Editing Nikita Khrushchev (section)

=== Struggle for power ===

[[File:Georgy Malenkov 1964.jpg|thumb|right|[[Georgy Malenkov]], the man who briefly succeeded Stalin as [[Leaders of the Soviet Union|leader of the Soviet Union]].]]
On 6 March 1953, Stalin's death was announced, as was the new leadership. Malenkov was the new Chairman of the Council of Ministers, with Beria (who consolidated his hold over the security agencies), Kaganovich, Bulganin, and former Foreign Minister [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] as [[First Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union|first vice-chairmen]]. Those members of the [[Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Presidium of the Central Committee]] who had been recently promoted by Stalin were demoted. Khrushchev was relieved of his duties as Party head for Moscow to concentrate on unspecified duties in the Party's Central Committee.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=114}} ''The New York Times'' listed Malenkov and Beria first and second among the ten-man Presidium—and Khrushchev last.{{sfn|''The New York Times'', 1953-03-10}}

However, Malenkov resigned from the secretariat of the Central Committee on 14 March.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=245}} This came due to concerns that he was acquiring too much power. The major beneficiary was Khrushchev. His name appeared atop a revised list of secretaries—indicating that he was now in charge of the party.<ref>[https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/614785/Union-of-Soviet-Socialist-Republics "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics"] at ''[[Encyclopædia Britannica]]''</ref> The Central Committee formally elected him First Secretary in September.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=258}}

After Stalin's death, Beria launched a number of reforms. According to Taubman, "unparalleled in his cynicism, he [Beria] did not let ideology stand in his way. Had he prevailed, he would almost certainly have exterminated his colleagues, if only to prevent them from liquidating him. In the meantime, however, his burst of reforms rivaled Khrushchev's and in some ways even Gorbachev's".{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=245}} One proposal, which was adopted, was an amnesty which eventually led to the freeing of over a million non-political prisoners. Another, which was not adopted, was to release [[East Germany]] into a united, neutral Germany in exchange for compensation from the West{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=246–247}}—a proposal considered by Khrushchev to be anti-communist.{{sfn|Khrushchev|2006|p=184}} Khrushchev allied with Malenkov to block many of Beria's proposals, while the two slowly picked up support from other Presidium members. Their campaign against Beria was aided by fears that Beria was planning a military coup,{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=121}} and, according to Khrushchev in his memoirs, by the conviction that "Beria is getting his knives ready for us."{{sfn|Khrushchev|2006|p=186}} The key move by Khrushchev and Malenkov was to lure two of Beria's most powerful deputy ministers, [[Sergei Kruglov (politician)|Sergei Kruglov]] and [[Ivan Serov]], to betray their boss. This allowed Khrushchev and Malenkov to arrest Beria as Beria belatedly discovered he had lost control of Ministry of Interior troops and the troops of the Kremlin guard.<ref>Timothy K.  Blauvelt, "Patronage and betrayal in the post-Stalin succession: The case of Kruglov and Serov" ''Communist & Post-Communist Studies'' (2008) 43#1 pp. 105–20.</ref> On 26 June 1953, Beria was arrested at a Presidium meeting, following extensive military preparations by Khrushchev and his allies. Beria was tried in secret and executed in December 1953 with five of his close associates.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=123}}

