Editing Heuristic (section)

==History==
{{Main|Analysis}}
{{Broader|Dialectic}}
[[George Polya]] studied and published on heuristics in 1945.<ref name=origin01>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Romanycia
	| first1 = M.
	| last2 = Pelletier
	| first2 = F.
	| date = 1985
	| title = What is a heuristic?
	| url = https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8640.1985.tb00058.x
	| journal = Computational Intelligence
	| volume = 1
	| issue = 1
	| pages = 47–58
	| doi = 10.1111/j.1467-8640.1985.tb00058.x
	| access-date = 7 May 2024
    | quote = Minsky's (1961 b) subject bibliography lists Polya (1945) as the earliest reference to heuristic in the AI literature.}}</ref> Polya (1945) cites [[Pappus of Alexandria]] as having written a [[Text (literary theory)|text]] that Polya dubs ''Heuristic''.<ref>{{cite book
	| last = Polya
	| first = George
	| author-link = George Pólya
	| year = 1945
	| title = How to Solve It
	| url = https://math.hawaii.edu/home/pdf/putnam/PolyaHowToSolveIt.pdf
	| location = Princeton, NJ
	| publisher = Princeton University Press
	| pages = 141
	| isbn = 978-0-691-16407-6
    | access-date = 10 May 2024}}</ref> Pappus' heuristic problem-solving methods consist of [[analysis]] and [[wikt:synthesis#Noun|synthesis]].<ref>{{cite book
    | last1= Groner
    | first1= Rudolf
    | last2= Groner
    | first2= Marina
    | last3= Bischof
    | first3= Walter
	| date = 2014
	| title = Methods of heuristics
	| url = https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=76a213b007a1c8072760b59b58df40729fa1f3c1
	| publisher = Routledge
	| page = <!-- or pages: -->
	| isbn = 
    | quote = The methods of analysis and synthesis appear later in almost every treatise on problem-solving methods [from Pappus].}}</ref>

