Editing Trajan (section)

== Military campaigns ==

=== Conquest of Dacia ===

{{Main|Trajan's Dacian Wars}}

[[File:Trajan's Column HD.jpg|thumb|[[Trajan's Column]], Rome]]

The earliest of Trajan's conquests were Rome's two wars against [[Dacia]], an area that had troubled Roman politics for over a decade in regard to the unstable peace negotiated by [[Domitian]]'s ministers with the powerful Dacian king [[Decebalus]].<ref name="Romanis REquote01" /> Dacia would be reduced by Trajan's Rome to a [[satellite state|client kingdom]] in the first war (101{{ndash}}102), followed by a second war that ended in actual incorporation into the Empire of the trans-Danube border group of Dacia.<ref name="Romanis REquote01">{{cite web|access-date= 21 July 2007|url=https://roman-emperors.sites.luc.edu/assobd.htm#t-inx|title= De Imperatoribus Romanis|website= An Online Encyclopedia of Roman Emperors|quote= Battle of Sarmizegetusa (Sarmizegetuza), A.D. 105. During Trajan's reign one of the most important Roman successes was the victory over the Dacians. The first important confrontation between the Romans and the [[Dacians]] had taken place in the year 87 and was initiated by Domitian. The [[praetorian prefect]] Cornelius Fuscus led five or six legions across the Danube on a bridge of ships and advanced towards [[Banat]] (in Romania). The Romans were surprised by a Dacian attack at Tapae (near the village of [[Bucova]], in Romania). [[Legion V Alaude]] was crushed and Cornelius Fuscus was killed. The victorious [[Dacia]]n general was called [[Decebalus]] (the brave one).}}</ref> According to the provisions of Decebalus's earlier treaty with Rome, made in the time of Domitian, Decebalus was acknowledged as ''rex amicus'', that is, client king; in exchange for accepting client status, he received from Rome both a generous stipend and a steady supply of technical experts.{{sfn|Schmitz|2005|p=9}} The treaty seems to have allowed Roman troops the right of passage through the Dacian kingdom in order to attack the [[Marcomanni]], [[Quadi]] and [[Sarmatians]]. However, senatorial opinion never forgave Domitian for paying what was seen as tribute to a barbarian king.<ref>Marcel Emerit. "Les derniers travaux des historiens roumains sur la Dacie". In: ''Revue des Études Anciennes''. Tome 41, 1939, n°1. pp. 57–64. available at [http://www.persee.fr/doc/rea_0035-2004_1939_num_41_1_3025]. Retrieved 23 February 2016.</ref> Unlike the Germanic tribes, the Dacian kingdom was an organized state capable of developing alliances of its own,{{sfn|Luttwak|1979|p=100}} thus making it a strategic threat and giving Trajan a strong motive to attack it.{{sfn|Schmitz|2005|p=13}}

In May of 101, Trajan launched his first campaign into the Dacian kingdom,<ref name="Romanis REquote05">{{cite web|url=https://roman-emperors.sites.luc.edu/assobd.htm#t-inx|title=De Imperatoribus Romanis|website=An Online Encyclopedia of Roman Emperors|access-date=8 November 2007|quote=Because the Dacians represented an obstacle against Roman expansion in the east, in the year 101 the emperor Trajan decided to begin a new campaign against them. The first war began on 25 March 101 and the Roman troops, consisting of four principal legions (X Gemina, XI Claudia, II Traiana Fortis, and XXX Ulpia Victrix), defeated the Dacians.}}</ref> crossing to the northern bank of the Danube and defeating the [[Dacian warfare|Dacian army]] at [[Tapae]] (see [[Second Battle of Tapae]]), near the [[Iron Gates of Transylvania]]. It was not a decisive victory, however.{{sfn|Le Roux|1998|p=73}} Trajan's troops took heavy losses in the encounter, and he put off further campaigning for the year in order to regroup and reinforce his army.<ref name="Romanis REquote03">{{cite web|title=Battle of Sarmizegetusa (Sarmizegetuza), A.D. 105: De Imperatoribus Romanis|url=https://roman-emperors.sites.luc.edu/assobd.htm#t-inx|website=An Online Encyclopedia of Roman Emperors|access-date=8 November 2007|quote=Although the Dacians had been defeated, the emperor postponed the final siege for the conquering of Sarmizegetuza because his armies needed reorganization. Trajan imposed on the Dacians very hard peace conditions: [[Decebalus]] had to renounce claim to part of his kingdom, including the Banat, Tara Hategului, Oltenia, and Muntenia in the area south-west of Transylvania. He had also to surrender all the Roman deserters and all his war machines. At Rome, Trajan was received as a winner and he took the name of Dacicus, a title that appears on his coinage of this period. At the beginning of the year 103 A.D., there were minted coins with the inscription: IMP NERVA TRAIANVS AVG GER DACICVS.}}</ref> Nevertheless, the battle was considered a Roman victory and Trajan strived to ultimately consolidate his position, including other major engagements, as well as the capture of Decebalus' sister as depicted on Trajan's Column.<ref name="ReferenceD">{{cite book |last=Jackson |first=Nicholas |chapter=First Dacian War |title=Trajan: Rome's Last Conqueror |publisher=GreenHill Books |location=UK |edition=1st |date=2022 |isbn=978-1784387075}}</ref>

