Editing Value theory (section)

=== Others ===
Several controversies surround the question of how the intrinsic value of a [[Mereology|whole]] is determined by the intrinsic values of its parts. According to the additivity principle, the intrinsic value of a whole is simply the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. For example, if a virtuous person becomes happy then the intrinsic value of the happiness is simply added to the intrinsic value of the virtue, thereby increasing the overall value.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|2001|pp=313, 318}} | {{harvnb|Dancy|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_78SDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA188 188]}} }}</ref>

[[File:1914 George Edward Moore (cropped).jpg|thumb|alt=Black-and-white photo of man wearing a suit with a pipe in his mouth|[[G. E. Moore]] introduced the idea of organic unities to describe entities whose total intrinsic value is not the sum of the intrinsic values of their parts.<ref>{{harvnb|Hurka|2021|loc=§ 4. The Ideal}}</ref>]]

Various counterexamples to the additivity principle have been proposed, suggesting that the relation between parts and wholes is more complex. For instance, [[Immanuel Kant]] argued that if a vicious person becomes happy, this happiness, though good in itself, does not increase the overall value. On the contrary, it makes things worse, according to Kant, since viciousness should not be rewarded with happiness. This situation is known as an ''organic unity''{{em dash}}a whole whose intrinsic value differs from the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|2001|pp=313, 318}} | {{harvnb|Dancy|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_78SDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA176 176–177]}} }}</ref> Another perspective, called ''holism about value'', asserts that the intrinsic value of a thing depends on its context. Holists can argue that happiness has positive intrinsic value in the context of virtue and negative intrinsic value in the context of vice. Atomists reject this view, saying that intrinsic value is context-independent.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA98 98–100]}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021a}} | {{harvnb|Dancy|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_78SDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA176 176–177]}} }}</ref>

Theories of value aggregation provide concrete principles for calculating the overall value of an outcome based on how positively or negatively each individual is affected by it. For example, if a government implements a new policy that affects some people positively and others negatively, theories of value aggregation can be used to determine whether the overall value of the policy is positive or negative. Axiological [[utilitarianism]] accepts the additivity principle, saying that the total value is simply the sum of all individual values.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Holtug|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA267 267–268]}} | {{harvnb|Peterson|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KscNwy-F3u8C&pg=PA147 147]}} | {{harvnb|Hirose|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=m-5jBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25–27]}} }}</ref> Axiological [[Egalitarianism|egalitarians]] are not only interested in the sum total of value but also in how the values are distributed. They argue that an outcome with a balanced advantage distribution is better than an outcome where some benefit a lot while others benefit little, even if the two outcomes have the same sum total.<ref name="auto6">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Holtug|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA273 273]}} | {{harvnb|Peterson|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KscNwy-F3u8C&pg=PA147 147]}} | {{harvnb|Hirose|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=m-5jBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25–27]}} }}</ref> Axiological [[Prioritarianism|prioritarians]] are particularly concerned with the benefits of individuals who are worse off. They say that providing advantages to people in need has more value than providing the same advantages to others.<ref name="auto6"/>

Another debate addresses the [[meaning of life]], investigating whether life or existence as a whole has a higher meaning or purpose.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Metz|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Cowan|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25–26]}} | {{harvnb|Groothuis|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA160 160–162]}} }}</ref> [[Ethical naturalism|Naturalist]] views argue that the meaning of life is found within the physical world, either as objective values that are true for everyone or as subjective values that vary according to individual preferences. Suggested fields where humans find meaning include exercising [[freedom]], committing oneself to a cause, practicing [[altruism]], engaging in positive [[social relationships]], or pursuing personal [[happiness]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Metz|2023|loc=§ 3. Naturalism}} | {{harvnb|Cowan|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25–26]}} | {{harvnb|Yalom|2020|pp=431–435}} }}</ref> [[Supernatural]]ists, by contrast, propose that meaning lies beyond the natural world. For example, various religions teach that [[God]] created the world for a higher purpose, imbuing existence with meaning. A related outlook argues that immortal [[soul]]s serve as sources of meaning by being connected to a [[transcendent reality]] and evolving [[Spirituality|spiritually]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Metz|2023|loc=§ 2. Supernaturalism}} | {{harvnb|Groothuis|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA162 162–164]}} | {{harvnb|Seachris|loc=§ 3. Theories of Meaning ''in'' Life}} }}</ref> [[Existential nihilism|Existential nihilists]] reject both naturalist and supernaturalist explanations by asserting that there is no higher purpose. They suggest that life is meaningless, with the consequence that there is no higher reason to continue living and that all efforts, achievements, happiness, and suffering are ultimately pointless.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Metz|2023|loc=4. Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 3. Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Groothuis|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA165 165–169]}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA30 30–32]}} }}</ref>

Formal axiology is a theory of value initially developed by philosopher [[Robert S. Hartman]]. This approach treats axiology as a [[formal science]], akin to [[logic]] and [[mathematics]]. It uses [[axiom]]s to give an abstract definition of value, understanding it not as a property of things but as a property of concepts. Value measures the extent to which an entity fulfills its concept. For example, a good car has all the desirable qualities of cars, like a reliable engine and effective brakes, whereas a bad car lacks many. Formal axiology distinguishes between three fundamental value types: intrinsic values apply to people; extrinsic values apply to things, actions, and social roles; systemic values apply to conceptual constructs. Formal axiology examines how these value types form a hierarchy and how they can be measured.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Edwards|2021|pp=2–4}} | {{harvnb|Hartman|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1UX7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA104 104–105, 305–306]}} }}</ref>