Editing Moshe Dayan (section)

==Political career==
{{Conservatism in Israel|Politicians}}
In 1959, a year after he retired from the IDF, Dayan joined [[Mapai]], the Israeli [[centre-left]] party, then led by [[David Ben-Gurion]]. Until 1964, he was the [[Agriculture Minister of Israel|Minister of Agriculture]]. In 1965, Dayan joined with the group of Ben-Gurion loyalists who defected from Mapai to form [[Rafi (political party)|Rafi]]. Prime Minister [[Levi Eshkol]] disliked Dayan. When tensions began to rise in early 1967, however, Eshkol appointed the charismatic and popular Dayan defence minister to raise public morale and bring Rafi into a unity government.

Despite his military background, Dayan advocated for the integration of the Palestinian Arabs in an eventual [[One-state solution]].<ref name="mosheint">{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1979/10/28/archives/you-have-to-know-the-arabs-to-like-them-and-i-like-them-an.html |title=Moshe Dayan Discusses His Plan for a Transition to Real Peace and Why 'a Cucumber Is a Cucumber' |archive-url=https://archive.today/20230125011054/https://www.nytimes.com/1979/10/28/archives/you-have-to-know-the-arabs-to-like-them-and-i-like-them-an.html |date=28 Oct 1979 |archive-date=25 January 2023 |work=[[NY Times]]}}</ref>{{Failed verification|date=March 2024}}

===1967 Six-Day War===
[[File:Dan Hadani collection (990044326670205171).jpg|thumb|Moshe Dayan in [[South Vietnam]], 1967]]
Moshe Dayan was covering the [[Vietnam War]] to observe modern warfare up close after he left political life. Moreover, he was on patrol as an observer with members of the [[United States Marine Corps|US Marine Corps]]. Although Dayan did not take part in most of the planning before the [[Six-Day War]] of June 1967, he personally oversaw the capture of East Jerusalem during the 5–7 June fighting.<ref>{{cite video
 | year =1960
 | title =Video: Cease-Fire. Uneasy Truce In Mid-East, 1967/06/13 (1967)
 | url =https://archive.org/details/1967-06-13_Cease-Fire
 | publisher =[[Universal Newsreel]]
 | access-date =22 February 2012
}}</ref> During the years following the war, Dayan enjoyed enormous popularity in Israel and was widely viewed as a potential Prime Minister. At this time, Dayan was the leader of the hawkish camp within the Labor government, opposing a return to anything like Israel's pre-1967 borders. He once said that he preferred [[Sharm-al-Sheikh]] (an Egyptian town on the southern edge of the [[Sinai Peninsula]] overlooking Israel's shipping lane to the [[Red Sea]] via the [[Gulf of Aqaba]]) without peace, to peace without Sharm-al-Sheikh. He modified these views later in his career and played an important role in the eventual peace agreement between Israel and [[Egypt]].

Dayan's contention was denied by Muky Tsur, a longtime leader of the United Kibbutz Movement who said "For sure there were discussions about going up the Golan Heights or not going up the Golan Heights, but the discussions were about security for the kibbutzim in Galilee," he said. "I think that Dayan himself didn't want to go to the Golan Heights. This is something we've known for many years. But no kibbutz got any land from conquering the Golan Heights. People who went there went on their own. It's cynicism to say the kibbutzim wanted land."<ref>{{cite news| url=http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/051197golan-dayan.html | work=The New York Times | title=General's Words Shed a New Light on the Golan | date=12 January 2000}}</ref>

About Dayan's comments, Israeli ambassador to the United States [[Michael Oren]] has said<ref>[https://www.jpost.com/israel/q-and-a-with-michael-oren 5 Jun. 2007] Q&A with [[Michael Oren]]</ref>
<blockquote>There is an element of truth to Dayan's claim, but it is important to note that Israel regarded the de-militarized zones in the north as part of their sovereign territory and reserved the right to cultivate them—a right that the Syrians consistently resisted with force. Syria also worked to benefit from the Jordan river before it flowed into Israel, aiming to get use of it as a water source; Syria also actively supported Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israel. Israel occasionally exploited incidents in the de-militarized zones to strike at the Syrian water diversion project and to punish the Syrians for their support of terror. Dayan's remarks must also be taken in context of the fact that he was a member of the opposition at the time. His attitude toward the Syrians changed dramatically once he became defense minister. Indeed, on June 8, 1967, Dayan bypassed both the Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff in ordering the Israeli army to attack and capture the Golan.</blockquote>

====USS ''Liberty'' incident====
During the [[Six-Day War]], [[Israeli Defense Forces|Israeli aerial and naval forces]] [[USS Liberty incident|attacked the USS ''Liberty'' spy ship]] as she was on patrol in international waters in the eastern [[Mediterranean Sea]].<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/israel-attacks-uss-liberty | title=Israel attacks USS ''Liberty'' | date=9 February 2010 }}</ref> 34 Americans were killed and 174 were wounded in the attack. Israel's official explanation was that the attack was a case of “mistaken identity,” but this remains disputed.

