Editing Public choice (section)

==Limitations and critiques==

Buchanan and Tullock outline methodological qualifications of the approach developed in their work ''[[The Calculus of Consent]]'':
:[E]ven if the model [with its rational self-interest assumptions] proves to be useful in explaining an important element of politics, it does not imply that all individuals act in accordance with the [[behavioral assumption]] made or that any one individual acts in this way at all times&nbsp;... the theory of collective choice can explain only some undetermined fraction of collective action. However, so long as some part of all individual behavior&nbsp;... is, in fact, motivated by utility maximization, and so long as the identification of the individual with the group does not extend to the point of making all individual utility functions identical, an economic-individualist model of political activity should be of some positive worth.

[[Steven Pressman (economist)|Steven Pressman]] offers a critique of the public choice approach, arguing that public choice fails to explain political behavior in a number of central areas, including politicians’ behavior and [[voting behaviour|voting behavior]].<ref name="STEVEN PRESSMAN 2004">Pressman, Steven (2004) "What is wrong with public choice", ''Journal of Post Keynesian Economics'', 27:1, 3–18</ref> In the case of politicians' behavior, the public choice assumption that a politician's utility function is driven by greater political and economic power cannot account for various political phenomena.<ref name="STEVEN PRESSMAN 2004 pp. 11">Pressman, Steven (2004) What is wrong with public choice, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 27:1, 3–18, [11]</ref> These include why politicians vote against their constituents' interests, why they advocate for higher taxation, fewer benefits, and smaller government, and why wealthy people seek office.<ref name="STEVEN PRESSMAN 2004 pp. 11"/>

As for critiques concerning voter behavior, it is argued that public choice cannot explain why people vote due to limitations in [[rational choice theory]].<ref name="STEVEN PRESSMAN 2004"/> For example, from the viewpoint of [[rational choice theory]], the expected gains of voting depend on (1) the benefit to the voter if their candidate wins and (2) the probability that one's vote will determine the election's outcome.<ref name="STEVEN PRESSMAN 2004"/> Even in a tight election the probability that one's vote decides the outcome is estimated at effectively zero.<ref name="Aldrich, J. 1993">Aldrich, J. “Rational Choice and Turnout.” American Journal of Political Science, 1993, 37 (1), 246–278.</ref> This suggests that even if a voter expects gains from their candidate's success, the expected gains from voting are still near zero.<ref name="Aldrich, J. 1993"/> When this is considered in combination with the multiple recognized costs of voting, such as the [[opportunity cost]] of foregone wages and transportation costs, a self-interested person is theoretically unlikely to vote at all.<ref name="STEVEN PRESSMAN 2004"/> Pressman is not alone in his critique; other prominent public choice economists, including [[Anthony Downs]] in ''[[An Economic Theory of Democracy]]'',<ref>Downs, A. ''An Economic Theory of Democracy''. New York: Harper & Row, 1957 {{ISBN?}}{{Page needed|date=March 2022}}</ref> [[Morris P. Fiorina]],<ref>Fiorina, M. “Information and Rationality in Election.” In J.A. Ferejohn and J.H.Kuklinski (eds.), Information and Democratic Processes. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990, pp. 329–342.</ref> and [[Gordon Tullock]]<ref>Tullock, G. Towards a Mathematics of Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967.</ref> recognize that theorizing voting behavior is a major hurdle for the public choice approach.<ref name="STEVEN PRESSMAN 2004"/>