Editing Hirohito (section)

=== World War II ===
{{More citations needed section|date=November 2019}}
[[File:Pacific Area - The Imperial Powers 1939 - Map.jpg|thumb|Political-military map of the Asia-Pacific region in 1939]]

==== Preparations ====
In July 1939, Hirohito quarrelled with his brother, [[Yasuhito, Prince Chichibu|Prince Chichibu]], over whether to support the [[Anti-Comintern Pact]], and reprimanded the army minister, [[Seishirō Itagaki]].{{sfnm|Hidenari|1991|1pp=106–108|Wetzler|1998|2pp=25, 231}} But after the success of the [[Wehrmacht]] in Europe, Hirohito consented to the alliance. On 27 September 1940, ostensibly under Hirohito's leadership, Japan became a contracting partner of the [[Tripartite Pact]] with [[Nazi Germany|Germany]] and [[Kingdom of Italy|Italy]] forming the [[Axis powers]].

The objectives to be obtained were clearly defined: a free hand to continue with the conquest of China and Southeast Asia, no increase in U.S. or British military forces in the region, and cooperation by the West "in the acquisition of goods needed by our Empire."<ref>{{Cite book |title=Japan's decision for war : records of the 1941 policy conferences |year=1967 |publisher=Stanford University Press |others=Nobutaka Ike |isbn=0-8047-0305-1}}</ref>

On 5 September, Prime Minister Konoe informally submitted a draft of the decision to Hirohito, just one day in advance of the Imperial Conference at which it would be formally implemented. On this evening, Hirohito had a meeting with the chief of staff of the army, Sugiyama, chief of staff of the navy, [[Osami Nagano]], and Prime Minister Konoe. Hirohito questioned Sugiyama about the chances of success of an open war with [[Western world|the Occident]]. As Sugiyama answered positively, Hirohito scolded him:

{{blockquote
|—At the time of the [[Second Sino-Japanese War|China Incident]], the army told me that we could achieve peace immediately after dealing them one blow with three divisions ... but you can't still beat Chiang Kai-shek even today! Sugiyama, you were army minister at that time.<br />—China is a vast area with many ways in and ways out, and we met unexpectedly big difficulties ...<br />—You say the interior of China is huge; isn't the Pacific Ocean even bigger than China? ... Didn't I caution you each time about those matters? Sugiyama, are you lying to me?{{sfn|Bix|2001|pp=411, 745}}}}

Chief of Naval General Staff Admiral Nagano, a former Navy Minister and vastly experienced, later told a trusted colleague, "I have never seen the Emperor reprimand us in such a manner, his face turning red and raising his voice."<ref>Prange, G. W., Dillon, K. V., Goldstein, D. M. (1991). At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor; Revised Edition. United Kingdom: Penguin Publishing Group.</ref><ref>Pike, F. (2016). Hirohito's War: The Pacific War, 1941–1945. United Kingdom: Bloomsbury Publishing.</ref>

[[File:Emperor Shōwa Army 1938-1-8.jpg|thumb|Emperor Hirohito riding Shirayuki during an Army inspection on 8 January 1938]]

Nevertheless, all speakers at the Imperial Conference were united in favor of war rather than diplomacy.<ref>{{cite web |title=Chapter III: Politico-Military Evolution Toward War |url=https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V2%20P1/ch3.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071226081745/http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V2%20P1/ch3.htm |url-status=dead |archive-date=26 December 2007 |access-date=25 November 2022 |website=history.army.mil}}</ref> Baron [[Yoshimichi Hara]], President of the Imperial Council and Hirohito's representative, then questioned them closely, producing replies to the effect that war would be considered only as a last resort from some, and silence from others.

