Editing Nuclear warfare (section)

===1980s===
[[Image:Trident C-4 montage.jpg|right|thumb|Montage of the launch of a [[Trident missile|Trident C4]] [[SLBM]] and the paths of its reentry vehicles]]
[[File:US nuclear strike map.svg|right|thumb|375px|[[Federal Emergency Management Agency|FEMA]]-estimated primary [[counterforce]] targets for Soviet [[ICBM]]s in 1990.  The resulting [[nuclear fallout|fall-out]] is indicated with the darkest considered as lethal to lesser fall-out yellow zones.<ref>{{cite web|title= Continental US Fallout Pattern for Prevailing Winds (FEMA-196/September 1990) |url= http://ocw.nd.edu/physics/nuclear-warfare/notes/lecture-17 |website= [[University of Notre Dame]] |url-status= dead |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20110315084044/http://ocw.nd.edu/physics/nuclear-warfare/notes/lecture-17 |archive-date= March 15, 2011}}</ref>{{failed verification|date=May 2014|reason=the map in the source is different}}]]

In the late 1970s and, particularly, during the early 1980s under U.S. President [[Ronald Reagan]], the United States renewed its commitment to a more powerful military, which required a large increase in spending on U.S. military programs. These programs, which were originally part of the defense budget of U.S. President [[Jimmy Carter]], included spending on conventional and nuclear weapons systems. Under Reagan, defensive systems like the [[Strategic Defense Initiative]] were emphasized as well.

Another major shift in nuclear doctrine was the development and the improvement of the [[submarine]]-launched, nuclear-armed, ballistic missile, or [[Submarine-launched ballistic missile|SLBM]]. It was hailed by many military theorists as a weapon that would make nuclear war less likely. SLBMs—which can move with "stealth" (greatly lessened detectability) virtually anywhere in the world—give a nation a "[[second strike]]" capability (i.e., after absorbing a "first strike"). Before the advent of the SLBM, thinkers feared that a nation might be tempted to initiate a first strike if it felt confident that such a strike would incapacitate the nuclear arsenal of its enemy, making retaliation impossible. With the advent of SLBMs, no nation could be certain that a first strike would incapacitate its enemy's entire nuclear arsenal. To the contrary, it would have to fear a near-certain retaliatory second strike from SLBMs. Thus, a first strike was a much less feasible (or desirable) option, and a deliberately initiated nuclear war was thought to be less likely to start.

However, it was soon realized that submarines could approach enemy coastlines undetected and decrease the warning time (the time between detection of the missile launch and the impact of the missile) from as much as half an hour to possibly under three minutes. This effect was especially significant to the United States, Britain and China, whose capitals of [[Washington, D.C.|Washington D.C.]], [[London]], and [[Beijing]] all lay within 100 miles (160&nbsp;km) of their coasts. [[Moscow]] was much more secure from this type of threat, due to its considerable distance from the sea. This greatly increased the credibility of a "surprise first strike" by one faction and (theoretically) made it possible to knock out or disrupt the [[chain of command]] of a target nation before any counterstrike could be ordered (known as a "[[decapitation strike]]"). It strengthened the notion that a nuclear war could possibly be "won", resulting not only in greatly increased tensions and increasing calls for [[fail-deadly]] control systems, but also in a dramatic increase in military spending. The submarines and their missile systems were very expensive, and one fully equipped nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed missile submarine could cost more than the entire [[Measures of national income and output#Gross National Product|GNP]] of a [[developing country]].<ref>{{cite news|url=http://americanhistory.si.edu/subs/history/timeline/cost/index.html|title=The Cost of Submarines|access-date=2008-07-13|work=Fast Attacks and Boomers}}</ref> It was also calculated, however, that the greatest cost came in the development of ''both'' sea- and land-based anti-submarine defenses and in improving and strengthening the "chain of command", and as a result, military spending skyrocketed.

[[South Africa]] developed a nuclear weapon capability during the 1970s and early 1980s. It was operational for a brief period before being dismantled in the early 1990s.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Liberman |first1=Peter |title=The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb |journal=International Security |date=2001 |volume=26 |issue=2 |pages=45–86 |doi=10.1162/016228801753191132 |jstor=3092122 |s2cid=57562545 }}</ref>

