Editing Metaethics (section)

=== Moral nihilism ===
[[Moral nihilism]], also known as ethical nihilism, is the metaethical view that nothing has intrinsic moral value. For example, a moral nihilist would say that killing someone, for whatever reason, is intrinsically neither morally right nor morally wrong. Moral nihilism must be distinguished from [[moral relativism]], which does allow for moral statements to be intrinsically true or false in a non-universal sense, but does not assign any static truth-values to moral statements. Insofar as only true statements can be known, moral nihilists are [[moral skepticism|moral skeptics]]. Most forms of moral nihilism are [[non-cognitivism|non-cognitivist]] and vice versa, though there are notable exceptions such as [[universal prescriptivism]] (which is semantically non-cognitive but substantially universal).