Editing Space Shuttle Columbia disaster (section)

== ''Columbia'' Accident Investigation Board ==
{{Main|Columbia Accident Investigation Board|l1=''Columbia'' Accident Investigation Board}}

About ninety minutes after the disaster, NASA Administrator [[Sean O'Keefe]] called to convene the [[Columbia Accident Investigation Board|''Columbia'' Accident Investigation Board]] (CAIB) to determine the cause.{{r|caib_report|page=231}}<ref name="caib_charter">{{cite web
  | last = O'Keefe
  | first = Sean
  | authorlink = Sean O'Keefe
  | title = Board Charter
  | publisher = NASA
  | date = February 18, 2003
| url = https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/CAIB/CAIB%20Website/caib_charter.html
  | accessdate = August 15, 2022
| archive-date = March 15, 2022
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220315083008/https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/CAIB/CAIB%20Website/caib_charter.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> It was chaired by retired U.S. Navy Admiral [[Harold W. Gehman, Jr.]] and included military and civilian analysts. It initially consisted of eight members, including Gehman, but expanded to 13 members by March. The CAIB members were notified by noon on the day of the accident, and participated in a teleconference that evening. The following day, they traveled to Barksdale AFB to begin the investigation. The CAIB members first toured the debris fields, and then established their operations at JSC. The CAIB established four teams to investigate NASA management and program safety, NASA training and crew operations, the technical aspects of the disaster, and how NASA culture affected the Space Shuttle program. These groups collaborated, and hired other support staff to investigate.{{r|caib_report|pages=231–232}} The CAIB worked alongside the reconstruction efforts to determine the cause of the accident, and interviewed members of the Space Shuttle program, including those who had been involved with STS-107.{{r|caib_report|pp=234–235}} The CAIB conducted public hearings from March until June,{{r|caib_report|pp=237–238}} and released its final report in August 2003.{{r|caib_report|p=2}}

=== Cause of the accident ===
After looking at sensor data, the CAIB considered damage to the left wing as a likely culprit for ''Columbia''{{'}}s destruction. It investigated that recovered debris and noted the difference in heat damage between the two wings. RCC panels from the left wing were found in the western portion of the debris field, indicating that it was shed first before the rest of the orbiter disintegrated.{{r|caib_report|pp=73–74}} [[X-ray]] and chemical analysis was conducted on the RCC panels, revealing the highest levels of slag deposits to be in the left wing tiles.{{r|caib_report|pp=75–76}} Impact testing was conducted at the [[Southwest Research Institute]], using a nitrogen-powered gun to fire a projectile made of the same material as the ET bipod foam. Panels taken from {{OV|Enterprise|full=no}}, {{OV|Discovery|full=no}}, and {{OV|Atlantis|full=no}} were used to determine the projectiles' effect on RCC panels.{{r|caib_report|pp=79–80}} A test on RCC panel{{spaces}}8, taken from ''Atlantis'', was the most consistent with the damage observed on ''Columbia'', indicating it was the damaged panel that led to the in-flight breakup.{{r|caib_report|pp=82–83}}

=== Organizational culture ===
The CAIB was critical of NASA organizational culture, and compared its current state to that of NASA leading up to the ''Challenger'' disaster.{{r|caib_report|p=99}} It concluded that NASA was experiencing budget constraints while still expecting to keep a high level of launches and operations.{{r|caib_report|p=100}} Program operating costs were lowered by 21% from 1991 to 1994,{{r|caib_report|p=107}} despite a planned increase in the yearly flight rate for assembly of the International Space Station.{{r|caib_report|p=114}} Despite a history of foam strike events, NASA management did not consider the potential risk to the astronauts as a safety-of-flight issue.{{r|caib_report|p=126}} The CAIB found that a lack of a safety program led to the lack of concern over foam strikes.{{r|caib_report|p=177}} The board determined that NASA lacked the appropriate communication and integration channels to allow problems to be discussed and effectively routed and addressed.{{r|caib_report|p=187}} This risk was further compounded by pressure to adhere to a launch schedule for construction of the ISS.{{r|caib_report|p=198}}