The following winter, Decebalus took the initiative by launching a counter-attack across the Danube further downstream, supported by Sarmatian cavalry,<ref>José Maria Blázquez, ''Las res gestae de Trajano militar: las guerras dácicas''. ''Aquila Legionis'', 6 (2005) 19.</ref> forcing Trajan to come to the aid of the troops in his rearguard. The Dacians and their allies were repulsed after two battles in Moesia, at [[Nicopolis ad Istrum]] and [[Adamclisi]].<ref>Ioan Glodariu, ''LA ZONE DE SARMIZEGETUSA REGIA ET LES GUERRES DE TRAJAN''. ''Studia Antiqua et Archaeologica'', VII, Iasi, 2000. Available at [http://www.sarmizegetusa.org/doc/Glodariu%20I.%20-%20La%20zone%20de%20Sarmizegetusa%20et%20les%20guerres%20de%20Trajan(Studia%20Antiqua%20et%20Archaeologica, VII, Iasi,2000).pdf]. Retrieved 2 July 2014.</ref> Trajan's army then advanced further into Dacian territory, and, a year later, forced Decebalus to submit. He had to renounce claim to some regions of his kingdom, return runaways from Rome then under his protection (most of them technical experts), and surrender all his war machines.{{sfn|Bennett|2001|pp=94–95}} Trajan returned to Rome in triumph and was granted the title ''Dacicus''.{{sfn|Bennett|2001|p=96}} The peace of 102 had returned Decebalus to the condition of more or less harmless client king; however, he soon began to rearm, to again harbour Roman runaways, and to pressure his Western neighbours, the [[Iazyges]] Sarmatians, into allying themselves with him. Through his efforts to develop an anti-Roman bloc, Decebalus prevented Trajan from treating Dacia as a protectorate instead of an outright conquest.<ref name="Christol & Nony, 171">Christol & Nony, 171.</ref> In 104, Decebalus devised an attempt on Trajan's life by means of some Roman deserters, a plan that failed. Decebalus also took prisoner Trajan's legate Longinus, who eventually poisoned himself while in custody. Finally, in 105, Decebalus undertook an invasion of Roman-occupied territory north of the Danube.{{sfn|Dando-Collins|2012|p=not numbered}}<ref name="Romanis REquote04">{{cite web|title=Battle of Sarmizegetusa (Sarmizegetuza), A.D. 105: De Imperatoribus Romanis|url=https://roman-emperors.sites.luc.edu/assobd.htm#t-inx|website=An Online Encyclopedia of Roman Emperors|access-date=8 November 2007|quote=However, during the years 103–105, Decebalus did not respect the peace conditions imposed by Trajan and the emperor then decided to destroy completely the Dacian kingdom and to conquer Sarmizegetuza.}}</ref>

[[File:Decebal's portrait.png|thumb|200px|left|Portrait of King [[Decebalus]] in the ''Cartea omului matur'' (1919)]]

Prior to the campaign, Trajan had raised two entirely new legions: [[Legio II Traiana Fortis|II Traiana]]{{snds}}which, however, may have been posted in the East, at the Syrian port of [[Laodicea ad Mare|Laodicea]]{{snds}}and [[XXX Ulpia Victrix]], which was posted to [[Brigetio]], in [[Pannonia (Roman province)|Pannonia]].{{sfn|Dando-Collins|2012|p=not numbered}}<ref>In the absence of literary references, however, the positioning of the new legions is conjectural: some scholars think that Legio II Traiana Fortis was originally stationed on the Lower Danube and participated in the Second Dacian War, being only later deployed to the East:cf. Ritterling, E., 1925. RE XII. Col. 1485. Syme, R., 1971. ''Danubian Papers'', Bucharest. p. 106. Strobel, K., 1984. "Untersuchungen zu den Dakerkriegen Trajans. Studien zur Geschichte des mittleren und unteren Donauraumes in der Hohen Kaiserzeit", ''Antiquitas'' I 33. Bonn. p. 98. Strobel, K., 2010. ''Kaiser Traian. Eine Epoche der Weltgeschichte'', Verlag Friedrich Pustet. Regensburg. pp. 254–255, 265, 299, 364. Urloiu, R-L., AGAIN ON LEGIO II TRAIANA FORTIS,. ''History and Civilization''. EUBSR 2013 International Conference, Volume 2.</ref> By 105, the concentration of Roman troops assembled in the middle and lower Danube amounted to fourteen legions (up from nine in 101){{snds}}about half of the entire Roman army.{{sfn|Mattern|1999|p=93}} Even after the Dacian wars, the Danube frontier would permanently replace the Rhine as the main military axis of the Roman Empire.{{sfn|Le Roux|1998|p=74}} Including [[auxilia]]ries, the number of Roman troops engaged on both campaigns was between 150,000 and 175,000, while Decebalus could dispose of up to 200,000.{{sfn|Le Roux|1998|p=73}} Other estimates for the Roman forces involved in Trajan's second Dacian War cite around 86,000 for active campaigning with large reserves retained in the proximal provinces, and potentially much lower numbers around 50,000 for Decebalus' depleted forces and absent allies.<ref name="ReferenceE">{{cite book |last=Jackson |first=Nicholas |chapter=Second Dacian War |title=Trajan: Rome's Last Conqueror |publisher=GreenHill Books |location=UK |edition=1st |date=2022 |isbn=978-1784387075}}</ref>

In a fierce campaign that seems to have consisted mostly of static warfare, the Dacians, devoid of manoeuvring room, kept to their network of fortresses, which the Romans sought systematically to storm{{sfn|Găzdac|2010|p=49}} (see also [[Second Dacian War]]). The Romans gradually tightened their grip around Decebalus' stronghold in [[Sarmizegetusa Regia]],{{sfn|Le Roux|1998|p=74}} which they finally took and destroyed. A controversial scene on Trajan's column just before the fall of Sarmizegetusa Regia suggests that Decebalus may have offered poison to his remaining men as an alternative option to capture or death while trying to flee the besieged capital with him.<ref name="ReferenceE"/> Decebalus fled but, when later cornered by Roman cavalry, committed suicide. His severed head, brought to Trajan by the cavalryman [[Tiberius Claudius Maximus]],<ref>Anton J. L. van Hooff, ''From Autothanasia to Suicide: Self-killing in Classical Antiquity''. London: Routledge, 2002, {{ISBN|0-415-04055-8}}, p. 277, note 41.</ref> was later exhibited in Rome on the steps leading up to the [[Capitoline Hill|Capitol]] and thrown on the [[Gemonian stairs]].<ref>Harriet I. Flower, ''The Art of Forgetting: Disgrace & Oblivion in Roman Political Culture''. University of North Carolina Press, 2006, {{ISBN|978-0-8078-3063-5}}, p. 253.</ref> The famous Dacian treasures were not found in the captured capital and their whereabouts were only revealed when a Dacian nobleman called Bikilis was captured.  Decebalus’ treasures had been buried under a temporarily diverted river and the captive workers executed to retain the secret.  Staggering amounts of gold and silver were found and packed off to fill Rome's coffers.<ref name="ReferenceE"/>

[[File:UlpiaTraianaSarmizegetusa.jpg|thumb|200px|right|The amphitheater at [[Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa]]]]

