Editing Materialism (section)

==Physicalism==
{{main|Physicalism}}
George Stack distinguishes between materialism and physicalism: {{blockquote|text=In the twentieth century, physicalism has emerged out of positivism. Physicalism restricts meaningful statements to physical bodies or processes that are verifiable or in principle verifiable. It is an empirical hypothesis that is subject to revision and, hence, lacks the dogmatic stance of classical materialism. [[Herbert Feigl]] defended physicalism in the United States and consistently held that mental states are brain states and that mental terms have the same referent as physical terms. The twentieth century has witnessed many materialist theories of the mental, and much debate surrounding them.<ref name="Craig1998">{{Citation |first=George J. |last=Stack |editor-first=E. |editor-last=Craig |year=1998 |title=Materialism |encyclopedia=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Luther to Nifo |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-415-18714-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=G3UBxqkkCX8C&pg=PA171 |pages=171–172 |issue=v. 6}}</ref>}}

But not all conceptions of physicalism are tied to verificationist theories of meaning or direct realist accounts of perception. Rather, physicalists believe that no "element of reality" is missing from the mathematical formalism of our best description of the world. "Materialist" physicalists also believe that the formalism describes fields of insentience. In other words, the intrinsic nature of the physical is non-experiential.{{Citation needed|date=June 2019}}