Editing Pseudoscience (section)

===Improper collection of evidence===
* Assertions that do not allow the logical possibility that they can be shown to be false by observation or physical experiment (See also: [[Falsifiability]]).<ref name="Popper"/><ref name="Lakatos_1970">{{cite book|vauthors=Lakatos I|year=1970|chapter=Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes|veditors=Lakatos I, Musgrave A|title=Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge|pages=91–195}}</ref>
* Assertion of claims that a theory predicts something that it has not been shown to predict.{{sfnp|Gauch|2003|pp=178 ff|loc=(Deductive Logic, "Fallacies")}}{{sfnp|Gauch|2003|pp=211 ff|loc=(Probability, "Common Blunders")}} Scientific claims that do not confer any predictive power are considered at best "conjectures", or at worst "pseudoscience" (e.g., ''[[ignoratio elenchi]]'').<ref name="Vtd7w">''Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' Vol. 3, "Fallacies" 174 ff, esp. section on "Ignoratio elenchi"</ref>
* Assertion that claims which have not been proven false must therefore be true, and vice versa (''See: [[Argument from ignorance]]'').<ref name="T3iJ6">''Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 ff esp. 177–178</ref>
* Over-reliance on testimonial, [[anecdotal evidence]], or personal experience: This evidence may be useful for the context of discovery (i.e., hypothesis generation), but should not be used in the context of [[Theory of justification|justification]] (e.g., [[statistical hypothesis testing]]).{{sfnp|Bunge|1983a|p=381}}
* Use of [[myth]]s and [[religious text]]s as if they were fact, or basing evidence on readings of such texts.<ref name="coker">{{cite web |author1=Rory Coker |title=Science versus Pseudoscience |url=https://web2.ph.utexas.edu/~coker2/index.files/distinguish.htm |website=web2.ph.utexas.edu |access-date=1 March 2022 |archive-date=1 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220301104806/https://web2.ph.utexas.edu/~coker2/index.files/distinguish.htm |url-status=live }}</ref>
* Use of concepts and scenarios from [[science fiction]] as if they were fact. This technique appeals to the familiarity that many people already have with science fiction tropes through the popular media.<ref name="cokerSF">{{cite web |author1=Rory Coker |title=SF in pseudoscience |url=https://web2.ph.utexas.edu/~coker2/index.files/sfandps.shtml |website=web2.ph.utexas.edu |access-date=1 March 2022 |archive-date=27 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220627154318/https://web2.ph.utexas.edu/~coker2/index.files/sfandps.shtml |url-status=live }}</ref>
* Presentation of data that seems to support claims while suppressing or refusing to consider data that conflict with those claims.{{sfnp|Thagard|1978|pp=227–228}} This is an example of [[selection bias]] or [[cherry picking]], a distortion of evidence or data that arises from the way that the data are collected. It is sometimes referred to as the selection effect.
* Repeating excessive or untested claims that have been previously published elsewhere, and promoting those claims as if they were facts; an accumulation of such uncritical secondary reports, which do not otherwise contribute their own empirical investigation, is called the [[Woozle effect]].<ref name="Gambrill2012">{{cite book|author=Eileen Gambrill|title=Critical Thinking in Clinical Practice: Improving the Quality of Judgments and Decisions|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=NsuHtwciwQwC&pg=PA109|date=1 May 2012|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|isbn=978-0-470-90438-1|page=109|edition=3rd|access-date=25 October 2015|archive-date=22 December 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191222023232/https://books.google.com/books?id=NsuHtwciwQwC&pg=PA109|url-status=live}}</ref>
* [[Evidence of absence|Reversed burden of proof]]: science places the burden of proof on those making a claim, not on the critic. "Pseudoscientific" arguments may neglect this principle and demand that [[skeptic]]s demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a claim (e.g., an assertion regarding the efficacy of a novel therapeutic technique) is false. It is essentially impossible to prove a universal negative, so this tactic incorrectly places the burden of proof on the skeptic rather than on the claimant.<ref name="Lilienfeld">Lilienfeld SO (2004). ''Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology'' Guildford Press {{ISBN|1-59385-070-0}}</ref>
* Appeals to [[holism]] as opposed to [[reductionism]] to dismiss negative findings: proponents of pseudoscientific claims, especially in organic medicine, alternative medicine, naturopathy and mental health, often resort to the "mantra of holism" .{{sfnp|Ruscio|2002}}