Editing Stanley Bruce (section)

==High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, 1933–1945==
[[File:Stanley Bruce 1934.jpg|thumb|left|Bruce in 1934]]
In September 1933, Bruce was appointed by Lyons to replace the ailing [[Granville Ryrie|Sir Granville Ryrie]] as [[High Commissioner to the United Kingdom]], giving him ambassadorial rank. He formally resigned from parliament on 7 October 1933.<ref>{{cite news|title=Mr. Bruce Resigns|url=http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article11699244|access-date=21 August 2013|newspaper=The Argus|date=7 October 1933|page=22}}</ref> Bruce would excel in the new post, becoming a trusted confidant among Conservative politicians and a familiar face in British government circles, which led to him at one point considering entering British politics formally.{{sfn|Lee|p=120}} Bruce was particularly close to Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, with whom he frequently consulted, and was notably influential in pressing for [[Edward VIII abdication crisis|Edward VIII's abdication in 1936]].{{sfn|Edwards|pp=249–254}} His importance and power in London was due in part to the free rein that Lyons gave him{{spaced ndash}} a rarity in the history of the position.{{sfn|P.G. Edwards|pp=39–41}} Combined with the turmoil and frequent ministerial changes within the [[Department of External Affairs (1921–70)|Commonwealth Department of External Affairs]], Bruce was generally credited as Australia's most influential and credible international representative during his posting, often determining matters of foreign policy in his own right.{{sfn|P.G. Edwards|pp=40–47}}

===League of Nations===
[[File:Bruce presiding over the League of Nations Council.png|right|thumb|Bruce chairing the League of Nations Council in 1936. [[Joachim von Ribbentrop]] is addressing the council.]]
Bruce represented Australia at the League of Nations and successfully lobbied for Australia to participate as a member of the League Council from 1933 to 1936. He opposed action against [[Empire of Japan|Japan]] following the [[Japanese invasion of Manchuria|invasion of Manchuria]] in 1933, concerned as to [[Australia–Japan relations|Australia's trading relationship with Japan]] and the potential future threat it posed to peace in the Pacific.{{sfn|Hudson|pp=67–70}}  He also attempted to steer the League away from sanctioning member nations, believing it yet lacked the military or economic sway to do so effectively and feared the breakdown of the League{{spaced ndash}} a prospect that loomed after [[Nazi Germany|Germany]] and Japan departed the body in 1933.{{sfn|Hudson|pp=74–77}} During the [[Abyssinia Crisis]], Bruce again counselled against partial sanctions, believing them the worst option as they would not stop the [[Second Italo-Ethiopian War|Ethiopian invasion]] and yet would alienate Italy{{spaced ndash}} then a [[Stresa Front|potential ally]] against a rearming Nazi Germany.{{sfn|Hudson|pp=74–77}} He further argued for much greater rearmament efforts in the United Kingdom and France to provide greater military capacity to enforce future decisions by the League. Bruce assumed the presidency of the League of Nations Council in 1936 at the height of the crisis and after the failure of the [[Hoare–Laval Pact]] between France, Italy and Britain, but further attempts to forestall the invasion failed. He presided as League Council President during the [[Rhineland Crisis]], although once again attempts to respond to fascist aggression failed. Although this did not shake his conviction in the potential of the League, he saw it doomed to failure without fundamental reforms to its structure and system of sanctions.{{sfn|Cumpston|pp=128–129}} He was nominated by Turkey to chair the 1936 [[Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits|Montreux Conference]], which was far more successful in negotiating international agreement on passage through the [[Turkish Straits]]{{spaced ndash}} an issue of particular relevance to Bruce as a veteran of the Gallipoli campaign.{{sfn|Cumpston|pp=129–130}} Despite the turmoil of his presidency, the League historian F.P. Walters would later describe Bruce as "the best, perhaps, of the many first-rate chairmen who presided over the Council, Conferences, or Committees of the League".<ref>F.P. Walters, ''A History of the League of Nations'', 1952, 833 pages, freely available on the site of the United Nations Office in Geneva [https://libraryresources.unog.ch/c.php?g=462663&p=3163196 online]</ref>

