p. 211.</ref><ref>Graham, ''Gall's Narrative'', p. 88.</ref> [[David Humphreys Miller]], who between 1935 and 1955 interviewed the last Lakota survivors of the battle, wrote that the Custer fight lasted less than one-half hour.<ref>Miller, David Humphreys, ''Custer's Fall, the Indian Side of the Story''. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1985 (reprint of 1957 edition), p. 158.</ref> Other native accounts said the fighting lasted only "as long as it takes a hungry man to eat a meal." The Lakota asserted that Crazy Horse personally led one of the large groups of warriors who overwhelmed the cavalrymen in a surprise charge from the northeast, causing a breakdown in the command structure and panic among the troops. Many of these men threw down their weapons while Cheyenne and Sioux warriors rode them down, "[[counting coup]]" with lances, coup sticks, and [[quirt]]s. Some Native accounts recalled this segment of the fight as a "buffalo run."<ref>Graham, pp. 45–56.</ref>

Captain [[Frederick William Benteen|Frederick Benteen]], battalion leader of Companies D, H and K, on the 18th day of the ''Reno Court of Inquiry''<ref>Nichols, Ronald H. (ed) (2007) p. 417, 419. "Reno Court of Inquiry, ''In The Case of Major Marcus A. Reno'' compiled and edited by Ronald H. Nichols, Custer Battlefield Historical & Museum Assn., Inc. Hardin, MT 59034</ref> gave his observations on the Custer battlefield on June 27, 1876:

{{Blockquote|I went over the battlefield carefully with a view to determine how the battle was fought. I arrived at the conclusion then, as I have now, that it was a [[rout]], a [[panic]], until the last man was killed ...

That there was no line formed on the battlefield. You can take a handful of corn and scatter it over the floor, and make just such lines, there were none. The only approach to a line was where 5 or 6 [dead] horses found at equal distances, like skirmishers [part of Lt. Calhoun's Company L]. Ahead of those 5 or 6 [dead] horses there were 5 or 6 men at about the same distances, showing that the horses were killed and the riders jumped off and were all heading to get where General Custer was. That was the only approach to a line on the field. There were more than 20 [troopers] killed there to the right. There were 4 or 5 at one place, all within a space of 20 to 30 yards. That was the condition all over the field and in the [gorge].<ref>Nicols (2007) p. 417</ref>

I think, in all probability, that the men turned their horses loose without any orders to do so. Many orders might have been given, but few obeyed. I think that they were panic stricken; it was a rout, as I said before.<ref>Nichols (2007) p. 419</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Rice|year=1998|title=Benteen testimony at Reno Court of Inquiry, January 13 – February 11, 1879|url=https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Reno_court_inquiry.html|via=The Library of Congress|url-status = live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171007141134/http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Reno_court_inquiry.html|archive-date=October 7, 2017|df=mdy-all}}</ref>}}

{{multiple image
| align     = right
| direction = horizontal
| total_width =350
| image1    = Custer's Last Stand, 1877.png
| alt1      =
| width1    =
| caption1  = Looking in the direction of the Indian village and the deep ravine. Photo by Stanley J. Morrow, spring 1877
| image2    = Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument.JPG
| alt2      =
| width2    =
| caption2  = Looking in the direction of the Indian village and the deep ravine. Taken November 2011
}}

A Brulé Sioux warrior stated: "In fact, Hollow Horn Bear believed that the troops were in good order at the start of the fight, and kept their organization even while moving from point to point."<ref>Gregory Michno, Lakota Noon, Mountain Press, 1997, p. 177</ref> Red Horse, an Oglala Sioux warrior, commented: "Here [Last Stand Hill] the soldiers made a desperate fight."<ref>Gregory Michno, Lakota Noon, Mountain Press, 1997, p. 252</ref> One Hunkpapa Sioux warrior, Moving Robe, noted that "It was a hotly contested battle",<ref>Gregory Michno, Lakota Noon, Mountain Press, 1997, p. 179</ref> while another, Iron Hawk, stated: "The Indians pressed and crowded right in around Custer Hill. But the soldiers weren't ready to die. We stood there a long time."<ref>Gregory Michno, Lakota Noon, Mountain Press, 1997, p. 254</ref> In a letter from February 21, 1910, Private William Taylor, Company M, 7th Cavalry, wrote: "Reno proved incompetent and Benteen showed his indifference—I will not use the uglier words that have often been in my mind. Both failed Custer and he had to fight it out alone."<ref>GSklenar, Larry, To Hell with Honor, p. 260</ref>


<gallery mode="packed" heights="150px" style="text-align:left" class="center">
File:Edgar Samuel Paxson - Custer's Last Stand.jpg|Custer's Last Stand by Edgar Samuel Paxson 
File:Keogh Memorial - Little Big Horn Battlefield.jpg|Keogh Battlefield Marker 1879 
</gallery>

