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==== Job search effort ==== {{technical|section|date=September 2022}} In the model just presented, the minimum wage always increases unemployment. This result does not necessarily hold when the search effort of workers is [[Endogeneity (econometrics)|endogenous]]. Consider a model where the intensity of the job search is designated by the scalar <math>\epsilon</math>, which can be interpreted as the amount of time and/or intensity of the effort devoted to search. Assume that the arrival rate of job offers is <math>\alpha\epsilon</math> and that the wage distribution is degenerated to a single wage <math>w</math>. Denote <math>\varphi(\epsilon)</math> to be the cost arising from the search effort, with <math>\varphi' > 0, \; \varphi'' > 0</math>. Then the discounted utilities are given by:<math display="block">\begin{aligned} rV_{e} &= w + q(V_{u}-V_{e}) \\ rV_{u} &= \max_{\epsilon} \; z - \varphi(\epsilon) + \alpha \epsilon(V_{e}-V_{u}) \end{aligned}</math>Therefore, the optimal search effort is such that the marginal cost of performing the search is equation to the marginal return:<math display="block">\varphi'(\epsilon) = \alpha(V_{e}-V_{u})</math>This implies that the optimal search effort increases as the difference between the expected utility of the job holder and the expected utility of the job seeker grows. In fact, this difference actually grows with the wage. To see this, take the difference of the two discounted utilities to find:<math display="block">(r+q)(V_{e}-V_{u}) = w-\max_{\epsilon}\left[z - \varphi(\epsilon) + \alpha \epsilon(V_{e}-V_{u}) \right]</math>Then differentiating with respect to <math>w</math> and rearranging gives us:<math display="block">{d\over{dw}}(V_{e}-V_{u}) = {1\over{r+q+\alpha\epsilon^{*}}} > 0</math>where <math>\epsilon^{*}</math> is the optimal search effort. This implies that a wage increase drives up job search effort and, therefore, the job finding rate. Additionally, the unemployment rate <math>u</math> at equilibrium is given by:<math display="block">u = {q\over{q+\alpha\epsilon}}</math>A hike in the wage, which increases the search effort and the job finding rate, decreases the unemployment rate. So it is possible that a hike in the minimum wage ''may'', by boosting the search effort of job seekers, boost employment. Taken in sum with the previous section, the minimum wage in labor markets with frictions can improve employment and decrease the unemployment rate when it is sufficiently low. However, a high minimum wage is detrimental to employment and increases the unemployment rate.
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