By 1937 Bruce's attention had shifted to social and economic co-operation, which he believed had far greater potential for success and was of greater importance to humanity at large.{{sfn|Cumpston|pp=129–130}} He had taken a leading role in promoting agriculture, nutrition and economic co-operation through the League of Nations, working intensively with [[Frank L. McDougall]] and [[John Boyd Orr]] throughout the decade.{{sfn|Lee|pp=112–113}} In 1937 he presented a plan of "economic appeasement", which built on this work and aimed to ease international tensions by reviving international trade and improving living standards in Europe through better working conditions, lower food prices, rural credits and housing assistance. Barriers to trade would gradually be reduced while European nations still recovering from the depression would be reintegrated into the international economy.{{sfn|Lee|pp=122–123}} In doing so he made a firm link between international trade and international peace, believing it key to unlocking world economic potential. Foreshadowing the logic of the [[Marshall Plan]], Bruce argued that unrelieved economic and social hardship threatened to push other nations towards fascism or communism.<ref>{{cite speech |title=Speech to the Second Committee of the League of Nations |author=Bruce, Stanley |date=19 September 1935 |location=Geneva}}</ref> [[File:Bruce chairing the Montreaux Conference.jpg|thumb|Bruce as Chairman of the Montreux Conference, 1938]]

<blockquote>I feel very strongly that it will be impossible to find a solution to the political problems of Europe and remove the present nightmare conditions unless something is done to improve the economic position&nbsp;... it is vital for the prestige and future wellbeing of the League that it should afford active leadership towards bringing about economic appeasement.{{sfn|Cumpston|p=150}}</blockquote>

The plan was supported by Secretary-General [[Joseph Louis Anne Avenol]], who like Bruce recognised that the League was rapidly becoming moribund and that a major change of direction was needed, although neither was successful in convincing key states in contributing to the plan.{{sfn|Stirling|p=131}}{{sfn|Hudson|pp=172–173}} Critically, new British Prime Minister [[Neville Chamberlain]] could not be convinced by Bruce to invest further into the development of the League, and the body began to lose its political impetus as war loomed. He would continue to press for League reform in the lead up to the war. The Bruce committee to advise on League reform was formed in 1939 in the aftermath of the [[German occupation of Czechoslovakia|partition of Czechoslovakia]] by Nazi Germany and the apparent failure of Chamberlain's [[appeasement]] policy. This committee, which met in July and August 1939, proposed a significant expansion of Bruce's earlier ideas to the League, bringing a wide range of economic and social programs under its purview as a means of fostering international co-operation. Their work, however, would be rendered moot by the outbreak of World War II.<ref>{{cite book|last=Clavin|first=Patricia|author-link=Patricia Clavin|title=Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946|year=2013|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Oxford, UK|isbn=978-0-19-957793-4|pages=233–251}}</ref>

