Editing Metaphysics (section)

=== Others ===
[[Identity (philosophy)|Identity]] is a relation that every entity has to itself as a form of sameness. It refers to numerical identity when the same entity is involved, as in the statement "the [[Phosphorus (morning star)|morning star]] is the [[Hesperus|evening star]]" (both are the planet [[Venus]]). In a slightly different sense, it encompasses qualitative identity, also called ''exact similarity'' and ''indiscernibility'', which occurs when two distinct entities are exactly alike, such as perfect identical twins.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kirwan|2005|pp=417–418}} | {{harvnb|Noonan|Curtis|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> The principle of the indiscernibility of identicals is widely accepted and holds that numerically identical entities exactly resemble one another. The converse principle, known as the [[identity of indiscernibles]] or Leibniz's Law, is more controversial and states that two entities are numerically identical if they exactly resemble one another.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sleigh|2005|p=418}} | {{harvnb|Kirwan|2005|pp=417–418}} | {{harvnb|Noonan|Curtis|2022|loc=§ 2. The Logic of Identity}} }}</ref> Another distinction is between synchronic and diachronic identity. Synchronic identity relates an entity to itself at the same time, whereas diachronic identity is about the same entity at different times, as in statements like "the table I bought last year is the same as the table in my dining room now".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gallois|2016|loc=§ 2.1 Diachronic and Synchronic Identity}} | {{harvnb|Noonan|Curtis|2022|loc=Lead Section, § 5. Identity Over Time}} }}</ref> [[Personal identity]] is a related topic in metaphysics that uses the term ''identity'' in a slightly different sense and concerns questions like what [[personhood]] is or what makes someone a person.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Noonan|Curtis|2022|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Olson|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 1. The Problems of Personal Identity}} | {{harvnb|Korfmacher}} }}</ref>

Various contemporary metaphysicians rely on the concepts of [[truth]], [[truth-bearer]], and [[Truthmaker theory|truthmaker]] to conduct their inquiry.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=15–17}} }}</ref> Truth is a property of being in accord with reality. Truth-bearers are entities that can be true or false, such as linguistic statements and mental representations. A truthmaker of a statement is the entity whose existence makes the statement true.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005a|p=926}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=15–17}} | {{harvnb|Asay|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=nRXeDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 11]}} | {{harvnb|MacBride|2022}} }}</ref> For example, the fact that a tomato exists and that it is red acts as a truthmaker for the statement "a tomato is red".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rodriguez-Pereyra|2006|pp=191–192}} | {{harvnb|Beebee|Dodd|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=l24TDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA2 2–3]}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|p=1}} }}</ref> Based on this observation, it is possible to pursue metaphysical research by asking what the truthmakers of statements are, with different areas of metaphysics being dedicated to different types of statements. According to this view, modal metaphysics asks what makes statements about what is possible and necessary true while the metaphysics of time is interested in the truthmakers of temporal statements about the past, present, and future.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=1–4, 163–165}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=15–17, 154}} | {{harvnb|Meinertsen|2018|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8HiQDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA21 21–22]}} }}</ref> A closely related topic concerns the nature of truth. Theories of truth aim to determine this nature and include [[Correspondence theory of truth|correspondence]], [[Coherence theory of truth|coherence]], [[Pragmatic theory of truth|pragmatic]], [[Semantic theory of truth|semantic]], and [[Deflationary theory of truth|deflationary theories]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dowden|Swartz|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2014|pp=12, 34–35, 47}} }}</ref>