Editing Roe v. Wade (section)

==== Abortion and right to privacy ====
After dealing with mootness and [[Standing (law)|standing]], the Court proceeded to the main issue of the case: the constitutionality of Texas's abortion law. The Court first surveyed the status of abortion throughout the history of [[Roman law]] and the English and early American common law.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.3.1, p. 887}} It also reviewed the developments of medical procedures and technology used in abortions.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.3.1, p. 887}}

Following its historical surveys, the Court introduced the concept of a constitutional "[[Right to privacy#United States|right to privacy]]" that it said had been intimated in earlier decisions such as ''[[Meyer v. Nebraska]]'' and ''[[Pierce v. Society of Sisters]]'', which involved parental control over [[Parenting|childrearing]], and ''Griswold v. Connecticut'', which involved the use of contraception.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.3.1, p. 887}} Then, "with virtually no further explanation of the privacy value",{{sfnp|Nowak|Rotunda|2012|loc=§&nbsp;18.29(b)(i)}} the Court ruled that regardless of exactly which provisions were involved, the U.S. Constitution and its guarantees of liberty covered a right to privacy that protected a pregnant woman's decision whether to abort a pregnancy.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.3.1, p. 887}}
{{Blockquote
|text=This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the [[Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution|Fourteenth Amendment]]'s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy.
|source=''Roe'', 410 U.S. at 153.<ref>Quoted in {{harvp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.3.1, p. 887}}.</ref>
}}
The Court reasoned that outlawing abortions would infringe a pregnant woman's right to privacy for several reasons: having unwanted children "may force upon the woman a distressful life and future"; it may bring imminent psychological harm; caring for the child may tax the mother's physical and mental health; and because there may be "distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child".<ref>{{harvp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.3.1, p. 887}}, quoting ''Roe'', 410 U.S. at 153.</ref> However, the Court rejected the notion that this right to privacy was absolute.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.3.1, p. 887}} It held instead that a woman's right to have an abortion must be balanced against other [[government interest]]s, such as protecting [[maternal health]] and protecting the life of the fetus.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.3.1, p. 887}} The Court held that these government interests were sufficiently compelling to permit states to impose some limits on pregnant women's right to choose to have an abortion.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.3.1, p. 887}}
{{Blockquote
|text=A State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision. ... We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
|source=''Roe'', 410 U.S. at 154.
}}
Texas's lawyers had argued that limiting abortion to situations where the mother's life was in danger was justified because life began at the moment of [[Fertilisation#Humans|conception]], and therefore the state's governmental interest in protecting prenatal life applied to all pregnancies regardless of their [[Prenatal development|stage]].{{sfnp|Nowak|Rotunda|2012|loc=§&nbsp;18.29(b)(i)}} The Court said that there was no indication that the Constitution's uses of the word "[[Legal person|person]]" were meant to include fetuses, and it rejected Texas's argument that a fetus should be considered a "person" with a legal and constitutional [[right to life]].{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.3.1, pp. 887–88}} The Court observed that there was still great disagreement over when an unborn fetus becomes a living being.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.3.1, pp. 887–88}}
{{Blockquote
|text=We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, in this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.
|source=''Roe'', 410 U.S. at 159.<ref>Quoted in {{harvp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;10.3.3.1, p. 888}}.</ref>
}}

{{anchor|trimester}}

To balance women's rights to privacy and state governments' interests in protecting mothers' health and prenatal life, the Court created the [[Trimester (pregnancy)|trimester]] framework.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/roe_v_wade_(1973)|title=Roe v. Wade (1973)|website=LII / Legal Information Institute}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Strauss |first1=Valerie |title=Answer Sheet: A brief lesson on Roe v. Wade |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2022/05/03/brief-lesson-roe-v-wade/ |access-date=May 16, 2022 |newspaper=The Washington Post |date=May 3, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220516181315/https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2022/05/03/brief-lesson-roe-v-wade/ |archive-date=May 16, 2022}}</ref> During the first trimester, when it was believed that the procedure was safer than childbirth, the Court ruled that a state government could place no restrictions on women's ability to choose to abort pregnancies other than imposing minimal medical safeguards, such as requiring abortions to be performed by [[Medical license|licensed]] physicians.{{sfnp|Nowak|Rotunda|2012|loc=§&nbsp;18.29(b)(i)}} From the second trimester on, the Court ruled that evidence of increasing risks to the mother's health gave states a compelling interest that allowed them to enact medical regulations on abortion procedures so long as they were reasonable and "narrowly tailored" to protecting mothers' health.{{sfnp|Nowak|Rotunda|2012|loc=§&nbsp;18.29(b)(i)}} From the beginning of the third trimester on—the point at which a fetus became viable under the medical technology available in the early 1970s—the Court ruled that a state's interest in protecting prenatal life became so compelling that it could legally prohibit all abortions except where necessary to protect the mother's life or health.{{sfnp|Nowak|Rotunda|2012|loc=§&nbsp;18.29(b)(i)}}

Having completed its analysis, the Court concluded that Texas's abortion statutes were unconstitutional and struck them down.
{{blockquote|A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts from criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.|source=''Roe'', 410 U.S. at 164.}}