Trajan built a new city, [[Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa|Colonia Ulpia Traiana Augusta Dacica Sarmizegetusa]], on another site (north of the hill citadel holding the previous Dacian capital),<ref>Martin Goodman, ''The Roman World 44 BC–AD 180'', 253.</ref> although bearing the same full name, Sarmizegetusa. This capital city was conceived as a purely civilian administrative centre and was provided the usual Romanized administrative apparatus ([[Decurion (administrative)|decurions]], [[aedile]]s, etc.).<ref>Jennifer Trimble, ''Women and Visual Replication in Roman Imperial Art and Culture''. Cambridge U. Press, 2011, {{ISBN|978-0-521-82515-3}}, p. 288.</ref> Urban life in Roman Dacia seems to have been restricted to Roman colonists, mostly military veterans;<ref>Ioana A. Oltean, ''Dacia: Landscape, Colonization and Romanization''. Abingdon: Routledge, 2007, {{ISBN|0-203-94583-2}}, p. 222.</ref> there is no extant evidence for the existence in the province of [[Peregrinus (Roman)|peregrine]] cities. Native Dacians continued to live in scattered rural settlements, according to their own ways.{{sfn|Le Roux|1998|p=268}} In another arrangement with no parallels in any other Roman province, the existing quasi-urban Dacian settlements disappeared after the Roman conquest.<ref>Carbó García, Juan Ramón. " ''Dacia Capta'': particularidades de un proceso de conquista y romanización." ''Habis'', 41, 275–292 (2010).</ref>

A number of unorganized urban settlements ([[vicus|''vici'']]) developed around military encampments in Dacia proper – the most important being [[Alba Iulia|Apulum]] – but were only acknowledged as cities proper well after Trajan's reign.<ref>Meléndez, Javier Bermejo, Santiago Robles Esparcia, and Juan M. Campos Carrasco. "Trajano fundador. El último impulso colonizador del imperio." ''Onoba. Revista de Arqueología y Antigüedad'' 1 (2013).</ref> The main regional effort of urbanization was concentrated by Trajan at the rearguard, in Moesia, where he created the new cities of Nicopolis ad Istrum and [[Marcianopolis]]. A [[vicus]] was also created around the Tropaeum Traianum.{{sfn|Sartre|1994|p=269}} The garrison city of [[Oescus]] received the status of [[Roman colony]] after its [[legionary]] garrison was redeployed.{{sfn|Sartre|1994|p=269}} The fact that these former Danubian outposts had ceased to be frontier bases and were now in the deep rear acted as an inducement to their urbanization and development.{{sfn|Luttwak|1979|pp=101, 104}} Not all of Dacia was permanently occupied. After the post-Trajanic evacuation of lands across the lower Danube,{{sfn|Luttwak|1979|p=101}} land extending from the Danube to the inner arch of the [[Carpathian Mountains]], including [[Transylvania]], the [[Metaliferi Mountains]] and [[Oltenia]] was absorbed into the Roman province, which eventually took the form of an "excrescence" with ill-defined limits, stretching from the Danube northwards to the [[Carpathians]].{{sfn|Le Roux|1998|p=74}} This may have been intended as a basis for further expansion within Eastern Europe, as the Romans believed the region to be much more geographically "flattened", and thus easier to traverse, than it actually was; they also underestimated the distance from those vaguely defined borders to the ocean.{{sfn|Mattern|1999|p=61}}

[[File:Londinium Roman Wall (39482079765).jpg|thumb|left|Modern [[statue of Trajan]] at [[Tower Hill]], London]]

Defence of the province was entrusted to a single legion, the [[Legio XIII Gemina|XIII Gemina]], stationed at [[Alba Julia|Apulum]], which functioned as an advance guard that could, in case of need, strike either west or east at the Sarmatians living at the borders.{{sfn|Luttwak|1979|pp=101, 104}} Therefore, the indefensible character of the province did not appear to be a problem for Trajan, as the province was conceived more as a sally-base for further attacks.<ref>Frank Vermeulen, Kathy Sas, Wouter Dhaeze, eds. ''Archaeology in Confrontation: Aspects of Roman Military Presence in the Northwest : Studies in Honour of Prof. Em. Hugo Thoen''. Ghent: Academia Press, 2004, {{ISBN|90-382-0578-3}}, p. 218.</ref> Even in the absence of further Roman expansion, the value of the province depended on Roman overall strength: while Rome was strong, the Dacian salient was an instrument of military and diplomatic control over the Danubian lands; when Rome was weak, as during the [[Crisis of the Third Century]], the province became a liability and was eventually abandoned.{{sfn|Luttwak|1979|p=104}} Trajan resettled Dacia with Romans and annexed it as a province of the Roman Empire. Aside from their enormous booty (over half a million slaves, according to [[John Lydus]]),<ref>Moses I. Finley, ed., ''Classical Slavery'', London: Routledge, 2014, {{ISBN|0-7146-3320-8}}, p. 122.</ref> Trajan's Dacian campaigns benefited the Empire's finances through the acquisition of Dacia's gold mines, managed by an imperial [[Procurator (Roman)|procurator]] of [[Equestrian order|equestrian]] rank (''procurator aurariarum'').{{sfn|Le Roux|1998|p=241}} On the other hand, commercial agricultural exploitation on the [[Roman villa|villa]] model, based on the centralized management of a huge landed estate by a single owner (''fundus'') was poorly developed.{{sfn|Le Roux|1998|pp=202, 242}} Therefore, use of slave labor in the province itself seems to have been relatively undeveloped, and epigraphic evidence points to work in the gold mines being conducted by means of labor contracts (''locatio conductio rei'') and seasonal wage-earning.<ref>Steven A. Epstein, ''Wage Labor and Guilds in Medieval Europe''. UNC Press, 1991, {{ISBN|0-8078-1939-5}}, p. 26; Paul du Plessis, ''Studying Roman Law''. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014, p. 82.</ref> The victory was commemorated by the construction both of the 102 cenotaph generally known as the [[Tropaeum Traiani]] in Moesia, as well of the much later (113) Trajan's Column in Rome, the latter depicting in stone carved bas-reliefs the Dacian Wars' most important moments.{{sfn|Bennett|2001|pp=102, 90}}

=== Nabataean annexation ===

In 106, [[Rabbel II Soter]], one of Rome's client kings, died. This event might have prompted the annexation of the [[Nabataean Kingdom]], but the manner and the formal reasons for the annexation are unclear. Some epigraphic evidence suggests a military operation, with forces from Syria and [[Egypt (Roman province)|Egypt]]. What is known is that by 107, Roman legions were stationed in the area around [[Petra]] and [[Bosra]], as is shown by a papyrus found in Egypt. The furthest south the Romans occupied (or, better, garrisoned, adopting a policy of having garrisons at key points in the desert){{sfn|Sartre|1994|p=46}} was [[Mada'in Saleh|Hegra]], over {{convert|300|km|mi}} south-west of [[Petra]].{{sfn|Bennett|2001|p=177}} The empire gained what became the province of [[Arabia Petraea]] (modern southern Jordan and northwest Saudi Arabia).{{sfn|Bennett|2001|pp=172–182}} At this time, a Roman road (''[[Via Traiana Nova]]'') was built from Aila (now [[Aqaba]]) in [[Limes Arabicus]] to [[Bosra]]h.{{sfn|Browning|1982|p=33}} As Nabataea was the last client kingdom in Asia west of the Euphrates, the annexation meant that the entire Roman East had been provincialized, completing a trend towards direct rule that had begun under the Flavians.{{sfn|Sartre|1994|p=46}}