The power struggle continued. Malenkov's power was in the central state apparatus, which he sought to extend through reorganizing the government, giving it additional power at the expense of the Party. He also sought public support by lowering retail prices and the level of bond sales to citizens, which had long been effectively obligatory. Khrushchev, with his power base in the Party, sought to strengthen the Party and his position within it. While, under the Soviet system, the Party was to be preeminent, it had been greatly drained of power by Stalin, who had given much of that power to himself and to the Politburo (later, to the Presidium). Khrushchev saw that with the Presidium in conflict, the Party and its Central Committee might again become powerful.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=125–126}} Khrushchev carefully cultivated high Party officials and was able to appoint supporters as local Party bosses, who then took seats on the Central Committee.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=259}}
[[File:Nikita Khrushchev-TIME-1953.jpg|thumb|left|Khrushchev featured on the November 1953 cover of ''TIME'' after becoming [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|First Secretary of the Communist Party]]]]
Khrushchev presented himself as a down-to-earth activist prepared to take up any challenge, contrasting with Malenkov who, though sophisticated, came across as colourless.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=259}} Khrushchev arranged for the [[Moscow Kremlin|Kremlin]] grounds to be opened to the public, an act with "great public resonance".{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=263}} While both Malenkov and Khrushchev sought reforms to agriculture, Khrushchev's proposals were broader and included the [[Virgin Lands Campaign]], under which hundreds of thousands of young volunteers would settle and farm areas of Western Siberia and Northern [[Kazakhstan]]. While the scheme was initially successful, it eventually became a tremendous disaster for Soviet agriculture.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=174}} In addition, Khrushchev possessed incriminating information on Malenkov, taken from Beria's secret files. As Soviet prosecutors investigated the atrocities of Stalin's last years, including the [[Leningrad affair|Leningrad case]], they came across evidence of Malenkov's involvement. Beginning in February 1954, Khrushchev replaced Malenkov in the seat of honour at Presidium meetings; in June, Malenkov ceased to head the list of Presidium members, which was thereafter organized in alphabetical order. Khrushchev's influence continued to increase, winning the allegiance of local party heads, and with his nominee heading the [[KGB]].{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=260–264}}

In 1954, the Soviet leadership with Khrushchev transferred [[Crimea]] from the [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Russian SFSR]] to the [[Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic|Ukrainian SSR]], a decision often attributed to Khrushchev's origin.<ref>Krishnadev Calamur, "Crimea: A Gift To Ukraine Becomes A Political Flash Point" [https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/02/27/283481587/crimea-a-gift-to-ukraine-becomes-a-political-flash-point]</ref> Other historians, though, point more to the pacification of inner-soviet tensions<ref>Sergei V. Moshkin, "Why did Khrushchev transfer Crimea to Ukraine?" [https://sites.utu.fi/bre/why-did-khrushchev-transfer-crimea-to-ukraine/]</ref> and to a move in the power game with Malenkov.<ref>Mark Kramer, "Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?" [https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-years-ago]</ref>

At a Central Committee meeting in January 1955, Malenkov was accused of involvement in atrocities, and the committee passed a resolution accusing him of involvement in the Leningrad case, and of facilitating Beria's climb to power. At a meeting of the mostly ceremonial [[Supreme Soviet]] the following month, Malenkov was demoted in favor of Bulganin, to the surprise of Western observers.{{sfn|Fursenko|2006|pp=15–17}} Malenkov remained in the Presidium as Minister of Electric Power Stations. According to Khrushchev biographer William Tompson, "Khrushchev's position as first among the members of the [[collective leadership]] was now beyond any reasonable doubt."{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=141–142}}

The post-Stalin battle for political control reshaped foreign policy. There was more realism and less ideological abstraction when confronted by European and Middle Eastern situations. Khrushchev's "secret speech" attack on Stalin in 1956 was a signal for abandoning Stalinist precepts and looking at new options, including more involvement in the Middle East. Khrushchev in power did not moderate his personality—he remained unpredictable and was emboldened by the spectacular successes in space. He thought that would give the USSR world prestige, leading to quick Communist advances in the Third World. Khrushchev's policy was still restrained by the need to retain the support of the Presidium and to placate the inarticulate but restive Soviet masses who were thrilled by Sputnik but demanded a higher [[standard of living]] on the ground as well.<ref>Paul Marantz, "Internal Politics and Soviet Foreign Policy: A Case Study." ''Western Political Quarterly'' 28.1 (1975): 130–46.  [https://www.jstor.org/stable/447860 online]</ref>