Editing Iran–Iraq War (section)

===1981: Stalemate===
For the next eight months, both sides were on a defensive footing, with the exception of the [[Battle of Dezful]], as the Iranians needed more time to reorganise their forces after the damage inflicted by the purge of 1979–80. During this period, fighting consisted mainly of artillery duels and raids.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Iraq had mobilised 21 divisions for the invasion, while Iran countered with only 13 regular army divisions and one [[brigade]]. Of the regular divisions, only seven were deployed to the border. The war bogged down into World War I-style [[trench warfare]] with updated weaponry. Due to the power of anti-tank weapons such as the [[RPG-7]], armoured manoeuvre by the Iraqis was very costly, and they consequently entrenched their tanks into static positions.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name=pollack04 />

Iraq also began firing [[Scud]] missiles into [[Dezful]] and [[Ahvaz]], and used [[terror bombing]] to bring the war to the Iranian civilian population.<ref name=Abdoleinen-Ghazaleh>{{cite journal|url=http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ghazalah%E2%80%99s-phased-analysis-of-combat-operations-part-two-of-three|title=Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazalah on the Combat Tactics and Strategy of the Iran–Iraq War|series=Ghazalah's Phased Analysis of Combat Operations|first1=Youssef|last1=Aboul-Enein|first2=Andrew|last2=Bertrand|first3=Dorothy|last3=Corley|date=12 April 2012|journal=Small Wars Journal|publisher=Small Wars Foundation|access-date=6 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160101040325/http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ghazalah%E2%80%99s-phased-analysis-of-combat-operations-part-two-of-three|archive-date=1 January 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> Iran launched dozens of "human wave assaults".

====Battle of Dezful====
{{Main|Battle of Dezful}}

[[File:Banisadr iran iraq war 2.jpg|thumb|Iranian president [[Abolhassan Banisadr|Abulhassan Banisadr]] during a visit to the frontlines]]

On 5 January 1981, Iran had reorganised its forces enough to launch a large-scale offensive, [[Operation Nasr]] (Victory).<ref name=wilson07 /><ref name=dennis09>{{cite book|last=Dennis|first=Simon Dunstan|title=The Six Day War, 1967: Jordan and Syria|year=2009|publisher=Osprey Publishing|location=Oxford|isbn=978-1-84603-364-3|edition=1st|page=22}}</ref><ref name="Jafari 2011">{{cite web|last=Jafari|first=Mojtaba|title=Nasr Offensive Operation|url=http://www.tebyan.net/newindex.aspx?pid=188315|date=26 July 2019|access-date=13 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140715001111/http://www.tebyan.net/newindex.aspx?pid=188315|archive-date=15 July 2014|url-status=live}}</ref> The Iranians launched their major armoured offensive from [[Dezful]] in the direction of [[Susangerd]], consisting of tank brigades from the 16th ''Qazvin'', 77th ''Khorasan'', and [[92nd Armored Division (Iran)|92nd Khuzestan Armoured Division]]s,<ref name="Jafari 2011" /> and broke through Iraqi lines.<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|32}} However, the Iranian tanks had raced through Iraqi lines with unguarded flanks and without infantry support;<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> as a result, they were cut off by Iraqi tanks.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

In the ensuing Battle of Dezful, the Iranian armoured divisions were nearly wiped out in one of the biggest tank battles of the war.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> When the Iranian tanks tried to manoeuvre, they became stuck in the mud of the marshes, and many tanks were abandoned.<ref name=wilson07 /> The Iraqis lost 45 [[T-55]] and [[T-62]] tanks, while the Iranians lost 100–200 [[Chieftain tank|Chieftain]] and [[M60 Patton|M-60]] tanks. Reporters counted roughly 150 destroyed or deserted Iranian tanks, and also 40 Iraqi tanks.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> 141 Iranians were killed during the battle.<ref name="Jafari 2011" />

The battle had been ordered by Iranian president [[Abulhassan Banisadr]], who was hoping that a victory might shore up his deteriorating political position; instead, the failure hastened his fall.<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|71}} Many of Iran's problems took place because of political infighting between Banisadr, who supported the regular army, and the hardliners, who supported the IRGC. Once he was [[impeached]] and the competition ended, the performance of the Iranian military improved.
 