=== Parthian campaign ===

{{main|Trajan's Parthian campaign}}

[[File:Asia Minor in the 2nd century AD - general map - Roman provinces under Trajan - bleached - English legend.jpg|thumb|300px|Anatolia, western Caucasus and northern Levant under Trajan]]

In 113, Trajan embarked on his last campaign, provoked by [[Parthian Empire|Parthia]]'s decision to put an unacceptable king on the throne of Armenia, a kingdom over which the two great empires had shared [[hegemony]] since the time of [[Nero]] some fifty years earlier. Trajan, already in Syria early in 113, consistently refused to accept diplomatic approaches from the Parthians intended to settle the Armenian imbroglio peacefully.<ref>Brian Campbell, "War and Diplomacy: Rome & Parthia 31 BC – AD 235". IN John Rich, Graham Shipley, eds.''War and Society in the Roman World''. London: Routledge, 1993, {{ISBN|0-203-07554-4}}, p. 234.</ref> As the surviving literary accounts of Trajan's Parthian War are fragmentary and scattered,<ref>R. P. Longden, "Notes on the Parthian Campaigns of Trajan". The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 21 (1931), pp. 1–35. Available at [https://archive.org/stream/Longden1931TrajanParthians/Longden_1931_Trajan_Parthians_djvu.txt]. Retrieved 18 August 2019.</ref> it is difficult to assign them a proper context, something that has led to a long-running controversy about its precise happenings and ultimate aims.

==== Cause of the war ====

Modern historians advance the possibility that Trajan's decision to wage war against Parthia had economic motives: after Trajan's annexation of Arabia, he built a new road, [[Via Traiana Nova]], that went from [[Bosra|Bostra]] to [[Aqaba|Aila]] on the Red Sea.{{sfn|Sidebotham|1986|p=154}} That meant that [[Charax Spasinou|Charax]] on the Persian Gulf was the sole remaining western terminus of the Indian trade route outside direct Roman control,<ref name="Christol & Nony, Rome, 171">Christol & Nony, Rome, 171.</ref> and such control was important in order to lower import prices and to limit the supposed drain of precious metals created by the deficit in Roman trade with the Far East.{{sfn|Young|2001|p=181}} That Charax traded with the Roman Empire, there can be no doubt, as its actual connections with merchants from [[Palmyra]] during the period are well documented in a contemporary Palmyrene epigraph, which tells of various Palmyrene citizens honoured for holding office in Charax.<ref>Daniel T. Potts, ed., ''Araby the Blest: Studies in Arabian Archaeology''. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1988, {{ISBN|87-7289-051-7}}, p. 142.</ref> Also, Charax's rulers' domains at the time possibly included the Bahrain islands, which offered the possibility of extending Roman hegemony into the Persian Gulf itself.<ref>Potts, 143.</ref> (A Palmyrene citizen held office as [[satrap]] over the islands shortly after Trajan's death,{{sfn|Veyne|2005|p=279}} though the appointment was made by a Parthian king of Charax.<ref>Julian Reade, ed.,''The Indian Ocean In Antiquity''. London: Routledge, 2013, {{ISBN|0-7103-0435-8}}, p. 279.</ref>)  The rationale behind Trajan's campaign, in this case, was one of breaking down a system of Far Eastern trade through small Semitic ("Arab") cities under Parthia's control and to put it under Roman control instead.<ref>George Fadlo Hourani, ''Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times''. Princeton University Press, 1995, {{ISBN|0-691-00170-7}}, p. 15.</ref>

[[File:Trajan RIC 325 - 650918.jpg|thumb|left|270px|[[Aureus]] issued by Trajan to celebrate the conquest of Parthia. Inscription: IMP. CAES. NER. TRAIAN. OPTIM. AVG. GER. DAC. PARTHICO / P. M., TR. P., CO[N]S. VI, P. P., S.P.Q.R. – PARTHIA CAPTA]]

In his Dacian conquests, Trajan had already resorted to Syrian auxiliary units, whose veterans, along with Syrian traders, had an important role in the subsequent colonization of Dacia.{{sfn|Găzdac|2010|p=59}} He had recruited Palmyrene units into his army, including a camel unit,<ref>Pat Southern, ''Empress Zenobia: Palmyra's Rebel Queen''. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2008, {{ISBN|978-1-84725-034-6}}, p. 25.</ref> therefore apparently procuring Palmyrene support to his ultimate goal of annexing Charax. It has even been ventured that, when earlier in his campaign Trajan annexed Armenia, he was bound to annex the whole of Mesopotamia lest the Parthians interrupt the flux of trade from the Persian Gulf and/or foment trouble at the Roman frontier on the Danube.<ref>Freya Stark, ''Rome on the Euphrates: The Story of a Frontier''.London: I.{{nbsp}}B. Tauris, 2012, {{ISBN|978-1-84885-314-0}}, p. 211.</ref> Other historians reject these motives, as the supposed Parthian "control" over the maritime Far Eastern trade route was, at best, conjectural and based on a selective reading of Chinese sources{{snds}}trade by land through Parthia seems to have been unhampered by Parthian authorities and left solely to the devices of private enterprise.{{sfn|Young|2001|p=176 sqq}} Commercial activity in second century Mesopotamia seems to have been a general phenomenon, shared by many peoples within and without the Roman Empire, with no sign of a concerted Imperial policy towards it.{{sfn|Finley|1999|p=158}}