====Custer's final resistance====
Recent archaeological work at the battlefield indicates that officers on Custer Hill restored some tactical control.<ref name="Fox1993"/>{{rp|255–259}} E Company rushed off Custer Hill toward the Little Bighorn River but failed to reach it, which resulted in the destruction of that company. This left about 50–60 men, mostly from F Company and the staff, on Last Stand Hill. The remainder of the battle took on the nature of a running fight. Modern archaeology and historical Indian accounts indicate that Custer's force may have been divided into three groups, with the Indians attempting to prevent them from effectively reuniting. Indian accounts describe warriors (including women) running up from the village to wave blankets in order to scare off the soldiers' horses. One 7th Cavalry trooper claimed to have found several stone ''mallets'' consisting of a round cobble weighing 8–10 pounds (about 4&nbsp;kg) with a rawhide handle, which he believed had been used by the Indian women to finish off the wounded.<ref name=Scott-TheyDied>{{cite book |title=They Died With Custer: Soldiers' Bones from the Battle of the Little Bighorn |first1=Douglas D. |last1=Scott |first2=P. |last2=Willey |first3=Melissa A. |last3=Connor |location=Norman |publisher=University of Oklahoma Press |year=2013 |orig-year=1998 |url={{GBurl|id=KO-9A4b2t4IC}} |isbn=((978-0-8061-3507-7))}}</ref>{{rp|314}} Fighting dismounted, the soldiers' skirmish lines were overwhelmed. Army doctrine would have called for one man in four to be a horseholder behind the skirmish lines and, in extreme cases, one man in eight. Later, the troops would have bunched together in defensive positions and are alleged to have shot their remaining horses as cover. As individual troopers were wounded or killed, initial defensive positions would have been abandoned as untenable.<ref name="ReferenceB">Gray, John C. "Custer's Last Campaign"</ref>

Under threat of attack, the first U.S. soldiers on the battlefield three days later hurriedly buried the troopers in shallow graves, more or less where they had fallen. A couple of years after the battle, markers were placed where men were believed to have fallen, so the placement of troops has been roughly construed. The troops evidently died in several groups, including on Custer Hill, around Captain [[Myles Keogh]], and strung out towards the Little Bighorn River.<ref name="ReferenceB" />

====Last break-out attempt====
According to Indian accounts, about forty men on Custer Hill made a desperate stand around Custer, delivering [[volley fire]].<ref name="michno1997" /> The great majority of the Indian casualties were probably suffered during this closing segment of the battle, as the soldiers and Indians on Calhoun Ridge were more widely separated and traded fire at greater distances for most of their portion of the battle than did the soldiers and Indians on Custer Hill.<ref name="michno1997" />{{rp|282}}

{{multiple image
| align     = right
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| image1    = Mitch Boyer.jpg
| alt1      =
| width1    =
| caption1  = This c. 1895–1899 portrait of A-ca-po-re, a Ute musician, by Charles A. Nast has been misidentified as Mitch Bouyer for nearly 100 years.
| image2    = 2008 0909Battlefield0026.JPG|
| alt2      =
| width2    =
| caption2  = [[Mitch Bouyer]] marker on Deep Ravine trail. Deep Ravine is to the right of this picture (south/southwest) and about {{convert|65|yard|m|round=5}} distant.
}}

Modern documentaries suggest that there may not have been a "Last Stand", as traditionally portrayed in popular culture. Instead, archaeologists suggest that in the end, Custer's troops were not surrounded but rather overwhelmed by a single charge. This scenario corresponds to several Indian accounts stating Crazy Horse's charge swarmed the resistance, with the surviving soldiers fleeing in panic.<ref name="michno1997" />{{NoteTag|Testimony of Yellow Nose.}} Many of these troopers may have ended up in a deep ravine {{convert|300|to|400|yard|m}} away from what is known today as Custer Hill. At least 28 bodies (the most common number associated with burial witness testimony), including that of scout [[Mitch Bouyer]], were discovered in or near that gulch, their deaths possibly the battle's final actions.

Although the marker for Mitch Bouyer was found accurate through archaeological and forensic testing of remains, it is some 65 yards away from Deep Ravine.<ref name=Scott-Arch/>{{rp|82}} Historian Douglas Scott theorized that the "Deep Gulch" or "Deep Ravine" might have included not only the steep-sided portion of the coulee, but the entire drainage including its tributaries, in which case the bodies of Bouyer and others were found where eyewitnesses had said they were seen.<ref name=Scott-TheyDied/>

Other archaeological explorations done in Deep Ravine found no human remains associated with the battle.<ref name=Scott-TheyDied/>{{rp|39–48}} Over the years since the battle, skeletal remains that were reportedly recovered from the mouth of the Deep Ravine by various sources have been repatriated to the Little Big Horn National Monument. According to Scott, it is likely that in the 108 years between the battle and Scott's excavation efforts in the ravine, geological processes caused many of the remains to become unrecoverable. For example, near the town of Garryowen, portions of the skeleton of a trooper killed in the Reno Retreat were recovered from an eroding bank of the Little Big Horn, while the rest of the remains had apparently been washed away by the river.<ref name=Scott-TheyDied/>