The Islamic Republic government in Iran was further distracted by internal fighting between the regime and the [[Mujahedin e-Khalq]] (MEK) on the streets of Iran's major cities in June 1981 and again in September.<ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|250–251|date=November 2012}} In 1983, the MEK started an alliance with Iraq following a meeting between MEK leader [[Massoud Rajavi]] and Iraqi Deputy Prime minister [[Tariq Aziz]].<ref>{{cite book|first=Shaul|last=Shay|title=The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror|date=October 1994|publisher=Routledge|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uLo6DwAAQBAJ&q=1983+Tariq+Aziz+massoud+rajavi&pg=PT239|isbn=978-0765802552|quote="The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside."}}</ref>{{sfn|Piazza|1994|p=16|ps=: "At the beginning of January of 1983, Rajavi held a highly publicised meeting with then Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Tarqi Aziz, which culminated in the signing of a peace communique on January 9 of that year. Rajavi, acting as the chairman of the NCR, co-outlined a peace plan with Aziz based on an agreement of mutual recognition of borders as defined by the 1975 Algiers Treaty."}}<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1983/01/10/world/iraqi-visits-iranian-leftist-in-paris.html|title=Iraqi Visits Iranian Leftist in Paris|newspaper=The New York Times|date=10 January 1983|quote=The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the exiled leader of an Iranian leftist group met for four hours today and said afterward that the war between their countries should brought to an end. The conversations between Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz of Iraq and Massoud Rajavi, leader of the People's Mujahedeen, an organization that includes a guerrilla wing active in Iran, were described by Mr. Rajavi as the first of their kind. He said the exchange of views had been "an important political turning point on the regional level and for the world in relation to the Iran–Iraq War"|access-date=30 December 2021|archive-date=16 August 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816021516/https://www.nytimes.com/1983/01/10/world/iraqi-visits-iranian-leftist-in-paris.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|first=Shaul|last=Shay|title=The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror|date=1994|publisher=Routledge|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uLo6DwAAQBAJ&q=1983+Tariq+Aziz+massoud+rajavi&pg=PT239|isbn=978-0765802552|quote="Despite the mortal blow inflicted on the organization, the Iranian regime continued to regard the Mujahidin as a real threat, and therefore continued to persecute its followers and damage their public image. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside."}}</ref>

In 1984, Banisadr left the coalition because of a dispute with [[Massoud Rajavi|Rajavi]], who moved from [[Paris]] to Iraq in 1986 and set up a base on the Iranian border.{{NoteTag|[[Massoud Rajavi]]}} The Battle of Dezful became a critical battle in Iranian military thinking. Less emphasis was placed on the Army with its conventional tactics, and more emphasis was placed on the Revolutionary Guard with its unconventional tactics.<ref name="wilson07" /><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0120/012038.html/(page)/2|title=Iran–Iraq War bogs down in rain, conflicting claims|newspaper=The Christian Science Monitor|access-date=5 October 2013|date=20 January 1981|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131231002127/http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0120/012038.html/(page)/2|archive-date=31 December 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Attack on H3====
[[File:Operation H3 map.png|thumb|upright=1|The [[H-3 airstrike|surprise attack on H-3 airbase]] is considered to be one of the most sophisticated air operations of the war.|right]]

The Iraqi Air Force, badly damaged by the Iranians, was moved to the [[H-3 Air Base]] in western Iraq, near the [[Jordan]]ian border and away from Iran. However, on 3 April 1981, the Iranian air force used eight F-4 Phantom fighter bombers, four F-14 Tomcats, three [[Boeing 707]] refuelling tankers, and one [[Boeing 747]] command plane to launch a surprise [[attack on H3]], destroying 27–50 Iraqi fighter jets and bombers.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://iiaf.net/stories/warstories/s1.html|title=Assault on Al-Wallid|website=Imperial Iraniasn Air Force|access-date=9 September 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011172153/http://iiaf.net/stories/warstories/s1.html|archive-date=11 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref>

