Editing Schlieffen Plan (section)

===Deployment plans, 1906–1907 to 1914–1915===
Extant records of Moltke's thinking up to 1911–1912 are fragmentary and almost wholly lacking to the outbreak of war. In a 1906 staff ride Moltke sent an army through Belgium but concluded that the French would attack through Lorraine, where the decisive battle would be fought before an enveloping move from the north took effect. The right wing armies would counter-attack through Metz, to exploit the opportunity created by the French advancing beyond their frontier fortifications. In 1908, Moltke expected the British to join the French but that neither would violate Belgian neutrality, leading the French to attack towards the Ardennes. Moltke continued to plan to envelop the French near [[Verdun]] and the [[Meuse]], rather than an advance towards Paris. In 1909, a new 7th Army with eight divisions was prepared to defend upper Alsace and to co-operate with the 6th Army in Lorraine. A transfer of the 7th Army to the right flank was studied but the prospect of a decisive battle in Lorraine became more attractive. In 1912, Moltke planned for a contingency where the French attacked from Metz to the [[Vosges Mountains]] and the Germans defended on the left (southern) wing, until all troops not needed on the right (northern) flank could move south-west through Metz against the French flank. German offensive thinking had evolved into a possible attack from the north, one through the centre or an envelopment by both wings.{{sfn|Strachan|2003|p=177}}

====''Aufmarsch I West''====
{{lang|de|Aufmarsch I West}} anticipated an isolated Franco-German war, in which Germany might be assisted by an Italian attack on the Franco-Italian border and by Italian and Austro-Hungarian forces in Germany. It was assumed that France would be on the defensive because their troops would be (greatly) outnumbered. To win the war, Germany and its allies would have to attack France. After the deployment of the entire German army in the west, they would attack through Belgium and Luxembourg, with virtually all the German force. The Germans would rely on an Austro-Hungarian and Italian contingents, formed around a cadre of German troops, to hold the fortresses along the Franco-German border. {{lang|de|Aufmarsch I West}} became less feasible, as the military power of the Franco-Russian alliance increased and Britain aligned with France, making Italy unwilling to support Germany. {{lang|de|Aufmarsch I West}} was dropped when it became clear that an isolated Franco-German war was impossible and that German allies would not intervene.{{sfn|Zuber|2010|pp=116–131}}

====''Aufmarsch II West''====
{{lang|de|Aufmarsch II West}} anticipated a war between the Franco-Russian Entente and Germany, with Austria-Hungary supporting Germany and Britain perhaps joining the Entente. Italy was only expected to join Germany if Britain remained neutral. {{nowrap|80 per cent}} of the German army would operate in the west and {{nowrap|20 per cent}} in the east. France and Russia were expected to attack simultaneously, because they had the larger force. Germany would execute an "active defence", in at least the first operation/campaign of the war. German forces would mass against the French invasion force and defeat it in a counter-offensive, while conducting a conventional defence against the Russians. Rather than pursue the retreating French armies over the border, {{nowrap|25 per cent}} of the German force in the west ({{nowrap|20 per cent}} of the German army) would be transferred to the east, for a counter-offensive against the Russian army. {{lang|de|Aufmarsch II West}} became the main German deployment plan, as the French and Russians expanded their armies and the German strategic situation deteriorated, Germany and Austria-Hungary being unable to increase their military spending to match their rivals.{{sfn|Zuber|2010|pp=95–97, 132–133}}

====''Aufmarsch I Ost''====
{{lang|de|Aufmarsch I Ost}} was for a war between the Franco-Russian Entente and Germany, with Austria-Hungary supporting Germany and the [[British Empire]] perhaps joining the Entente. The [[Kingdom of Italy]] was only expected to join Germany if Britain remained neutral; {{nowrap|60 per cent}} of the German army would deploy in the west and {{nowrap|40 per cent}} in the east. France and Russia would attack simultaneously, because they had the larger force and Germany would execute an "active defence", in at least the first operation/campaign of the war. German forces would mass against the Russian invasion force and defeat it in a counter-offensive, while conducting a conventional defence against the French. Rather than pursue the Russians over the border, {{nowrap|50 per cent}} of the German force in the east (about {{nowrap|20 per cent}} of the German army) would be transferred to the west, for a counter-offensive against the French. {{lang|de|Aufmarsch I Ost}} became a secondary deployment plan, as it was feared a French invasion force could be too well established to be driven from Germany or at least inflict greater losses on the Germans, if not defeated sooner. The counter-offensive against France was also seen as the more important operation, since the French were less able to replace losses than Russia and it would result in a greater number of prisoners being taken.{{sfn|Zuber|2010|pp=116–131}}

====''Aufmarsch II Ost''====

[[File:Fond de carte 1914.svg|thumb|{{centre|Map of French, Belgian and German frontier fortifications, 1914}}]]
{{lang|de|Aufmarsch II Ost}} was for the contingency of an isolated Russo-German war, in which Austria-Hungary might support Germany. The plan assumed that France would be neutral at first and possibly attack Germany later. If France helped Russia then Britain might join in and if it did, Italy was expected to remain neutral. About {{nowrap|60 per cent}} of the German army would operate in the west and {{nowrap|40 per cent}} in the east. Russia would begin an offensive because of its larger army and in anticipation of French involvement but if not, the German army would attack. After the Russian army had been defeated, the German army in the east would pursue the remnants. The German army in the west would stay on the defensive, perhaps conducting a counter-offensive but without reinforcements from the east.{{sfn|Zuber|2010|pp=54–55}} {{lang|de|Aufmarsch II Ost}} became a secondary deployment plan when the international situation made an isolated Russo-German war impossible. {{lang|de|Aufmarsch II Ost}} had the same flaw as {{lang|de|Aufmarsch I Ost}}, in that it was feared that a French offensive would be harder to defeat, if not countered with greater force, either slower as in {{lang|de|Aufmarsch I Ost}} or with greater force and quicker, as in {{lang|de|Aufmarsch II West}}.{{sfn|Zuber|2010|pp=52–60}}