Editing Maxims of equity (section)

===Equity abhors a forfeiture===
Today, a mortgagor refers to his interest in the property as his "equity". The origin of the concept, however, was actually a mirror-image of the current practice.

At [[common law]], a [[mortgage]] was a [[conveyancing|conveyance]] of the [[property]], with a [[condition subsequent]], that if the grantor paid the secured indebtedness to the grantee on or before a date certain (the "law" day) then the condition subsequent would be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect. As was inevitable, debtors would be unable to pay on the law day, and if they tendered the debt after the time had passed, the creditor owed no duty to give the land back. So then the debtor would run to the court of equity, plead that there was an unconscionable forfeiture about to occur, and beg the court to grant an equitable decree requiring the lender to surrender the property upon payment of the [[secured debt]] with interest to date. And the equity courts granted these petitions quite regularly and often without regard for the amount of time that had lapsed since the law day had passed. The lender could interpose a defense of [[laches (equity)|laches]], saying that so much time had gone by (and so much improvement and betterment had taken place) that it would be inequitable to require undoing the finality of the mortgage conveyance. Other defenses, including [[equitable estoppel]], were used to bar redemption as well.

This unsettling system had a negative impact on the willingness of lenders to accept real estate as collateral security for loans. Since a lender could not re-sell the property until it had been in uncontested possession for years, or unless it could show changed circumstances, the value of real estate collateral was significantly impaired. Impaired, that is, until lawyers concocted the bill of foreclosure, whereby a mortgagee could request a decree that unless the mortgagor paid the debt by a date certain (and after the law date set in the mortgage), the mortgagor would thereafter be barred and foreclosed of all right, [[Title (property)|title]] and [[equity of redemption]] in and to the mortgaged premises.

To complete the circle, one needs to understand that when a mortgagor fails to pay an installment when due, and the mortgagee accelerates the mortgage, requiring immediate repayment of the entire mortgage indebtedness, the mortgagor does not have a right to pay the past-due installment(s) and have the mortgage reinstated. In ''Graf v. Hope Building Corp.'',<ref>''[[Graf v. Hope Building Corp.]]'', 254 NY 1 (1930)</ref> the [[New York Court of Appeals]] observed that in such a case, there was no forfeiture, only the operation of a clause fair on its face, to which the mortgagor had freely assented. In the latter 20th Century, New York's lower courts eroded the ''Graf'' doctrine to such a degree that it appears that it is no longer the law, and that a court of conscience has the power to mandate that a default be excused if it is equitable to do so. Of course, now that the pendulum is swinging in the opposite direction, we can expect courts to explain where the limits on the newly expanded equity of redemption lie...and it is probably not a coincidence that the cases that have eroded ''Graf v. Hope Building Corp.'' have been accompanied by the rise of [[arbitration]] as a means for enforcing mortgages.<ref>See Osborne, ''Real Estate Finance Law'' (West, 1979), Chapter 7</ref>