As in the case of the ''alimenta'', scholars like Moses Finley and [[Paul Veyne]] have considered the idea that a foreign trade policy underlay Trajan's war to be anachronistic; according to these scholars, the concern of Roman leaders with the trade in far eastern luxuries{{snds}}besides collecting toll taxes and customs<ref>Paul Erdkamp, ''The Grain Market in the Roman Empire: A Social, Political and Economic Study''. Cambridge University Press, 2005, {{ISBN|978-0-521-83878-8}}, p. 5.</ref>{{snds}}was moral in nature, because contemporary Roman mores frowned upon the "softness" of luxuries.{{sfn|Finley|1999|p=132}}{{sfn|Veyne|2001|pp=163/215}} In the absence of conclusive evidence, trade between Rome and India might have been far more balanced, in terms of quantities of precious metals exchanged: one of our sources for the notion of the Roman gold drain{{snds}}Pliny's the Younger's uncle Pliny the Elder{{snds}}had earlier described the [[Gangetic Plains]] as one of the gold sources for the Roman Empire.{{sfn|Veyne|2001|p=181}} Accordingly – in a controversial book on the Roman economy – Finley considers Trajan's "badly miscalculated and expensive assault on Parthia" to be an example of the many Roman "commercial wars" that had in common the fact of existing only in the books of modern historians.{{sfn|Finley|1999|p=158}}

[[File:Statue of Trajan from Minturno - Museo Archeologico di Napoli.jpg|thumb|Trajan, "[[Palladium (classical antiquity)|the Palladium]]", white marble statue at Naples Archeological Museum, late 1st century AD]]

The alternative view is to see the campaign as triggered by the lure of territorial annexation and prestige,{{sfn|Finley|1999|p=158}} the sole motive ascribed by Cassius Dio.{{sfn|Bennett|2001|p=188}} As far as territorial conquest involved tax-collecting,<ref>Michael Alexander Speidel: "Bellicosissimus Princeps". In: Annette Nünnerich-Asmus ed., ''Traian. Ein Kaiser der Superlative am Beginn einer Umbruchzeit?'' Mainz 2002, pp. 23/40.</ref> especially of the 25% tax levied on all goods entering the Roman Empire, the ''tetarte'', one can say that Trajan's Parthian War had an "economic" motive.{{sfn|Sidebotham|1986|p=144}} Also, there was the propaganda value of an Eastern conquest that would emulate, in Roman fashion, those of [[Alexander the Great]].<ref>Nathanael John Andrade, ''"Imitation Greeks": Being Syrian in the Greco-Roman World (175 BCE – 275 CE)''. Doctoral Thesis, University of Michigan, 2009, p. 192. Available at [https://www.proquest.com/docview/304928274]. Retrieved 11 June 2014.</ref> The fact that emissaries from the [[Kushan Empire]] might have attended to the commemorative ceremonies for the Dacian War may have kindled in some Greco-Roman intellectuals like [[Plutarch]]{{snds}}who wrote about only 70,000 Roman soldiers being necessary to a conquest of India{{Citation needed|date= June 2023}} {{snds}}as well as in Trajan's closer associates, speculative dreams about the booty to be obtained by reproducing Macedonian Eastern conquests.<ref>Raoul McLaughlin, ''Rome and the Distant East: Trade Routes to the Ancient Lands of Arabia, India and China''. London: Continuum, 2010, {{ISBN|978-1-84725-235-7}}, p. 130.</ref> There could also be Trajan's idea to use an ambitious blueprint of conquests as a way to emphasize quasi-divine status, such as with his cultivated association, in coins and monuments, to [[Hercules]].<ref>Olivier Hekster, "Propagating power: Hercules as an example for second-century emperors". ''Herakles and Hercules. Exploring a Graeco-Roman Divinity'' (2005): 205–21.Available at [https://www.academia.edu/2129770/Propagating_power_Hercules_as_an_example_for_second-century_emperors] Retrieved 18 August 2019.</ref>

Also, it is possible that the attachment of Trajan to an expansionist policy was supported by a powerful circle of conservative senators from Hispania committed to a policy of imperial expansion, first among them being the all-powerful Licinius Sura.{{sfn|Des Boscs-Plateaux|2005|pp=304, 311}} Alternatively, one can explain the campaign by the fact that, for the Romans, their empire was in principle unlimited, and that Trajan only took advantage of an opportunity to make idea and reality coincide.<ref>Dexter Hoyos, ed., ''A Companion to Roman Imperialism''. Leiden: Brill, 2012, {{ISBN|978-90-04-23593-9}}, p. 262.</ref> Finally, there are other modern historians who think that Trajan's original aims were purely military and strategic: to assure a more defensible Eastern frontier for the Roman Empire, crossing Northern Mesopotamia along the course of the [[Khabur (Euphrates)|Khabur River]] in order to offer cover to a Roman Armenia.{{sfn|Luttwak|1979|p=108}}<ref name="ReferenceF">{{cite book |last=Jackson |first=Nicholas |chapter=Parthian War |title=Trajan: Rome's Last Conqueror |publisher=GreenHill Books |location=UK |edition=1st |date=2022 |isbn=978-1784387075}}</ref> This interpretation is backed by the fact that all subsequent Roman wars against Parthia would aim at establishing a Roman presence deep into Parthia itself.<ref>David Kennedy & Derrick Riley, ''Rome's Desert Frontiers''. London: B.T. Datsford Limited, 2004, {{ISBN|0-7134-6262-0}}, pp. 31/32.</ref> It is possible that during the onset of Trajan's military experience, as a young tribune, he had witnessed engagement with the Parthians; so any strategic vision was grounded in a tactical awareness of what was needed to tackle Parthia.<ref name="ReferenceF"/>

==== Course of the war ====
[[File:Trajan inscription Artaxata, Armenia 116.jpg|thumb|An AD 116 [[:File:Trajan inscription Artaxata, Armenia 116 full.jpg|inscription]] of the [[Legio IV Scythica]] found near the Armenian capital [[Artaxata]] mentioning Trajan.<ref>Discovered in 1967 in [[Pokr Vedi]], made of [[Vedi]] [[limestone]]. Now kept at the [[History Museum of Armenia]] (see [[:File:Trajan inscription Artaxata, Armenia 116 sign.jpg|sign]]). {{cite journal |last1=Arakelyan |first1=Babken |author1-link=Babken Arakelyan |title=Լատիներեն արձանագրություններ Արտաշատ մայրաքաղաքից [Inscriptions in Latin from the Ancient Armenian Capital of Artashat] |journal=[[Patma-Banasirakan Handes]] |date=1967 |issue=4 |pages=302–311 |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161111133137/hpj.asj-oa.am/1121/ |language=hy}}</ref>]]