According to the 1980 [[United Nations]] report ''General and Complete Disarmament: Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons: Report of the Secretary-General'', it was estimated that there were a total of about 40,000 [[Historical nuclear weapons stockpiles and nuclear tests by country|nuclear warheads in existence]] at that time, with a potential combined explosive yield of approximately 13,000 [[TNT equivalent|megatons]]. By comparison, the largest volcanic eruption in [[recorded history]] when the volcano [[Mount Tambora]] erupted in 1815—turning 1816 into the [[Year Without A Summer]] due to the levels of [[global dimming]] [[sulfate]] aerosols and ash expelled—it exploded with a force of roughly 33 billion tons of TNT or 33,000 megatons of TNT this is about 2.2 million [[Little Boy|Hiroshima Bombs]],<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.discovermagazine.com/the-sciences/tambora-1815-just-how-big-was-the-eruption|title = Tambora 1815: Just How Big Was the Eruption?}}</ref> and ejected {{convert|175|km3|cumi|abbr=on}} of mostly rock/[[tephra]],<ref name="Stothers1984">{{cite journal | last = Stothers | first = Richard B. | journal = [[Science (journal)|Science]] | title = The Great Tambora Eruption in 1815 and Its Aftermath | volume = 224 | issue = 4654 | year = 1984 | pages = 1191–1198 | doi = 10.1126/science.224.4654.1191 | pmid = 17819476|bibcode = 1984Sci...224.1191S | s2cid = 23649251 }}</ref> that included 120&nbsp;million [[tonne]]s of sulfur dioxide as [[Mount Tambora#Global effects|an upper estimate]].<ref name="Oppenheimer2003">{{cite journal | last = Oppenheimer | first = Clive | title = Climatic, environmental and human consequences of the largest known historic eruption: Tambora volcano (Indonesia) 1815 | journal = Progress in Physical Geography | volume = 27 | issue = 2 | year = 2003 | pages = 230–259 | doi = 10.1191/0309133303pp379ra| bibcode = 2003PrPG...27..230O | s2cid = 131663534 }}</ref> A larger eruption, approximately 74,000 years ago, in [[Mount Toba]] produced {{convert|2800|km3|abbr=on}} of tephra, forming [[lake Toba]],<ref name=USGS>{{cite web |url= http://hvo.wr.usgs.gov/volcanowatch/2005/05_04_28.html |title=Supersized eruptions are all the rage! |date=April 28, 2005 |publisher=[[USGS]]}}</ref> and produced an estimated {{convert|6000|e6t|ST}} of sulfur dioxide.<ref name=robock2009>{{cite journal| author1=Robock, A.|author2=C.M. Ammann|author3=L. Oman|author4=D. Shindell|author5=S. Levis|author6=G. Stenchikov| title=Did the Toba volcanic eruption of ~74k BP produce widespread glaciation?| journal=[[Journal of Geophysical Research]] | year=2009 | volume=114 |issue=D10 | pages= D10107| doi=10.1029/2008JD011652| bibcode=2009JGRD..11410107R| doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Huang | first1 = C.Y.| last2 = Zhao | first2 = M.X.| last3 = Wang | first3 = C.C.| last4 = Wei | first4 = G.J.| title = Cooling of the South China Sea by the Toba Eruption and correlation with other climate proxies ~71,000 years ago| journal = Geophysical Research Letters | year = 2001 | volume = 28 | issue = 20 | pages = 3915–3918| doi = 10.1029/2000GL006113 | bibcode=2001GeoRL..28.3915H| doi-access = free }}</ref> The explosive energy of the eruption may have been as high as equivalent to 20,000,000 megatons (Mt) of TNT,<ref name="ocw.nd.edu">{{cite web|url=http://ocw.nd.edu/physics/nuclear-warfare/notes/lecture-18|title=Lecture 18 — Notre Dame OpenCourseWare|access-date=September 23, 2014|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141010114324/http://ocw.nd.edu/physics/nuclear-warfare/notes/lecture-18|archive-date=October 10, 2014}}</ref>{{better source needed|date=September 2014}} while the asteroid created [[Chicxulub impact]], that is connected with the extinction of the dinosaurs corresponds to at least 70,000,000&nbsp;Mt of energy, which is roughly 7000 times the maximum arsenal of the US and Soviet Union.<ref name="ocw.nd.edu"/>
[[File:Massale vredesdemonstratie in Bonn tegen de modernisering van kernwapens in West, Bestanddeelnr 253-8611.jpg|thumb|230px|Protest against the deployment of [[Pershing II]] missiles in Europe, Bonn, West Germany, 1981]]

However, comparisons with [[supervolcanos|supervolcanoes]] are more misleading than helpful due to the different [[aerosol]]s released, the likely [[air burst]] fuzing height of nuclear weapons and the globally scattered location of these potential nuclear detonations all being in contrast to the singular and subterranean nature of a [[Supervolcano|supervolcanic eruption]].<ref name="Martin-1982" /> Moreover, assuming the entire world stockpile of weapons were grouped together, it would be difficult, due to the [[nuclear fratricide]] effect, to ensure the individual weapons would go off all at once. Nonetheless, many people believe that a full-scale nuclear war would result, through the nuclear winter effect, in the [[human extinction]], though not all analysts agree on the assumptions that underpin these nuclear winter models.<ref name="bmartin.cc"/>

On 26 September 1983, a Soviet early warning station under the command of [[Stanislav Petrov]] falsely detected 5 inbound [[intercontinental ballistic missile]]s from the US. Petrov correctly assessed the situation as a false alarm, and hence did not report his finding to his superiors.  It is quite possible that his actions prevented "[[World War III]]", as the Soviet policy at that time was [[Launch on warning|immediate nuclear response]] upon discovering inbound ballistic missiles.<ref>{{cite news |first=Tony |last=Long |newspaper=[[Wired (magazine)|Wired]] |title=The Man Who Saved the World by Doing ... Nothing |url=https://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2007/09/dayintech_0926 |date=26 September 2007 }}</ref>

The world came unusually close to nuclear war in November 1983 when the Soviet Union thought that the NATO military exercise [[Able Archer 83]] was a ruse or "cover-up" to begin a nuclear first strike. The Soviets responded by raising readiness and preparing their nuclear arsenal for [[High-alert nuclear weapon|immediate use]]. Soviet fears of an attack ceased once the exercise concluded without incident.