Many ''Liberty'' survivors and their supporters maintain that Dayan personally ordered the attack, and this is supported by a [[CIA]] report on the attack.<ref>{{cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=72cI13uPqGMC | title=The Attack on the ''Liberty'': The Untold Story of Israel's Deadly 1967 Assault on a U.S. Spy Ship | isbn=9781439166055 | last1=Scott | first1=James | date=2 June 2009 | publisher=Simon and Schuster }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://stationhypo.com/2021/08/08/uss-liberty-lawsuit-reveals-us-govt-withholding-hundreds-of-pages-about-deadly-1967-israeli-attack-guest-post/ | title=USS Liberty Lawsuit Reveals US Gov't. Withholding Hundreds of Pages about Deadly 1967 Israeli Attack (Guest Post) | work=Station HYPO | date=8 August 2021 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d516 | title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 – Office of the Historian }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/june/commentary-remember-liberty|title=Commentary – Remember the Liberty &#124; Proceedings – June 2017 Vol. 143/6/1,372|date=June 2017 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.wrmea.org/2005-august/washingtons-fateful-cover-up-of-israels-attack-on-the-uss-liberty.html | title=Washington's Fateful Cover-Up of Israel's Attack on the USS Liberty | date=27 August 2005 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/uss-liberty-cia-report-dayan-personally-ordered-the-attack-39469/ | title=USS Liberty: CIA Report "Dayan Personally Ordered the Attack" | date=July 2017 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20140604-remember-the-uss-liberty-the-us-and-israel-wish-you-didn-t/ | title=Remember the USS Liberty? The US and Israel wish you didn't | date=4 June 2014 }}</ref>

One of the prevailing theories for the motivation for the attack is that the Israelis wished to keep secret their pending invasion of the [[Golan Heights]], and they feared that the [[signals intelligence]] collection ship might have collected intelligence about the pending invasion.<ref>{{cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WGQSAAAAYAAJ | title=Assault on the Liberty: The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship | isbn=9780394505121 | last1=Ennes | first1=James M. | date= 1979 | publisher=Random House }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/israels-assault-on-the-uss-liberty/ | title=Israel's Assault on the USS Liberty }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.fauquier.com/news/fauquier-man-seeks-truth-of-attack-on-uss-liberty-50-years-ago/article_0b2f85f8-34d4-11e7-8a4c-3be94cbba260.html | title=Fauquier man seeks truth of attack on USS ''Liberty'' 50 years ago | date=10 May 2017 }}</ref><ref>https://www.usslibertyveterans.org/files/documentcenter/USS%20Liberty%20Document%20Center/usslibertydocumentcenter.org/doc/upload/MOSHE%20DAYAN%20AND%20THE%20ATTACK%20ON%20THE%20UNITED%20STATES%20SHIP5.pdf {{Bare URL PDF|date=August 2024}}</ref>

===1973 Yom Kippur War===
[[File:President Nixon with Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan - NARA - 194702.tif|thumb|Moshe Dayan with President [[Richard Nixon]] (1970)]]
After [[Golda Meir]] became prime minister in 1969 following the death of [[Levi Eshkol]], Dayan remained defense minister.

He was still in that post when the [[Yom Kippur War]] began catastrophically for [[Israel]] on 6 October 1973. As the highest-ranking official responsible for military planning, Dayan may bear part of the responsibility for the Israeli leadership having missed the signs for the upcoming war.<ref name=blum>Blum, H: ''The Eve of Destruction'', Harper Collins Publishers, 2003</ref> In the hours preceding the war, Dayan chose not to order a full mobilization or a preemptive strike against the Egyptians and Syrians.<ref name=blum/> He assumed that Israel would be able to win easily even if the Arabs attacked and, more importantly, did not want Israel to appear as the aggressor, as it would have undoubtedly cost it the invaluable support of the United States (who would later mount a massive airlift to rearm Israel).

[[File:Menachem Begin and Moshe Dayan exits from an aircraft.JPEG|150px|thumb|Moshe Dayan and [[Menachem Begin]], [[Andrews Air Force Base]], [[Maryland]] (1978)]]
Following the heavy defeats of the first two days, Dayan's views changed radically; he was close to announcing 'the downfall of the "[[The Third Temple|Third]] [[Temple in Jerusalem|Temple]]"' at a news conference, but was forbidden to speak by Meir.

Dayan suggested options at the beginning of the war, including a plan to withdraw to the Mitleh Mountains in Sinai and a complete withdrawal from the Golan Heights to carry the battle over the Jordan, abandoning the core strategic principles of [[Israel Defense Forces#Doctrine|Israeli war doctrine]], which says that war must be taken into enemy territory as soon as possible. Chief of the General Staff [[David Elazar]] objected to these plans and was proved correct. Israel broke through the Egyptian lines on the [[Sinai Peninsula|Sinai]] front, crossed the [[Suez canal]], and encircled the 3rd Egyptian Army. Israel also counterattacked on the Syrian front, repelling the Jordanian and Iraqi expeditionary forces and shelling the outskirts of [[Damascus]]. Although the war ended with an Israeli victory, the Arab attack destroyed Israel's image of invincibility and eventually led to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the subsequent withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Egyptian territory.

===Foreign minister===
[[File:Boutros Boutros-Ghali et Moshe Dayan Strasbourg 10 octobre 1979.jpg|thumbnail|left|[[Boutros Boutros-Ghali]] and Moshe Dayan at [[Council of Europe]] in [[Strasbourg]], October 1979.]]

According to those who knew him, the war deeply depressed Dayan. He went into political eclipse for a time. In 1977, despite having been [[1977 Israeli legislative election|re-elected to the Knesset]] for the [[Alignment (political party)|Alignment]], he accepted the offer to become Foreign Minister in the new [[Likud]] government led by [[Menachem Begin]]. He was expelled from the Alignment, and as a result, sat as an independent MK. As foreign minister in Begin's government, he was instrumental in drawing up the [[Camp David Accords]], a peace agreement with Egypt. Dayan resigned his post in October 1979, because of a disagreement with Begin over whether the Palestinian territories were an internal Israeli matter (the Camp David treaty included provisions for future negotiations with the Palestinians; Begin, who did not like the idea, did not put Dayan in charge of the negotiating team). In 1981, he founded a new party, [[Telem (political party)|Telem]].<!-- Restore the references that have been deleted -->