Editing Munich Agreement (section)

=====Poland=====
[[File:Polish Army capturing Zaolzie in 1938.PNG|left|thumb|The Polish Army entering Trans-Olza in 1938]]
Poland was building up a secret Polish organization in the area of [[Trans-Olza]] from 1935.{{sfn|Goldstein|Lukes|1999|p=122}} In summer 1938, Poland tried to organize guerrilla groups in the area.{{sfn|Goldstein|Lukes|1999|p=122}} On 21 September, Poland officially requested a direct transfer of the area to its own control. Polish envoy to Prague [[Kazimierz Papée]] marked that the return of [[Cieszyn Silesia]] will be a sign of a goodwill and the "redress of injustice" of 1920.{{sfn|Jesenský|2014|p=82}} Similar notes were sent to Paris and London with a request that Polish minority in Czechoslovakia should gain the same rights as Sudeten Germans.{{sfn|Rak|2019|p=405}} On the next day Beneš sent a letter to Polish president [[Ignacy Mościcki]] with a promise of "border's rectification", but the letter was delivered only on 26 September.{{sfn|Kornat|2012|p=157}} The answer of Mościcki delivered on 27 September was evasive, but it was accompanied with the demand of Polish government to hand over two Trans-Olza counties immediately, as a prelude to ultimate settlement of the border dispute.{{sfn|Majewski|2019|pp=459–460}} Beneš's answer wasn't conclusive: he agreed to hand over the disputed territory to Poland but argued that it could not be done on the eve of the German invasion, because it would disrupt Czechoslovak preparations for war. Poles recognised the answer as playing for time.{{sfn|Kornat|2012|p=157}}

Polish diplomatic actions were accompanied by placing army along the Czechoslovak border on 23–24 September and by giving an order to the so-called "battle units" of Trans-Olza Poles and the "Trans-Olza Legion", a paramilitary organisation that was made up of volunteers from all over Poland, to cross the border to Czechoslovakia and attack Czechoslovak units.{{sfn|Goldstein|Lukes|1999|p=122}} The few who crossed, however, were repulsed by Czechoslovak forces and retreated to Poland.{{sfn|Goldstein|Lukes|1999|p=122}}

The Polish ambassador in Germany learned about the results of Munich Conference on 30 September from [[Ribbentrop]], who assured him that Berlin conditioned the guarantees for the remainder of Czechoslovakia on the fulfilment of Polish and Hungarian territorial demands.{{sfn|Rak|2019|p=409}} Polish foreign minister [[Józef Beck]] was disappointed with such a turn of events. In his own words the conference was "an attempt by the directorate of great powers to impose binding decisions on other states (and Poland cannot agree on that, as it would then be reduced to a political object that others conduct at their will)."{{sfn|Rak|2019|p=410}} As a result, at 11:45&nbsp;p.m. on 30 September, 11 hours after the Czechoslovak government accepted the Munich terms, Poland gave an ultimatum to the Czechoslovak government.{{sfn|Goldstein|Lukes|1999|p=66}} It demanded the immediate evacuation of Czechoslovak troops and police and gave Prague time until noon the following day. At 11:45&nbsp;a.m. on 1 October the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry called the Polish ambassador in Prague and told him that Poland could have what it wanted but then requested a 24-hour delay. On 2 October, the [[Polish Army]], commanded by General [[Władysław Bortnowski]], annexed an area of 801.5&nbsp;km<sup>2</sup> with a population of 227,399 people. Administratively the annexed area was divided between [[Frysztat County]] and [[Cieszyn County]].<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Dziennik Ustaw Śląskich, 31.10.1938, [R. 17], nr 18 – Silesian Digital Library|url=https://www.sbc.org.pl/dlibra/show-content/publication/edition/6949?id=6949|access-date=2019-08-29|journal=4258 III| date=14 February 2008 }}</ref>
The historian [[Dariusz Baliszewski]] wrote that during the annexation there was no co-operation between Polish and German troops, but there were cases of co-operation between Polish and Czech troops defending territory against Germans, for example in [[Bohumín]].<ref name="Baliszewski">{{Cite web|last=Baliszewski|first=Mariusz|title=Prawda o Zaolziu – Uważam Rze Historia|url=https://historia.uwazamrze.pl/artykul/1149147/prawda-o-zaolziu|access-date=2019-10-12|website=historia.uwazamrze.pl|language=pl}}</ref>

The Polish ultimatum finally led Beneš to decide, by his own account, to abandon any idea of resisting the settlement (Czechoslovakia would have been attacked on all sides).<ref name="Taylor 1967 241">{{Cite book|last=Taylor|first=A.J.P.|title=Origin of the Second World War|publisher=Penguins Books|year=1967|pages=241}}</ref>

The Germans were delighted with that outcome and were happy to give up the sacrifice of a small provincial rail centre to Poland in exchange for the ensuing propaganda benefits. It spread the blame of the partition of Czechoslovakia, made Poland a participant in the process and confused political expectations. Poland was accused of being an accomplice of Germany.<ref>
{{Cite book|last=Watt|first=Richard|title=Bitter Glory. Poland and its fate 1918–1939. New York|year=1998|isbn=9780781806732|pages=511|publisher=Hippocrene Books }}</ref> However, there was no formal agreement between Poland and Germany about Czechoslovakia at any time.<ref name="Weinberg1">{{cite journal|last1=Weinberg|first1=Gerhard L.|year=1975|title=German Foreign Policy and Poland, 1937–38|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/27920627|journal=The Polish Review|volume=20|issue=1|page=16|jstor=27920627|access-date=13 February 2021}}</ref>

The Chief of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Army, General [[Ludvík Krejčí]], reported on 29 September that "Our army will in about two days' time be in full condition to withstand an attack even by all Germany's forces together, provided Poland does not move against us."<ref>{{Cite book|last=Stone|first=Norman|title=Czechoslovakia Crossroads and Crises|date= 1989|isbn=9781349106462|pages=119|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK }}</ref>

Historians such as H.L. Roberts<ref name="Roberts">{{cite book|last1=Roberts|first1=H.L.|title=The Diplomats 1919–1939|date=1960|publisher=Princeton|editor1-last=Craig|editor1-first=Gordon A.|pages=603, 611|chapter=The Diplomacy of Colonel Beck|quote="Even Beck's unpleasant performance at the time of Munich was not planned in concert with the Germans... He did not like Czechoslovakia, but he did not plot its destruction"|editor2-last=Gilbert|editor2-first=Felix}}</ref> and [[Anna Cienciala]]<ref>{{cite book|last1=Cienciala|first1=A.M.|url=https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203045077|title=The Munich Crisis, 1938 Prelude to World War II|date=30 November 1999|publisher=Routledge|isbn=9780203045077|editor1-last=Goldstein|editor1-first=Erik|pages=57–58|chapter=The Munich crisis of 1938: Plans and strategy in Warsaw in the context of the western appeasement of Germany|doi=10.4324/9780203045077|access-date=13 February 2021|editor2-last=Lukes|editor2-first=Igor}}</ref> have characterised [[Jozef Beck|Beck]]'s actions during the crisis as unfriendly to Czechoslovakia, but not actively seeking its destruction. Whilst [[Stalin]]-era Polish historiography typically followed the line that Beck had been a "German Agent" and had collaborated with Germany, post-1956 historiography has generally rejected this characterisation.<ref name="Gromada1">{{cite journal|last1=Gromada |first1=Thadeus V.|year=1981|title=Joseph Beck in the Light of Recent Polish Historiography|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/25777835|journal=The Polish Review|volume=26|issue=3|pages=68–71|jstor=25777835|access-date=13 February 2021}}</ref>