Despite the successful attack (in addition to other air attacks), the Iranian Air Force was forced to cancel its successful 180-day air offensive and abandoned their attempted control of Iraqi [[airspace]]. They had been seriously weakened by sanctions and pre-war purges and further damaged by a fresh purge after the [[Abolhassan Banisadr#Impeachment|impeachment crisis of President Banisadr]].<ref name="csis 5">{{cite web|last=Cordesman|first=Anthony|title=Lessons of Modern Warfare: The Iran Iraq War Chapter V|url=http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap05.pdf|access-date=4 May 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090911152946/http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap05.pdf|archive-date=11 September 2009|url-status=live}}</ref> The Iranian Air Force could not survive further attrition, and decided to limit their losses, abandoning efforts to control Iraqi [[airspace]]. The Iranian air force would henceforth fight on the defensive, trying to deter the Iraqis rather than engaging them. While throughout 1981–1982 the Iraqi air force would remain weak, within the next few years they would rearm and expand again, and begin to regain the strategic initiative.<ref name="Cooper Blinders">{{cite web|last=Cooper|first=Tom|title=Bombed by Blinders Part 1|url=http://www.acig.info/CMS/?option=com_content&task=view&id=247&Itemid=47|access-date=20 April 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170630000305/http://www.acig.info/CMS/?option=com_content&task=view&id=247&Itemid=47|archive-date=30 June 2017|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Introduction of human wave attacks====
The Iranians suffered from a shortage of heavy weapons,<ref name=pollack04 />{{rp|225|date=November 2012}} but had numerous volunteers, so they began using [[human wave attack]]s against the Iraqis. Typically, an Iranian assault would commence with poorly trained Basij who would launch the primary human wave assaults to swamp the weakest portions of the Iraqi lines en masse (on some occasions even bodily clearing minefields).<ref name=pollack04 /><ref name=moin>[https://books.google.com/books?id=b2OL9IEXaAgC&q=martyrdom+iraq Khomeini: life of the Ayatollah] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924090001/https://books.google.com/books?id=b2OL9IEXaAgC&printsec=frontcover&dq=moin+khomeini&hl=en&src=bmrr&ei=xilNTreuMOLj0QHz5ID_Bg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAA#v=snippet&q=martyrdom%20iraq&f=false |date=24 September 2015 }} By Baqer Moin</ref> This would be followed up by the more experienced Revolutionary Guard infantry, who would breach the weakened Iraqi lines,<ref name=pollack04 /><ref name=wilson07 /> and followed up by the regular army using mechanised forces, who would manoeuvre through the breach and attempt to encircle and defeat the enemy.<ref name=pollack04 /><ref name=wilson07 />

[[File:Iranian soldier holding IV bag during Iran-Iraq war.jpeg|thumb|209x209px|A wounded Iranian soldier holding an [[Intravenous therapy|IV bag]]]]

According to [[historian]] Stephen C. Pelletiere, the idea of Iranian "human wave attacks" was a misconception.<ref name=Pelletiere /> Instead, the Iranian tactics consisted of using groups of 22-man infantry [[squads]], which moved forward to attack specific objectives. As the squads surged forward to execute their missions, that gave the impression of a "human wave attack". Nevertheless, the idea of "human wave attacks" remained virtually [[synonymous]] with any large-scale infantry frontal assault Iran carried out.<ref name=Pelletiere>{{cite book|last=Pelletiere|first=Stephen|title=The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=V_-MKu4k6QAC&q=Iran+did+not+use+human+wave+attacks&pg=PA40|isbn=978-0275938437|year=1992|publisher=Abc-Clio}}</ref> Large numbers of troops would be used, aimed at overwhelming the Iraqi lines (usually the weakest portion, typically manned by the [[Iraqi Popular Army]]), regardless of losses.<ref name=pollack04 />

