Editing Ngo Dinh Diem (section)

===Counter-insurgency===
{{Main|1960 South Vietnamese coup attempt|1962 South Vietnamese Independence Palace bombing}}
During his presidency, Diệm strongly focused on his central concern: internal security to protect his regime as well as maintain order and social change: staunch anti-subversion and anti-rebellion policies. After the Bình Xuyên was defeated and the Hòa Hảo and Cao Đài were subdued, Diệm concentrated on his most serious threat: the communists. Diệm's main measures for internal security were threats, punishment and intimidation.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=187}} His regime countered North Vietnamese and communist subversion (including the assassination of over 450 South Vietnamese officials in 1956) by launching campaigns known as "Denounce the Communists". Tens of thousands of suspected communists were detained in "political re-education centers". The North Vietnamese government claimed that over 65,000 individuals were imprisoned and 2,148 killed in the process by November 1957.<ref>{{cite book|last=Turner|first=Robert F.|title=Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development|year=1975|publisher=[[Hoover Institution]] Publications|isbn=978-0817964313|pages=174–178}}</ref> In a 1961 letter to the [[International Control Commission]], North Vietnamese general [[Võ Nguyên Giáp]] stated that each "Denounce the Communists" campaign had resulted in hundreds arrested, wounded or killed, sometimes thousands.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Vo |first=Nguyen Giap |title=We Open The File |publisher=Foreign Languages Publishing House (Hanoi)|page=36 |year=1961}}</ref> According to historian [[Gabriel Kolko]], from 1955 to by the end of 1958, 40,000 political prisoners had been jailed and many were executed.{{sfn|Kolko|1994|p=89}} Historian [[Guenter Lewy]] considers such figures exaggerated, stating that there were only 35,000 prisoners in total in South Vietnam during the period.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lewy |first=Guenter |url=https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/America_in_Vietnam.html?id=LtDufIAplzkC&redir_esc=y |title=America in Vietnam |date=1980-05-29 |page=294–95|publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-987423-1 |language=en}}</ref>
 
By the end of 1959, Diệm was able to entirely control each family and the communists had to suffer their "darkest period" in their history. Membership declined by two thirds and they had almost no power in the countryside of South Vietnam.<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Jacobs|2006|p=90}}|{{harvnb|Moyar|2006|pp = 85-86}}}}</ref> Diệm's repression extended beyond communists to anti-communist dissidents and anti-corruption [[whistleblowers]]. In 1956, after the "Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign", Diệm issued Ordinance No. 6, which placed anyone who was considered a threat to the state and public order in jail or house arrest.{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|pp=89-90}}
 
Nevertheless, Diệm's hard policies led to fear and resentment in many quarters in South Vietnam and negatively affected his relations with the US in terms of counter-insurgent methods.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=187}} On 22 February 1957, when Diệm delivered a speech at an agricultural fair in [[Buôn Ma Thuột]], a communist named [[Hà Minh Tri]] attempted to assassinate the president. He approached Diệm and fired a pistol from close range, but missed, hitting the Secretary for Agrarian Reform's left arm. The weapon then jammed and security overpowered Tri before he was able to fire another shot. Diệm was unmoved by the incident.<ref name="Moyar, pp. 66–67">{{harvnb|Moyar|2006|pp= 66–67}}</ref> The assassination attempt was the desperate response of the communists to Diệm's relentless anti-communist policies.<ref name="Moyar, pp. 66–67"/>
 
As opposition to Diệm's rule in South Vietnam grew, a low-level insurgency began to take shape there in 1957. Finally, in January 1959, under pressure from southern communist cadres who were being successfully targeted by Diệm's secret police, Hanoi's [[Central Committee]] issued a secret resolution authorizing the use of armed insurgency in the South with supplies and troops from the North. On 20 December 1960, under instructions from Hanoi, southern communists established the [[Vietcong]] (VC) in order to overthrow the government of the south. On 11 November 1960, a failed [[1960 South Vietnamese coup attempt|coup attempt]] against Diệm was led by Lieutenant Colonel [[Vương Văn Đông]] and Colonel [[Nguyễn Chánh Thi]] of the ARVN [[Republic of Vietnam Airborne Division|Airborne Division]].{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p=252-253}} There was a further attempt to assassinate Diệm and his family in February 1962 when two air force officers{{snd}}acting in unison{{snd}}[[1962 South Vietnamese Independence Palace bombing|bombed the Presidential Palace]].{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p= 280-281}}{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|pp=131-132}}{{sfn|Moyar|2006|pp=151-152}}
 
[[File:Gvnhamlet.jpg|thumb|South Vietnamese "Strategic Hamlet"|229x229px]]
In 1962, the cornerstone of Diệm's counterinsurgency effort – the [[Strategic Hamlet Program]] (''Vietnamese:'' ''Ấp Chiến lược''), "the last and most ambitious of Diem's government's nation building schemes", was implemented, calling for the consolidation of 14,000 villages of South Vietnam into 11,000 secure hamlets, each with its own houses, schools, wells, and watchtowers supported by South Vietnamese government. The hamlets were intended to isolate the VC from the villages, their source for recruiting soldiers, supplies, and information, and to transform the countryside. In the end, because of many shortcomings, the Strategic Hamlet Program was not as successful as had been expected and was cancelled after the assassination of Diệm. However, according to Miller, the program created a remarkable turnabout in Diệm's regime in their war against communism.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=247}} [[Frederick Nolting]] reported that Diệm named reestablishing control and security as his number one priority regarding the countryside. While appearing receptive to building an "infrastructure of democracy" in the rural areas, Diệm emphasised that it would have to wait until the conclusion of the war.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=247}} However, the Strategic Hamlet Program was exposed as an almost complete failure in the aftermath of the [[1963 South Vietnamese coup|November 1, 1963 coup]] that left Diem murdered. US officials discovered, for example, that only 20% of the 8,600 hamlets that the Diem regime had reported "Complete" met the minimum American standards of security and readiness.<ref> Tucker, Spencer, The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ABC-CLIO, 2011, p. 1070</ref>