Editing Analytic philosophy (section)

== Ordinary language ==
{{Main|Ordinary language philosophy}}

After [[World War II]], from the late 1940s to the 1950s, analytic philosophy became involved with ordinary-language analysis. This resulted in two main trends.

=== Later Wittgenstein ===
One strain of language analysis continued Wittgenstein's later philosophy, from the ''[[Philosophical Investigations]]'' (1953), which differed dramatically from his early work of the ''Tractatus''. The criticisms of [[Frank P. Ramsey]] on color and logical form in the ''Tractatus'' led to some of Wittgenstein's first doubts with regard to his early philosophy. Philosophers refer to them like two different philosophers: "early Wittgenstein" and "later Wittgenstein". In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein develops the concept of a "[[language-game]]" and, rather than his prior picture theory of meaning, advocates a theory of [[meaning as use]]. It also contains the [[private language argument]] and the notion of [[family resemblance]].

=== Oxford philosophy ===
The other trend was known as "[[University of Oxford|Oxford]] philosophy", in contrast to earlier analytic Cambridge philosophers (including the early Wittgenstein) who thought philosophers should avoid the deceptive trappings of natural language by constructing ideal languages. Influenced by Moore's ''Common Sense'' and what they perceived as the later Wittgenstein's [[Quietism (philosophy)|quietism]], the Oxford philosophers claimed that ordinary language already represents many subtle distinctions not recognized in the formulation of traditional philosophical theories or problems.

[[File:Rex Whistler - Gilbert Ryle, Fellow.jpg|thumb|upright=0.8|Gilbert Ryle]]
While schools such as logical positivism emphasize logical terms, which are supposed to be universal and separate from contingent factors (such as culture, language, historical conditions), ordinary-language philosophy emphasizes the use of language by ordinary people. The most prominent ordinary-language philosophers during the 1950s were [[P. F. Strawson]], [[J. L. Austin]], and [[Gilbert Ryle]].<ref>{{Citation |last=Longworth |first=Guy |title=John Langshaw Austin |date=2017 |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/austin-jl/ |access-date=21 July 2020 |edition=Spring 2020 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref>

Ordinary-language philosophers often sought to resolve philosophical problems by showing them to be the result of misunderstanding ordinary language. Ryle, in ''[[The Concept of Mind]]'' (1949), criticized Cartesian [[Mind–body dualism|dualism]], arguing in favor of disposing of "[[Ghost in the machine|Descartes' myth]]" via recognizing "[[Category mistake|category errors]]".

Strawson first became well known with his article "On Referring" (1950), a criticism of Russell's theory of descriptions explained in the latter's famous "On Denoting" article. In his book ''Individuals'' (1959), Strawson examines our conceptions of basic [[particular]]s. Austin, in the posthumously published ''[[How to Do Things with Words]]'' (1962), emphasized the theory of [[speech act]]s and the ability of words to [[Performative utterance|<em>do</em> things]] (e.g. "I promise") and not just say things. This influenced several fields to undertake what is called a [[performative turn]]. In ''[[Sense and Sensibilia (Austin book)|Sense and Sensibilia]]'' (1962), Austin criticized [[sense-data]] theories.