Editing Ontology (section)

=== Others ===
The dispute between constituent and relational ontologies{{efn|In this context, the term "relational ontology" has a slightly different meaning than the term "relationalism", which says that, at the most basic level, reality is made up of relations.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rea|2021|pp=104–105}} | {{harvnb|Heil|2009|p=310}} | {{harvnb|Runggaldier|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=opLRzEaauTUC&pg=PA248 248]}} | {{harvnb|Lupisella|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3JTyDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA70 70]}} }}</ref>}} concerns the internal structure of concrete particular objects. Constituent ontologies say that objects have an internal structure with properties as their component parts. Bundle theories are an example of this position: they state that objects are bundles of properties. This view is rejected by relational ontologies, which say that objects have no internal structure, meaning that properties do not inhere in them but are externally related to them. According to one analogy, objects are like pin-cushions and properties are pins that can be stuck to objects and removed again without becoming a real part of objects. Relational ontologies are common in certain forms of nominalism that reject the existence of universal properties.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rea|2021|pp=104–105}} | {{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2011|pp=390–392}} | {{harvnb|Koslicki|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=th1rDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 11]}} | {{harvnb|Rettler|Bailey|2023|loc=§ 3.2 What Objects Are}} }}</ref>

Hierarchical ontologies state that the world is organized into levels. Entities on all levels are real but low-level entities are more fundamental than high-level entities. This means that they can exist without high-level entities while high-level entities cannot exist without low-level entities.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Houng|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=M6T6CAAAQBAJ&pg=PA106 106–110]}} | {{harvnb|Schaffer|2009|pp=347–348, 354–356}} | {{harvnb|Ceder|2018|loc=§ Flat ontology}} }}</ref> One hierarchical ontology says that elementary particles are more fundamental than the macroscopic objects they compose, like chairs and tables. Other hierarchical theories assert that substances are more fundamental than their properties and that nature is more fundamental than culture.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Schaffer|2010|pp=31, 44–45}} | {{harvnb|Schaffer|2009|pp=354–356}} | {{harvnb|Ceder|2018|loc=§ Flat ontology}} }}</ref> Flat ontologies, by contrast, deny that any entity has a privileged status, meaning that all entities exist on the same level. For them, the main question is only whether something exists rather than identifying the level at which it exists.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Houng|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=M6T6CAAAQBAJ&pg=PA106 106–110]}} | {{harvnb|Schaffer|2009|pp=347–348, 354–356}} | {{harvnb|Ceder|2018|loc=§ Flat ontology}} }}</ref>{{efn|Some flat ontologies allow that there are entities on higher levels but stipulate that they are reducible to the lowest level, meaning that they are no addition to being.<ref>{{harvnb|Houng|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=M6T6CAAAQBAJ&pg=PA106 106–110]}}</ref>}}

The ontological theories of [[endurantism]] and [[perdurantism]] aim to explain how material objects persist through time. Endurantism is the view that material objects are three-dimensional entities that travel through time while being fully present in each moment. They remain the same even when they gain or lose properties as they change. Perdurantism is the view that material objects are four-dimensional entities that extend not just through space but also through time. This means that they are composed of [[temporal part]]s and, at any moment, only one part of them is present but not the others. According to perdurantists, change means that an earlier part exhibits different qualities than a later part. When a tree loses its leaves, for instance, there is an earlier temporal part with leaves and a later temporal part without leaves.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Miller|2018|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Costa|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Theories of Persistence}} | {{harvnb|Simons|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ql27m77IveQC&pg=PA166 166]}} | {{harvnb|Hawley|2023|loc=3. Change and Temporal Parts}} }}</ref>

Differential ontology is a [[poststructuralist]] approach interested in the relation between the concepts of identity and [[Difference (philosophy)|difference]]. It says that traditional ontology sees identity as the more basic term by first characterizing things in terms of their essential features and then elaborating differences based on this conception. Differential ontologists, by contrast, privilege difference and say that the identity of a thing is a secondary determination that depends on how this thing differs from other things.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cisney|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Rae|2020|p=[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/poststructuralist-agency/deleuze-differential-ontology-and-subjectivity/1C78F8C61B72EBF95B5C687DF75F06E0 33]}} | {{harvnb|Rae|2014|p=86}} }}</ref>

[[Object-oriented ontology]] belongs to the school of [[speculative realism]] and examines the nature and role of objects. It sees objects as the fundamental building blocks of reality. As a flat ontology, it denies that some entities have a more fundamental form of existence than others. It uses this idea to argue that objects exist independently of human thought and perception.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Young|2021|pp=83–84}} | {{harvnb|Isrow|2022|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=MrB7EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA28 28]}} | {{harvnb|Neyrat|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=e_nJDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT13 13]}} }}</ref>