Editing Military doctrine (section)

===Germany===
{{See also|Mission-type tactics}}
Prior to WWI, Germany had an offensive military doctrine exemplified by the [[Schlieffen Plan]].<ref name=":03">{{cite journal |last=Sagan |first=Scott D. |date=Fall 1986 |title=1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability |journal=International Security |volume=11 |issue=2 |pages=151–175 |doi=10.2307/2538961 |jstor=2538961 |s2cid=153783717}}</ref> Germany also devoted considerable resources to building a fleet of battleships, which provoked fears among European powers.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Murray |first=Michelle |date=2010 |title=Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics:The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2010.524081 |journal=Security Studies |volume=19 |issue=4 |pages=656–688 |doi=10.1080/09636412.2010.524081 |issn=0963-6412}}</ref> During World War II, Germany deployed an operational strategy sometimes referred to as [[Blitzkrieg]] in its offensives against Poland and France.

German military doctrine incorporates the concept of ''Auftragstaktik'' (Mission-type tactics), which can be seen as a doctrine within which formal rules can be selectively suspended in order to overcome "friction". Carl von Clausewitz stated that "Everything in war is very simple but the simplest thing is difficult". Problems will occur with misplaced communications, troops going to the wrong location, delays caused by weather, etc., and it is the duty of the commander to do his best to overcome them. Auftragstaktik encourages commanders to exhibit initiative, flexibility and improvisation while in command.<ref>Martin Samuels,  "Erwin Rommel and German Military Doctrine, 1912-1940," ''War in History'' (2017) 24#3:308-35.</ref>