The campaign was carefully planned in advance: ten legions were concentrated in the Eastern theatre; since 111, the correspondence of Pliny the Younger witnesses to the fact that provincial authorities in Bithynia had to organize supplies for passing troops, and local city councils and their individual members had to shoulder part of the increased expenses by supplying troops themselves.<ref>Fergus Millar, ''The Roman Near East, 31 B.C. – A.D. 337''. Harvard University Press, 1993, {{ISBN|0-674-77886-3}}, p. 103.</ref> The intended campaign, therefore, was immensely costly from its very beginning.<ref>M.Christol & D. Nony, ''Rome et son Empire''. Paris: Hachette, 2003, {{ISBN|2-01-145542-1}}, p. 171.</ref> Trajan marched first on Armenia, deposed the Parthian-appointed king, [[Parthamasiris of Armenia|Parthamasiris]] (who was afterwards murdered while kept in the custody of Roman troops in an unclear incident, later described by [[Marcus Cornelius Fronto|Fronto]] as a breach of Roman good faith),<ref>John Rich, Graham Shipley, eds., ''War and Society in the Roman World''. London: Routledge, 1993, {{ISBN|0-415-06644-1}}, p. 235.</ref> and annexed it to the Roman Empire as a province, receiving in passing the acknowledgement of Roman hegemony by various tribes in the Caucasus and on the Eastern coast of the Black Sea{{snds}}a process that kept him busy until the end of 114.{{sfn|Bennett|2001|pp=194–195}} At the same time, a Roman column under the legate [[Lusius Quietus]]{{snds}}an outstanding cavalry general<ref>Hermann Bengtson, ''Römische Geschichte: Republik und Kaiserzeit bis 284 n. Chr''. Munich: Beck, 2001, {{ISBN|3-406-02505-6}}, p. 289.</ref> who had signalled himself during the Dacian Wars by commanding a unit from his native [[Mauretania]]<ref>Alfred S. Bradford, ''With Arrow, Sword, and Spear: A History of Warfare in the Ancient World''. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2001, {{ISBN|0-275-95259-2}}, p. 232.</ref>{{snds}}crossed the [[Aras (river)|Araxes]] river from Armenia into [[Media Atropatene]] and the land of the [[Mardians]] (present-day [[Ghilan]]).{{sfn|Choisnel|2004|p=164}} It is possible that Quietus' campaign had as its goal the extending of the newer, more defensible Roman border eastwards towards the [[Caspian Sea]] and northwards to the foothills of the Caucasus.<ref>S.J. De Laet, review of Lepper, ''Trajan's Parthian War''. ''L'Antiquité Classique'', 18-2, 1949, pp. 487–489.</ref> This newer, more "rational" frontier, depended, however, on an increased, permanent Roman presence east of the Euphrates.<ref>Richard Stoneman, ''Palmyra and Its Empire: Zenobia's Revolt Against Rome''. Ann Arbor: 1994, University of Michigan Press, {{ISBN|0-472-08315-5}}, p. 89.</ref>

[[File:Trajan Sestertius 116 833039.jpg|thumb|270px|right|[[Sestertius]] during 116 to commemorate [[Trajan's Parthian campaign|Trajan's Parthian victories]]. [[Obverse]]: bust of Trajan, with laurel crown; caption: IMP. CAES. NERV. TRAIANO OPTIMO AVG. GER. DAC. PARTHICO P. M., TR. P., COS VI, P. P.; Reverse: Trajan standing between prostrate allegories of [[Kingdom of Armenia (antiquity)|Armenia]] (crowned with a [[tiara]]) and the Rivers Tigris & Euphrates; caption: ARMENIA ET MESOPOTAMIA IN POTESTATEM P. R. REDACTAE (put under the authority of the Roman People) – S. C. (Senatus Consultus, issued by [[Senate of the Roman Empire|the Senate]]).]]

The chronology of subsequent events is uncertain, but it is generally believed that early in 115 Trajan launched a Mesopotamian campaign, marching down towards the Taurus mountains in order to consolidate territory between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. He placed permanent garrisons along the way to secure the territory.<ref>{{cite book|last=Sheldon|first=Rose Mary|title=Rome's Wars in Parthia: Blood in the Sand|date=2010|publisher=Vallentine Mitchell|location=London|page=133}}</ref> While Trajan moved from west to east, Lusius Quietus moved with his army from the Caspian Sea towards the west, both armies performing a successful pincer movement,{{sfn|Bennett|2001|p=195}} whose apparent result was to establish a Roman presence into the Parthian Empire proper, with Trajan taking the northern Mesopotamian cities of [[Nisibis]] and [[Suruç#History|Batnae]] and organizing a province of [[Mesopotamia (Roman province)|Mesopotamia]], including the Kingdom of [[Osrhoene]]{{snds}}where King [[Abgar VII]] submitted to Trajan publicly<ref>[[Maurice Sartre]], ''The Middle East Under Rome''. Harvard University Press, 2005, {{ISBN|0-674-01683-1}}, p. 146. According to Cassius Dio, the deal between Trajan and Abgaros was sealed by the king's son offering himself as Trajan's paramour—Bennett, 199.</ref>{{snds}}as a Roman protectorate.{{sfn|Bennett|2001|p=199}} This process seems to have been completed at the beginning of 116, when coins were issued announcing that Armenia and Mesopotamia had been put under the authority of the Roman people.<ref>Bennett, Trajan, 196; Christol & Nony, Rome,171.</ref> The area between the Khabur River and the mountains around [[Singara]] seems to have been considered as the new frontier, and as such received a road surrounded by fortresses.{{sfn|Petit|1976|p=44}}

After wintering in Antioch during 115/116 {{snds}}and, according to literary sources, barely escaping from a [[115 Antioch earthquake|violent earthquake]] that claimed the life of one of the consuls, [[Marcus Pedo Vergilianus|Marcus Pedo Virgilianus]]<ref>Fergus Millar, ''The Roman Near East, 31 B.C. – A.D. 337''. Harvard University Press, 1993, {{ISBN|0-674-77886-3}}, p. 101.</ref>{{sfn|Birley|2013|p=71}}{{snds}}Trajan again took to the field in 116, with a view to the conquest of the whole of Mesopotamia, an overambitious goal that eventually backfired on the results of his entire campaign. According to some modern historians, the aim of the campaign of 116 was to achieve a "pre-emptive demonstration" aiming not toward the conquest of Parthia, but for tighter Roman control over the Eastern trade route. However, the overall scarcity of manpower for the Roman military establishment meant that the campaign was doomed from the start.<ref>Patrick Le Roux, IN Ségolène Demougin, ed., ''H.-G. Pflaum, un historien du XXe siècle: actes du colloque international, Paris les 21, 22 et 23 octobre 2004''. Geneva: Droz, 2006, {{ISBN|2-600-01099-8}}, pp. 182/183.</ref> It is noteworthy that no new legions were raised by Trajan before the Parthian campaign, maybe because the sources of new citizen recruits were already over-exploited.{{sfn|Petit|1976|p=45}}