===Notable===
{{Incomplete list|date=May 2024}}

====Figures====
* [[George Polya]]<ref name=chow>{{cite journal
| last1 = Chow
| first1 = Sheldon
| date = 2015
| title = Many Meanings of 'Heuristic'
| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/24562967
| journal = The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
| volume = 66
| issue = 4
| pages = 977–1016
| doi = 10.1093/bjps/axu028
| jstor = 24562967
| access-date = 5 May 2024
|quote=[I]nfluential heuristics researchers, including George Polya, Herbert Simon, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, and Gerd Gigerenzer.}}</ref><ref name=Barnabas2>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Hughes
	| first1 = Barnabas
	| date = 1974
	| title = Heuristic Teaching in Mathematics
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/3482053
	| journal = Educational Studies in Mathematics
	| volume = 5
	| issue = 3
	| pages = 291–99
	| doi = 10.1007/BF00684704
	| jstor = 3482053
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote = The most important work in heuristic teaching has been done by George Polya. His ''How To Solve It'' has been a best seller since its first printing in 1945-copies sold number in the hundreds of thousands. Complementary to ''How To Solve It'' are two other works, each in two volumes: ''Mathematical Discovery'' and ''Mathematics And Plausible Reasoning''.}}</ref><ref name=origin01/>
* [[Herbert A. Simon]]<ref name=chow/>
* [[Daniel Kahneman]]<ref name=chow/>
* [[Amos Tversky]]<ref name=chow/><ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Hey
	| first1 = Spencer
	| date = 2016
	| title = Heuristics and Meta-Heuristics in Scientific Judgement
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/43946078
	| journal = The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
	| volume = 67
	| issue = 2
	| pages = 471–95
	| doi = 10.1093/bjps/axu045
	| jstor = 43946078
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
| quote = It is difficult to overstate the influence of Tversky and Kahneman's work and the so-called 'heuristics-and-biases research programme' that followed.}}</ref>
* [[Gerd Gigerenzer]]<ref name=chow/>
* [[Judea Pearl]]<ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Chow
| first1 = Sheldon
| date = 2015
| title = Many Meanings of 'Heuristic'
| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/24562967
| journal = The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
| volume = 66
| issue = 4
| pages = 977–1016
| doi = 10.1093/bjps/axu028
| jstor = 24562967
| access-date = 5 May 2024
|quote='To choose a ripe cantaloupe, press the spot on the candidate cantaloupe where it was attached to the plant and smell it; if the spot smells like the inside of a cantaloupe, it's probably ripe' (Pearl [1984])}}</ref>
* [[Robin Dunbar]]<ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Chow
| first1 = Sheldon
| date = 2015
| title = Many Meanings of 'Heuristic'
| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/24562967
| journal = The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
| volume = 66
| issue = 4
| pages = 977–1016
| doi = 10.1093/bjps/axu028
| jstor = 24562967
| access-date = 5 May 2024
|quote='Start in the centre square when beginning a game of tic-tac-toe' (Dunbar [1998])}}</ref>
* [[David Perkins Page]]<ref name=Barn>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Hughes
	| first1 = Barnabas
	| date = 1974
	| title = Heuristic Teaching in Mathematics
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/3482053
	| journal = Educational Studies in Mathematics
	| volume = 5
	| issue = 3
	| pages = 291–99
	| doi = 10.1007/BF00684704
	| jstor = 3482053
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
| quote = Mauritz Johnson (1966) observes that the idea is hardly new, and that, ignoring the classical accreditation of its use to Socrates in the ''Meno'', one finds an early discussion of discovery learning by David P. Page in his ''Theory and Practice of Teaching'' in 1847 as well as by later writers, Herbert Spencer in 1860, Frank and Charles McMurry in 1897, and William Chandler Babley in 1905.}}</ref>
* [[Herbert Spencer]]<ref name=Barn/>
* [[Charles Alexander McMurry]]<ref name=Barn/>
* [[Frank Morton McMurry]]<ref name=Barn/>
* [[Lawrence Zalcman]]<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Zalcman
	| first1 = Lawrence
	| date = 1975
	| title = A Heuristic Principle in Complex Function Theory
	| url = https://doi.org/10.2307/2319796
	| journal = The American Mathematical Monthly
	| volume = 82
	| issue = 8
	| pages = 813–18
	| doi = 10.2307/2319796
	| jstor = 2319796
	| access-date = 5 May 2024}}</ref>
* [[Imre Lakatos]]<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Hey
	| first1 = Spencer
	| date = 2016
	| title = Heuristics and Meta-Heuristics in Scientific Judgement
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/43946078
	| journal = The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
	| volume = 67
	| issue = 2
	| pages = 471–95
	| doi = 10.1093/bjps/axu045
	| jstor = 43946078
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote = Lakatos ([1965]) also adopted the term to characterize his methodology of scientific research programmes, which would lead researchers to either avoid or pursue certain lines of inquiry 'negative' and 'positive' heuristics, respectively).}}</ref>
* [[William C. Wimsatt]]<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Hey
	| first1 = Spencer
	| date = 2016
	| title = Heuristics and Meta-Heuristics in Scientific Judgement
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/43946078
	| journal = The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
	| volume = 67
	| issue = 2
	| pages = 471–95
	| doi = 10.1093/bjps/axu045
	| jstor = 43946078
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote = Wimsatt's ([1980], [1981], [2006], [2007]) work on reductionist modelling strategies - also built upon Simon's programme of bounded rationality - provides an alternative starting point that is more useful for understanding the role that heuristics play in science.}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Schaffner
	| first1 = Kenneth 
	| date = 2008
	| title = Theories, Models, and Equations in Biology: The Heuristic Search for Emergent Simplifications in Neurobiology
	| url = https://doi.org/10.1086/594542
	| journal = Philosophy of Science
	| volume = 75
	| issue = 5
	| pages = 1008–21
	| doi = 10.1086/594542
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
| quote = In a series of papers beginning in 1980 and represented in his 2007 book, Bill Wimsatt analyzed a series of 'heuristics,' thought of as guides or 'rules of thumb,' which are employed when scientists proceed in a reductionist manner (1980, 2007).}}</ref>
*[[Alan Hodgkin]]<ref name=ken1>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Schaffner
	| first1 = Kenneth 
	| date = 2008
	| title = Theories, Models, and Equations in Biology: The Heuristic Search for Emergent Simplifications in Neurobiology
	| url = https://doi.org/10.1086/594542
	| journal = Philosophy of Science
	| volume = 75
	| issue = 5
	| pages = 1008–21
	| doi = 10.1086/594542
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
| quote = In summary, Hodgkin and Huxley use heuristics in the Wimsatt sense, and the heuristics fall both into what Wimsatt calls reductionistic heuristics and also nonreductionistic heuristics.}}</ref>
* [[Andrew Huxley]]<ref name=ken1/>

====Works====
* ''[[Meno]]''<ref name=Barn/>
* ''[[How to solve it]]''<ref name=Barnabas2/>
* ''[[Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning]]''<ref name=Barnabas2/>