On 8 October, Sugiyama signed a 47-page report to the Emperor (sōjōan) outlining in minute detail plans for the advance into Southeast Asia. During the third week of October, Sugiyama gave Hirohito a 51-page document, "Materials in Reply to the Throne," about the operational outlook for the war.{{sfn|Wetzler|1998|pp=52–54}}

As war preparations continued, Prime Minister [[Fumimaro Konoe]] found himself increasingly isolated, and he resigned on 16 October. He justified himself to his chief cabinet secretary, Kenji Tomita, by stating:

{{blockquote|Of course His Majesty is a pacifist, and there is no doubt he wished to avoid war. When I told him that to initiate war was a mistake, he agreed. But the next day, he would tell me: "You were worried about it yesterday, but you do not have to worry so much." Thus, gradually, he began to lean toward war. And the next time I met him, he leaned even more toward. In short, I felt the Emperor was telling me: my prime minister does not understand military matters, I know much more. In short, the Emperor had absorbed the view of the army and navy high commands.<ref>Fujiwara, ''Shōwa tennō no jūgo-nen sensō'', 1991, p. 126, citing Kenji Tomita's diary.</ref>}}

The army and the navy recommended the appointment of [[Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni]], one of Hirohito's uncles, as prime minister. According to the Shōwa "Monologue", written after the war, Hirohito then said that if the war were to begin while a member of the imperial house was prime minister, the imperial house would have to carry the responsibility and he was opposed to this.{{sfn|Hidenari|1991|p=118}} Instead, Hirohito chose the hard-line General [[Hideki Tojo|Hideki Tōjō]], who was known for his devotion to the imperial institution, and asked him to make a policy review of what had been sanctioned by the Imperial Conferences.

[[File:Imperial general headquaters meeting.jpg|thumb|The Emperor as head of the [[Imperial General Headquarters]] on 29 April 1943.]]
On 2 November Tōjō, Sugiyama, and Nagano reported to Hirohito that the review of eleven points had been in vain. Emperor Hirohito gave his consent to the war and then asked: "Are you going to provide justification for the war?"{{sfn|Bix|2016|p=421}}{{sfn|Wetzler|1998|pp=47–50}} The decision for war against the United States was presented for approval to Hirohito by General Tōjō, Naval Minister Admiral [[Shigetarō Shimada]], and Japanese Foreign Minister [[Shigenori Tōgō]].<ref>''Day of Deceit'', Robert B. Stinnett, New York, 2000, p. 143.</ref>

On 3 November, Nagano explained in detail the plan of the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]] to Hirohito.{{sfn|Wetzler|1998|pp=29, 35}} On 5 November Emperor Hirohito approved in imperial conference the operations plan for a war against the [[Western world]] and had many meetings with the military and Tōjō until the end of the month.{{sfn|Bix|2016|pp=424, 430-31}} He initially showed hesitance towards engaging in war, but eventually approved the decision to strike Pearl Harbor despite opposition from certain advisors.<ref name="nuclearmuseum_emperor-hirohito">{{cite web |url=https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/profile/emperor-hirohito/#:~:text=The%20emperor%27s%20office%20signed%20off,his%20ability%20to%20do%20so |title=Emperor Hirohito - Nuclear Museum}}</ref> In the period leading up to Pearl Harbor, he expanded his control over military matters and participated in the Conference of Military Councillors, which was considered unusual of him. Additionally, he sought additional information regarding the attack plans.<ref name="nuclearmuseum_emperor-hirohito"/> An aide reported that he openly showed joy upon learning of the success of the surprise attacks.<ref name="nuclearmuseum_emperor-hirohito"/>

On 25 November [[Henry L. Stimson]], United States Secretary of War, noted in his diary that he had discussed with U.S. President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] the severe likelihood that Japan was about to launch a surprise attack and that the question had been "how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves."

On the following day, 26 November 1941, [[U.S. Secretary of State]] [[Cordell Hull]] presented the Japanese ambassador with the [[Hull note]], which as one of its conditions demanded the complete withdrawal of all Japanese troops from [[French Indochina]] and China. Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tojo said to his cabinet, "This is an ultimatum." On 1 December an Imperial Conference sanctioned the "War against the United States, United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Netherlands."<ref>{{cite book |title=December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor |year=2003 |first=William H. |last=Bartsch}} p. 187.</ref>

==== War: advance and retreat ====
On 8 December (7 December in Hawaii), 1941, in simultaneous attacks, Japanese forces [[Battle of Hong Kong|struck]] at the [[British Forces Overseas Hong Kong|Hong Kong Garrison]], the [[United States Fleet]] in [[Attack on Pearl Harbor|Pearl Harbor]] and in the [[Commonwealth of the Philippines|Philippines]], and began the [[Malayan campaign|invasion of Malaya]].