As far as the sources allow a description of this campaign, it seems that one Roman division crossed the [[Tigris]] into [[Adiabene]], sweeping south and capturing Adenystrae; a second followed the river south, capturing [[Babylon]]; Trajan himself sailed down the [[Euphrates]] from [[Dura-Europos]]{{snds}}where a triumphal arch was erected in his honour{{snds}}through Ozogardana, where he erected a "tribunal" still to be seen at the time of [[Julian the Apostate|Julian the Apostate's]] campaigns in the same area. Having come to the narrow strip of land between the Euphrates and the Tigris, he then dragged his fleet overland into the Tigris, capturing [[Seleucia on the Tigris|Seleucia]] and finally the Parthian capital of [[Ctesiphon]].{{sfn|Bennett|2001|pp=197/199}}{{sfn|Birley|2013|p=72}} He continued southward to the [[Persian Gulf]], when, after escaping with his fleet a tidal bore on the Tigris,<ref name="ReferenceC">Longden, "Notes on the Parthian Campaigns", 8.</ref> he received the submission of Athambelus, the ruler of [[Charax Spasinu|Charax]]. He declared Babylon a new province of the Empire and had his statue erected on the shore of the Persian Gulf,<ref>T. Olajos, "Le monument du triomphe de Trajan en Parthie. Quelques renseignements inobservés (Jean d'Ephèse, Anthologie Grecque XVI 72)". ''Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae'', 1981, vol. 29, no 1-4, pp. 379–383. The statue was torn down by [[Sassanids]] in 571/572.</ref> after which he sent the Senate a laurelled letter declaring the war to be at a close and bemoaning that he was too old to go on any further and repeat the conquests of [[Alexander the Great]].{{sfn|Bennett|2001|p=199}} Since Charax was a ''de facto'' independent kingdom whose connections to Palmyra were described above, Trajan's bid for the Persian Gulf may have coincided with Palmyrene interests in the region.{{sfn|Edwell|2007|p=21}} Another hypothesis is that the rulers of Charax had expansionist designs on Parthian Babylon, giving them a rationale for alliance with Trajan.<ref>E. J. Keall, ''Parthian Nippur and Vologases' Southern Strategy: A Hypothesis''. ''Journal of the American Oriental Society'' Vol. 95, No. 4 (Oct. – Dec. 1975), pp. 620–632.</ref> The Parthian city of [[Susa]] was apparently also occupied by the Romans.<ref>George Rawlinson, ''Parthia''. New York: Cosimo, 2007, {{ISBN|978-1-60206-136-1}}, p. 310.</ref>

[[File:TrajanCoinAhinposhBuddhistMonasteryAfghanistan.jpg|thumb|200px|left|A coin of Trajan, found together with coins of the [[Kushan Empire|Kushan]] ruler [[Kanishka]], at the [[Ahin Posh]] Buddhist Monastery, Afghanistan. Caption: IMP. CAES. NER. TRAIANO OPTIMO AVG. GER. DAC.]]

According to late literary sources (not backed by numismatic or inscriptional evidence) a province of [[Roman Assyria|Assyria]] was also proclaimed,<ref>Christopher S. Mackay, ''Ancient Rome: A Military and Political History''.Cambridge University Press, 2004, {{ISBN|0-521-80918-5}}, p. 227.</ref> apparently covering the territory of Adiabene.<ref>Various authors have discussed the existence of the province and its location: André Maricq (La province d'Assyrie créée par Trajan. A propos de la guerre parthique de Trajan. In: Maricq: ''Classica et orientalia'', Paris 1965, pp. 103/111) identifies Assyria with Southern Mesopotamia; Chris S. Lightfood ("Trajan's Parthian War and the Fourth-Century Perspective", ''Journal of Roman Studies'' 80, 1990, pp. 115–126), doubts the actual existence of the province; Maria G. Angeli Bertinelli ("I Romani oltre l'Eufrate nel II secolo d. C. – le provincie di Assiria, di Mesopotamia e di Osroene", In ''Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt'', Bd. 9.1, Berlin 1976, pp. 3/45) puts Assyria between Mesopotamia and Adiabene; Lepper (1948, p. 146) considers Assyria and Adiabene to be the same province.</ref> Some measures seem to have been considered regarding the fiscal administration of Indian trade{{snds}}or simply about the payment of customs (''portoria'') on goods traded on the Euphrates and Tigris.{{sfn|Luttwak|1979|p=110}}{{sfn|Edwell|2007|p=21}} It is possible that it was this "streamlining" of the administration of the newly conquered lands according to the standard pattern of Roman provincial administration in tax collecting, requisitions and the handling of local potentates' prerogatives, that triggered later resistance against Trajan.<ref>Janos Harmatta and others, eds., ''History of Civilizations of Central Asia: The development of sedentary and nomadic civilizations, 700 B.C. to A.D. 250''. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1999, {{ISBN|81-208-1408-8}}, p. 135.</ref> According to some modern historians, Trajan might have busied himself during his stay on the Persian Gulf with ordering raids on the Parthian coasts,<ref>Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, ''Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf: A Maritime Political Geography'', London: Routledge, 2013, {{ISBN|0-7007-1098-1}}, p. 120.</ref> as well as probing into extending Roman suzerainty over the mountaineer tribes holding the passes across the [[Zagros Mountains]] into the [[Iranian plateau]] eastward, as well as establishing some sort of direct contact between Rome and the Kushan Empire.{{sfn|Choisnel|2004|pp=164/165}} No attempt was made to expand into the Iranian Plateau itself, where the Roman army, with its relative weakness in cavalry, would have been at a disadvantage.<ref>Axel Kristinsson, ''Expansions: Competition and Conquest in Europe Since the Bronze Age''. Reykjavík:  ReykjavíkurAkademían, 2010, {{ISBN|978-9979-9922-1-9}}, p. 129.</ref>