===Contemporary===
The study of heuristics in human [[decision-making]] was developed in the 1970s and the 1980s, by the psychologists [[Amos Tversky]] and [[Daniel Kahneman]],<ref name=Kahneman>{{cite book|editor1-last=Kahneman|editor1-first=Daniel|author1-link=Daniel Kahneman|editor2-last=Slovic|editor2-first=Paul|author2-link=Paul Slovic|editor3-last=Tversky|editor3-first=Amos|author3-link=Amos Tversky|date=30 April 1982|title=Judgment Under Uncertainty|location=Cambridge, UK|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|doi=10.1017/cbo9780511809477|isbn=978-0-52128-414-1}}</ref> although the concept had been originally introduced by the [[list of Nobel laureates|Nobel laureate]] [[Herbert A. Simon]]. Simon's original primary object of research was problem solving that showed that we operate within what he calls ''[[bounded rationality]]''. He coined the term ''[[satisficing]]'', which denotes a situation in which people seek solutions, or accept choices or judgements, that are "good enough" for their purposes although they could be optimised.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://www.interaction-design.org/encyclopedia/heuristics_and_heuristic_evaluation.html|title=The Glossary of Human Computer Interaction |chapter= Heuristics and heuristic evaluation|access-date=1 September 2013|archive-date=5 July 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150705023836/https://www.interaction-design.org/encyclopedia/heuristics_and_heuristic_evaluation.html|url-status=live|publisher=Interaction Design Foundation}}</ref>

[[Rudolf Groner]] analysed the history of heuristics from its roots in ancient Greece up to contemporary work in [[cognitive psychology]] and [[artificial intelligence]],<ref>{{cite book|last1=Groner|first1=Rudolf|author1-link=Rudolf Groner|last2=Groner|first2=Marina|last3= Bischof|first3=Walter F.|year=1983|title=Methods of Heuristics|location=Hillsdale, NJ|publisher=[[Lawrence Erlbaum]]}}</ref> proposing a cognitive style "heuristic versus algorithmic thinking", which can be assessed by means of a validated [[questionnaire]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Groner|first1=Rudolf|last2=Groner|first2=Marina|year=1991|chapter=Heuristische versus algorithmische Orientierung als Dimension des individuellen kognitiven Stils|trans-chapter=Heuristic versus algorithmic orientation as a dimension of the individual cognitive style|title=Über die richtige Art, Psychologie zu betreiben|language=de|trans-title=About the right way to do psychology|editor1=K. Grawe|editor2=N. Semmer|editor3=R. Hänni|location=Göttingen|publisher=[[Hogrefe Publishing Group|Hogrefe]]|isbn=978-3-80170-415-5}}</ref>

===Adaptive toolbox===

The ''adaptive toolbox'' contains strategies for fabricating heuristic devices.<ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = G.
| last2 = Gaissmaier
| first2 = W.
| date = 2011
| title = Heuristic Decision Making
| url = https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2099042_4/component/file_2099041/content
| journal = Annual Review of Psychology
| volume = 62
| issue = 
| pages = 451–482
| doi = 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
| pmid = 21126183
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote = The collection of heuristics and building blocks an individual or a species has at its disposal for constructing heuristics, together with the core mental capacities that building blocks exploit, has been called the adaptive toolbox (Gigerenzer et al. 1999).| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F16D-5
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref> The core mental capacities are [[recall (memory)]], [[frequency]], [[object permanence]], and [[imitation]].<ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = G.
| last2 = Gaissmaier
| first2 = W.
| date = 2011
| title = Heuristic Decision Making
| url = https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2099042_4/component/file_2099041/content
| journal = Annual Review of Psychology
| volume = 62
| issue = 
| pages = 451–482
| doi = 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
| pmid = 21126183
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote =Core capacities include recognition memory, frequency monitoring, object tracking, and the ability to imitate.| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F16D-5
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref> [[Gerd Gigerenzer]] and his research group argued that models of heuristics need to be formal to allow for predictions of behavior that can be tested.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Gigerenzer|first1=Gerd|author-link=Gerd Gigerenzer|last2=Todd|first2=Peter M.|author2-link=Peter Todd|last3=and the ABC Research Group|year=1999|title=Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart|location=Oxford, UK|publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]|isbn=978-0-19512-156-8}}</ref> They study the fast and frugal heuristics in the "adaptive toolbox" of individuals or institutions, and the [[ecological rationality]] of these heuristics; that is, the conditions under which a given heuristic is likely to be successful.<ref>{{cite book|editor-last1=Gigerenzer|editor-first1=Gerd|editor-last2=Selten|editor-first2=Reinhard|author2-link=Reinhard Selten|year=2002|title=Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox|location=Cambridge, MA|publisher=[[MIT Press]]|isbn=978-0-26257-164-7}}</ref> The descriptive study of the "adaptive toolbox" is done by observation and experiment, while the prescriptive study of [[ecological rationality]] requires mathematical analysis and computer simulation. Heuristics – such as the [[recognition heuristic]], the [[take-the-best heuristic]] and [[fast-and-frugal trees]] – have been shown to be effective in predictions, particularly in situations of uncertainty. It is often said that heuristics trade accuracy for effort but this is only the case in situations of risk. Risk refers to situations where all possible actions, their outcomes and probabilities are known. In the absence of this information, that is under uncertainty, heuristics can achieve higher accuracy with lower effort.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Gigerenzer|first1=Gerd|last2=Hertwig|first2=Ralph|last3=Pachur|first3=Thorsten|date=15 April 2011|title=Heuristics: The Foundations of Adaptive Behavior|publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744282.001.0001|isbn=978-0-19989-472-7|hdl=11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F172-8}}</ref> This finding, known as a [[Less-is-better effect|less-is-more effect]], would not have been found without formal models. The valuable insight of this program is that heuristics are effective not despite their simplicity – but because of it. Furthermore, [[Gerd Gigerenzer|Gigerenzer]] and Wolfgang Gaissmaier found that both individuals and organisations rely on heuristics in an adaptive way.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Gigerenzer|first1=Gerd|last2=Gaissmaier|first2=Wolfgang|title=Heuristic Decision Making|date=January 2011|journal=[[Annual Review of Psychology]]|volume=62|ssrn=1722019|doi=10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346|pmid=21126183|hdl=11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F16D-5|hdl-access=free|pages=451–482}}</ref>