According to the former Iraqi general [[Ra'ad al-Hamdani]], the Iranian human wave charges consisted of armed "civilians" who carried most of their necessary equipment themselves into battle and often lacked [[command and control]] and [[logistics]].<ref name="Woods 2010">{{cite web|last=Woods|first=Kevin|title=Saddam's Generals: A Perspective of the Iran–Iraq War|url=http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/saddams-generals.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130403150153/http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/saddams-generals.pdf|archive-date=3 April 2013}}</ref> Operations were often carried out during the night and deception operations, infiltrations, and manoeuvres became more common.<ref name=Abdoleinen-Ghazaleh /> Infiltrating forces would be reinforced to maintain momentum, all forces would be concentrated onto a newly discovered weak point, and human wave attacks were used to facilitate breakthroughs.<ref name="Woods 2010" />

Human wave attacks, while extremely bloody (tens of thousands of troops died in the process),<ref name="moin" /> when used in combination with infiltration and surprise, caused major Iraqi defeats. As the Iraqis would dig in their tanks and infantry into static, entrenched positions, the Iranians would manage to break through the lines and encircle entire divisions.<ref name=pollack04 /> Merely the fact that the Iranian forces used [[maneuver warfare|manoeuvre warfare]] by their light infantry against static Iraqi defenscs was often the decisive factor in battle.<ref name=wilson07 /> However, lack of coordination between the Iranian Army and IRGC and shortages of heavy weaponry played a detrimental role, often with most of the infantry not being supported by artillery and armour.<ref name=pollack04 /><ref name=wilson07 />

====Operation Eighth-Imam====
After the Iraqi offensive stalled in March 1981, there was little change in the front other than Iran retaking the high ground above [[Susangerd]] in May. By late 1981, Iran returned to the offensive and launched [[Operation Samen-ol-A'emeh]]&nbsp;(The Eighth Imam),<ref name=biontino88>{{cite book|title=Iran Yearbook|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VRoYAQAAMAAJ|page=125|publisher=Moini-Biontino|year=1988|isbn=978-3927073005|lccn=sn89044105}}</ref> ending the Iraqi [[Siege of Abadan]] on 27–29 September 1981.<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|9}} The Iranians used a combined force of regular artillery with small groups of armour, supported by Pasdaran (IRGC) and Basij infantry.<ref name="csis 5" /> On 15 October, after lifting the siege, a large Iranian convoy was ambushed by Iraqi tanks, and during the ensuing tank battle Iran lost 20 [[Chieftain tank|Chieftains]] and other armoured vehicles and withdrew from the previously gained territory.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a241169.pdf|title=Tactical Evolution in the Iraqi Army: The Abadan Island And Fish Lake Campaigns of the Iran-Ipaq War|access-date=2014-08-18|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131203034017/http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a241169.pdf|archive-date=3 December 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Operation Tariq al-Quds====
On 29 November 1981, Iran began [[Operation Tariq al-Quds]] with three army brigades and seven Revolutionary Guard brigades. The Iraqis failed to properly patrol their occupied areas, and the Iranians constructed a {{convert|14|km|m mi|abbr=on}} road through the unguarded sand dunes, launching their attack from the Iraqi rear.<ref name=wilson07 /> The town of [[Bostan, Iran|Bostan]] was retaken from Iraqi divisions by 7 December.<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|10}} By this time the Iraqi Army was experiencing serious morale problems, compounded by the fact that Operation Tariq al-Quds marked the first use of Iranian "human wave" tactics, where the Revolutionary Guard [[light infantry]] repeatedly charged at Iraqi positions, oftentimes without the support of armour or air power. The fall of Bostan exacerbated the Iraqis' logistical problems, forcing them to use a roundabout route from Ahvaz to the south to resupply their troops. 6,000 Iranians and over 2,000 Iraqis were killed in the operation.<ref name=efraimkarsh />