With the nation fully committed to the war, Hirohito took a keen interest in military progress and sought to boost morale. According to Akira Yamada and Akira Fujiwara, Hirohito made major interventions in some military operations. For example, he pressed Sugiyama four times, on 13 and 21 January and 9 and 26 February, to increase troop strength and launch an attack on [[Bataan]]. On 9 February 19 March, and 29 May, Hirohito ordered the Army Chief of staff to examine the possibilities for an attack on [[Chongqing]] in China, which led to Operation Gogo.<ref>Yamada, pp. 180, 181, 185; Fujiwara, pp. 135–138.</ref>

While some authors, like journalists [[Peter Jennings]] and [[Todd Brewster]], say that throughout the war, Hirohito was "outraged" at Japanese war crimes and the political dysfunction of many societal institutions that proclaimed their loyalty to him, and sometimes spoke up against them,<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last1=Jennings |first1=Peter |title=The Century |last2=Brewster |first2=Todd |date=November 1998 |publisher=[[Doubleday (publisher)|Doubleday]] |isbn=0-385-48327-9 |location=New York |page=252 |author-link=Peter Jennings |author-link2=Todd Brewster}}</ref> others, such as historians [[Herbert P. Bix]] and [[Mark Felton]], as well as the expert on China's international relations Michael Tai, point out that Hirohito personally sanctioned the "[[Three Alls policy]]" ({{lang|ja|Sankō Sakusen}}), a [[scorched earth]] strategy implemented in China from 1942 to 1945 and which was both directly and indirectly responsible for the deaths of "more than 2.7 million" Chinese civilians.{{Sfn|Bix|2016|p=365}}<ref>{{Cite book |last=Felton |first=Mark |editor-last1=Carmichael |editor-first1=Cathie |editor-last2=Maguire |editor-first2=Richard C. |title=The Routledge History of Genocide |chapter=The Perfect Storm: Japanese military brutality during World War Two |year=2019 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0367867065 |page=114}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Tai |first=Michael |title=China and Her Neighbours: Asian Diplomacy from Ancient History to the Present |year=2019 |publisher=Zed |isbn=978-1-786997-79-1 |page=28}}</ref>

As the tide of war began to turn against Japan (around late 1942 and early 1943), the flow of information to the palace gradually began to bear less and less relation to reality, while others suggest that Hirohito worked closely with Prime Minister [[Hideki Tojo]], continued to be well and accurately briefed by the military, and knew Japan's military position precisely right up to the point of surrender. The chief of staff of the General Affairs section of the Prime Minister's office, Shuichi Inada, remarked to Tōjō's private secretary, Sadao Akamatsu:
{{blockquote|There has never been a cabinet in which the prime minister, and all the ministers, reported so often to the throne. In order to effect the essence of genuine direct imperial rule and to relieve the concerns of the Emperor, the ministers reported to the throne matters within the scope of their responsibilities as per the prime minister's directives&nbsp;... In times of intense activities, typed drafts were presented to the Emperor with corrections in red. First draft, second draft, final draft and so forth, came as deliberations progressed one after the other and were sanctioned accordingly by the Emperor.<ref>Akamatsu's diary, in {{harvnb|Wetzler|1998|p=50}}.</ref>}}

[[File:Showa-family1941 12 7.jpg|left|thumb|upright=1.2|Emperor Hirohito with his wife [[Empress Kōjun]] and their children on 7 December 1941]]
In the first six months of war, all the major engagements had been victories. Japanese advances were stopped in the summer of 1942 with the [[Battle of Midway]] and the landing of the American forces on [[Guadalcanal]] and [[Tulagi]] in August. Hirohito played an increasingly influential role in the war; in eleven major episodes he was deeply involved in supervising the actual conduct of war operations. Hirohito pressured the High Command to order an early attack on the Philippines in 1941–42, including the fortified Bataan peninsula. He secured the deployment of army air power in the [[Guadalcanal campaign]]. Following Japan's withdrawal from Guadalcanal he demanded a new offensive in [[New Guinea]], which was duly carried out but failed badly. Unhappy with the navy's conduct of the war, he criticized its withdrawal from the central [[Solomon Islands (archipelago)|Solomon Islands]] and demanded naval battles against the Americans for the losses they had inflicted in the Aleutians. The battles were disasters. Finally, it was at his insistence that plans were drafted for the recapture of [[Saipan]] and, later, for an offensive in the [[Battle of Okinawa]].<ref>Herbert Bix, "Emperor Hirohito's war," ''History Today,'' (Dec 1991), 41#12</ref>  With the Army and Navy bitterly feuding, he settled disputes over the allocation of resources. He helped plan military offenses.<ref>Herbert P. Bix "Japan's Delayed Surrender: a Reinterpretation." ''Diplomatic History'' 1995 19(2): 197–225. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/24912294 online].</ref>

