Editing Piracy (section)

==== Clientele ====
Pirates, of course, had to sell their loot.  They had trading relationships with land communities and foreign traders in the southeastern regions of China. [[Zhu Wan]], who held the office of Grand Coordinator for Coastal Defense, documented that pirates in the region to which he had been sent had the support of the local elite gentry class.<ref>Higgins. 1980. p. 30</ref>  These "pirates in gowns and caps" directly or indirectly sponsored pirate activity and certainly directly benefitted from the illegal private trade in the region.  When Zhu Wan or other officials from the capital attempted to eliminate the pirate problem, these local elites fought back, having Zhu Wan demoted and eventually even sent back to Beijing to possibly be executed.<ref>Higgins. 1980. p. 34</ref>  The gentry who benefitted from illegal maritime trade were too powerful and influential, and they were clearly very invested in the smuggling activities of the pirate community.<ref>Robinson. 2000. p. 547</ref>

In addition to their relationship with the local elite class on the coast, pirates also had complicated and often friendly relationships and partnerships with the dynasty itself, as well as with international traders.<ref>MacKay. 2013. pp. 552, 557</ref>  When pirate groups recognized the authority of the dynasty, they would often be allowed to operate freely and even profit from the relationship.  There were also opportunities for these pirates to ally themselves with colonial projects from Europe or other overseas powers.<ref name="MacKay. 2013. p. 559">MacKay. 2013. p. 559</ref>  Both the dynasty and foreign colonial projects would employ pirates as mercenaries to establish dominance in the coastal region.<ref>MacKay. 2013. p. 551</ref>  Because of how difficult it was for established state powers to control these regions, pirates seem to have had a lot of freedom to choose their allies and their preferred markets.<ref>Szonyi, Michael. ''The Art of Being Governed: Everyday Politics in Late Imperial China''. Princeton. {{ISBN|9781400888887}}. {{OCLC|1007291604}}. pp. 101, 102</ref>  Included in this list of possible allies, sea marauders and pirates even found opportunities to bribe military officials as they engaged in illegal trade.<ref>Szonyi. 2017. pp. 101–102</ref>  They seem to have been incentivized mostly by money and loot, and so could afford to play the field with regards to their political or military allies.

Because pirate organizations could be so powerful locally, the Ming government made concerted efforts to weaken them.  The presence of colonial projects complicated this, however, as pirates could ally themselves with other maritime powers or local elites to stay in business.  The Chinese government was clearly aware of the power of some of these pirate groups, as some documents even refer to them as "sea rebels," a reference to the political nature of pirates.<ref name="MacKay. 2013. p. 559"/>  Pirates like [[Zheng Zhilong]] and [[Zheng Chenggong]] accrued tremendous local power, eventually even being hired as naval commanders by the Chinese dynasties and foreign maritime powers.<ref>MacKay. 2013. pp. 559, 561</ref>