Editing George C. Marshall (section)

==Secretary of Defense==
[[File:Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall at The Pentagon.jpg|left|thumb|upright|Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall in his office at the Pentagon]]
When the early months of the [[Korean War]] showed how poorly prepared the Defense Department was, President Truman fired Secretary [[Louis A. Johnson]] and named Marshall as [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] in September 1950.{{sfn|Historical Office}} The appointment required a congressional waiver because the [[National Security Act of 1947]] prohibited a uniformed military officer from serving in the post. This prohibition included Marshall since individuals promoted to General of the Army are not technically retired but remain officially on active duty.{{sfn|Five-Star Generals in U.S.|2016}} Marshall was the first person to be granted such a waiver; in 2017, [[Jim Mattis]] became the second and in January 2021, General [[Lloyd Austin]] became the third.{{sfn|Marshall Mattis|2017}} Marshall's main role as Secretary of Defense was to restore confidence and morale to the Defense Department while rebuilding the [[United States Armed Forces]] following their [[Demobilization of United States armed forces after World War II|post-World War II demobilization]].

===Korean War===
[[File:L to R, President Truman, George Marshall, Paul Hoffman, and Averell Harriman, in the oval office discussing the... - NARA - 200036.tif|thumb|Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall discussing the Korean War with President Truman and Special Assistant to the President Averell Harriman in the Oval Office]]
Marshall worked to provide more manpower to meet the demands of both the [[Korean War]] and the [[Cold War]] in Europe. To implement his priorities Marshall brought in a new leadership team, including [[Robert A. Lovett]] as his deputy and [[Anna M. Rosenberg]], former head of the [[War Manpower Commission]], as assistant secretary of defense for manpower. He also worked to rebuild the relationship between the Defense and State Departments, as well as the relationship between the secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Marshall participated in the post-[[Battle of Inchon|Inchon landing]] discussion that led to authorizing [[Douglas MacArthur]] to conduct the [[UN offensive into North Korea]]. A secret "eyes only" signal from Marshall to MacArthur on 29 September 1950, declared the Truman administration's commitment: "We want you to feel unhampered strategically and tactically to proceed north of the [[38th parallel north|38th Parallel]]".{{sfn|A. Lewis|2012|p=104}} At the same time, Marshall advised against public pronouncements which might lead to [[United Nations]] votes undermining or countermanding the initial mandate to restore the [[Korean Demilitarized Zone|border between North and South Korea]]. Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were generally supportive of MacArthur because they were of the view that field commanders should be able to exercise their best judgment in accomplishing the intent of their superiors.{{fact|date=February 2025}}

Following Chinese military intervention in Korea during late November, Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought ways to aid MacArthur while avoiding all-out war with China. In the debate over what to do about China's increased involvement, Marshall opposed a cease-fire on the grounds that it would make the U.S. look weak in China's eyes, leading to demands for future concessions.{{sfn|Foreign Relations of United}} In addition, Marshall argued that the U.S. had a moral obligation to honor its commitment to South Korea. When British Prime Minister [[Clement Attlee]] suggested diplomatic overtures to China, Marshall opposed, arguing that it was impossible to negotiate with the Communist government. In addition, Marshall expressed concern that concessions to China would undermine confidence in the U.S. among its Asian allies, including Japan and the Philippines. When some in Congress favored expanding the war in Korea and confronting China, Marshall argued against a wider war in Korea, continuing instead to stress the importance of [[Containment|containing]] the [[Soviet Union]] during the Cold War battle for primacy in Europe.{{fact|date=February 2025}}

====Relief of General MacArthur====
{{main|Relief of Douglas MacArthur}}
Increasingly concerned about public statements from MacArthur, commander of [[United Nations Command]] forces fighting in the Korean War, which contradicted President Truman's on prosecution of the war, on the morning of 6 April 1951, Truman held a meeting with Marshall, [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]] Omar Bradley, Secretary of State Dean Acheson and advisor [[W. Averell Harriman]] to discuss whether MacArthur should be removed from command.{{sfn|McCullough|1992b}}

Harriman was emphatically in favor of MacArthur's relief, but Bradley opposed it.{{sfn|McCullough|1992b}} Marshall asked for more time to consider the matter.{{sfn|McCullough|1992b}} Acheson was in favor but did not disclose this, instead warning Truman that if he did it, MacArthur's relief would cause "the biggest fight of your administration."{{sfn|Beisner|2009|p=429}} At another meeting the following day, Marshall and Bradley continued to oppose MacArthur's relief.{{sfn|McCullough|1992b}} On 8 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with Marshall, and each expressed the view that MacArthur's relief was desirable from a "military point of view," suggesting that "if MacArthur were not relieved, a large segment of our people would charge that civil authorities no longer controlled the military."{{sfn|Cleaver|2019|pp=179}}

Marshall, Bradley, Acheson, and Harriman met with Truman again on 9 April.{{sfn|McCullough|1992b}} Bradley informed the President of the views of the Joint Chiefs, and Marshall added that he agreed with them.{{sfn|McCullough|1992b}} Truman wrote in his diary that "it is of unanimous opinion of all that MacArthur be relieved. All four so advise."{{sfn|Diary entries 6 7}} (The Joint Chiefs would later insist that they had only "concurred" with the relief, not "recommended" it.){{sfn|Pearlman|2008|p=214}}

On 11 April 1951, Truman directed transmittal of an order to MacArthur, issued over Bradley's signature, relieving MacArthur of his assignment in Korea and directing him to turn over command to [[Matthew Ridgway]].{{sfn|Willbanks|2013|p=99}} In line with Marshall's view, and those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MacArthur's relief was looked upon by proponents as being necessary to reassert the tenet of [[civilian control of the military]].{{sfn|McCullough|1992b}}