In September 1944, Hirohito declared that it must be his citizens' resolve to smash the evil purposes of the Westerners so that their imperial destiny might continue, but all along, it is just a mask for the urgent need of Japan to scratch a victory against the counter-offensive campaign of the Allied Forces.{{sfn|Bix|2016|pp=480-481}}

On 18 October 1944, the Imperial headquarters had resolved that the Japanese must make a stand in the vicinity of Leyte to prevent the Americans from landing in the Philippines. This view was widely frowned upon and disgruntled the policymakers from both the army and navy sectors. Hirohito was quoted that he approved of such since if they won in that campaign, they would be finally having a room to negotiate with the Americans. As high as their spirits could go, the reality check for the Japanese would also come into play since the forces they have sent in Leyte, was practically the ones that would efficiently defend the island of Luzon, hence the Japanese had struck a huge blow in their own military planning.{{sfn|Bix|2016|p=481}}

The media, under tight government control, repeatedly portrayed him as lifting the popular morale even as the Japanese cities came under heavy air attack in 1944–45 and food and housing shortages mounted.  Japanese retreats and defeats were celebrated by the media as successes that portended "Certain Victory."<ref>David C. Earhart, ''Certain Victory: Images of World War II in the Japanese Media'' (2015).</ref> Only gradually did it become apparent to the Japanese people that the situation was very grim owing to growing shortages of food, medicine, and fuel as U.S. submarines began wiping out Japanese shipping. Starting in mid 1944, American raids on the major cities of Japan made a mockery of the unending tales of victory. Later that year, with the downfall of Tojo's government, two other prime ministers were appointed to continue the war effort, [[Kuniaki Koiso]] and [[Kantarō Suzuki]]—each with the formal approval of Hirohito. Both were unsuccessful and Japan was nearing disaster.<ref>{{cite book |author=Robert A. Pape |title=Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=T_6tDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA118 |year=2014 |pages=117–118 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=9780801471513}}</ref>

==== Surrender ====
{{Main|Surrender of Japan}}
{{more citations needed|section|date=December 2017}}<!--3 paragraphs have no citations.-->
[[File:Emperor Hirohito of Japan or the Shōwa Emperor on the ship Musashi 1943-06-24, from- 島村信政5 (cropped).jpg|thumb|upright|Emperor Hirohito on the battleship ''Musashi'', 24 June 1943]]
In early 1945, in the wake of the losses in the [[Battle of Leyte]], Emperor Hirohito began a series of individual meetings with senior government officials to consider the progress of the war. All but ex-Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe advised continuing the war. Konoe feared a communist revolution even more than defeat in war and urged a negotiated surrender. In February 1945, during the first private audience with Hirohito he had been allowed in three years,<ref>Bix, p. 756.</ref>{{incomplete short citation|date=October 2023}} Konoe advised Hirohito to begin negotiations to end the war. According to Grand Chamberlain [[Hisanori Fujita]], Hirohito, still looking for a ''tennozan'' (a great victory) in order to provide a stronger bargaining position, firmly rejected Konoe's recommendation.<ref>Fujita Hisanori, ''Jijûchô no kaisô'', Chûô Kôronsha, 1987, pp. 66–67, Bix, p. 489.</ref>{{incomplete short citation|date=October 2023}}

With each passing week victory became less likely. In April, the Soviet Union issued notice that it would not renew its neutrality agreement. Japan's ally Germany surrendered in early May 1945. In June, the cabinet reassessed the war strategy, only to decide more firmly than ever on a fight to the last man. This strategy was officially affirmed at a brief Imperial Council meeting, at which, as was normal, Hirohito did not speak.