===World War II===

In the events leading up to World War II, Bruce and Lyons had been supporters of the British under Chamberlain and the policy of appeasement exercised with regards to the [[reoccupation of the Rhineland]], the [[Anschluss]] and the [[Munich Crisis]].<ref>{{cite book|last=Bird|first=David|title=The 'Tame Tasmanian': Appeasement and Rearmament in Australia, 1932–1939|year=1993|publisher=A.W.Martin|isbn=1-74097-157-4|location=Melbourne|pages=262–268}}</ref> Even during the "[[phoney war]]", Bruce continued to advocate the implementation of a more durable international system to enforce peace through mutual disarmament, the expansion of transnational trade, and global organisations capable of addressing the pressing social and economic questions that he felt were the recurrent causes of international conflict.{{sfn|Lee|p=138}} He had become a close confidant of senior Conservative Party figures [[Anthony Eden]] and Neville Chamberlain in this period,{{sfn|Stirling|p=60}} and was strident in advancing the opinion of Australia (and the dominions more broadly) that negotiation and compromise with Nazi Germany was preferable to war.{{sfn|Cumpston|pp=157–167}} Bruce actively participated in the negotiations for the [[Munich Agreement]]. When Lyons died in April 1939, Earle Page and Richard Casey personally appealed for Bruce to return to Australia and take over once more as prime minister at the head of the UAP. Bruce demurred, however, and made it the condition of his return that he be allowed to sit in parliament as an [[Independent (politician)|independent]] and lead an all-party [[unity government]]. Such conditions were politically impossible to meet, and Robert Menzies [[1939 United Australia Party leadership election|was elected as the new leader of the UAP]].{{sfn|Cumpston|pp=168–169}}

[[File:Stanley Bruce and the Troops.png|thumb|upright=1.4|left|High Commissioner Bruce drinking tea with Australian troops in London during World War II]]
[[Declaration of war by the United Kingdom|Britain's declaration of war]] against Germany on 3 September 1939 was followed within hours by Australia's Prime Minister Menzies stating that because of Britain's declaration Australia too was now at war with Germany. Winston Churchill's accession as British Prime Minister in May 1940 brought Bruce into frequent conflict with the British government. Churchill saw the dominions as still semi-dependent colonies who were at London's command<ref>{{cite book|last=Stewart|first=Andrew|title=Empire Lost: Britain, the dominions and the Second World War|year=2008|publisher=Bloomsbury Academic|isbn=978-1-84725-244-9|location=London, UK|page=41}}</ref> whereas Bruce saw the Empire as a kind of international partnership and the dominions as rightful parties to the decision-making process.{{sfn|Lee|p=137}} Britain's preoccupation with the European theatre alarmed Australian politicians, given the tenuous position of Far Eastern possessions and the looming possibility of Japanese invasion.{{sfn|Cumpston|pp=180–184}}

After [[Pacific War|a string of defeats in the Far East]], particularly the [[Fall of Singapore]], the Australian government was finally successful in having Bruce accredited to the [[British War Cabinet]] and [[Pacific War Council]] as an Australian (and dominion) representative.{{sfn|Cumpston|pp=196–198}} 
However, Bruce soon became embroiled in the disputes over Churchill's autocratic leadership style and his lack of consultation with the cabinet over war decisions. He was regularly left out of cabinet communique or not invited to meetings, much to his displeasure.{{sfn|P.G. Edwards|p = 52}} With the fear of [[Proposed Japanese invasion of Australia during World War II|Japanese invasion]] mounting in Australia throughout 1942, Bruce directly confronted Churchill on a number of occasions over Far East policy and the continuing lack of consultation with Australia and his own cabinet. Churchill usually responded by rebuffing him or pointedly excluding him further from government business.{{sfn|Edwards|pp = 275–285}} Although outwardly relenting in the face of pressure exerted by the dominions for representation in war decisions, Churchill routinely marginalised or ignored that representation.<ref>{{cite book|last=Garner|first=Joe|title=The Commonwealth Office, 1925–68|year=1978|publisher=Heinemann|location=London, UK|isbn=0-435-32355-5|page=[https://archive.org/details/commonwealthoffi0000garn/page/217 217]|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/commonwealthoffi0000garn/page/217}}</ref> Bruce persisted in this difficult arrangement until May 1944 when he became completely disillusioned and resigned, choosing other forums in which to represent Australia in London.{{sfn|Cumpston|p = 220}} In spite of his tempestuous relationship with Churchill, Bruce was held in high regard by many cabinet members, particularly future prime ministers [[Clement Attlee]] and Anthony Eden, and his dogged determination to advance dominion interests during the war years earned him high praise from [[John Curtin]] and the other dominion prime ministers.{{sfn|Lee|pp=170–176}}