Editing Zbigniew Brzezinski (section)

====Ending Soviet détente====
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Presidential Directive 18 on U.S. National Security, signed early in Carter's term, signaled a fundamental reassessment of the value of [[détente]], and set the United States on a course to quietly end Kissinger's strategy.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd18.pdf |title=Unclassified Memorandum from National Security Council |publisher=Jimmycarterlibrary.org |date=August 27, 1977 |access-date=December 31, 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110721044458/http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd18.pdf |archive-date=July 21, 2011 |url-status=dead  }}</ref>

Zbigniew Brzezinski played a major role in organizing Jimmy Carter's policies on the Soviet Union as a grand strategy.<ref name=":0" /> Brzezinski was a liberal Democrat and a committed anti-communist, favoring social justice while seeing world events in substantially Cold War terms.<ref>{{Cite web|date=May 28, 2017|title=Zbigniew Brzezinski obituary|url=http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/may/28/zbigniew-brzezinski-obituary|access-date=October 21, 2021|website=The Guardian|language=en}}</ref> Additionally, according to ''[[Foreign Policy]]'', "Brzezinski’s outlook was anti-Soviet, but he also insisted, like [[George F. Kennan|George Kennan]] before him, on the necessity of cultivating a strong West."<ref name=":0" />

Brzezinski stated that human rights could be used to put the Soviet Union ideologically on the defensive:

:I felt strongly that in the U.S.-Soviet competition the appeal of America as a free society could become an important asset, and I saw in human rights an opportunity to put the Soviet Union ideologically on the defensive....by actively pursuing this' commitment we could mobilize far greater global support and focus global attention on the glaring internal weaknesses of the Soviet system.<ref name="humanRightsWeapon">Zbigniew Brzezinski.  National Security Adviser to Jimmy Carter, US President (1977-1981). Power and Principle. Chapter 5.</ref>

Brzezinski's policy on Iran was thoroughly connected to the Soviet Union, because it was observed that each coup and revolution in 1979 had advanced Soviet power towards the Persian Gulf.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web|title=Jimmy Carter and the Second Yemenite War: A Smaller Shock of 1979? {{!}} Wilson Center|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/jimmy-carter-and-second-yemenite-war-smaller-shock-1979|access-date=November 21, 2021|website=www.wilsoncenter.org|date=June 28, 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=INTERVIEW WITH DR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI-(13/6/97) |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/coldwar/interviews/episode-17/brzezinski1.html |access-date=2022-09-29 |website=nsarchive2.gwu.edu |quote=I think the crisis in Iran heightened our sense of vulnerability in so far as that part of the world is concerned. After all, Iran was one of the two pillars on which both stability and our political preeminence in the Persian Gulf rested. Once the Iranian pillar had collapsed, we were faced with the possibility that one way or another, before too long, we may have either a hostile Iran on the northern shore of the Persian Gulf facing us, or we might even have the Soviets there; and that possibility arose very sharply when the Soviets marched into Afghanistan. If they succeed in occupying it, Iran would be even more vulnerable to the Soviet Union, and in any case, the Persian Gulf would be accessible even to Soviet tactical air force from bases in Afghanistan. Therefore, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was viewed by us as of serious strategic consequence, irrespective of whatever may have been the Soviet motives for it. Our view was the objective consequences would be very serious, irrespective of what may or may not have been the subjective motives for the Soviet action.}}</ref> Brzezinski advised President Carter that the United States's "greatest vulnerability" lay on an arc "stretching from [[Chittagong]] through [[Islamabad]] to [[Aden]]."<ref>{{Cite web|title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy – Office of the Historian|url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d100|access-date=November 21, 2021|website=history.state.gov}}</ref> This played a role in the [[Carter Doctrine]].<ref name=":1" />