The following day, [[Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal of Japan|Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal]] [[Kōichi Kido]] prepared a draft document which summarized the hopeless military situation and proposed a negotiated settlement. Extremists in Japan were also calling for a death-before-dishonor mass suicide, modeled on the "[[Forty-seven rōnin|47 Ronin]]" incident. By mid-June 1945, the cabinet had agreed to approach the Soviet Union to act as a mediator for a negotiated surrender but not before Japan's bargaining position had been improved by repulse of the anticipated Allied invasion of mainland Japan.

On 22 June, Hirohito met with his ministers saying, "I desire that concrete plans to end the war, unhampered by existing policy, be speedily studied and that efforts be made to implement them." The attempt to negotiate a peace via the Soviet Union came to nothing. There was always the threat that extremists would carry out a coup or foment other violence. On 26 July 1945, the Allies issued the [[Potsdam Declaration]] demanding [[unconditional surrender]]. The Japanese government council, the Big Six, considered that option and recommended to Hirohito that it be accepted only if one to four conditions were agreed upon, including a guarantee of Hirohito's continued position in [[Culture of Japan|Japanese society]].

That changed after the [[atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki]] and the Soviet declaration of war. On 9 August, Emperor Hirohito told [[Kōichi Kido]]: "The Soviet Union has declared war and today began hostilities against us."<ref>Kido Kōichi Nikki, p. 1223.</ref> On 10 August, the cabinet drafted an "[[Imperial Rescript ending the War]]" following Hirohito's indications that the declaration did not comprise any demand which prejudiced his prerogatives as a sovereign ruler.

On 12 August 1945, Hirohito informed the imperial family of his decision to surrender. One of his uncles, [[Prince Yasuhiko Asaka]], asked whether the war would be continued if the ''[[kokutai]]'' (national polity) could not be preserved. Hirohito simply replied "Of course."{{sfn|Hidenari|1991|p=129}} On 14 August, Hirohito made the decision to surrender "unconditionally"<ref>{{Cite book |last=Wells |first=H. G. |title=The Outline of History: Being a Plain History of Life and Mankind |publisher=[[Doubleday (publisher)|Doubleday]] |year=1971 |editor-last=Wells |editor-first=G. P. |editor-link=G. P. Wells |volume=2 |location=New York |pages=991 |author-link=H. G. Wells |editor-last2=Postgate |editor-first2=Raymond |editor-link2=Raymond Postgate}}</ref> and the Suzuki government notified the Allies that it had accepted the [[Potsdam Declaration]].

On 15 August, a recording of [[Hirohito surrender broadcast|Hirohito's surrender speech]] was broadcast over the radio (the first time Hirohito was heard on the radio by the Japanese people) announcing Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. During the historic broadcast Hirohito stated: "Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization." The speech also noted that "the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage" and ordered the Japanese to "endure the unendurable." The speech, using formal, archaic Japanese, was not readily understood by many commoners. According to historian [[Richard Storry]] in ''A History of Modern Japan'', Hirohito typically used "a form of language familiar only to the well-educated" and to the more traditional [[samurai]] families.<ref>{{cite book |author1-link=Richard Storry |first=Richard |last=Storry |title=A History of Modern Japan |year=1991 |publisher=Penguin}}</ref>

A faction of the army opposed to the surrender attempted a [[coup d'état]] on the evening of 14 August, prior to the broadcast. They seized the Imperial Palace (the [[Kyūjō incident]]), but the physical recording of Hirohito's speech was hidden and preserved overnight. The coup failed, and the speech was broadcast the next morning.<ref name=Rescript>{{cite web |url=http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/August%202012/0812keeper.aspx |title=Hirohito's "Jewel Voice Broadcast" |publisher=The Air Force Association |date=August 2012 |access-date=14 August 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130910212019/http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/August%202012/0812keeper.aspx |archive-date=10 September 2013}}</ref>

In his first ever press conference given in Tokyo in 1975, when he was asked what he thought of the bombing of Hiroshima, Hirohito answered: "It's very regrettable that nuclear bombs were dropped and I feel sorry for the citizens of Hiroshima but it couldn't be helped because that happened in wartime" (''[[shikata ga nai]]'', meaning "it cannot be helped").<ref>Bix, p. 676</ref>{{incomplete short citation|date=October 2023}}{{sfn|Dower|1999|p=606}}