Editing V-2 rocket (section)

== Countermeasures ==
{{Main|Operation Crossbow| Project Big Ben}}

[[File:V-2 förbränningskammare.JPG|thumb|[[Rocket engine]] used by V-2, ''[[Deutsches Historisches Museum]]'', Berlin (2014).]]

=== Big Ben and Operation Crossbow ===
Unlike the [[V-1 flying bomb|V-1]], the V-2's speed and trajectory made it practically invulnerable to anti-aircraft guns and fighters, as it dropped from an altitude of {{cvt|100|-|110|km}} at up to three times the speed of sound at sea level (approximately {{convert|3550|km/h|mph|0|abbr=on}}). Nevertheless, the threat of what was then code-named "Big Ben" was great enough that efforts were made to seek countermeasures. The situation was similar to the pre-war concerns about manned bombers and resulted in a similar solution, the formation of the Crossbow Committee, to collect, examine and develop countermeasures.

Early on, it was believed that the V-2 employed some form of radio guidance, a belief that persisted in spite of several rockets being examined without discovering anything like a radio receiver. This resulted in efforts to jam this non-existent guidance system as early as September 1944, using both ground and air-based jammers flying over the UK. In October, a group had been sent to jam the missiles during launch. By December it was clear these systems were not having any obvious effect, and jamming efforts ended.<ref name="stock25">Jeremy Stocker, [https://books.google.com/books?id=rr-RAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA20 "Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1942–2002"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170920143537/https://books.google.com/books?id=rr-RAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA20 |date=20 September 2017 }}, pp. 20–28.</ref>

=== Anti-aircraft gun system (proposed) ===
General [[Frederick Alfred Pile]], commander of [[Anti-Aircraft Command]], studied the problem and proposed that enough [[anti-aircraft gun]]s were available to produce a barrage of fire in the rocket's path, but only if provided with a reasonable prediction of the trajectory. The first estimates suggested that 320,000 shells would have to be fired for each rocket. About 2% of these were expected to fall back to the ground{{explain|date=January 2024}}, almost 90 tons of rounds, which would cause far more damage than the missile. At a 25 August 1944 meeting of the Crossbow Committee, the concept was rejected.<ref name=stock25 />

Pile continued studying the problem and returned with a proposal to fire only 150 shells at a single rocket, with those shells using a new fuse that would greatly reduce the number that fell back to Earth unexploded. Some low-level analysis suggested that this would be successful against 1 in 50 rockets, provided that accurate trajectories were forwarded to the gunners in time. Work on this basic concept continued and developed into a plan to deploy a large number of guns in [[Hyde Park, London|Hyde Park]] that were provided with pre-configured firing data for {{convert|2.5|mi|km|1|adj=mid|abbr=off}} grids of the London area. After the trajectory was determined, the guns would aim and fire between 60 and 500 rounds.<ref name=stock25 />

At a Crossbow meeting on 15 January 1945 Pile's updated plan was presented with some strong advocacy from [[Roderic Hill]] and [[Charles Drummond Ellis]]. However, the Committee suggested that a test not be performed as no technique for tracking the missiles with sufficient accuracy had yet been developed. By March this had changed significantly, with 81% of incoming missiles correctly allotted to the grid square each fell into, or the one beside it. At a 26 March meeting Pile was directed to a subcommittee with [[RV Jones]] and Ellis to further develop the statistics. Three days later the team returned a report stating that if the guns fired 2,000 rounds at a missile there was a 1 in 60 chance of shooting it down. Plans for an operational test began, but as Pile later put it, "[[Bernard Montgomery|Monty]] beat us to it", as the attacks ended with the Allied capture of their launching areas.<ref name=stock25 />

With the Germans no longer in control of any part of the continent that could be used as a launching site capable of striking London, they began targeting Antwerp. Plans were made to move the Pile system to protect that city, but the war ended before anything could be done.<ref name=stock25 />

=== Direct attack and disinformation===
The only effective defences against the V-2 campaign were to destroy the launch infrastructure—expensive in terms of bomber resources and casualties—or to cause the Germans to aim at the wrong place by [[disinformation]]. The British were able to convince the Germans to direct [[V-1 flying bomb|V-1s]] and V-2s aimed at London to less populated areas east of the city. This was done by sending deceptive reports on the sites hit and damage caused via the German espionage network in Britain, which was secretly controlled by the British (the [[Double-Cross System]]).{{sfn|Ramsey|2016|p=100}}

According to the BBC television presenter Raymond Baxter, who served with the RAF during the war, in February 1945 his squadron was performing a mission against a V2 launch site, when they saw one missile being launched. One member of Baxter's squadron opened fire on it, without effect.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.v2rocket.com/start/deployment/denhaag.html|title=V2ROCKET.COM – Den Haag (The Hague, Wassenaar, Hoek van Holland (Hook of Holland)|website=www.v2rocket.com|access-date=28 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180223065336/http://www.v2rocket.com/start/deployment/denhaag.html|archive-date=23 February 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>

On 3 March 1945, the Allies attempted to destroy V-2s and launching equipment in the "Haagse Bos" in The Hague by a [[Bombing of the Bezuidenhout|large-scale bombardment]], but due to navigational errors the [[Bezuidenhout]] quarter was destroyed, killing 511 Dutch civilians.