Editing 2000 Camp David Summit (section)

===Accusations of Israeli and American responsibility===
[[Robert Malley]], part of the [[Clinton administration]] and present at the summit, wrote to dispel three "myths" regarding the summit's failure. First myth, Malley says, was "Camp David was an ideal test of Mr. Arafat's intentions". Malley recalls that Arafat didn't think that Israeli and Palestinian diplomats had sufficiently narrowed issues in preparation for the summit and that the Summit happened at a "low point" in the relations between Arafat and Barak.<ref name=Malley/> The second myth was "Israel's offer met most if not all of the Palestinians' legitimate aspirations". According to Malley, Arafat was told that Israel would not only retain sovereignty over some Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem, but [[Haram al Sharif]] too, and Arafat was also asked to accept an unfavorable 9-to-1 ratio in land swaps.<ref name=Malley/> The third myth was that "The Palestinians made no concession of their own". Malley pointed out that the Palestinians starting position was at the 1967 borders, but they were ready to give up Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, and parts of the West Bank with Israeli settlements. Further, the Palestinians were willing to implement the right of return in a way that guaranteed Israel's demographic interests. He argues that Arafat was far more compromising in his negotiations with Israel than [[Anwar el-Sadat]] or [[King Hussein of Jordan]] had been when they negotiated with Israel.<ref name=Malley>Robert Malley, [https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/08/opinion/fictions-about-the-failure-at-camp-david.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm ''Fictions About the Failure At Camp David'']. New York Times, 8 July 2001</ref>

Clayton Swisher wrote a rebuttal to Clinton and Ross's accounts about the causes for the breakdown of the Camp David Summit in his 2004 book, ''The Truth About Camp David''.<ref>{{cite book| url=https://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1560256230| title=The Truth About Camp David: The Untold Story About the Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process| first=Clayton E.| last=Swisher| date=21 September 2004| publisher=Nation Books|isbn=978-1-56025-623-6}}</ref> Swisher, the Director of Programs at the Middle East Institute, concluded that the Israelis and the Americans were at least as guilty as the Palestinians for the collapse. [[M.J. Rosenberg]] praised the book: "Clayton Swisher's 'The Truth About Camp David,' based on interviews with [US negotiators] [[Martin Indyk]], Dennis Ross and [Aaron] Miller himself provides a comprehensive and acute account – the best we're likely to see – on the [one-sided diplomacy] Miller describes."<ref>{{cite news |title=Bush Gets It Right |first=MJ |last=Rosenberg |publisher=Israel Policy Forum |url=http://israelinsider.com/Views1/5730.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190207113736/http://israelinsider.com/Views1/5730.htm |url-status=dead |archive-date=2019-02-07 }}</ref>

[[Shlomo Ben-Ami]], then Israel's Minister of Foreign Relations who participated in the talks, stated that the Palestinians wanted the immediate withdrawal of the Israelis from the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, and only subsequently the Palestinian authority would dismantle the Palestinian organizations. The Israeli response was "we can't accept the demand for a return to the borders of June 1967 as a pre-condition for the negotiation."<ref>2003 [[Charles Enderlin]] book, ''[https://archive.org/details/shattereddreams00char_0 Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995–2002].'' Use the [[Google Book Search]] form at the bottom of the linked page to find the quotes. [[Shlomo Ben-Ami]] quoted on page 195.</ref> In 2006, Shlomo Ben-Ami stated on [[Democracy Now!]] that "Camp David was not the missed opportunity for the Palestinians, and if I were a Palestinian I would have rejected Camp David, as well. This is something I put in the book. But Taba is the problem. The Clinton parameters are the problem" referring to his 2001 book ''Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy.''<ref>Shlomo Ben-Ami vs Norman Finkelstein Debate.  [http://www.democracynow.org/2006/2/14/fmr_israeli_foreign_minister_shlomo_ben "Fmr. Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben Ami Debates Outspoken Professor Norman Finkelstein on Israel, the Palestinians, and the Peace Process"] ''[[Democracy Now!]]''.  14 February 2006.</ref>

[[Norman Finkelstein]] published an article in the winter 2007 issue of ''[[Journal of Palestine Studies]],'' excerpting from his longer essay called ''Subordinating Palestinian Rights to Israeli "Needs"''.  The abstract for the article states: "In particular, it examines the assumptions informing Ross’s account of what happened during the negotiations and why, and the distortions that spring from these assumptions. Judged from the perspective of Palestinians' and Israelis' respective rights under international law, all the concessions at Camp David came from the Palestinian side, none from the Israeli side."<ref name="Finkelstein">[http://www.palestine-studies.org/journals.aspx?id=7317&jid=1&href=fulltext "The Camp David II Negotiations: How Dennis Ross Proved the Palestinians Aborted the Peace Process"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090306075815/http://www.palestine-studies.org/journals.aspx?id=7317&jid=1&href=fulltext |date=6 March 2009 }}. By [[Norman G. Finkelstein]]. ''[[Journal of Palestine Studies]].'' Winter 2007 issue. Article is excerpted from his longer essay called ''Subordinating Palestinian Rights to Israeli "Needs"''</ref>

Berkeley political science professor Ron Hassner has argued that it was the failure of participants at the negotiations to include religious leaders in the process or even consult with religious experts prior to the negotiations, that led to the collapse of the negotiations over the subject of Jerusalem.  "Both parties seem to have assumed that the religious dimensions of the dispute could be ignored.  As a result, neither party had prepared seriously for the possibility that the Temple Mount issue would come to stand at the heart of the negotiations."<ref name="waronsacredgrounds.org"/> Political Scientist Menahem Klein, who advised the Israeli government during the negotiations, confirmed that "The professional back channels did not sufficiently treat Jerusalem as a religious city... It was easier to conduct discussions about preservation of historical structures in the old city than to discuss the link between the political sanctity and the religious sanctity at the historical and religious heart of the city."<ref>Klein, Menahem. Shattering a Taboo:  The Contacts towards a Permanent Status Agreement in Jerusalem, 1994–2001.  2001.  Jerusalem:  Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies.  cited in Hassner, ibid., p.81 [https://archive.today/20130416041615/http://www.waronsacredgrounds.org/]</ref>

The Israeli group [[Gush Shalom]] stated that "the offer is a pretense of generosity for the benefit of the media", and included detailed maps of what the offer specifically entailed.<ref>Gush Shalom, [http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/en/channels/downloads/baraks_offers/barak_eng.swf ''Barak's generous offers'']. Accessed 2015-12-19.  [https://web.archive.org/web/20111012045349/http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/en/channels/downloads/baraks_offers/barak_eng.swf Archived] 2013-07-11.</ref> Among Gush Shalom's concerns with Barak's offer were Barak's demand to annex large settlement blocs (9% of the West Bank), lack of trust in the commitment and/or ability of the Israeli government to evacuate the thousands of non-bloc Israeli settlers in the 15-year timeline, and limited sovereignty for Palestinians in Jerusalem.