Trajan left the Persian Gulf for Babylon{{snds}}where he intended to offer sacrifice to Alexander in the house where he had died in 323{{nbsp}}BC<ref name="Bennett, Trajan, 199">Bennett, Trajan, 199.</ref>{{snds}} But a revolt led by [[Sanatruces II of Parthia|Sanatruces]], a nephew of the Parthian king [[Osroes I]] who had retained a cavalry force, possibly strengthened by the addition of [[Saka]] archers,<ref>Kaveh Farrokh, ''Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War''. Oxford: Osprey, 2007, {{ISBN|978-1-84603-108-3}}, p. 162.</ref> imperilled Roman positions in Mesopotamia and Armenia. Trajan sought to deal with this by forsaking direct Roman rule in Parthia proper, at least partially.{{sfn|Bennett|2001|p=200}} Trajan sent two armies towards Northern Mesopotamia: the first, under Lusius Quietus, recovered Nisibis and [[Edessa]] from the rebels, probably having King Abgarus deposed and killed in the process,{{sfn|Bennett|2001|p=200}} with Quietus probably earning the right to receive the honors of a senator of praetorian rank (''adlectus inter praetorios'').<ref>''The Cambridge Ancient History: The Imperial peace, A.D. 70–192'', 1965 ed., p. 249.</ref> The second army, however, under Appius Maximus Santra (probably a governor of Macedonia) was defeated and Santra killed.<ref name=":0">Julián González, ed., ''Trajano Emperador De Roma'', 216.</ref>

Later in 116, Trajan, with the assistance of Quietus and two other legates, [[Marcus Erucius Clarus]] and Tiberius Julius Alexander Julianus,<ref>The last two were made consuls (''suffecti'') for the year 117.</ref><ref name=":0"/> defeated a Parthian army in a battle where Sanatruces was killed (possibly with the assistance of Osroes' son and Sanatruces' cousin, [[Parthamaspates of Parthia|Parthamaspates]], whom Trajan wooed successfully).<ref>E. Yarshater, ed., ''The Cambridge History of Iran'', Volume 3(1). Cambridge University Press, 1983, {{ISBN|0-521-20092-X}}, p. 91.</ref> After re-taking and burning Seleucia, Trajan then formally deposed Osroes, putting Parthamaspates on the throne as client ruler. This event was commemorated in a coin as the reduction of Parthia to client kingdom status: <small>REX PARTHIS DATUS</small>, "a king is given to the Parthians".{{sfn|Mommsen|1999|p=289}} That done, Trajan retreated north in order to retain what he could of the new provinces of Armenia{{snds}}where he had already accepted an armistice in exchange for surrendering part of the territory to Sanatruces' son Vologeses{{sfn|Bennett|2001|p=203}}{{snds}}and Mesopotamia. It was at this point that Trajan's health started to fail him. The fortress city of [[Hatra]], on the [[Tigris]] in his rear, continued to hold out against repeated Roman assaults. He was personally present at the [[siege]], and it is possible that he suffered a heat stroke while in the blazing heat.{{sfn|Bennett|2001|p=200}}

=== Diaspora revolt ===
{{main|Diaspora revolt}}

[[File:Ostia Museum 2013-03-08, Traianus.jpg|thumb|Statue of Trajan, [[Carrara marble|Luna marble and Proconessian marble]], 2nd century AD, from [[Ostia Antica]]]]

About this same time (AD 116–117), Jews in the Eastern provinces of the Roman Empire—Egypt, Cyprus, and Cyrene, which was likely the original trouble hotspot—rebelled in what appears to have been an ethnic and religious uprising against the local populations, later known as the [[Diaspora revolt|Diaspora Revolt]].<ref>James J. Bloom, ''The Jewish Revolts Against Rome, A.D. 66–135: A Military Analysis''. McFarland, 2010, p. 191.</ref> Additionally, Jewish communities in Northern Mesopotamia revolted, likely as part of a broader resistance against Roman occupation.<ref>Bloom, 194.</ref> Trajan had to withdraw his army to suppress these revolts, a move he considered a temporary setback. He never returned to command, delegating Eastern operations to Lusius Quietus, who was appointed governor of Judaea in early 117 and likely dealt with Jewish unrest there.<ref>A precise description of events in Judea at the time being impossible, due to the non-historical character of the Jewish (rabbinic) sources, and the silence of the non-Jewish ones: William David Davies, Louis Finkelstein, Steven T. Katz, eds., ''The Cambridge History of Judaism: Volume 4, The Late Roman–Rabbinic Period''. Cambridge U. Press, 2006, {{ISBN|978-0-521-77248-8}}, p. 100.</ref> Quietus discharged his commissions successfully, leading rabbinic sources to name the conflict in Judaea the "[[Kitos War]]," with ''Kitus'' being a corruption of ''Quietus''.<ref>Bloom, 190.</ref> Whether or not the Diaspora revolt included Judea proper, or only the Jewish Eastern diaspora, remains doubtful in the absence of clear epigraphic and archaeological evidence. What is certain is that there was an increased Roman military presence in Judea at the time.<ref>Christer Bruun, "the Spurious 'Expeditio Ivdaeae' under Trajan".  ''Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik'' 93 (1992) 99–106.</ref>

Quietus was promised a consulate<ref>He was already consul ''in absentia'': Tanja Gawlich, ''Der Aufstand der jüdischen Diaspora unter Traian''. GRIN Verlag, 2007, {{ISBN|978-3-640-32753-9}}, p. 11.</ref> in the following year (118) for his victories, but he was killed before this could occur, during the bloody purge that opened Hadrian's reign, in which Quietus and three other former consuls were sentenced to death after being tried on a vague charge of conspiracy by the (secret) court of the Praetorian Prefect [[Publius Acilius Attianus|Attianus]].<ref>Margret Fell, ed., ''Erziehung, Bildung, Recht''. Berlim: Dunker & Hunblot, 1994, {{ISBN|3-428-08069-6}}, p. 448.</ref> It has been thought that Quietus and his colleagues were executed on Hadrian's direct orders, for fear of their popular standing with the army and their close connections to Trajan.{{sfn|Bennett|2001|p=203}}<ref>Histoire des Juifs, Troisième période, I – Chapitre III – Soulèvement des Judéens sous Trajan et Adrien.</ref> In contrast, the next prominent Roman figure in charge of the repression of the Jewish revolt, the equestrian Quintus [[Marcius Turbo]], who had dealt with the rebel leader from Cyrene, Loukuas, retained Hadrian's trust, eventually becoming his [[Praetorian Prefect]].<ref>Bloom, 195/196.</ref> As all four consulars were senators of the highest standing and as such generally regarded as able to take imperial power (''capaces imperii''), Hadrian seems to have decided to forestall these prospective rivals.<ref>Gabriele Marasco, ed., ''Political Autobiographies and Memoirs in Antiquity: A Brill Companion''. Leiden: Brill, 2011, {{ISBN|978-90-04-18299-8}}, p. 377.</ref>