===Cognitive-experiential self-theory===
Heuristics, through greater refinement and research, have begun to be applied to other theories, or be explained by them. For example, the [[cognitive-experiential self-theory]] (CEST) is also an adaptive view of heuristic processing. CEST breaks down two systems that process information. At some times, roughly speaking, individuals consider issues rationally, systematically, logically, deliberately, effortfully, and verbally. On other occasions, individuals consider issues intuitively, effortlessly, globally, and emotionally.<ref>{{cite journal|last=De Neys|first=Wim|date=18 October 2008|title=Cognitive experiential self theory|journal=Perspectives on Psychological Science|volume=7|issue=1|url=http://www.psych-it.com.au/Psychlopedia/article.asp?id=53|doi=10.1177/1745691611429354|pmid=26168420|s2cid=32261626|pages=28–38|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130731094145/http://www.psych-it.com.au/Psychlopedia/article.asp?id=53|archive-date=31 July 2013}}</ref> From this perspective, heuristics are part of a larger experiential processing system that is often adaptive, but vulnerable to error in situations that require logical analysis.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Epstein|first1=S.|last2=Pacini|first2=R.|last3=Denes-Raj|first3=V.|last4=Heier|first4=H.|year=1996|title=Individual differences in intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking styles|journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology|volume=71|issue=2|doi=10.1037/0022-3514.71.2.390|pmid=8765488|pages=390–405}}</ref>

===Attribute substitution===
In 2002, [[Daniel Kahneman]] and [[Shane Frederick]] proposed that cognitive heuristics work by a process called ''[[attribute substitution]]'', which happens without conscious awareness.<ref name=revisited>{{cite book|last1=Kahneman|first1=Daniel|last2=Frederick|first2=Shane|year=2002|chapter=Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment|title=Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment|editor1=Thomas Gilovich|editor2=Dale Griffin|editor3=Daniel Kahneman|location=Cambridge, UK|publisher=Cambridge University Press|url=https://archive.org/details/heuristicsbiases00gilo|url-access=limited|oclc=47364085|isbn=978-0-52179-679-8|pages=[https://archive.org/details/heuristicsbiases00gilo/page/n60 49]–81}}</ref> According to this theory, when somebody makes a judgement (of a "target attribute") that is computationally complex, a more easily calculated "heuristic attribute" is substituted. In effect, a cognitively difficult problem is dealt with by answering a rather simpler problem, without being aware of this happening.<ref name=revisited/> This theory explains cases where judgements fail to show [[regression toward the mean]].<ref>{{cite journal|last=Kahneman|first=Daniel|date=December 2003|title=Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics|journal=American Economic Review|volume=93|issue=5|url=http://www.econ.tuwien.ac.at/Lotto/papers/Kahneman2.pdf|citeseerx=10.1.1.194.6554|doi=10.1257/000282803322655392|issn=0002-8282|pages=1449–1475|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180219074537/http://www.econ.tuwien.ac.at/lotto/papers/Kahneman2.pdf|archive-date=19 February 2018}}</ref> Heuristics can be considered to reduce the complexity of clinical judgments in health care.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Cioffi|first=Jane|year=1997|title=Heuristics, servants to intuition, in clinical decision making|journal=[[Journal of Advanced Nursing]]|volume=26|issue=1|doi=10.1046/j.1365-2648.1997.1997026203.x|pmid=9231296|pages=203–208}}</ref>