=== Possible emergency procedures ===
In its report, the CAIB discussed potential options that could have saved ''Columbia''{{'}}s crew.<ref name=ars_rescue>{{cite web|url=https://arstechnica.com/science/2016/02/the-audacious-rescue-plan-that-might-have-saved-space-shuttle-columbia/|title=The audacious rescue plan that might have saved space shuttle ''Columbia''|website=Ars Technica|date=February 1, 2016|access-date=August 15, 2022|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160929012837/http://arstechnica.com/science/2016/02/the-audacious-rescue-plan-that-might-have-saved-space-shuttle-columbia/|archive-date=September 29, 2016}}</ref> They determined that the mission could have been extended to at most 30 days (February 15), after which the [[lithium hydroxide]] canisters used to remove carbon dioxide would have run out.{{r|caib_report|p=173}} On STS-107, ''Columbia'' was carrying the Extended Duration Orbiter, which increased its supply of oxygen and hydrogen.<ref name="CAIBVolIIAppendixD12">{{cite web
  | last1 = Gehman
  | first1 = Harold
  | author-link1 = Harold W. Gehman Jr.
  | last2 = Barry
  | first2 = John
  | last3 = Deal
  | first3 = Duane
  | last4 = Hallock
  | first4 = James
  | author-link4 = James N. Hallock
  | last5 = Hess
  | first5 = Kenneth
  | last6 = Hubbard
  | first6 = G. Scott
  | author-link6 = G. Scott Hubbard
  | last7 = Logsdon
  | first7 = John
  | author-link7 = John Logsdon
  | last8 = Logsdon
  | first8 = John
  | author-link8 = Douglas D. Osheroff
  | last9 = Ride
  | first9 = Sally
  | author-link9 = Sally Ride
  | last10 = Tetrault
  | first10 = Roger
  | last11 = Turcotte
  | first11 = Stephen
  | author-link11 = Stephen A. Turcotte
  | last12 = Wallace
  | first12 = Steven
  | last13 = Widnall
  | first13 = Sheila
  | author-link13 = Sheila E. Widnall
  | title = STS-107 In-Flight Options Assessment
  | publisher = CAIB Report, Volume II, Appendix D.13
  | date = 2003
  | url = https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/caib/news/report/pdf/vol2/part13.pdf
  | access-date = August 15, 2022
| archive-date = September 21, 2012
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20120921163712/http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/caib/news/report/pdf/vol2/part13.pdf
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref>{{rp|398}} To maximize the mission duration, non-essential systems would have been powered down,{{r|CAIBVolIIAppendixD12|page=399}} and animals in the [[Spacehab]] module would have been euthanized.{{r|CAIBVolIIAppendixD12|page=397}}

When STS-107 launched, ''Atlantis'' was undergoing preparation for the STS-114 launch on March 1, 2003. Had NASA management decided to launch a rescue mission, an expedited process could have begun to launch it as a rescue vehicle. Some pre-launch tests would have been eliminated to allow it to launch on time. ''Atlantis'' would have launched with additional equipment for [[extravehicular activity|EVAs]], and launched with a minimum required crew. It would have rendezvoused with ''Columbia'', and the STS-107 crew would have conducted EVAs to transfer to ''Atlantis''. ''Columbia'' would have been remotely deorbited; as Mission Control would have been unable to remotely land it, it would have been disposed of in the Pacific Ocean.{{r|CAIBVolIIAppendixD12|pages=400–404}}

The CAIB also investigated the possibility of on-orbit repair of the left wing. Although there were no materials or adhesives onboard ''Columbia'' that could have survived reentry, the board researched the effectiveness of stuffing materials from the orbiter, crew cabin, or water into the RCC hole. They determined that the best option would have been to harvest tiles from other places on the orbiter, shape them, and then stuff them into the RCC hole. Given the difficulty of on-orbit repair and the risk of further damaging the RCC tiles, the CAIB determined that the likelihood of a successful on-orbit repair would have been low.{{r|CAIBVolIIAppendixD12|pages=405–406}}