Editing Planned Parenthood v. Casey (section)

===Concurrence/dissents===
Justices Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens, who both joined the plurality in part, also each filed opinions [[concurring]] in the Court's judgment in part and dissenting in part. Chief Justice William Rehnquist filed an opinion concurring in the Court's judgment in part and dissenting in part, which was joined by Justices Byron White, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, none of whom joined any part of the plurality. Justice Scalia also filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, which was also joined by Rehnquist, White, and Thomas.

====Rehnquist and Scalia, joined by White and Thomas====
[[File:William Rehnquist.jpg|thumb|175px|Chief Justice [[William Rehnquist]] was the senior justice of the four that dissented against the upholding of ''Roe''.]]
Rehnquist and Scalia each joined the plurality in upholding the parental consent, informed consent, and waiting period laws. However, they dissented from the plurality's decision to uphold ''Roe v. Wade'' and strike down the spousal notification law, contending that ''Roe'' was incorrectly decided. In his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist questioned the fundamental right to an abortion, the "right to privacy", and the strict scrutiny application in ''Roe''.<ref>''Casey'', 505 U.S. at 950–54 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).</ref> He also questioned the new "undue burden" analysis under the plurality opinion, instead deciding that the proper analysis for the regulation of abortions was rational-basis.<ref>''Casey'', 505 U.S. at 966 ("Accordingly, we think that the correct analysis is that set forth by the plurality opinion in ''Webster''. A woman's interest in having an abortion is a form of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, but States may regulate abortion procedures in ways rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").</ref>

In his opinion, Justice Scalia also argued for a rational-basis approach, finding that the Pennsylvania statute in its entirety was constitutional.<ref>''Casey'', 505 U.S. at 981 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).</ref> He argued that abortion was not a "protected" liberty, and as such, the abortion liberty could be intruded upon by the State.<ref>''See Casey'', 505 U.S. at 979–80 (finding that it is not unconstitutional to intrude upon the abortion liberty because the abortion liberty is not a protected liberty).</ref> To this end, Justice Scalia concluded this was so because an abortion right was not in the Constitution, and "longstanding traditions of American society" have allowed abortion to be legally proscribed.<ref>''Casey'', 505 U.S. at 980.</ref> Rehnquist and Scalia joined each other's concurrence/dissents. White and Thomas, who did not write their own opinions, joined in both.

====Stevens and Blackmun====
[[File:Justice Blackmun Official.jpg|thumb|175px|left| Justice [[Harry Blackmun]], the original author of ''Roe'', would have struck down all of the Pennsylvania abortion restrictions, continuing to apply [[strict scrutiny]].]]
Justices Blackmun and Stevens wrote opinions in which they approved of the plurality's preservation of ''Roe'' and rejection of the spousal notification law. They did not agree with the plurality's decision to uphold the other three laws at issue.

Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Stevens joined the plurality's preservation of ''Roe'' and rejection of the spousal notification law, but under his interpretation of the undue burden standard ("[a] burden may be 'undue' either because the burden is too severe or because it lacks a legitimate rational justification"), he would have found the information requirements in §§ 3205(a)(2)(i)–(iii) and § 3205(a)(1)(ii), and the 24-hour waiting period in §§ 3205(a)(1)–(2) unconstitutional.<ref>''Casey'', 505 U.S. at 912–914, 920–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).</ref> Instead of applying an undue burden analysis, Justice Stevens would have preferred to apply the analyses in ''Akron'' and ''Thornburgh,'' two cases that had applied a strict scrutiny analysis, to reach the same conclusions.<ref>''Casey'', 505 U.S. at 917–18 ("In my opinion, the principles established in this long line of cases and the wisdom reflected in Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in ''Akron'' (and followed by the Court just six years ago in ''Thornburgh'') should govern our decision today.").</ref> Justice Stevens also placed great emphasis on the fact that women had a right to bodily integrity, and a constitutionally protected liberty interest to decide matters of the "highest privacy and the most personal nature."<ref>''Casey'', 505 U.S. at 915.</ref> As such, Justice Stevens felt that a State should not be permitted to attempt to "persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion"; he felt this was too coercive and violated the woman's decisional autonomy.<ref>''Casey'', 505 U.S. at 916.</ref>

Justice Blackmun concurred in part, concurred in the judgment in part, and dissented in part. He joined the plurality's preservation of ''Roe'' – of which he wrote the majority – and he, too, rejected the spousal notification law.<ref>''Casey'', 505 U.S. at 923–26 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).</ref> Justice Blackmun, however, argued for a woman's right to privacy and insisted, as he did in ''Roe'', that all non-''de-minimis'' abortion regulations were subject to strict scrutiny.<ref>''Casey'', 505 U.S. at 926–28.</ref> Using such an analysis, Justice Blackmun argued that the content-based counseling, the 24-hour waiting period, informed parental consent, and the reporting regulations were unconstitutional.<ref>''See Casey'', 505 U.S. at 926, 934.</ref> He also dissented from the plurality's undue burden test, and instead found his trimester framework "administrable" and "far less manipulable".<ref>''Casey'', 505 U.S. at 930.</ref> Blackmun even went further in his opinion than Stevens, sharply attacking and criticizing the anti-''Roe'' bloc of the Court.